Ex Parte Lee et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 22, 2017

13162364 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 22, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/162,364 06/16/2011 HaengjuLee 20110310USNP/166552.3260 7326
145893 7590 12/27/2017
FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP / CONDUENT
PRINCETON PIKE CORPORATE CENTER
997 LENOX DRIVE
BLDG. #3
EAWRENCEVTT.TE, NJ 08648
EXAMINER
GREGG, MARY M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/27/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdocket @ foxrothschild. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HAENGJU LEE,
SHANMUGA-NATHAN GNANASAMBANDAM,
RAJINDERJEET SINGH MINHAS,
SHI ZHAO, ANDRES QUIROZ HERNANDEZ,
GARY MOREY, DAVID CACCIOLA, and
WILLIAM VOLL
Appeal 2016-001170
Application lS/162,3641
Technology Center 3600
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Haengju Lee, et al. (Appellants) seek our review under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) of the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—20. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
1 The Appellants identify Xerox Corporation as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-001170
Application 13/162,364
THE INVENTION
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A system for determining a probability of default of a loan, the
system comprising:
a processor; and
a computer-readable storage medium that holds programming
instructions that instruct the processor to:
receive a loan data set, the loan data set comprising first
data relating to a plurality of loans that are in a default status and
second data relating to a plurality of loans that are in a non-default
status,
develop, based on the first data and the second data, a set
of loan models, wherein the loan models comprise at least one
defaulted loan model and at least one non-defaulted loan model,
receive data relating to a target loan,
for each loan model in the set of loan models, determine
a posterior probability that the target loan would have corresponded to
that loan model during a historic time period,
compare each determined posterior probability and
classify the target loan to the model having a highest posterior
probability, and
use parameters of the loan model to which the target loan
is classified to determine a probability of default over a prospective
time period for the target loan.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Hughes etal. US 2007/0294156 A1 Dec. 20,2007
(“Hughes”)
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Zhang et al. US 2011/0125671 A1 May 26,2011
(“Zhang”)
Showalter US 2011/0270779 Al Nov. 3,2011
Shigeru Motoi et al, A Hierarchical Bayesian Hidden Markov Model
for Multi-Dimensional Discrete Data, Frontiers in Robotics,
Automation and Control, Chapter 19, 357—374; last visited December
2017, www.intechopen.com, (“Motoi”).
Bayes’ Formula, http://www:math.comell:edu/~mec/2008-
2009/TianyiZheng/Bayes.html, July 15, 2009, last visited December
2017 (“Math”).
The following rejections are before us for review:
1. Claims 1—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
judicially-excepted subject matter.
2. Claims 1, 2 and 7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Showalter.
3. Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by
Showalter.
4. Claims 3 and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Zhang.
5. Claims 4, 10, and 13—19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Showalter and Motoi.
6. Claims 5 and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Math.
7. Claims 6 and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Hughes.
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8. Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Showaiter, Motoi, and Math.
ISSUES
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as being directed to non-statutory subject matter?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1, 2, and 7 under 35 U.S.C. §
102(e) as being anticipated by or, in the alternative, under U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Showalter?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
being anticipated by Showalter?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 3 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as being unpatentable over Showalter and Zhang?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 4, 10, and 13—19 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Showalter and Motoi?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 5 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as being unpatentable over Showalter and Math?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 6 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as being unpatentable over Showalter and Hughes?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Showalter, Motoi, and Math?
FINDINGS OF FACT
We rely on the Examiner’s factual findings stated in the Answer.
Additional findings of fact may appear in the Analysis below.
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ANALYSIS
The rejection of claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter.
The Appellants argued these claims as a group. See App. Br. 11—19;
Reply Br. 5—6. We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group,
and the remaining claims 2—20 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R.
§41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct.
2347 (2014) identifies a two-step framework for determining whether
claimed subject matter is judicially-excepted from patent-eligibility under 35
U.S.C. § 101. According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,” such
as an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. In that regard, the
Examiner determined, inter alia, that “[cjlaims 1-20 are directed to a method
of performing the abstract idea of utilizing mathematical calculations to
determine an economic probability which is a fundamental business practice
of determining risk.” Final Act. 14. This determination is reproduced in the
Appeal Brief at page 11.
The Appeal Brief next reiterates the Alice two-step framework for
analyzing whether claimed subject matter is judicially-excepted as patent-
ineligible. We have no issue with what is said there.
This is followed by a section entitled “7. The Office Action provides
no support for its assertion that ‘determinins risk’ is an abstract idea.'1'’ App.
Br. 12—13. In this section, the Appellants argue that “[tjhere is nothing
‘fundamental’ about the claimed process.” App. Br. 12. However, under
step 1, the question is not whether claimed subject matter is fundamental but
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whether the claimed subject matter is directed to a concept, which concept is
an abstract idea.
In said section, the Appellant also argues that the Examiner has not
met a burden of establishing a prima facie case of subject matter
ineligibility, a requirement the Appellants state that “[t]he Board recently
reaffirmed ... in its decision in Ex parte Poisson, Appeal 2012-011084
(Feb. 27, 2015).” The Board did no such thing. Ex parte Poisson is not
precedential to the Board. Nevertheless, we disagree with the view that the
Examiner did not provide sufficient reasoning. The reasoning at Final
Act. 2—6 and 14—18 is extensive. We are satisfied that the Examiner has
clearly articulated the reasons why the claimed invention is not patent
eligible such that the Appellants were provided sufficient notice to
effectively respond. See “July 2015 Update: Interim Eligibility Guidance
Quick Reference Sheet” (“Prima Facie Case'”)
(https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-qrs.pdf).
The next section in the Appeal Brief is entitled “2. The Office Action
failed to individually address all claims, as well as all elements of each
claim.” This section does not explain why the Examiner should have
analyzed the dependent claim, only that it should have been done. We have
reviewed the dependent claims. They variously call for, inter alia, delivering
a message (e.g., claim 2), determining a probability of default (e.g., claim 3),
developing a set of loan models (e.g., claim 4), and posterior probability
equations (e.g., claim 5). The Appellants do not explain and we do not see
how the claim limitations in these dependent claims affect the abstract idea
the Examiner determined the claims to be directed to. At best they provide a
more limited description of the scheme set forth in the corresponding
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independent claims but they do not make the abstract idea any less abstract.
They remain directed to the abstract idea to which the Examiner determined
the claims to be directed. Where all claims are directed to the same abstract
idea, “addressing each claim of the asserted patents [is] unnecessary.”
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat 7 Ass ’n,
776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
This appears to be the extent of the Appellants challenge of the
Examiner’s determination under step 1 of the Alice framework. We do not
see that the Appellants have shown the Examiner was in error in determining
that the claims are directed to a method of performing the abstract idea of a
utilizing mathematical calculations to determine an economic probability
and that that concept is not an abstract idea. For the foregoing reasons we
are unpersuaded by said challenge that the Examiner’s determination under
step 1 was in error.
Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72—
73). In that regard, the Examiner determined that “[t]he claims do not
recite an improvement in another technology or technical field, nor do they
purport to perform the functioning of the computer itself.” Final Act. 16.
The Examiner relied on intrinsic evidence — the disclosure at paras. 4, 74,
75, and 76 of the Specification — in support of determining that the
invention as claimed “requires no more than a general purpose computer to
perform generic functions that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known in the industry.” Final Act. 16, 17.
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According to the Examiner, “[vjiewed as a whole, these additional claim
element(s) do not provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract
idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the
claim(s) amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Final
Act. 17-18.
In the section entitled “3. The claims require significantly more than
just the abstract idea” (App. Br. 14—17), the Appellants argue that “[e]ven if
(for the sake of argument) the Office were to consider the claims to include
an abstract idea, [what is claimed is much] more than an abstract idea.”
App. Br. 14. We are unpersuaded.
The Appellants reproduce four steps from independent claims 1, 8,
and 15, and state that they “improve the functioning of a processor by
enabling it to determine the probability that a loan will default at a particular
future time.” App. Br. 14. We do not see that. The four steps calls for
developing a set of loan models, determining a posterior probability for each
loan in the set that a target loan would have corresponded to that loan model
during a historic time period, comparing each determined posterior
probability and classifying the target loan to the model having a highest
posterior probability, and using parameters of the loan model to which the
target loan is classified to determine a probability of default over a
prospective time period for the target loan. These steps present a scheme,
not a processor, let alone an improved one. We do not see how this scheme
improves the functioning of a processor. The Appellants argue that “[a]
conventional computer could not classify a loan to one of various models,
and then use the model to determine a probability that the loan will default,
without significant modifications such as those of the present claims.” App.
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Br. 15. Actually, that is precisely what the Specification indicates. As the
Examiner explained, the Specification discloses that all that is needed to
perform the claimed scheme is “a processor and a computer-readable storage
medium” (Specification para. 4), i.e., a conventional generic computer. See
also Specification para. 74.
More limitations from claim 15 (App. Br. 15), and from dependent
claims 4, 10, and 16 (App. Br. 15—16) and 5, 6, 12, and 20 (App. Br. 16—17)
are reproduced in the Appeal Brief— with the Appellants repeating in each
case that “these are additional, specific processing steps [ ] improve the
functioning of a processor.” App. Br. 17. Again, we do not see how any of
the reproduced steps, all of which relate to a set of loans and predicting the
probability that an active loan will enter a status of default within a period of
time, improve the functioning of a processor. Moreover, the disclosure in
the Specification of common processors belies the argument that these steps
require employing something more than a conventional generic computer.
The section ends with the Appellants arguing that “the use of a
processor in the current claims insert meaningful limitations that cannot be
performed by humans alone.” App. Br. 17. Notwithstanding that the test of
patent-eligibility is not whether humans can practice the claimed subject
matter without using a processor, but whether there is an “‘inventive
concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 12—IS). Using a common processor, which the
Specification allows, does not add anything of significance. “[T]he relevant
question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the
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practitioner to implement the abstract idea ... on a generic computer.” See
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357—59. Here, they do not. See Mortgage Grader, Inc.
v. First Choice Loan Services Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(holding no inventive concept where “the claims ‘add’ only generic
computer components such as an ‘inter-face,’ ‘network,’ and ‘database.’”).
“We have repeatedly held that such invocations of computers and networks
that are not even arguably inventive are ‘insufficient to pass the test of an
inventive concept in the application’ of an abstract idea.” Electric Power
Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
The Appellants’ arguments in this section of the Appeal Brief do not
make a persuasive case that the claims include limitations that are sufficient
to ensure that the claimed subject matter in practice amounts to significantly
more than be upon the abstract idea of “utilizing mathematical calculations
to determine an economic probability” itself. Final Act. 14.
The Appellants have not shown the Examiner was in error in
determining that, “[vjiewed as a whole, these additional claim element(s) do
not provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract idea into a
patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claim(s) amounts
to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Final Act. 17—18. For the
foregoing reasons we are unpersuaded that the Examiner’s determination
under step 2 was in error.
The Appellants’ position vis-a-vis the rejection ends with a section
entitled “4. The claims are not directed to an ‘abstract idea. ”’ App. Br. 18-
19. This section is purportedly an “answer to the first part of the two-part
analysis of Alice [which] is no, the claims are not directed to an abstract
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idea.” App. Br. 19. But the section does not challenge the Examiner’s
articulation of what the claims are directed to nor does it challenge the
Examiner’s determination that that which the Examiner has determined the
claims are directed to an abstract idea (i.e., the Alice step 1 determination).
Instead, the Appellants argue that (a) in contrast to the “inventions of
Alice and Bilski [which] involved methods of actually implementing a
financial transaction” (App. Br. 18), “the methods and systems of the present
claims do not actually implement any financial transaction” (id.) and (b)
there is “no risk of [ ] preemption.” Id. at 19. Neither of these arguments
are persuasive as to error in the rejection.
(a) The test of patent-eligibility is not whether financial transactions
are involved. See Alice.
(b) Regarding pre-emption, it is true that the Supreme Court has
characterized pre-emption as a driving concern for patent eligibility. See
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. But characterizing pre-emption as a driving
concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing pre-emption as
the sole test for patent eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made clear that
the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to
patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in
and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at
2354). However, “[w]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.” Id.; cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1362-63 (Fed. Cir.), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 701, 193 F. Ed. 2d 522 (2015)
(“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited
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to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”) Be that as it may, because we find for the reasons discussed
above that the claimed subject matter covers patent-ineligible subject matter,
the pre-emption concern is necessarily addressed. “Where a patent’s claims
are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo
framework,. . . preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.”
Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1379.
The Appellants’ arguments, having been fully addressed and found
unpersuasive as to error in the rejection, the rejection is sustained.
The rejection of claims 1, 2, and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Showalter.
The Examiner’s position is that Showalter describes “develop[ing] . . .
a set of loan models, wherein the loan models comprise at least one
defaulted loan model and at least one nondefaulted loan model” as claim 1
requires. See Final Act. 20. In that regard, the Examiner finds that
Showalter “teaches using different models based on class; [citing] para[.]
0050, para[s.] 0053-0054, para 0072, para[s.] 0076-0078, para[.] 0080,
para[s.] 0103-0110, para[.] 0118; [and] Table 1.” Final Act. 20.
The Appellants do not disagree with that finding. “While this is
correct, this does not mean that the system of Showalter develops and uses
multiple models in its analysis. The system of Showalter still uses a single
model to generate a prediction. ([See] 10083 of Showalter.) The system of
Showalter does not develop probabilities for each model in a set of loan
models before generating the prediction.” App. Br. 20. The Appellants
explain:
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the system of Showalter operates in a completely different manner
than the system of claim 1. Showalter selects a single model, applies
various treatments of a particular loan to a model, and predicts which
treatment is least likely to default. In contrast, claim 1 covers a
system and method that receives a target loan, develops multiple
models (including defaulted and non-defaulted loan models),
determines probabilities that the target loan would have corresponded
to each of the loan models in a historic time, and classifies the target
loan to the model having the highest probability. It is only after each
of these steps occur that the present claims use the particular loan
model to determine the probability of default.
App. Br. 21.
We agree. Showalter paragraph 5 discloses a model “configured to
output a loan treatment recommendation for a borrower of the loan. The
processor is configured to apply the model as a function of the credit report
information, the property information, the loan information, and the real
estate market information.” In another aspect, the borrower is classified into
one of a plurality of clusters based on the modeled borrower. See Showalter
para. 6. “The classification may provide an accurate indication of a given
borrower and his/her property based on learning from a large number (e.g.,
thousands or more) of other borrowers and properties.” Showalter para. 42.
“If the model is applied during loan origination, each applicant may be
classified into a number (e.g., 20-30 classes) of applicant. Each class may
be modeled to better indicate a prediction of asset behavior.” Showalter
para. 43. In other words, Showalter describes a model for a class. The
purpose of Showalter’s model is to classify which in turn assists in making
predictions.
The claimed invention requires more; that is, a set of loan models are
developed and for each loan model in said set of loan models, a posterior
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probability that a target loan would have corresponded to that loan model
during a historic time period is determined.
What Showalter discloses and what is claimed are not the same.
Accordingly, Showalter does not anticipate what is claimed.
As for whether Showalter renders the claimed subject obvious to one
of ordinary skill in the art, the Examiner states that
although the prior art does not as argued by the applicant explicitly
cite the term “posterior,” the prior art does teach utilizing “historical
time” cluster data in order to measure the likelihood that an event will
occur given the related cluster group data comparison and teaches
utilizing the probability of an event occurring after taking into
consideration new information. Therefore, the prior art provides
teaching, suggestion and motivation that would have led one of
ordinary skill in the art to arrive at the claimed invention.
Final Act. 22. Notwithstanding the Appellants define “posterior” as
historical (see Specification para. 47), the question is whether one of
ordinary skill would have been led to “determine a posterior probability that
the target loan would have corresponded to that loan model during a historic
time”/or each loan in a set of loan models as claimed. Disclosure of
“utilizing the probability of an event occurring after taking into
consideration new information,” such as historical data, is insufficient to
meet said claim limitation, especially in light of our finding above that
Showalter does not describe a set of loan models being developed and
determining for each loan model in said set of loan models, a posterior
probability that a target loan would have corresponded to that loan model
during a historic time period.
The rejection of claim 1, and claims 2 and 7 that depend therefrom, is
not sustained.
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The rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by
Showalter.
Independent claim 8 includes the same limitations that claim 1
includes and which we have found Showalter does not describe.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed in not sustaining the 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) rejection of claim 1, this rejection of claim 8 is also not sustained.
The rejection of claims 3 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Zhang.
The rejection of claim 3, which depends from independent claim 1,
and claim 9, which depends from independent claim 8, is not sustained for
the reasons discussed in not sustaining the rejection of claim 1 under
§ 103(a).
The rejection of claims 4, 10, and 13—19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Motoi.
Independent claim 15 includes the same limitations that claim 1
includes and which we have found Showalter does not render obvious.
Motoi was not relied on as disclosing the subject matter we have found
missing from Showalter. See Final Act. 50. Accordingly, for the reasons
discussed in not sustaining the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claim 1, this
rejection of claim 15 is also not sustained.
The rejection of claim 4, which depends from independent claim 1;
claims 10, 13, and 14, which depend from independent claim 8; and claims
16—19, which depend from independent claim 15, is not sustained for the
reasons discussed in not sustaining the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§103.
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The rejection of claims 5 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Math.
The rejection of claim 5, which depends from independent claim 1,
and claim 11, which depends from independent claim 8, is not sustained for
the reasons discussed in not sustaining the rejection of claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
The rejection of claims 6 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Hughes.
The rejection of claim 6, which depends from independent claim 1,
and claim 12, which depends from independent claim 8, is not sustained for
the reasons discussed in not sustaining the rejection of claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
The rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Showalter, Motoi, and Math.
The rejection of claim 20, which depends from independent claim,
which depends from independent claim 15, is not sustained for the reasons
discussed in not sustaining the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
CONCLUSIONS
The rejection of claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to non-statutory subject matter is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 1, 2, and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Showalter is reversed.
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The rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated
by Showalter is reversed.
The rejection of claims 3 and under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Zhang is reversed.
The rejection of claims 4, 10, and 13—19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Showalter and Motoi is reversed.
The rejection of claims 5 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Math is reversed.
The rejection of claims 6 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter and Hughes is reversed.
The rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Showalter, Motoi, and Math is reversed.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—20 is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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