Ex Parte LAZIER et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 17, 201913491757 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 17, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/491,757 06/08/2012 45809 7590 05/21/2019 SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P. (MICROSOFT TECHNOLOGY LICENSING, LLC) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT 2555 GRAND BOULEVARD KANSAS CITY, MO 64108-2613 ARI LAZIER UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 316995-US-CNT/MFCP.169880 7951 EXAMINER LUDWIG, MATTHEW J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2178 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/21/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): IPDOCKET@SHB.COM IPRCDKT@SHB.COM usdocket@microsoft.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ARI LAZIER, HUGH WILLIAMS, and NICK WHYTE Appeal2018-001268 Application 13/491,757 Technology Center 2100 Before ERIC B. CHEN, IRVINE. BRANCH, and JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judges. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellants 1 appeal from the Examiner's decision to finally reject claims 1-5 and 7-19. Claim 6 has been canceled. See App. Br. 27 (Claims Appendix). We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. App. Br. 3. Appeal2018-001268 Application 13/491,757 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants' Invention Appellants' invention generally relates to "detecting third-party content in web pages." Abstr. Claim 1, which is illustrative of the claimed invention, reads as follows: 1. One or more computer-readable storage media containing thereon computer-readable code executed by one or more computers for performing a method for handling third-party content in web applications, comprising: operating a set of software to detect third-party content controlled by third party, wherein the third-party content is embedded in a web page, and the third-party content is accessed or executed from embedded content in the web page rendered by a host application; detecting the third-party content in the web page, wherein a classifier determines if a content is third-party content that belongs to a third-party; downloading the third-party content so that the third-party content is classified; analyzing the third-party content with the classifier, wherein the classifier is software located on a server or a user's computing device, and wherein the classifier detects one or more problems of loading the third-party content; detecting the one or more problems with the third-party content as an output of the classifier, wherein the one or more problems include at least one of the third-party content no longer exists, the third-party content is unavailable, the third-party content changes, or the third-party content disrupts the host application; and modifying the web page to remove the one or more problems that are detected before rendering the web page. 2 Appeal2018-001268 Application 13/491,757 Rejections Claims 1, 14, and 15 stand rejected on the ground of non-statutory, obviousness-type double patenting based on claims 1, 15, and 17 of Lazier et al. (US 8,255,873 B2; iss. Aug. 28, 2012). Final Act. 3-5. Claims 1-5 and 7-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Palapudi et al. (US 2007/017 4324 Al; pub 1. July 26, 2007) ("Palapudi") and Randall (US 7,725,452 Bl; iss. May 25, 2010). Final Act. 5-14. REJECTION FOR DOUBLE PATENTING Appellants do not contest the double patenting rejection of claims 1, 14, and 15. Accordingly, we summarily sustain this rejection. REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) Claims 1-5, 7-14, and 19 A dispositive issue for this rejection of claims 1-5, 7-14, and 19 is whether the Examiner errs in addressing the claimed "determines if a content is third-party content" (herein "claimed determination"), as recited by independent claims 1 and 14 ( and incorporated by their dependent claims 2- 5, 7-13, and 19). For the below reasons, we are persuaded the Examiner erred. Appellants' Specification expressly defines the claimed "third-party content" as "provided by someone or an entity other than the owner, controller, or publisher of the web page." Spec. ,r 28. This meaning is not disputed. The Examiner finds the claimed determination is obvious over Palapudi' s detecting of URL links, because some of the detected links would expectedly be third-party content (as evidenced by Randall). Ans. 15- 3 Appeal2018-001268 Application 13/491,757 16. Further, because Appellants' Specification does not disclose a means of discriminating third-party content, the Examiner finds the claimed determination does not discriminate third-party content and, thus, reads on Palapudi's mere detecting of links that may (i.e., 'so happen' to) include links provided by third parties. Id. Specifically, the Examiner states: Id. [Palapudi] does not explicitly state the [detected] link is a third part[y] link[, but Randall] show[ s] that ... [it] would have been obvious ... to have utilized ... third party hyperlinks[.] ... The examiner [also] notes that [Appellants'] specification ... fails to accurately detail how the third party content is detected[,] other than that it is a link detected within a web page. See paragraph 0028. Appellants reply that the claimed determination "describe[ s] a determination of whether 'a content is third-party content."' Reply Br. 5 ( emphasis omitted). Appellants further reply that, because the claims "do[] not merely recite that third-party content 'exists' in the web page" (id.), the claimed determination cannot be interpreted as merely detecting links that may include links provided by third parties. Id. at 4--5 We agree with Appellants. The plain meaning of "determines if a content is third-party content" (claimed determination) is to determine whether content of the webpage is provided by a third-party, i.e., to discriminate third-party content. The Examiner's claim interpretation reads this plain meaning out of the claims-thus reading out a restriction-only because the Specification allegedly fails to disclose a means of discriminating third-party content. Ans. 15-16. The Examiner thus neglects the "presuppos[ition] that a patent applicant defines his invention in the claims, not in the specification." Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. 4 Appeal2018-001268 Application 13/491,757 Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Examiner cannot, as here, remove a claim restriction to address a lack of specification support. See, e.g., Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[C]laims can only be construed to preserve their validity where the proposed claim construction ... does not revise or ignore the explicit language of the claims."). The Examiner's claim interpretation also renders the claimed "determines if a content is third-party content" ( claimed determination) entirely redundant to the prior recited "detecting the third-party content in the web page." Under the Examiner's interpretation, each recitation identically requires only a detection of content that may include third-party content. "[I]nterpretations that render some portion of the claim language superfluous are disfavored." Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Because the Examiner's claim interpretation is erred, we do not sustain this rejection of claims 1-5, 7-14, and 19. Claims 15-17 The only issue for this rejection of claims 15-17 is whether the Examiner errs in addressing the claimed "detecting a change in ... a content from a comparison of a last identifier associated with a last analysis of ... the content to a current identifier associated with a current analysis of ... the content" (herein "claimed detecting"), as recited by independent claim 15 (and incorporated by its dependent claims 16 and 17). For the below reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. The Examiner finds the claimed detecting is obvious over Palapudi's updates to an index 452 (herein "index"). Final Act. 12-14 (citing Palapudi 5 Appeal2018-001268 Application 13/491,757 ,r,r 65-73); see also Palapudi ,r 66 ( describing the index). Specifically, the Examiner finds the index tracks a webpage' s referenced files by storing descriptions of the files as references 530 (herein "reference"). Final Act. 13; see also Palapudi ,r 79 ( describing the references); Fig. 5 (illustrating an indexed reference). The Examiner further finds a reference monitor 460 detects a change to a file by detecting changes to the respective reference. Final Act. 13-14. And, the Examiner reads the claimed last and current identifiers respectively on a changed reference-that is, on the reference before the change (last identifier) and after the change ( current identifier). Final Act. 13-14; Ans. 17-18. Appellants contend Palapudi' s reference monitor 460 does not "detect[] a change in ... a content" ( claimed detecting), but rather merely records a detected change into the index. App. Br. 20-21; Reply Br. 12. According to Appellants, only Palapudi' s file system 480 detects a change to a file, which is then reported to the reference monitor 460 for recording into the index. Id.; see also Palapudi ,r 69 ( describing interactions of the file system 480 and reference monitor 460). Appellants further contend that a file's reference before a change (last identifier) is not compared to the reference after a change (current identifier); rather, the obsolete reference is merely removed. Reply Br. 12. We are unpersuaded because Appellants do not address the Examiner's reasoning for the above findings. According to the Examiner, the claimed detecting requires an undescribed comparison of mere "last" and "current" identifiers. Ans. 17-18. The claimed comparing is read on the reference monitor 460 identifying a reference in need of an update, because the last reference is determined to be different than ( comparing) the updated 6 Appeal2018-001268 Application 13/491,757 current reference. Final Act. 13-14; Ans. 17-18; see also Palapudi ,r 71 ( describing the update). The claimed detecting is read on the reference monitor 460 responding to the update by notifying a W ebmaster ( of the respective file's modification), because the update is determined to be a result of (detecting) the file being modified. Final Act. 13-14; Ans. 17-18; see also Palapudi ,r 72 ( describing the notification). Instead of rebutting these reasons for the rejection, e.g., establishing narrower meanings of "compare" or "detect" as claimed, Appellants cursorily argue that Palapudi's above update does not compare references and only Palapudi' s file system 480 detects a change in content. Because the Appellants do not persuasively address the Examiner's findings, we sustain this rejection of claims 15-17. Claim 18 A dispositive issue for this rejection of claim 18 is whether the Examiner errs in addressing the claimed "set of computer software operates on the one or more servers to determine the last identifier and a set of computer software operates on a computing device of a user to determine the current identifier," as recited by claim 18 (which depends from claim 15). For the reasons provided below, we are persuaded the Examiner erred. Appellants argue, and there is no dispute, "in claim 18 [] the 'last identifier' is determined on a server[] and the 'current identifier' is determined on a client device." App. Br. 23. Appellants further argue the Examiner neglects the claimed distribution of server and client operations inasmuch the Palapudi-Randall combination "implement[ s] Randall's crawling robot and URL scheduler and Palapudi' s reference engine on a client device ... [ and thus] would perform all of [their] ... functions ... on 7 Appeal2018-001268 Application 13/491,757 a client device." Id. In the Reply Brief, Appellants contend the Examiner "does not provide a response." Reply Br. 13. We agree. The Answer states only that "the examiner points to the same paragraphs and rationale mentioned [for] ... claim 15 above in responding to appellant's arguments." Ans. 18. With respect to claim 15, the Examiner cites to paragraph 70 of Palapudi. Id. at 17. Neither the Examiner's findings nor the cited paragraph of Palapudi address a client-server distribution of operations, as required by claim 18. The Final Office Action is equally unavailing, stating nothing of a "server" in the rejections of claims 15 and 18. Final Act. 12-14. 2 Because the Examiner does not address the claimed distribution of server and client determinations, we do not sustain this rejection of claim 18. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 14, and 15 on the ground of non-statutory, obviousness-based double patenting. We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-5, 7-14, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). 2 To the extent the Examiner finds Palapudi's "reference engine can be implemented on a server computing device" in rejecting claim 17 (id. at 14), that statement is neither explained nor directed to claims 15 and 18. 8 Appeal2018-001268 Application 13/491,757 AFFIRMED-IN-PART 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation