Ex Parte Lenord et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 29, 2016

12760281 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 29, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
121760,281 04/14/2010
45113 7590 10/03/2016
Siemens Corporation
Intellectual Property Department
3501 Quadrangle Blvd Ste 230
Orlando, FL 32817
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Matthias Lenord
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2010P06271 US 8721
EXAMINER
GEBRESILASSIE, KIBROM K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2128
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/03/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
IPDadmin.us@siemens.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MATTHIAS LENORD, RAYMOND KOK, and
PETER HUTCHISON
Appeal2015-002117
Application 12/760,281
Technology Center 2100
Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, JOHN A. EV ANS, and
ALEX S. YAP, Administrative Patent Judges.
YAP, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
final rejection of claims 1-24. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Siemens Product
Lifecycle Management Software Inc. (App. Br. 4.)
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Application 12/760,281
STATEivIENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants' invention relates to "systems and methods for use in
computer-aided design, manufacturing, engineering, prototype/test,
maintenance, modeling, and visualization ... and in product lifecycle
management ... and other systems." (Spec. at i-f 3.) Claim 1 is illustrative
of Appellants' invention, and is reproduced below:
1. A method for creation of a mechatronics object,
compnsmg:
receiving requirements for a mechatronics object in a
data processing system;
receiving functions for the mechatronics object in the
data processing system;
assigning the functions to respective ones of components
and operations by the data processing system;
linking the requirements to respective ones of the
functions by the data processing system; and
storing the mechatronics object, including the linked
requirements and functions, in the data processing system, the
mechatronics object also including mechanical engineering
assembly data, computer-aided design data, and physics data.
Prior Art and Rejections on Appeal
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal:
Pritchard et al.
("Pritchard")
US 8,078,445 B2
2
Issued
Dec. 13, 2011
Appeal2015-002117
Application 12/760,281
Kojima et al.
("Kojima")
Sudarsan et al.
("Sudarsan")
R. Plateaux et al.
("Cho ley"2)
Assembly Model Data in Robot Oct. 1998
Cell System, Proceedings of the
1998 IEEE/RSJ Intl. Conference on
Intelligent Robots and Systems,
©1998 IEEE, pp. 655-660
A Product Information Modeling Feb. 2, 2005
Framework for Product Lifecycle
Management, Computer Aided
Design, Computer-Aided Design 37
(2005), pp. 1399-14111
Towards an Integrated Apr. 2009
Mechatronic Design Process,
Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE
International Conference on
Mechatronics, ©2009 IEEE,
pp. 1-6
Claims 1, 9, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Choley in view of Kojima. (See Final Office Action
(mailed January 13, 2014) ("Final Act.") 10-12.)
Claims 2---6, 8, 10-14, 16, 18-22, and 24 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Choley in view of Kojima,
and further in view of Pritchard. (See Final Act. 12-16.)
Claims 7, 15, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Choley in view of Kojima and Pritchard, and further in
view of Sudarsan. (See Final Act. 16-17.)
2 Appellants and the Examiner refer to this reference as "Choley," the
second named author of the reference. To avoid confusion, and to be
consistent with the record, we will also refer to this reference by its second
named author.
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants'
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We are not persuaded by
Appellants' arguments.
In order for arguments to be considered by the Board, our rules
require that they be included in the Briefs. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(vii)
("Any arguments or authorities not included in the brief or a reply brief ...
will be refused consideration by the Board, unless good cause is shown.");
see also MPEP 1205.02 ("It is essential that the Board be provided with a
brief fully stating the position of the appellant with respect to each ground of
rejection presented for review in the appeal so that no search of the Record
is required in order to determine that position. Thus, the brief should not
incorporate or reference previous responses. 37 CPR 41.37(c)(l) requires
that the brief contain specific items ... "). Here, Appellants attempt to
incorporate by reference its "previous responses, filed April 3, 2013, May 6,
2013, September 27, 2014, and March 5, 2014." (App. Br. 17, 36.) This
does not comply with our rules and we will not consider these previous
responses.
We further note that "the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art." In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2011); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe,
736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Here, Appellants have not presented
any cogent arguments sufficient to address the Examiner's detailed position
and instead assert repeatedly, without elaboration or specific criticism of the
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Examiner's detailed findings, that the references do not disclose the
limitation at issue.
Claims 1, 9, and 17
Issue One
"Receiving Requirements for a Mechatronics Object
in a Data Processing System "
The Examiner finds that Choley teaches the receiving requirements
limitation of claim 1. (Final Act. 11; see Choley, 1 ("Introduction"), 2.)
According to the Examiner, Choley discloses a mechatronics process that
"collect[ s] the requirements and [] translate[ s] them into parametric
specification." (Final Act. 11; Ans. 2-5; Choley, 1.) The "requirements,
functions, underlying structures and components are puzzle macro-pieces
[and] the requirement definition phase is automatically generated." (Final
Act. 11, emphasis omitted; Choley, 2.) Appellants contend that Choley does
not teach the limitation because the "'requirements phase' clearly cannot be
the claimed received 'requirements for a mechatronic object', and the Office
Action does not indicate whether Choley's 'requirements' of the
'documentation' or the 'requirements objects' are alleged to correspond to
the claimed 'requirements for a mechatronic object."' (App. Br. 18.)
Moreover, according to Appellants, Choley also does not teach
"requirements that are 'linked to respective functions' by the data processing
system as required by the claims." (App. Br. 19-20; Reply 12-14.)
Appellants have not presented any cogent arguments sufficient to address
the Examiner's detailed position. Appellants assert, without elaboration or
specific criticism of the Examiner's detailed findings, that the references do
not disclose the limitation at issue. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357.
Moreover, we agree with the Examiner's findings regarding this limitation.
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Issue Two
"Receiving Functions for the Mechatronics Object
in the Data Processing System "
The Examiner finds that Choley teaches the receiving function
limitation of claim 1. (Final Act. 11; see Choley, 2, Fig. 1.) According to
the Examiner, a "design process is like an incomplete puzzle as defined in
Fig. 1 [and] requirements, functions, underlying structures and
components are puzzle macro-pieces . .. linked to possible solution and
instances (components)." (Final Act. 11, emphasis in original; Ans. 6--8.)
Figure 1 of Choley is reproduced below:
Figure I. The Design Puzzk
Figure 1 depicts a design puzzle. Appellants contend that the portion of
Choley cited by the Examiner "appears to allege that the 'functional sub-
assemblies' correspond to the claimed functions [and] that Choley describes
that 'each function' is made up of multiple 'components."' (App. Br. 20-21;
Reply 14--15.) According to Appellant, "[t]his appears to contradict the
claimed feature of receiving functions for a single mechatronics object." (App.
Br. 21.) We are not persuaded that the Examiner has erred. Appellants'
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assertion is mere attorney argument, which is unsupported by factual
evidence. Thus, this argument is entitled to little probative value. In re
Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner's findings
regarding this limitation.
Issue Three
"Assigning the Functions to Respective Ones of Components and
Operations By the Data Processing System "
The Examiner finds that Choley teaches the receiving function
limitation of claim 1. (Final Act. 11; see Choley, 2, Fig. 3.) According to
the Examiner, Choley teaches ''functions, elementary or complex, [are]
linked to possible solutions and instances (components)." (Final Act. 11,
emphasis in original; Ans. 9.) Appellants disagree and assert that the
Modelica sequential function charts, in Figure 3 of Choley (cited to by the
Examiner) "do not teach or suggest that any 'functional sub-assemblies' are
assigned to components or operations" and "[t]here is no teaching that any
functions are assigned to respective components or operations." (App. Br.
21-23; Reply 16--17.) We are also not persuaded that the Examiner has
erred. Importantly, Appellants have not presented any cogent arguments
sufficient to address the Examiner's detailed position. Appellants' assertion
is mere attorney argument, which is unsupported by factual evidence. Thus,
this argument is entitled to little probative value. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d at
1357. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner's findings regarding this
limitation.
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Issue Four
"Linking the Requirements to Respective Ones of the Functions
By the Data Processing System "
The Examiner finds that Choley teaches the linking limitation of claim
1. (Ans. 10; see Choley, 3, Figs. 1, 2.) According to the Examiner, Figure 1
of Choley (reproduced above) teaches that "the 'design puzzle[] shows a
clear link between the requirements and respective function." (Ans. 10.) In
addition, Figure 2 "illustrates the 'link' between requirements and
functions." Figure 2 of Choley is reproduced below:
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gr;Jph. i.h.:·1'i.fH~d by ~~n app!i:.::i.ih()ft poh~t.~ phelH)r:·i:;non ~yp~s.: iJ
Jircciml! .I (>r •.om;: impfai( oti(~~
Figure 2 depicts the Requirement/Function/Structure/Physical/Behavior
diagram. Appellants contend that "Choley's 'jigsaw puzzle' illustration of
concepts has nothing at all to do with the claim limitations" and that "while
Choley uses similar terms with regard to requirements and 'functional level',
these are not the same concepts as claimed and are not equivalents of the
claim requirements." (Reply 17-18; App. Br. 23-24.) We are not persuaded
that the Examiner has erred. Appellants have not presented any cogent
arguments sufficient to address the Examiner's detailed position.
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Appellants' assertion is mere attorney argument, which is unsupported by
factual evidence. Thus, this argument is entitled to little probative value. In
re Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner's
findings regarding this limitation.
Issue Five
"Storing the Mechatronics Object ... In the Data Processing System"
The Examiner finds that Choley in view of Kojima teach the storing
limitation of claim 1. (Final Act. 11-12; Ans. 12-13; see Kojima, 656, 659,
Fig. 6.) According to the Examiner, Choley "does not specify storing CAD
data and assembly data" but Kojima does and
[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
to combine the teaching of Kojima et al with the teaching of
Choley et al because both references are drawn to modeling
mechatronic systems. The motivation to include the teaching of
Kojima et al would be to visualize the difficult part of an
assembly[.]
(Final Act. 11-12; Kojima, Conclusion.) Appellants contend that Kojima
"describes that something unrelated to the claims can be stored in a library
unrelated to the claims, and does not describe storing any mechatronics
object including linked requirements and functions, as claimed." (Reply 20.)
Appellants further argue that "[s]ince Choley does not teach, suggest, or
even consider such a mechatronics object, and Kojima does not teach,
suggest, or even consider such an object, no combination of these references
can teach the limitations of the claims." (Id. at 21.) We are not persuaded
that the Examiner has erred. We agree with the Examiner's findings
regarding Kojima. Appellants have not presented any cogent arguments
sufficient to address the Examiner's detailed position. Appellants' assertion
is mere attorney argument, which is unsupported by factual evidence. Thus,
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this argument is entitled to little probative value. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d at
1357. In addition, "[o]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking
references individually where, as here, the rejection is based on
combinations of references." See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA
1981 ).
Issue Six
"The Mechatronics Objects Also Including Mechanical Engineering
Assembly Data, Computer-Aided Design Data, and Physics Data"
The Examiner finds that Choley "discloses ... physics data [and]
Kojima [] discloses [] CAD data and assembly data." (Final Act. 11; Ans.
13-14; see Choley, 4--5; Kojima, 656, 659, Fig. 6.) With respect to physics
data, Appellants contend that Choley does not teach physical data and even
if it does the "'geometrical and inertial data' [(in Choley)] is not taught to be
stored in any mechatronics object, as claimed." (App. Br. 29-32.) With
regard to CAD data and assembly data, Appellants argue that Kojima only
"describes that a computer can analyze CAD data and assembly model data
(AMD), does not teach or suggest anything about a mechatronics object as
claimed. [Moreover, according to Appellant, [t]here is no object that stores
this CAD data and AMD." (Id. at 31-32; Reply 21-22.) We are not
persuaded that the Examiner has erred. Appellants have not presented any
cogent arguments sufficient to address the Examiner's detailed position.
Appellants' assertion is mere attorney argument, which is unsupported by
factual evidence. Thus, this argument is entitled to little probative value. In
re Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner's
findings regarding this limitation.
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Issue Seven
Combination of Choley and Kojima
As discussed above, the Examiner finds that
[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
to combine the teaching of Kojima et al with the teaching of
Choley et al because both references are drawn to modeling
mechatronic systems. The motivation to include the teaching of
Kojima et al would be to visualize the difficult part of an
assembly[.]
(Final Act. 12.) Appellants disagree and contend that "[t]he proposed
'motivation' to attempt to combine these references is [] flawed [because]
Appellant[s] find[] no support for the characterization of Kojima as drawn to
'modeling mechatronic systems."' (App. Br. 32-33.) According to the
Appellants, the "awkward and improper combination shows that the
rejections are based on an improper hindsight reconstruction." (Id. at 33-
3 5.) The Examiner responds that
Kojima et al teaches assembly robot system which is equivalent
to the mechatronics system. Therefore, both references are
drawn to the mechatronic systems. The motivation to include
the teaching of Kojima et al would be to investigate the utility
of assembly model data and the best format for these data in the
assembly process (Kojima et al, Abstract), which is found in the
reference.
(Ans. 15.) Appellants disagree with the Examiner's findings regarding
Kojima and the Examiner's findings that the assembly robot system in
Kojima "is equivalent to the mechatronics system." (Reply 22-24.)
We are not persuaded that the Examiner has erred. We agree with the
Examiner's finding that the assembly robot system in Kojima is a
mechatronics system. We further find that the Examiner has articulated a
reasoning with a rational underpinning for why a person of ordinary skill in
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the art at the time of the invention would combine Choley and Koijima.
(Ans. 15; Final Act. 12.) See KSR Int'! Co., v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
415, 418 (2007).
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellants'
contentions with respect to claim 1. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants make similar
arguments relating to claims 9 and 17, which have similar limitations. (App.
Br. 36--65.) Therefore, we also sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
claims 9 and 1 7.
Claims 2, 10, and 18
"Physics Definitions"
Claims 2, 10, and 18 recite "wherein the functions include physics
definitions." The Examiner states that while "[n]either Choley []nor
Kojima[] discloses the functions include physics definitions," Pritchard
teaches this limitation. (Final Act. 12-13; Pritchard, 4:23-38.) According to
the Examiner, for example, Pritchard describes "containment concept [that]
can be implemented via a container ID property inside the associated class
related to a motion profiles such as angular velocities, linear velocities,
accelerations, and the like" (i.e., physics definitions). (Id.) Appellants
disagree and contend that "Pritchard' s simple mention of motion profiles
does not relate at all to the requirements of the functions that include physics
definitions." (App. Br. 66--68; Reply 25-26.) Appellants have not presented
any cogent arguments sufficient to address the Examiner's detailed position.
Appellants' assertion is mere attorney argument, which is unsupported by
factual evidence. Thus, this argument is entitled to little probative value. In
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re Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. ivforeover, we agree with the Examiner's
findings regarding this limitation.
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellants'
contention with respect to claim 2. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants make similar
arguments relating to claims 10 and 18, which have similar limitations.
(App. Br. 77-79 and 89-90.) Therefore, we also sustain the 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 10 and 18.
Claims 3, 11, and 19
"Electrical Definitions"
Claims 3, 11, and 19 recite "wherein the functions include electrical
definitions." The Examiner states that while "[n]either Choley []nor
Kojima [] discloses the functions include electrical definitions," Pritchard
teaches this limitation. (Final Act. 13; Ans. 16--17; Pritchard, 4:3-5.) For
example, according to the Examiner, Pritchard teaches functions that include
electrical definitions such as "drive parameters[, e.g.,] average amperes,
peak amperes[,] and bus volts." (Id.) Appellants disagree and contend that
"Pritchard's simple mention of electrical parameters does not relate at all to
the requirements of the functions that include physics [sic] definitions."
(App. Br. 68---69; Reply 27.) Appellants have not presented any cogent
arguments sufficient to address the Examiner's detailed position.
Appellants' assertion is mere attorney argument, which is unsupported by
factual evidence. Thus, this argument is entitled to little probative value. In
re Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner's
findings regarding this limitation.
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For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellants'
contention with respect to claim 3. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants make similar
arguments relating to claims 11 and 19, which have similar limitations.
(App. Br. 79-81 and 91-92.) Therefore, we also sustain the 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 11 and 19.
Claims 4, 12, and 20
"Automation Definitions"
Claims 4, 12, and 20 recite "wherein the functions include automation
definitions." The Examiner states that while "[n]either Choley []nor
Kojima [] discloses the functions include automation definitions," Pritchard
teaches this limitation. (Final Act. 13-14; Ans. 17-18; Pritchard, 6:53-56.)
For example, according to the Examiner, Pritchard teaches "visualization
component [that] can be employed to facilitate creating a servo driven
mechatronic system related to automation control systems" (i.e., automation
definitions). (Id.) Appellants disagree and contend that "Pritchard's simple
mention of an automation control system does not relate at all to the
requirements of the functions that include physics [sic] definitions." (App.
Br. 70-72; Reply 28.) Appellants have not presented any cogent arguments
sufficient to address the Examiner's detailed position. Appellants' assertion
is mere attorney argument, which is unsupported by factual evidence. Thus,
this argument is entitled to little probative value. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d at
1357. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner's findings regarding this
limitation.
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellants'
contention with respect to claim 4. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's
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rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants make similar
arguments relating to claims 12 and 20, which have similar limitations.
(App. Br. 81-83 and 92-94.) Therefore, we also sustain the 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 12 and 20.
Claims 5, 13, and 21
"Simulating a Structure and Operation of the Mechatronics Object"
Claims 5, 13, and 21 recite "simulating a structure and operation of
the mechatronics object." The Examiner states that while "[n]either Choley
[] nor Kojima [] discloses simulating the structure and operation of the
mechatronics object," Pritchard teaches this limitation. (Final Act. 13-14;
Ans. 18; Pritchard, 6:44--47.) For example, according to the Examiner,
Pritchard teaches "a servo driven mechatronic visualization system for
analyzing members and simulation the operation via the position dependent
load of the subject." (Id.) Appellants disagree and contend that Pritchard
merely describes a servo driven mechatronic visualization
system for analyzing members and simulating the operation via
the position dependent load of the subject innovation [and
because t]here is no mechatronic object, as claimed, either in
Pritchard or any of the other cited references, individually or in
combination, so Pritchard cannot be said to be simulating a
structure and operation of the mechatronics object, as claimed.
(App. Br. 72-73, emphasis in original; Reply 29.)
Appellants have not presented any cogent arguments sufficient to
address the Examiner's detailed position. Appellants' assertion is mere
attorney argument, which is unsupported by factual evidence. Thus, this
argument is entitled to little probative value. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357.
Moreover, we agree with the Examiner's findings regarding Pritchard.
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For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellants'
contention with respect to claim 5. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants make similar
arguments relating to claims 13 and 21, which have similar limitations.
(App. Br. 83-84 and 94--95.) Therefore, we also sustain the 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 13 and 21.
Claims 6, 14, and 22
"Wherein At Least One of the Receiving Requirements and the
Receiving Functions is Performed Via an Interaction With a User"
Claims 6, 14, and 22 recite "wherein at least one of the receiving
requirements and the receiving functions is performed via an interaction
with a user." The Examiner states that while "[n]either Choley []nor
Kojima[] disclose[s] [receiving requirements and functions] performed via
an interaction with a user," but Pritchard teaches this limitation. (Final Act.
15; Ans. 19; Pritchard, 9: 1-21.) For example, according to the Examiner,
Pritchard teaches
interfaces [that] can include a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to
interact with the various components for providing industrial
control information to users [and] one of ordinary skill in the art
[would] include the teaching of Pritchard [with that of Choley
and Kojima] to adjust and configure one or more aspects
including receiving user command to modify operations of the
GUI.
(Ans. 19.) Appellants disagree and contend that Pritchard
While this passage certainly describes a GUI, there is no
teaching or suggestion of receiving requirements or receiving
functions via an interaction with a user, as claimed. Pritchard
describes several types of things that can be entered by a user,
but none of them are the requirements or functions as described
in the claims.
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(App. Br. 73-75, emphasis added; Reply 30.)
Appellants have not presented any cogent arguments sufficient to
address the Examiner's detailed position. Appellants' assertion is mere
attorney argument, which is unsupported by factual evidence. Thus, this
argument is entitled to little probative value. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357.
In addition, "[ o ]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where, as here, the rejection is based on combinations of
references." See In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 426. Moreover, we agree with the
Examiner's findings regarding this limitation.
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellants'
contention with respect to claim 6. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants make similar
arguments relating to claims 14 and 22, which have similar limitations.
(App. Br. 83-84 and 94--95.) Therefore, we also sustain the 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 14 and 22.
Claims 7, 15, and 2 3
"Using the Mechatronic Object as a
Reusable Product Definition in a Product Lifecycle Management System"
Claims 7, 15, and 23 recite "using the mechatronic object as a
reusable product definition in a product lifecycle management system." The
Examiner states that while "[n]either Choley[,] Kojima[, nor Pritchard]
discloses a product lifecycle management system," Sudarsan teaches this
limitation. (Final Act. 16--17; Ans. 21-22; Sudarsan, Abstract, 1409.) For
example, according to the Examiner, Sudarsan teaches a
Product Lifecycle management system [that] holds the promise
of seamlessly integrating all the information produced
throughout all phases to a product's life cycle [and] one of
ordinary skill in the art [would] include the teaching of
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Sudarsan [with that of Choley, K._OJima, and PritcharaJ to
support framework for product information that can access,
store, serve, and reuse all the product information throughout
the entire lifecycle.
(Ans 17.) Appellants disagree and contend that "Sudarsan is cited simply
for the mention of the words 'product lifecycle management system,' and is
not alleged to teach any substantive limitations at all, either of this claim or
of the parent claims." (App. Br. 101-102; Reply 32-33.)
Appellants, however, have not presented any cogent arguments
sufficient to address the Examiner's detailed position. Appellants' assertion
is mere attorney argument, which is unsupported by factual evidence. Thus,
this argument is entitled to little probative value. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d at
1357 .. In addition, "[o]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking
references individually where, as here, the rejection is based on
combinations of references." See In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 426. Moreover,
we agree with the Examiner's findings regarding this limitation.
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellants'
contention with respect to claim 7. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants make similar
arguments relating to claims 15 and 23, which have similar limitations.
(App. Br. 102-105.) Therefore, we also sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
rejection of claims 15 and 23.
Claims 8, 16, and 2 4
"Performing a Functional Decomposition
of the Mechatronics Object Into a Hierarchical Representation
Based on Function Groups, Function Subgroups and Functional Units"
Claims 8, 16, and 24 recite "performing a functional decomposition of
the mechatronics object into a hierarchical representation based on function
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groups, function subgroups and functional units." The Examiner states that
while "[ n ]either Choley [] nor Kojima [] disclose[ s ]" this limitation,
Pritchard teaches this limitation. (Final Act. 15; Ans. 20-21; Pritchard,
2:21-39, Fig. 2.) For example, according to the Examiner, Pritchard teaches
parsing component can be decompose or break up a load to its
subparts or constituent values, such decomposition can be
based on predetermined criteria as set by a user, such can
include criteria based on environmental factor, linkage factors,
and member factors) [and] one of ordinary skill in the art
[would] include the teaching of Pritchard [with that of Choley
and Kojima] to identify contributions from friction, gravity, and
inertia to move the system based on the designated motion
profile.
(Ans. 19, emphasis in original.) Appellants disagree and contend that
Pritchard "does not describe anything at all about performing afunctional
decomposition of a mechatronics object into a hierarchical representation
based on function groups, function subgroups and functional units." (App.
Br. 75-77, emphasis added; Reply 31.)
Appellants have not presented any cogent arguments sufficient to
address the Examiner's detailed position. Appellants' assertion is mere
attorney argument, which is unsupported by factual evidence. Thus, this
argument is entitled to little probative value. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357.
In addition, "[ o ]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where, as here, the rejection is based on combinations of
references." See In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 426. Moreover, we agree with the
Examiner's findings regarding this limitation.
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellants'
contention with respect to claim 8. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellants make similar
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arguments relating to claims 16 and 24, which have similar limitations.
(App. Br. 86-88 and 98-100.) Therefore, we also sustain the 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 16 and 24.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-24 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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