Ex Parte LaRosaDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 4, 201713601605 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 4, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/601,605 08/31/2012 Joseph J. LaRosa 705546-000090 6373 29540 7590 12/06/2017 DAY PTTNFY T T P EXAMINER One Canterbury Green 201 Broad Street MCCOY, RICHARD ANTHONY Stamford, CT 06901 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2431 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/06/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Patents @ daypitney. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JOSEPH J. LAROSA Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 Technology Center 2400 Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, NABEEL U. KHAN, and PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s non- final rejection of claims 45—53 and 61—67.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Claims 1—44 and 54—60 have been cancelled. Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a system and method which allows an affiliated user of secured social networking sites to amalgamate content from those sites to create an accessible website for another user who does not maintain accounts on the social networking sites. Spec. Tflf 24, 28, 32. Claim 45, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 45. A system for generating access to a secured website, comprising: a memory device; and a processor disposed in communication with the memory device, the processor configured to: provide a means for a first user of a plurality of secured social network websites of which the first user is a member to select and filter from a listing of the plurality of social network sites at which the first user maintains an individual identity account and amalgamate content from the plurality of such selected and filtered websites, and create a secured website of amalgamated content including content from the selected and filtered social network sites; receive instructions from the first user to send an invitation to a second user having restricted or limited access to the plurality of secured social network websites to authorize a level of access to the secured website of amalgamated content; and generate the invitation with a link to provide the second user with a level of access to the secured website without requiring login or registration procedures for the second user for the plurality of secured websites or the secured website of amalgamated content; and transmit the invitation to the second user. App. Br. 15 (Claims Appendix). 2 Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 REJECTIONS Claims 45—53 and 61—67 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fields et al. (US 8,082,272 B2, issued Dec. 20, 2011) and Khanna (US 2002/0133605 Al, published Sept. 19, 2002). Final Act. 3-9. ISSUES First Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding Fields discloses, teaches, or otherwise suggests “means for a first user ... to select and filter from a listing of the plurality of social network sites at which the first user maintains an individual identity account and amalgamate content from the plurality of such selected and filtered websites,” (“the disputed limitation”) as recited in claim 45? Second Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding Khanna and Fields are properly combined? Third Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding Fields and Khanna teach or suggest “wherein the processor is further configured to grant access, deny access, and limit access to the second user to the secured website,” as recited in claim 46? ANALYSIS First Issue Rejecting claim 45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner relies primarily on Fields. Relevant here, the Examiner finds Fields’ description of the functionality of a BlogBurst server teaches the disputed limitation. Final Act. 4 (citing Fields col. 16,1. 58—col. 17,1. 35; col. 4,11. 50-60; col. 5,11. 3 Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 33—65; Figs. 5L, 5N). More specifically, the Examiner finds the BlogBurst server allows an editor/organizer to select content using checkbox interface elements and filter it using a search input box as shown in Figures 5L and 5N. Id. The Examiner finds the use of the checkboxes and search input box corresponds to the recited “means ... to select and filter from a listing of the plurality of social network sites at which the first user maintains an individual identity account.” Id. The Examiner further finds the selected and filtered content may be reassembled into collections, which corresponds to the recited “amalgamate content from the plurality of such selected and filtered websites.” Id. The Examiner also finds Fields discloses the selection and filtering of content is provided “for a first user of a plurality of secured social network websites of which the first user is a member” because it “discloses that the web sites of contributors may be publically accessible or secured for restricting access,” including password protection, and that editors/organizers are members of the websites because authorization is required for access to the content. Id. The Examiner further explains the Specification does not provide a specific definition for “member,” and that under its broadest reasonable interpretation, it includes users whom are authorized individuals as disclosed by Fields at column 4, line 58. Ans. 3. In light of these disclosures in Fields, the Examiner concludes it would have been obvious to deploy Fields’ system so that the protected web sites accessed by BlogBurst editors/organizers include those organizers as authorized users because they would need such access to perform their role of reviewing and organizing content. Ans. 3. 4 Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 Appellant argues the disputed limitation is not taught in the cited prior art because “Fields does not disclose means for a first user to amalgamate content from secured social networking sites at which the user maintains an individual account.” App Br. 5. Appellant characterizes Fields as “merely stat[ing] that contributors may manage content on either secured or unsecured websites [] and is silent with respect to providing access to the secured content.” App. Br. 8 (citation omitted). Appellant argues Fields provides no mechanism or process whereby secured sites can be accessed by the BlogBurst server. Id. According to Appellant, “while Fields mentions that contributors may interact with secured sites, it makes no such provision for using such sites in connection with the BlogBurst server, and provides no hint or suggestion as to how links to secured content would be accessed by the BlogBurst server and then made accessible to other users.” App. Br. 8— 9. Appellant also contends the Examiner’s interpretation of “member” is unreasonably broad in light of the Specification, arguing that the description “makes unambiguously clear that a member is a user and account-holder of a networking site.” Reply Br. 7. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Appellant contends Fields is silent with regard to how access to secured sites is provided. We disagree. Fields teaches that the websites created by contributors/bloggers may be “password-protected or otherwise secured for restricting access to only authorized individuals . . . .” Fields col. 4,11. 56—58. In Fields’ system, editors/organizers are provided the ability to select and filter from among those “password-protected or otherwise secured” websites to amalgamate content and create a secured website. Because the editors/organizers have access to the secured content as an “authorized individual,” a person of 5 Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 ordinary skill in the art would understand that a customary way for access to be provided would be through the use of an individual account associated with these “password-protected or otherwise secured” web sites. As such, we disagree with Appellant that Fields “provides no hint or suggestion as to how links to the secured content” would be accessed by the editor/organizer. To the contrary, although Fields does not explicitly state the editor/organizer is a member of the secured websites, by indicating that these web sites are accessed only by “authorized individuals,” Fields at least suggests the editor/contributor is a member at those sites and possesses an individual identity account as an authorized individual. We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument the Examiner has relied on an overly broad interpretation of “member.” Appellant cites paragraph 28 of the Specification as evidence of the meaning of “member,” and specifically relies on the statement that “[sjender 101 is a member of the networking site and depending on the embodiment is an email user, text messenger, instant messenger, blogger, etc. [. . .] with accounts at one or more sites such as 103.” Reply Br. 7 (citing Spec. 128). Appellant argues this statement “makes unambiguously clear that a member is a user and account-holder of a networking site.” Id. We disagree, as this statement is not a definition, but instead describes one example implementation which “depend[s] on the embodiment.” One dictionary defines “member” as “an individual, thing, or organization belonging to a group.” Oxford New American Dictionary 1091, (3d ed. 2010). Applying this definition of member, we agree with the Examiner the editors/organizers in Fields are “members,” as they are individuals belonging to the group of authorized 6 Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 individuals. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Fields teaches the disputed limitation. Second Issue As noted above, in rejecting independent claims 45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner relies primarily on Fields, finding it teaches each limitation except for “without requiring login or registration procedures for the second user for the plurality of secured websites or the secured website of amalgamated content.” Final Act. 4—7. Explaining that claim 45 previously recited “without ever requiring login or registration procedures . . .,” and was subsequently broadened by amendment to recite “without requiring login or registration procedures,” the Examiner determines the limitation “requires [only] that on at least one occasion the second user is provided a level of access without login or registration.” Ans. 5. The Examiner finds Khanna teaches this limitation when combined with Fields’ use of cookies because it provides access to a website without requiring the user to login. Final Act. 6 (citing Khanna 138). Appellant argues the teachings of Fields and Khanna are incompatible and that Khanna teaches away from Fields. App. Br. 9-11. More specifically, Appellant argues because Fields requires registration and acceptance of license agreements by both organizers/editors and distributors/publishers, it would defeat the purpose of the Fields system to allow distributors/publishers to access content without requiring login or registration. App. Br. 10. Appellant further contends the Examiner’s interpretation of the claim is “strained,” and that the removal of the term “ever” did not change the meaning of the claim because it was superfluous. Reply Br. 9. 7 Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 We are not persuaded Khanna teaches away from Fields. As an initial matter, we do not agree with Appellant that the removal of the term “ever” did not change the meaning of the claim. Including the term “ever” in the limitation made clear that the second user must be provided access without needing to register or login even a single time. With the removal of “ever,” the claim may be reasonably understood to no longer impose such a requirement. With respect to Appellant’s argument that the references teach away from each other, we note “[a] reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) {citing In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Here, Khanna does not discredit the registration process taught by Fields. Rather, it seeks to improve the ease with which a site can be accessed subsequent to a registration. As such, we do not agree the teachings of Fields and Khanna are incompatible as alleged. Third Issue Appellant argues separately for patentability of dependent claim 46, which recites “wherein the processor is further configured to grant access, deny access, and limit access to the second user to the secured website.” App. Br. 15 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner finds this limitation taught by Fields. Final Act. 6 (citing Fields col. 8,11. 8—30); Ans. 5—6 (additionally citing col. 7,1. 60-col. 8 1. 27). Appellant argues the prior art fails to teach limiting access to the second user to the secured website because it teaches only limiting the content a distributor can distribute, but does not teach limiting the content 8 Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 which it can view. Thus, Appellant equates “access” to content to be synonymous with “viewing” content. We are not persuaded the Examiner has erred. We agree with the Examiner that “limit[ing] access” can include activities beyond merely limiting viewing of content. See Ans. 6. We also agree that Fields discloses various ways that the system limits access to the secured website. For example, activity limitations imposed by the EULA amount to limitations on access to the secured website, as they limit the activities the user can perform with respect to the website. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claim 46. Summary We are not persuaded the Examiner has erred finding Fields and Khanna teach or suggest the argued limitations above. Nor are we persuaded that the Examiner has erred in combining the teachings of Fields and Khanna. Appellant presents no additional arguments for separate patentability of any remaining claims. As such, the remaining claims fall for the same reasons. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 45—53 and 61—67. 9 Appeal 2017-006807 Application 13/601,605 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation