Ex Parte Lee et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 19, 2012

11217006 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 19, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte INN-SUNG LEE, MOON-SHIK KANG, and SONG-YI HAN
____________

Appeal 2010-004998
Application 11/217,006
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and
BARBARA A. BENOIT, Administrative Patent Judges.

BENOIT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-9 and 11-19. Claims 2, 13 and 14 have been indicated
as containing allowable subject matter, and claim 10 has been cancelled.
Br. 5; Ans. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention is a liquid crystal display device having a lamp
driving apparatus for preventing lamps from being damaged due to electric
Appeal 2010-004998
Application 11/217,006

2
current variation among the lamps. See generally Abstract; Spec. 1; Fig. 1.
Claim 1 is illustrative with key disputed limitations emphasized:
1. An apparatus for driving a plurality of lamps connected to each
other in parallel, the apparatus comprising:
a DC/DC converter for converting a DC input signal into a converted
DC signal having a voltage level;
a DC/AC inverter for inverting the converted DC signal into an AC
signal to supply the inverted AC signal to an input terminal of each of the
lamps connected to each other in parallel; and
a power controller for detecting electric current at an output terminal
of each of the lamps connected to each other in parallel to generate a
feedback signal to control the voltage level of the converted DC signal
output from the DC/DC converter and bypassing a part of the inverted AC
signal applied to the input terminal of the lamps when a level of the detected
electric current is higher than a predetermined threshold value.

THE REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejected claims 1-9 and 13-191 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Toda (US 6,153,987; issued Nov. 28, 2000) in
view of Mitchell (US 5,272,327; issued Dec. 21, 1993) and Cho (US
6,674,250 B2; issued Jan. 6, 2004; filed Mar. 30, 2001). Ans. 3-8.2
2. The Examiner rejected claims 11 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Toda in view of Mitchell, Cho, and Blanchard
(US 2002/0167811 A1; published Nov. 14, 2002; filed May 11, 2001).
Ans. 8-9.

1 The Examiner has also objected to claims 2, 13, and 14 as being dependent
on a rejected base claim and has indicated these claims contain allowable
subject matter. Ans. 2.
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Appeal Brief filed August 25,
2009 and the Examiner’s Answer mailed November 16, 2009.
Appeal 2010-004998
Application 11/217,006

3

CONTENTIONS
The Examiner finds that Toda discloses every recited feature of
illustrative claim 1 except for the power controller for detecting electric
current at an output terminal of the lamp and the plurality of lamps
connected to each other in parallel in concluding that the claim would have
been obvious. Ans. 3-4. The Examiner cites Mitchell as teaching a power
controller for detecting current at an output terminal of the lamp and
bypassing a part of the inverted AC signal applied to the input terminal of
the lamp when a level of the detected electric current is higher than a
predetermined threshold value. Ans. 4. The Examiner cites Cho as teaching
an apparatus for driving a plurality of lamps connected to each other in
parallel. Id.
Appellants argue that Mitchell does not teach or suggest bypassing a
part of the AC signal applied to the input terminal of the lamp when the
detected electric current is higher than a predetermined threshold value. Br.
10-12. Appellants also argue that Cho does not disclose a control circuit for
each lamp. Br. 12.

ISSUE
Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims by finding
that Mitchell teaches bypassing a part of the AC signal applied to the input
terminal of the lamp when the detected electric current is higher than a
predetermined threshold value?

Appeal 2010-004998
Application 11/217,006

4
ANALYSIS
OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1-9 and 13-19
OVER TODA IN VIEW OF MITCHELL AND CHO
Claims 1-8
This appeal turns on whether a part of Mitchell’s AC current bypasses
the input terminal of the lamp. We therefore begin by construing the term
“bypassing.” Appellants contend that bypassing means diverted away from
the lamp and does not mean merely controlling the amount of the current
delivered to the lamp. Br. 12. The plain meaning of “bypass” is “to divert
circulation from the usual course.”3 We, therefore, construe “bypassing a
part of the inverted AC signal applied to the input terminal of the lamps” as
providing an alternative path other than through the lamp for the flow of
current. This construction is consistent with the Specification. See Spec.
8:14-19; Fig. 1 (lamp L1, bypassing part 41).
With this construction, we find the Examiner’s reliance on Mitchell
for bypassing a part of the AC signal applied to the input terminal of the
lamp erroneous. The Examiner indicates that Mitchell teaches the claimed
bypassing because the inverted AC signal is not applied to the lamp when
the current is excessive. Ans. 11 (citing Mitchell, Fig. 4 (56, 58, 60-68);
col. 4, ll. 25-39; col. 5, ll. 28-50). This does not meet the limitation of

3 WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1913) (defining by-pass),
available at http://machaut.uchicago.edu/websters; cf. OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (defining bypass: “Electr. A circuit or element providing an
alternative path for the flow of current”; noting a 1914 use by R.A. Phillip in
H. PENDER, AMERICAN HANDBOOK FOR ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS 364, as “[t]o
avoid the excessively high voltage which would occur when the circuit is
opened . . . an automatic by-pass is provided in multiple with the lamps”),
available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/25580.
Appeal 2010-004998
Application 11/217,006

5
claim 1 which requires a particular manner of not applying the excessive
current—namely, bypassing. Merely keeping excessive current from being
applied to the lamp is not bypassing because bypassing requires providing an
alternative path other than through the lamp for the flow of the excessive
current. Accordingly, Mitchell’s teaching that the inverted AC signal is not
applied to the lamp when the current is excessive, as found by the Examiner
(Ans. 11), does not teach or suggest bypassing a part of the inverted AC
signal applied to the input terminal of the lamp when a level of the detected
electric current is higher than a predetermined threshold value, as required
by claim 1.
Because this issue is dispositive of our reversing claim 1, we need not
address Appellants’ other arguments regarding that claim—namely whether
Cho teaches a control circuit for each lamp. Br. 12.
We are therefore persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim
1 and claims 2-8, which depend from claim 1. Accordingly, the rejection of
claims 1-8 is reversed.
Claims 9 and 13-19
We likewise are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of independent claim 9. Claim 9 recites, in pertinent part, a power
controller for detecting electric current at an output terminal of each of the
plurality of lamps and bypassing a part of the converted AC signal applied to
the input terminal of a lamp of the plurality of lamps when a level of the
detected electric current is higher than a predetermined threshold value. We
note that these limitations of independent claim 9 differ from similar
limitations in claim 1 in two respects—namely, claim 9 recites a converted
AC signal (rather than an inverted AC signal) and bypassing a part of the
Appeal 2010-004998
Application 11/217,006

6
converted AC signal applied to the input terminal of a lamp (rather than the
lamps).
Despite these distinctions, the Examiner’s reliance on Mitchell for the
features recited by independent claim 9 is erroneous for the same reasons
discussed above with respect to independent claim 1. We are therefore
persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 9 and
claims 13-19, which depend from claim 9. The rejection of claims 9 and 13-
19 is accordingly reversed.

OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 11 AND 12
OVER TODA IN VIEW OF MITCHELL, CHO, AND BLANCHARD
We also find error in the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 11
and 12. Because the Examiner has not shown that the additional cited
reference cures the deficiencies noted above regarding independent claim 9,
from which claims 11 and 12 depend, we likewise reverse the rejection of
dependent claims 11 and 12 (Ans. 8-9) for the same reasons discussed above
with respect to independent claim 9.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner erred in rejecting (1) claims 1-9 and 13-19 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Toda in view of Mitchell and Cho, and
(2) claims 11 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Toda in
view of Mitchell, Cho, and Blanchard.

ORDER
We reverse the rejection of claims 1-9 and 11-19.
Appeal 2010-004998
Application 11/217,006

7

REVERSED

babc