Ex Parte LaMont et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 19, 2016

13042096 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/042,096 03/07/2011
28841 7590 02/23/2016
ConocoPhillips Company
Legal Department - Technology & Intellectual
Property
600 North Dairy Ashford
Houston, TX 77079-1175
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
David C. LaMont
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
41142US 6300
EXAMINER
AHUJA, ANURADHA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3674
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/23/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
Legal-IP@conocophillips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAVID C. LAMONT, JAMES P. SEABA,
THOMAS J. WHEELER, and EDWARD G. LATIMER
Appeal2014-001051
Application 13/042,0961
Technology Center 3600
Before THOMAS F. SMEGAL, ERIC. C. JESCHKE and
JASON W. MELVIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
SMEGAL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
David C. LaMont et al. (Appellants) seek our review under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134 of the Examiner's Final Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims
1-3, 5-12, and 15-17 as being unpatentable over De Francesco (US
2008/0257543 Al, pub. Oct. 23, 2008), Keith (US 3,442,332, iss. May 6,
1969), and Brook (WO 2008/074980 Al, pub. June 26, 2008).2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is ConocoPhillips
Company. Br. 2.
2 Claims 4, 13, 14, and 18-20 were canceled. Id. at 7-9.
Appeal2014-001051
Application 13/042,096
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1 and 12 are independent claims. Claim 1 is reproduced
below and illustrates the claimed subject matter, with disputed limitations
emphasized.
1. A method, comprising:
forming a mixture of flue gas from oxy-fuel combustion
and steam generated prior to being mixed with the flue gas,
wherein the flue gas contains carbon dioxide with an initial
concentration of oxygen that is at least 0.1 volume percent;
injecting the mixture into a subterranean formation for
heating oil in the formation and reacting with the oil at least
some of the oxygen that is from the flue gas and is dissolved in
liquid condensate of the steam;
recovering fluids including the oil that is heated and the
carbon dioxide from the flue gas;
separating the fluids recovered to isolate from a liquid
phase the carbon dioxide containing less than the initial
concentration of oxygen, wherein the separating the fluids
removes the liquid phase from a vapor phase that is at least
95% carbon dioxide by volume; and
transporting to a sequestration site the carbon dioxide
that is separated from the liquid phase.
ANALYSIS
Obviousness of Claims 1-3, 5-12, and 15-17 over De Francesco,
Keith, and Brook
Appellants argue claims 1-3, 5-12, and 15-17 together in contesting
the rejection of these claims as obvious over De Francesco, Keith, and
Brook. See Br. 5---6. We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this
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Application 13/042,096
group, and the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
41.37(c)(l)(iv).
We agree with and adopt as our own the Examiner's factual findings,
legal reasoning, and conclusions concerning the rejection of claim 1. See
Final Act. 3--4. While relying on De Francesco and Keith for various
limitations, the Examiner finds that De Francesco and Keith "fail to disclose
'transporting to a sequestration site the carbon dioxide that is separated from
the liquid phase."' Id. at 4. However, the Examiner determines that
"Brook teaches integrated methods wherein carbon dioxide injection in
formations for hydrocarbon recovery, [is] followed by separation of carbon
dioxide from [the] produced hydrocarbons and [that] possible uses of the
separated carbon dioxide are disclosed." Id. (citing Brook, p. 11, 11. [14]-
26).3 The Examiner reasons that "[a]t the time of invention, it would have
been obvious ... to have modified the combined teachings of De Francesco
and Keith with the aforementioned teachings of Brook to provide for
transportation of the carbon dioxide separated from the liquid phase in order
to sequester the carbon dioxide." Id. (emphasis added).
Appellants contend that claim 1 recites "transporting to a
sequestration site the carbon dioxide that is separated from the liquid phase,"
while the "[ c ]ombined teachings of De Francesco, Keith and Brook lack any
indication or reasoning for sequestration of this carbon dioxide which is
separated from produced liquids." Br. 5. Even though acknowledging that
Brook "provides that the carbon dioxide produced in the process for
3 The possible uses of the separated carbon dioxide disclosed by Brook
include injection into "other subterranean formations," where "[i]t is
envisaged that carbon dioxide may be stored indefinitely." See Brook, p. 11,
11. 22-26.
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Appeal2014-001051
Application 13/042,096
production of electricity ... is 'preferably' used in the oil or gas field,"
Appellants then assert that "Brook 'also envisaged' alternative direct
sequestration of this carbon dioxide without mention of first sending such
carbon dioxide to the oil or gas field." Id.
The Examiner responds that "Brook discloses carbon dioxide injection
into formations for hydrocarbon recovery; and separation of the carbon
dioxide produced together with the hydrocarbons; wherein the separated
carbon dioxide is re-injected into a subterranean formation, or as an
alternative, stored (sequestered) in a depleted formation, aquifer or cavern."
Ans. 3 (again citing Brook, p. 11, 11. 14--26). Furthermore, "[t]he Examiner
interprets Brook as disclosing the compression of a 'dehydrated concentrated
C02' stream to form a 'concentrated C02 stream,"' that "[t]he 'concentrated
C02' stream is then further compressed to form an 'injected C02' stream
for injection into a hydrocarbon formation to produce 'carbon dioxide'
together with the hydrocarbons," and that "[t]he produced 'carbon dioxide'
is then separated from the produced hydrocarbons for re-injection or for
storage (sequestration)." Id. The Examiner observes that "Appellants
appear to interpret Brook as disclosing direct sequestration of the
'dehydrated concentrated C02' stream," and that "Appellant[s']
interpretation does not appear to be commensurate with the actual disclosure
of Brook." Id. We agree.
Relying on their misreading of Brook, Appellants then contend that
"[s]equestration as an alternative to re-injection ... would require sending
the carbon dioxide that is produced in the process described in Brook to the
oil or gas field for injection just to be recovered and shipped out as more is
shipped in for continued injection." Br. 5. Appellants advance this same
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Appeal2014-001051
Application 13/042,096
contention regarding Keith and De Francesco, asserting that both "are silent
on sequestration and thereby also on sequestration as an alternative to re-
inj ection for carbon dioxide separated from production," and that "[b ]y
contrast, only the present application provides processing of carbon dioxide
as reasoning for injecting flue gas from oxy-fuel combustion prior to its
recovery and sequestration. "4 Id. at 6.
First, Appellants are simply attacking Brook in isolation for lacking
support of findings not relied upon by the Examiner, rather than addressing
the Examiner's proposed combination of De Francesco, Keith, and Brook.
Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually
when the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures.
See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As the
Examiner explains, Brook "teaches sequestration as an alternative to re-
inj ection for the carbon dioxide stream separated from production." Ans. 3.
See also Final Act. 3--4. Furthermore, Appellants appear to misread Keith,
which discloses both re-injection and sequestration of carbon dioxide
separated during production of crude oil. See Keith, col. 4, 1. 75---col. 5,
1. 10.
Appellants also contend that without processing of the carbon dioxide
as provided by the present application, "oxygen in the flue gas makes
transportation of the carbon dioxide to a sequestration site problematic since
the oxygen causes corrosion." Br. 6. However, we find Appellants'
contention to be unavailing as it is not commensurate with the scope of
4 We note that recovery and sequestering of carbon dioxide, after injecting
flue gas from oxy-fuel combustion into a subterranean formation, is also
taught by De Francesco at paragraph 28.
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Application 13/042,096
claim 1, which is not limited to transporting carbon dioxide having an
oxygen content that will not cause corrosion, but merely recites
"transporting to a sequestration site the carbon dioxide [containing less than
the initial concentration of oxygen] that is separated from the liquid phase."
Br. 7, Claims App. As we are instructed by our reviewing court, "limitations
are not to be read into the claims from the specification." In re Van Geuns,
988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321
(Fed. Cir. 1989)).
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-3, 5-12, and
15-1 7 as unpatentable over De Francesco, Keith, and Brook.
DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner's rejection.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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