Ex Parte Leppänen et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 9, 2017

13691201 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/691,201 11/30/2012 Kari Juhani T EPPANEN P5901US01 6772
11764 7590
Ditthavong & Steiner, P.C.
44 Canal Center Plaza
Suite 322
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
NEALON, WILLIAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2643
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/11/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@dcpatent.com
Nokia. IPR @ nokia. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KARIJUHANI, ARTO TAPIO PALIN,
TAPANI ANTERO LEPPANEN, TIMO TAPANI AALTONEN,
JARI ANTERO NIKARA, and KIMMO KALERVO KUUSILINNA
Appeal 2016-000730
Application 13/691,2011
Technology Center 2600
Before STEPHEN C. SIU, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
ALEX S. YAP, Administrative Patent Judges.
PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1—22, which constitute all of the claims pending in the
application. Claims 23—52 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Nokia Corporation of
Espoo, Finland. App. Br. 1.
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Application 13/691,201
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants describe the disclosed and claimed invention as follows:
Methods and apparatuses are provided for enabling a
communication intended for a device to be automatically
conveyed to a group of other devices within proximity of the
device. A method may include determining at least one
communication directed to at least one device and one or more
other devices within a proximity of the at least one device. The
method also comprises causing a conveying of the at least one
communication to at least one of the one or more other devices
based, at least in part, on a determination of a request to receive
the at least one communication by the at least one of the one or
more other devices.
Abstract.2
Claims 1 and 4 are representative and reproduced below (with the
disputed limitations emphasized)'.
1. A method of comprising facilitating a processing of and/or
processing (1) data and/or (2) information and/or (3) at least one
signal, the (1) data and/or (2) information and/or (3) at least one
signal based, at least in part, on the following:
at least one communication associated with at least one
device;
at least one determination of one or more other devices
within a proximity of the at least one device;
a transmission of at least one notification of the at least one
communication to the one or more other devices; and
2 Our Decision refers to the Final Action mailed Nov. 13, 2014 (“Final
Act.”); Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed Apr. 2, 2015 (“App. Br.”); the
Examiner’s Answer mailed Aug. 27, 2015 (“Ans.”); Appellants’ Reply Brief
filed Oct. 22, 2015 (“Reply Br.”); and the original Specification filed Nov.
30, 2012 (“Spec.”).
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Application 13/691,201
a relaying, a forwarding, or a combination thereof of the
at least one communication from the at least one device to at least
one of the one or more other devices based, at least in part, on a
determination of a request to receive the at least one
communication by the at least one of the one or more other
devices.
4. A method of claim 3, wherein the additional information
includes at least in part, an originator of the at least one
communication, metadata associated with the at least one
communication, access to the communication, or a combination
thereof
App. Br. 17—18 (Claims App’x).
Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1—5, 9, 10, 12—16, 20, and 21 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Seligmann et al. (US
2004/0185839 Al; published Sept. 23, 2004) (“Seligmann”).
Claims 7, 8, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Seligmann.
Claims 6 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Seligmann and Bentley et al. (US
2009/0037985 Al; Feb. 5, 2009) (“Bentley”).
Claims 11 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Seligmann and Stanforth et al. (US
2003/0040316 Al; published Feb. 27, 2003).
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments in the Briefs and are not persuaded the Examiner has erred.
Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt as our own the findings and reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the Office Action from which this appeal is taken
(Final Act. 2—9) and in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 2—15), and we concur
with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. For emphasis, we consider
and highlight specific arguments as presented in the Briefs.
Rejection of Claim l3 under § 102(b)
Appellants contend Seligmann does not disclose, expressly or
inherently, forwarding at least one communication from one device to at
least one or more other devices “based, at least in part, on a determination of
a request to receive the at least one communication by the at least one of the
one or more other devices,” as recited in claim 1, and as similarly recited in
claim 12. App. Br. 6—13; Reply Br. 2-4. In particular, Appellants argue the
Examiner is relying on the definition in paragraph 17 of Seligmann for the
term “forwarding in,” but the Examiner “does not describe any basis why or
how a forwarding request originating at a second terminal would be sent to a
first terminal. In other words, there is no express description of ‘a
determination of a request to receive the at least one communication ....’”
App. Br. 10-11. Appellants also argue that, although the definition for
“forwarding out” is used throughout Seligmann, the description of
“forwarding in” in paragraph 17 “stands alone and is unrelated to any other
3 We decide the rejection of claims 1—3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, and 21,
which are rejected under the first-stated ground of rejection, on the basis of
representative claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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aspect of the processes described in SeligmannId. at 11. According to
Appellants, the Examiner cites paragraph 17, as well as other paragraphs, of
Seligmann, but “fails to establish how the cited portions provide any
description which may be fairly construed as disclosing” the disputed
limitation. Reply Br. 3^4.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has
erred. “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). Here, the Examiner finds, and we
agree, that paragraph 17 of Seligmann expressly discloses the disputed
limitation of claim 1 because it describes a “forwarding in” procedure in
which a call is forwarded from a first telecommunications terminal to a
second telecommunications terminal “as a result of a forwarding request
originating at the second telecommunications terminal.” Ans. 5—6 (citing
Seligmann 117). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the
Examiner “does not describe any basis why or how a forwarding request
originating at a second terminal would be sent to a first terminal” because, as
the Examiner finds, the language of claim 1 does not recite any reason
“why” (or method “how”) the forwarding request is sent by the second
device. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (“Appellant’s
arguments fail from the outset because . . . they are not based on limitations
appearing in the claims.”). We are also not persuaded by Appellants’
argument that the “forwarding in” procedure described in paragraph 17
“stands alone and is unrelated to any other aspect of the processes described
in Seligmann’'’ (see App. Br. 11) because the Examiner finds, and we agree,
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this procedure is referred to and described in several other portions of
Seligmann. See Ans. 5—7 (citing Seligmann || 18—20, 24, 38, 40, 48; Figs.
3, 4). Thus, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Seligmann
anticipates claim 1 under § 102(b) and, therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1. For the same reasons, we also sustain the rejection of
independent claim 12, and claims 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 20, and 21, which
depend variously from claims 1 and 12 and are not separately argued.
Rejection of Claim 44 under § 102(b)
Claim 4 depends from claim 3, which recites a generation of the
notification of claim 1 “to include a request for authentication information”
that is provided by one of the other devices “to cause, at least in part, an
initiation of (a) the relaying, the forwarding, or a combination thereof of the
at least one communication; (b) a presentation of additional information; or
(c) a combination thereof.” Claim 4 recites that the “additional information”
of claim 3 “includes at least in part, an originator of the at least one
communication, metadata associated with the at least one communication,
access to the communication, or a combination thereof.” Appellants contend
that paragraphs 40 and 48 of Seligmann, which are relied on by the
Examiner, fail to disclose providing the authentication information “‘to
cause ... (b) a presentation of additional information [as recited in claim
3]
4 We decide the rejection of claims 4 and 15, which are rejected under the
first-stated ground of rejection, on the basis of representative claim 4. See
37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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... wherein the additional information includes ... an originator of the
at least one communication, metadata associated with the at least one
communication, access to the communication, or a combination thereof
. . (emphasis added) as recited in claim 4.” App. Br. 13—15. In particular,
Appellants argue that, although paragraphs 40 and 48 mention a sender’s
contact identifier, this relates only to the contact identifier of the terminal
and “not to an identifier of an originator of the at least one
communication which is to be forwarded from the originating terminal 120-
i to terminal 120-j.” App. Br. 13—15. Appellants also argue “there is
absolutely no presentation of the additional information as recited in claim 4
incorporated from claim 3.” Id. at 14—15.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has
erred. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Seligmann discloses
providing authentication information to cause “a presentation of additional
information,” as recited in claim 3:
Seligmann teaches transmitting an authorization request
(query) [0038]. If the sender of the response allows terminal
120-i to forward to/from terminal 120-j via the specified
forwarding operation, the response contains an authorization flag
set to TRUE. [0040]
If the value of this flag is true, then (b) (further information
is presented) in that the response will additionally present the
sender’s contact identifier and location. [0040, 0048] AND (a)
the forwarding operation is carried out. [0026, 0040].
Ans. 10.
As indicated by the above findings, the Examiner also finds the
“additional information” includes the “sender’s contact identifier and
location,” as recited in claim 4. See id. (citing Seligmann 140 (“if the value
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of this flag is true, then the response also contains the sender’s contact
identifier and location”). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments
that the sender’s contact identifier mentioned in paragraph 40 is an identifier
of the terminal, rather than the originator of the communication, because it is
unsupported by any evidence or citation to the record. Mere attorney
arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual
evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Seligmann anticipates claim
4 under § 102(b) and, therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim
4, as well as the rejection of claim 15.
Rejection of Claims 6—8, 11, 17—19, and 22 under § 103(a)
In the second-stated ground of rejection above, the Examiner rejects
claims 7, 8, 18, and 19 under § 103(a) in view of Seligmann. In the third-
stated ground of rejection above, the Examiner rejects claims 6 and 17 under
§ 103(a) in view of Seligmann and Bentley. In the fourth-stated ground of
rejection above, the Examiner rejects claims 11 and 22 under § 103(a) in
view of Seligmann and Stanforth. Appellants do not separately argue the
rejection of any of these claims. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 6—8, 11, 17—19, and 22 under § 103(a).
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—5, 9, 10, 12—16,
20, and 21 under § 102(b).
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 6—8, 11, 17—19,
and 22 under § 103(a).
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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