Ex Parte LangeDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 29, 201613135456 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/135,456 07/05/2011 Jeffrey Lange 26646 7590 03/31/2016 KENYON & KENYON LLP ONE BROADWAY NEW YORK, NY 10004 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 121701120 6519 EXAMINER BAIRD, EDWARD J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3692 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/31/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): uspto@kenyon.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JEFFREY LANGE Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 1 Technology Center 3600 Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's decision of July 25, 2012, rejecting claims 250-259. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART and enter a new ground of rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Longitude, LLC. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 Illustrative Claim 250. A computer system for assisting in conducting demand-based trading, the system comprising: at least one processor configured to: receive an indication of a selected outcome and an indication of a specified payout for an investment order, the selected outcome corresponding to at least one of a plurality of established states, each state corresponding to at least one possible outcome of an event of economic significance; and output an investment amount as a function of the selected outcome, the specified payout and a total amount invested in the plurality of states; wherein: the investment amount is an amount pledged to be paid if the order is made, such pledge occurring prior to occurrence of the event of economic significance; and the specified payout is paid after and conditional upon occurrence of the selected outcome of the event of economic s1gn1ficance. Rebane Corby et al. (hereinafter "Corby") Kohls et al. (hereinafter "Kohls") The Cited References us 6,078,904 US 2002/0032644 Al US 7 ,020,632 B 1 The Rejections Jun.20,2000 Mar. 14, 2002 Mar. 28, 2006 The Appellant seeks review of the following rejections: I. The rejection of claims 250 and 251 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 2 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 as unpatentable over Kohls and Rebane. 2 Final Action 6-8. II. The rejection of claim 252 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kohls, Rebane and Corby. Final Action 8-9. III. The rejection of claim 253 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kohls, Rebane and Corby. Final Action 8-9. IV. The rejection of claims 254 and 255 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kohls, Rebane and Corby. Final Action 8-10. V. The rejection of claim 256 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kohls, Rebane and Corby. Final Action 8-10. VI. The rejection of claim 257 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kohls, Rebane and Corby. Final Action 8-10. VII. The rejection of claims 258 and 259 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kohls, Rebane and Corby. Final Action 8-11. 3 FACTUAL FINDINGS We adopt aH the Examiner's findings as our own. Answer 4--16. Additional findings of fact may appear in the Analysis that follows. 2 In addition to Kohls and Rebane, the Final Action also lists Corby as being among the references relied upon for rejecting claims 250 and 251. Final Action 6. Corby is similarly identified in regard to the rejection of claims 250 and 251 in the Answer. Answer 4. It appears that the inclusion of Corby, in both instances, was erroneous because the Examiner's respective analyses do not discuss Corby. 3 The Appellant contended that claims 254--259 were allowable for the same reasons offered as to claim 253 (Appeal Br. 7), but proceeded to make additional arguments as to claims 254--257 (Appeal Br. 7-8), which are addressed as Rejections IV-VI herein. 3 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 ANALYSIS Rejection I In regard to Rejection I, the Appellant has grouped claims 250 and 251 together. Appeal Br. 3---6. The discussion herein is directed to claim 250 alone. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Based upon four reasons presented in the Appeal Brief, each of which is addressed in tum below, the Appellant (Appeal Br. 4--6) contends that the Examiner's proposed combination of Kohls and Rebane does not disclose or suggest the "processor configured to ... output an investment amount as a function of the selected outcome, the specified payout and a total amount invested in the plurality of states" of claim 250 (Appeal Br. 10, Claims App.). In addition, the Appellant's Reply Brief introduces a new argument in favor of claim 250. Reply Br. 3. First, the Appellant contends that Kohls does not disclose or suggest the iimitation. Appeai Br. 4--5; Repiy Br. 3. However, the rejection is based upon a combination of Kohls with Re bane, not Kohls alone, and the Examiner (Final Action 7) did not rely upon Kohls alone for the teaching of the limitation in question. "[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on combinations of references." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (citation omitted). Thus, the Appellant's first argument does not address the substance of the Examiner's reasoning and is not persuasive. Second, the Appellant (Appeal Br. 5) contends that Rebane does not disclose or suggest the limitation at issue. According to the Appellant: 4 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 The cited portion of the Rebane reference describes a user interface that "graphically displays for each investment in the portfolio the allocation of the investment assets to the selected securities in terms of both monetary and percentage allocations." Nowhere does the Rebane reference disclose or suggest that this allocation of investment assets is a function of the selected outcome, the specified payout, and a total amount invested in the plurality of states (and the Examiner does not expressly refer to any cited portion of the Rebane reference as disclosing these limitations). Appeal Br. 5. See also Reply Br. 4. The Appellant here focuses on one aspect of Rebane alone, rather than more directly applicable portions of Rebane or the combined teachings of Rebane and Kohls, as cited by the Examiner. The Examiner found that Kohls teaches claim 250's receipt of a "selected outcome" and a "specified payout" for an investment order. Final Action 7; Answer 5. The Examiner also found that Rebane teaches the creation of a risk tolerance function ("RTF") for an individual investor to define risk preferences in advance of optimizing an investment portfolio for that investor. Final Action 7-8; Answer 5. Rebane's RTF is used to output proposed investment allocations (see Rebane col. 1, 11. 1-18; col. 6, 11. 19-38) based upon multiple factors, including the expected monetary value of assets (see id. at col. 5, 11. 17-31) - i.e., information corresponding to claim 250's "selected outcome" and "specified payout" - and the net investable assets (see id. at col. 5, 11. 4--5)- i.e., information corresponding to claim 250's "total amount invested in the plurality of states." Thus, the Appellant has not shown any error in the Examiner's determination that Kohls and Rebane together disclose the features of claim 250 's "processor configured to ... output an investment amount as a 5 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 function of the selected outcome, the specified payout and a total amount invested in the plurality of states" of claim 250 (Appeal Br. 10, Claims App.). Accordingly, the Appellant's second argument is not persuasive. Third, the Appellant contends that Rebane suggests the "opposite" of the limitation. Appeal Br. 5-6. Specifically, the Appellant argues: [T]he cited portion of the Rebane reference actually states, at 8:34--36, that "[t]here is also displayed a graphical representation of the expected return of the portfolio given the investment allocation." Thus, in contrast to claim 250, which recites the output of an investment amount as a function of, inter alia, the specified payout, the Rebane reference describes the output of an expected return given the investment allocation, i.e., the reverse of the feature of claim 250. Id. at 5. See also Reply Br. 4. As in the Appellant's second argument (discussed above), the Appellant concentrates on Rebane' s disclosure of "a graphical representation of the expected return of the portfolio given the investment allocation" (Re bane col. 8, 11. 34--36), but does not address aspects of Rebane more relevant to the claimed "processor configured to ... output an investment amount" (Appeal Br. 10, Claims App.) of claim 250. In particular, the Appellant does not address those aspects of Rebane identified by the Examiner that instruct an investor in the "selection, analysis of investments and the allocation of investment assets among investments." Final Action 7 (citing Rebane col. 1, 11. 10-18) (emphasis added). As explained above, in regard to the Appellant's second argument on claim 250, such teachings of Rebane specifically concern the determination of how much money an investor should pay for a particular investment - the same issue involved in 6 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 claim 250's "output [of] an investment amount" (Appeal Br. 10, Claims App.). Accordingly, we disagree with the Appellant's contention that Rebane teaches the "opposite" (Appeal Br. 5-6) of claim 250's "processor configured to ... output an investment amount," as it is based upon an incomplete depiction of Rebane's disclosure. Therefore, the Appellant's third argument is not persuasive. Fourth, the Appellant contends that Kohls and Rebane may not be combined because Kohls "describes matched bid prices for contracts but the price of the contract on which the parties are bidding remains fixed," such that the resulting combination would constitute "[a] graphical representation of this fixed return," which "would be superfluous." Appeal Br. 6. See also Reply Br. 4. As an initial matter, the alleged "superfluous[ ness ]" of the proposed combination does not constitute a reason why the teachings of Kohis and Rebane could not be combined. After all, even actual disadvantages that might arise from combining references need not preclude a particular combination. See, e.g., Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[A] given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.") (citation omitted). Even so, the Appellant does not allege that any disadvantage actually arises from the combination of Kohls with Rebane. Moreover, combining the teachings of Kohls and Rebane would not necessarily result in the allegedly "superfluous" feature because such a combination may, as the Examiner explains (Answer 6), graphically 7 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 represent the expected performance for a portfolio of investments undertaken with the Kohls system - as opposed to the value of only a single contract. Indeed, Kohls contemplates the graphical representation of "account balances, net positions, profit and loss." Kohls col. 12, 11. 1-2. Accordingly the Appellant's fourth argument is not persuasive. In addition to the four arguments set forth in the Appeal Brief, the Appellant introduces a new argument in the Reply Brief. There, the Appellant (Reply Br. 3) disputes the Examiner's finding that Kohls teaches claim 250's "indication of a specified payout" (Appeal Br. 10, Claims App.), which the Examiner identified as Kohls' fixed contract payment (see Final Action 6-7, citing Kohls col. 7, 11. 24--40, col. 8, 11. 18-31; Answer 5, 10, additionally citing Kohls col. 7, 11. 12-23). The Appellant contends that Kohls "describes a system in which users input a bid price, and not a specified payout." Reply Br. 3. Because the Appellant did not challenge this finding in the Appeal Brief~ the Appellant may not address this issue for the first time in the Reply Brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). Nonetheless, the Appellant's argument does not reveal any error on the part of the Examiner. Contrary to the Appellant's contention (Reply Br. 3), claim 250 does not require "users" to "input" anything; claim 250 simply calls for a "processor configured to ... receive ... an indication of a specified payout." Appeal Br. 10, Claims App. The Appellant similarly misapprehends Kohls, by asserting that "[ u ]sers inform the system of the Kohls reference how much they want to bid; not how much they want in return." Reply Br. 3. Yet, Kohls (e.g., Kohls col. 7, 11. 12-23) involves a defined fixed payout for each contract, thus providing "an indication of a specified payout" as set forth in the claim. 8 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 In view of the foregoing analysis, the Examiner's rejection of claim 250 is sustained. Because claim 251 was grouped together on appeal with claim 250, the Examiner's rejection of claim 251 is sustained, as well. Re} ections II, III and VII The Appellant argues that the rejections of claims involved in Rejection II (claim 252), Rejection III (claim 253) and Rejection VII (claims 258 and 259) were in error for the same reasons set forth as to claim 250. Appeal Br. 6-7. Thus, these claims stand or fall with claim 250. Because the rejection of claim 250 is sustained herein, the rejections of claims 252, 253, 258 and 259 are also sustained. Rejection IV In regard to Rejection IV, the Appellant has grouped claims 254 and 255 together. Appeal Br. 7. The discussion herein is directed to claim 254 alone. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). The Appeiiant contends (Appeai Br. 7) that the cited references do not teach claim 254' s limitation of "determining the total amount invested as a function of respective selected outcomes and specified payouts of a plurality of orders." In response, the Examiner explained how Kohls' disclosure meets the limitation at issue: Examiner maintains that a bid placed on one side of the contract and a second. complementary bid on the opposing side ofthe contract are indicative of Appellant's total amount invested in the plurality of states in that each bid on each side of the contract specifies a set number of contract units and a bid price. Answer 15 (citing Kohls col. 7 lines 12--40). 9 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 In the Reply Brief, the Appellant argued that the Examiner's explanation in the Answer "improperly focuses solely on one matched contract as the total amount invested" because "[t]he total amount invested in such a scheme relates to the many matched contracts, and is a function of the total number of matched bids, and the fixed face value of each contract." Reply Br. 5. Although the Appellant refers to "the many matched contracts," the limitation of claim 254 at issue actually recites "a plurality of orders." Appeal Br. 11, Claims App. The term "plurality" simply means "two or more." Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 258F.3d1317, 1327- 28 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Because the Examiner's example from Kohls involved two bids ("a bid placed on one side of the contract and a second. complementary bid on the opposing side of the contract"), where "each bid on each side of the contract specifies a set number of contract units'' (Answer 15), the Examiner's example possesses the claimed "plurality of orders." Accordingly, the Appellant's argument as to claim 254 is not persuasive. The Examiner's rejection of claim 254 is sustained. Because claim 255 was grouped together on appeal with claim 254, the Examiner's rejection of claim 255 is sustained, as well. Rejection V Claim 256 depends from claim 253 and sets forth the following language: [I]f the selected outcome in the order becomes an observed outcome of the event, determining an executed payout for the 10 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 order, as a function of specified payouts, selected outcomes, and investment amount limits of a plurality of orders. Appeal Br. 12, Claims App. In rejecting claim 256, the Examiner said that the claim "is not further limiting of claim 253, the claim upon which it depends." Final Action 10. The Appellant disagreed, arguing that claim 256 "further limits claim 253 because it requires that the executed payout is determined as a function of desired payouts, selected outcomes, and investment amount limits of a plurality of orders." Appeal Br. 8. In response, the Examiner explained that the features added by claim 256 are nevertheless met by Kohls, such that the subject matter of claim 256 would have been obvious. Answer 15 (citing Kohls col. 7, 11. 12--40). In the Reply Brief, the Appellant contends that Kohls "does not disclose a user's specification of payouts, and instead only discloses the user's specification of a bid price" - pointing out that the Appellant had raised this same alleged shortcoming of Kohls, earlier in the Reply Brief (at page 3), in regard to claim 250. Reply Br. 6. But claim 256 does not recite the limitation of claim 250 to which the Appellant refers - a "processor configured to ... receive ... an indication of a specified payout." See Reply Br. 3, 6; Appeal Br. 10-12 Claims App. Nor does claim 256 depend from claim 250; claim 256 depends instead from independent claim 253, which contains a similar limitation ("receiving ... an indication of a specified payout"). Appeal Br. 11-12 Claims App. Thus, the Appellant's argument here is properly directed to claim 253, not claim 256. In addition, as discussed above (in Rejection I) regarding the "specified payout" feature of claim 250, the Appellant is foreclosed under 37 C.F .R. § 41.41 (b )(2) from 11 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 introducing this argument in the Reply Brief, as the Appellant has done, where the Examiner had already stated that Kohls disclosed the "specified payout" feature of claim 253 in the Final Action. Final Action 6-7, 9. In any event, the argument raised in regard to claim 250 (see Reply Br. 3), which the Appellant would re-apply to claim 256, has already been determined to be unpersuasive herein. As discussed above, in regard to Rejection I, the disclosure of a defined fixed payout in Kohls (see, e.g., col. 8, 11. 18-31) satisfies claim 250's requirement of a "processor configured to ... receive ... an indication of a specified payout" (Appeal Br. 10, Claims App.). The Appellant (Reply Br. 6) also criticizes the Examiner's argument that the "executed payout" feature of claim 256 is met by the fixed contract value in Kohls (see Answer 15). The Examiner equated claim 256's "executed payout" with the "fixed value of the contract" in Kohls (Answer 15) - the same element of Kohls that the Examiner (Final Action 6-7, 9) identified as the "specified payout" of claim 253, which "is paid after and conditional upon occurrence of the selected outcome of the event of economic significance" (Appeal Br. 11, Claims App.). In response to the Examiner, the Appellant argues that "the fixed value of the contract [in Kohls] is just that- fixed," such that "[i]t is not determined as a function of specified payouts, selected outcomes, and investment amount limits of a plurality of orders." Reply Br. 6. Yet, the Appellant neither disputes nor offers any alternative to the Examiner's interpretation of the "executed payout" (of claim 256) as being the "specified payout" (of claim 253) that is paid "upon occurrence of the selected outcome." See Appeal Br. 11-12, Claims App. Nor does the 12 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 Specification reveal any other interpretation of the "executed payout." Based upon the Examiner's interpretation of the "executed payout," claim 256 suffers from the very conundrum that the Appellant ascribes to the Examiner's argument regarding Kohls- i.e., the "executed payout for the order" of claim 256 cannot be "determin[ ed] ... as a function of specified payouts, selected outcomes, and investment amount limits of a plurality of orders" if the "specified payout for an investment order" "is paid," per claim 253. Appeal Br. 11-12, Claims App. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the meaning of the limitation added by claim 256 is unclear and the scope of the claim cannot be determined. Where claims do not particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required by the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, a rejection of the claims as obvious (under 35 U.S.C. § 103) must be reversed as impermissibly involving speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims. In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862---63 (CCPA 1962). "If no reasonably definite meaning can be ascribed to certain terms in the claim, the subject matter does not become obvious -the claim becomes indefinite." In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970). Therefore, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claim 256 is reversed, proforma. Pursuant to 3 7 C.F .R. § 41. 50(b ), claim 25 6 is hereby rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite, because the precise meaning of the limitation introduced in claim 256 cannot be determined. 13 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 Rejection VI In rejecting claim 257, the Examiner said that the claim "is not further limiting of claim 253, the claim upon which it depends in as much it is the repetition of steps which does not add patentable weight." Final Action 10. The Appellant (Appeal Br. 8) countered that claim 257 does further limit claim 253, referring to the language of claim 257 (Appeal Br. 12, Claims App.) specifying that claim 253 's step of "determining an investment amount" includes determining a respective investment amount for each of the respective specified plurality of states, such that a same payout for the respective order is executed regardless of which of the respective specified states is identified to correspond to an observed outcome of the event of economic significance. In response, the Examiner maintained the position that the language of claim 257 did not further limit the scope of its base claim 253 and also stated that, in any event, the limitations recited in claim 257 are taught by Kohls, such that the claimed subject matter would have been obvious. Answer 8, 16. In the Reply Brief, the Appellant argues that Kohls fails to teach the subject matter added by claim 257: [A ]s discussed above in support of the patentability of claim 250, however, the Kohls reference describes a user's input of a bid price, and not the determination of an investment amount. Accordingly, the Kohls reference does not disclose or suggest determining a respective investment amount for each of the respective specified plurality of states. Reply Br. 6. The Appellant's reference back to an argument in support of claim 250 is misplaced for two reasons. First, the Appellant's argument is not 14 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 directed to the subject matter added by claim 257, but is instead directed to the "determining ... an investment amount" introduced in the claim from which it depends (Appeal Br. 11, Claims App.). Second, claim 257 does not depend from claim 250; rather, claim 257 depends from independent claim 253 (Appeal Br. 12, Claims App.). Nevertheless, as explained above (in regard to Rejection I) the Appellant's argument (see Appeal Br. 4--5; Reply Br. 3) that Kohls does not teach claim 250's "processor configured to ... output an investment amount" was determined to be unpersuasive because the Examiner correctly determined that the limitation was met by a combination of Kohls and Rebane (see Final Action 7; Answer 13-14 ). Accordingly, the Appellant's argument as to claim 257 is unpersuasive and the Examiner's rejection is sustained. DECISION We AFFIRM the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 250--'255 and 257-259 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We REVERSE the Examiner's decision rejecting claim 256 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We ENTER A NEW GROUND OF REJECTION for claim 256 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides that "[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review." 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the Appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise 15 Appeal2013-008446 Application 13/135,456 one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner .... (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under§ 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record .... No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART, 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 16 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation