Ex Parte LaFever et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 8, 2017

13764773 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 8, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/764,773 02/11/2013 Malcolm Gary LaFever 1326-0003US1 9252
29855 7590 11/13/2017
Blank Rome LLP - Houston General
717 Texas Avenue, Suite 1400
Houston, TX 77002
EXAMINER
BOSWELL, BETH V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/13/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
hou stonpatents @ blankrome .com
mbrininger @ blankrome. com
smcdermott@blankrome.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MALCOLM GARY LaFEVER and TED NATHAN MYERSON
Appeal 2016-005131
Application 13/764,7731
Technology Center 3600
Before LARRY J. HUME, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.
DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify Anonos Inc. as the real party in interest. Br. 3.
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Application 13/764,773
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants’ disclosed and claimed invention is directed to managing
user data. Abstract, see also Spec. 1:13—16. In a disclosed embodiment,
user data may be collected from a variety of unaffiliated data sources (e.g.,
social networks, e-commerce accounts, and loyalty programs). Spec. 1:18—
2:17, 5:19—20. The gathered data may be aggregated to allow the user to
control disclosure of the information to other third party recipients.
Spec. 6:13—19. The Specification refers to such a system as a private data
concierge (PDC). Spec. 5:12—14. Further, in a disclosed embodiment, a
unique proxy identifier may be associated with the user as a mechanism to
provide user anonymity. Spec. 40:16-41:13.
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is
reproduced below with the disputed limitations emphasized in italics'.
1. A computer-implemented-method for collecting data related to a
user and providing the user with control over said data, comprising:
providing, by a computing device, for a user to select one or more
unaffiliated data sources to be accessed to collect said data, and
recording selections of unaffiliated data sources made by the user;
assigning to each selected data source, by the computing device,
a dynamically changing, unique identifier associated with the user and
the user’s use of the selected one or more unaffiliated data sources',
collecting, on the computing device, said data from the
unaffiliated data sources selected by the user and said associated
dynamically changing, unique identifiers;
aggregating, on the computing device, said data collected from
the unaffiliated data sources by the collecting operation and said
associated dynamically changing, unique identifiers;
generating, on the computing device, an aggregated data profile
associated with said user based on said data, wherein said aggregated
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data profile comprises a plurality of characteristics of said user and said
associated dynamically changing, unique identifiers;
providing, by the computing device, the user with one or more
controls to revise one or more characteristics contained in the user’s
aggregated data profile, thereby forming user-revised characteristics;
providing, by the computing device, the user with one or more
controls for the user to authorize release of said user-revised
characteristics as contained in the user’s aggregated data profile to one
or more third parties without disclosing an identity of the user by
disclosing the dynamically changing unique identifiers associated with
the user,
wherein the one or more controls for the user to authorize release
of said user-revised characteristics include controls for setting one or
more of a plurality of levels of disclosure of the dynamically changing
unique identifiers associated with the user with the release for each of
the one or more third parties,
wherein the level of disclosure is variable and the controls are
configured to allow the user to modify the level of disclosure for one or
more of the third parties at any time, and
wherein the dynamically changing unique identifiers associated
with the user for each of the one or more unaffiliated data sources
change over time;
releasing, by the computing device, said user-revised
characteristics to one or more third parties only when authorized by the
user and only releasing the user-revised characteristics corresponding
to the set level of disclosure to each of the one or more third parties;
tracking, by the computing device, past and current dynamically
changing unique identifiers and mapping said identifiers to the user;
and
facilitating transactions, with the computing device, between the
user and one or more third parties using the tracked past and current
unique identifiers mapped to the user.
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The Examiner’s Rejections
1. Claims 1—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 11.
2. Claims 1, 3, 6—11, and 13—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Moonka et al. (US 2012/0054680 Al;
Mar. 1, 2012) (“Moonka”); King (US 8,364,969 B2; Jan. 29, 2013); and
Amaudruz et al. (US 2011/0311049 Al; Dec. 22, 2011) (“Amaudruz”).
Final Act. 12—21.
3. Claims 2, 4, 5, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Moonka, King, Amaudruz, and Leach (US
2012/0323656 Al; Dec. 20, 2012). Final Act. 22-24.
ANALYSIS2
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellants dispute the Examiner’s conclusion that the pending claims
are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Br. 10-24. In particular, Appellants assert the claims “cause data that
represents a physical object or substance to undergo a physical
transformation.” Br. 12—13. Specifically, Appellants contend “the claimed
invention affirmatively and dynamically obscures data using the
aforementioned DDIDs [(Dynamic De-Identifiers, a term introduced in the
2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
September 2, 2015 (“Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed February 10,
2016 (“Ans.”); and the Final Office Action, mailed March 3, 2015 (“Final
Act.”), from which this Appeal is taken. We note Appellants did not file a
Reply Brief in response to the factual findings and legal conclusions in the
Examiner's Answer.
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Appeal Brief to indicate dynamically changing proxy identifiers, see Br. 13)]
in order to transform data that may previously have been identifiable to third
parties into data that is unidentifiable to third parties.” Br. 16—17. Further,
Appellants assert the claims recite additional elements of data
transformation, including the deletion; addition; substitution or replacement;
serialization; scrubbing, anonymizing, obscuring, and obfuscating; and
separating, disjoining, splitting, segregating, disassociating, or
disaggregating of data or data attributes. Br. 13—15. Additionally,
Appellants argue the claims specify how the computer hardware and
database are specially programmed. Br. 17—18.
For the reasons discussed below, Appellants have not persuaded us of
error. The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis. Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Banklnt’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). If a claim
falls within one of the statutory categories of patent eligibility (i.e., a
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter) then the first
inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially recognized
exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea).
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. If so, the second step is to determine whether any
element, or combination of elements, amounts to significantly more than the
judicial exception. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
Although the independent claims each broadly fall within the statutory
categories of patentability, the Examiner determines the claims are directed
to a judicially recognized exception—i.e., an abstract idea. Final Act. 11. In
particular, the Examiner finds the claims are directed to the abstract idea of
organizing human activities—specifically, “organizing how users control
their data release.” Final Act. 11.
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Instead of using a definition of an abstract idea, “the decisional
mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar
or parallel descriptive nature can be seen—what prior cases were about, and
which way they were decided.” Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353—54 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); accord United
States Patent and Trademark Office, July 2015 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility 3 (July 30, 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/ieg-july-2015-update.pdf (instructing Examiners that “a claimed
concept is not identified as an abstract idea unless it is similar to at least one
concept that the courts have identified as an abstract idea.”). As part of this
inquiry, we must “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior
art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded
subject matter.” Affinity Labs, of Tex., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d
1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, Appellants’ claims generally relate to collecting data associated
with a user and providing the user control over the collected data. See, e.g.,
claim 1. Additionally, the claims recite “assigning ... a dynamically
changing, unique identifier associated with the user.” Thus, when the user
releases selected user data to a third party, the data may be released along
with the dynamically changing, unique identifier; thereby providing a level
of anonymity for the user. As part of controlling the user data to be released,
the claims also allow for the user to “revise one or more characteristics” of
the user data and set a level of disclosure.
Our reviewing court has concluded that abstract ideas include the
concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data
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set, and storing the data in memory. Content Extraction & Transmission
LLCv. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Additionally, the collection of information and analysis of information (e.g.,
recognizing certain data within the dataset) are also abstract ideas. Elec.
Power, 830 F.3d at 1353. Similarly, “collecting, displaying, and
manipulating data” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLCv.
Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Also, the
gathering and combining of data that does not require input from a physical
device is an abstract idea. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elec, for Imaging,
Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Recently, our reviewing court
has also concluded that “creating an index and using that index to search for
and retrieve data” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLCv. Erie
Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Further, merely combining several abstract ideas does not render the
combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea ... to another
abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also
FairWarningIP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093—94 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination of
abstract ideas).
Here, the collection, aggregation, organization, and dissemination of
user data is similar to ideas previously concluded by our reviewing court to
be abstract. See e.g., Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347, Elec. Power,
830 F.3d at 1353, Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351. Additionally, assigning an
identifier associated with a user is similar to the use of an index in a
database. See Erie Indem., 850 F.3d at 1327. Further, in Dealertrack, Inc. v.
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Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the court determined the claim at
issue included three steps of receiving data, selectively forwarding data, and
forwarding reply data. Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333. As the Examiner
explains, “[i]n Dealertrack, the claimed system receives and selectively
forwards credit application data that represents physical objects, but the
court held that this basic concept of processing information through a
clearinghouse was an abstract idea.” Ans. 19.
Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we
analyze the claims under step two to determine if there are additional
limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims
amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2357. The implementation of the abstract idea involved must be “more than
[the] performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities
previously known to the industry.’” Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347—
48 (alteration in original) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359).
Appellants argue the claims recite significantly more to support
eligibility of the patent application. Br. 19—24. In particular, Appellants
assert the claims: (i) effect a transformation of a particular article to a
different state; (ii) include a limitation that is not well-understood or
conventional; or (iii) recite other meaningful limitations beyond linking the
use to a particular technological environment. Br. 19.
Contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the claims do not cause data to
undergo a physical transformation such that the data becomes anonymous
(see Br. 13), rather the claims assign an identifier (i.e., a dynamically
changing unique identifier) that is associated with the user and the user’s use
of the data source. See Ans. 19. Also, many of the examples of
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“transformation” identified by Appellants are not recited in the claims or are
otherwise subsumed by the limitation of “revis[ing] one or more
characteristics contained in the user’s aggregated data profile.” See Br. 13—
15, claim 1; see also In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982)
(limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be relied upon for
patentability).
Further, we disagree with Appellants that the claims add a specific
limitation that was not well-understood, routine, or conventional. As set
forth in the Specification, the private data concierge (PDC) engine may be
run on a computing device. Spec. 26:20-27:1. The recited steps such as
collecting data from data sources, aggregating data together, assigning an
identifier (i.e., index) to the data, providing for inputs from a user to
manipulate the data, and sending data are generic computer functions that
are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known
to the industry. “[T]he use of generic computer elements like a
microprocessor or user interface do not alone transform an otherwise
abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.” FairWarningIP, 839 F.3d
at 1096 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Also, as the Examiner explains, Appellants’ reliance
on extrinsic evidence (i.e., a speech given by the FTC Commissioner, see
Br. 20—21) “merely shows industry’s interest to provide consumer control
over their data. It does not demonstrate how the claimed computing
elements must operate in an unconventional manner to execute the claimed
process.” Ans. 21.
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner that the use of a
dynamically changing unique identifier does not add a meaningful limitation
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beyond generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular
technological environment. Ans. 22. Appellants do not provide persuasive
evidence or argument to support their position. See Br. 22—24.
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Additionally, for similar reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 2—20, which were not argued
separately with particularity. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner relies on the combined teachings of
Moonka, King, and Amaudruz. Final Act. 12—17. In particular, the
Examiner relies on King to teach, inter alia, assigning a unique identifier
associated with the user and the user’s use of the selected one or more
unaffiliated data source. Final Act. 14 (citing King, col. 4,1. 50-col. 5,
1. 50). Additionally, the Examiner finds Amaudruz teaches, inter alia, a
dynamically changing identifier associated with the user changes over time
for each of the unaffiliated data sources and tracking previous (i.e., past)
identifiers. Final Act. 16 (citing Amaudruz 42-48).
We conclude Appellants mischaracterize the claim, asserting the
claim protects the user’s identity “by scrambling data . . . and then providing
a system to re-assemble the data.” Br. 25. This is not recited in the claims.
See Self, 671 F.2d at 1348. Appellants also assert the unique identifiers are
not only associated with the user, but are also purpose-limited, and limited
per transaction. Br. 27. Appellants argue the identifiers of Amaudruz are
“not the appropriate kind to implement the dynamic anonymity features of
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the claimed invention” because the identifiers of Amaudruz “will generally
bear a close relationship to each other.” Br. 26—27. Therefore, Appellants
posit multiple parties holding slightly different keys could collaborate to
relate the keys to each other to yield a higher-access key. Br. 27.
When construing claim terminology during prosecution before the
Office, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the Specification, reading claim language in light of the
Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
We are mindful, however, that limitations are not to be read into the claims
from the Specification. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
Here, the plain language of the claim recites the dynamically changing
identifier associated with the user is unique. There are no additional
limitations as to the level of uniqueness of the identifier. Additionally, there
is no limitation that the unique aspect of the identifier extends to a purpose
or transaction level. See Ans. 25. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded of
Examiner error.
Appellants also argue the Examiner erred in finding the prior art
teaches or suggests “controls for setting one or more of a plurality of levels
of disclosure of the dynamically changing unique identifiers associated with
the user with the release for each of the one or more third parties.” Br. 28—
29. In particular, Appellants contend because King does not teach the use of
dynamically changing unique identifiers, it cannot teach the disputed
limitation. Br. 28. Additionally, Appellants again assert Amaudruz’s
identifiers differ from the claimed dynamically changing unique identifiers
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and that Amaudraz “changes identifiers for an entirely different purpose.”
Br. 28-29.
As an initial matter, “[a]n intended use or purpose usually will not
limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than
define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim
Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2003). Additionally, non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking
references individually where, as here, the ground of unpatentability is based
upon the teachings of a combination of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Rather, the test for obviousness is whether the
combination of references, taken as a whole, would have suggested the
patentee’s invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art. In re Merck
& Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error because the Examiner relies on
the combined teachings of Moonka, King, and Amaudraz to teach the
disputed limitation and Appellants’ arguments are not responsive to the
Examiner’s rejection. See Final Act. 12—17; Ans. 26—27. In particular, the
Examiner relies on Moonka to teach a control interface for reviewing,
managing and controlling the release of personal information and King to
teach associating different levels of personal information with different
tokens (i.e., identifiers). Ans. 26 (citing Moonka Tflf 38, 41, 45, Fig. 3; King,
col. 7,11. 25-65).
Further, we agree with the Examiner’s findings. As shown in Figure 3
of Moonka and the accompanying text, Moonka teaches providing a user
interface “for displaying user list information and providing user control of
user-related information.” Moonka 138. Additionally, King teaches
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various levels of disclosure of user information as “different levels of
granularity.” King, col. 7,11. 30-45. Thus, we agree that the combined
teachings of Moonka, King, and Amaudruz teach or reasonably suggest
controls for setting one or more of a plurality of levels of disclosure of the
dynamically changing unique identifiers associated with the user with the
release for each of the one or more third parties.
Appellants also argue the Examiner erred in finding the prior art
teaches tracking past and current dynamically changing unique identifiers.
Br. 29—31. Appellants acknowledge “tracking/logging techniques in general
are known,” but contend Amaudruz “is not concerned with tracking the full
history of dynamically changing identifiers” and instead tracks past
identifiers using a percentage accuracy threshold. Br. 30-31 (emphasis
omitted).
As an initial matter, we note the claim language does not specify the
manner in which past and current identifiers are tracked. In other words, the
claims do not preclude using a percentage accuracy threshold in tracking
past identifiers. Additionally, the claim language does not specifically recite
tracking the “full history” of the identifiers. Thus, to the extent Appellants
are arguing limitations not present in the claims, we are unpersuaded of
Examiner error. See Self, 671 F.2d at 1348.
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner that it would have been
obvious to apply Moonka’s teaching of tracking database changes to the
track-able identifiers of King and Amaudruz. Ans. 28. An obviousness
analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject
matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”
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KSR Inti Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). “A person of
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”
KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
Appellants also argue the prior art cannot be combined to produce the
surprising and unpredictable result of enabling the full use (and, therefore,
the full value) of user data by transforming the data in ways which make it
less useful for “data mining” and “big data” parties. Br. 34—37. As
discussed above, we disagree with Appellants that there is a
“transformation” of data. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error.
Notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have
suggested to an ordinarily-skilled artisan at the time of the invention, the
totality of the evidence submitted, including objective evidence of
nonobviousness, may lead to a conclusion that the claimed invention would
not have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art. In re Piasecki,
745 F.2d 1468, 1471—72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Objective evidence of
nonobviousness may include solving a long-felt but unsolved need, failure of
others, unexpected results, commercial success, copying, licensing, industry
praise, and industry skepticism. Graham v. Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966);
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc.,
699 F.3d 1340, 1347, 1349-55 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Here, Appellants contend the claimed system satisfies a long-felt,
unmet need to improve privacy by providing user control over revealing user
information to third parties. Br. 37—39. Appellants identify a Pew Research
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Internet Project3 and documents identified in their Information Disclosure
Statement as purported support. Br. 38.
To accord substantial weight to objective evidence requires the
finding of a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed
invention. In re GPACInc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The
burden of showing that there is a nexus lies with the applicant. Demaco
Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir.
1988); see also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Here, Appellants have not alleged a nexus between the proffered
objective evidence and the claimed invention, let alone sufficiently
demonstrated such a nexus. As the Examiner explains, Appellants have not
sufficiently shown that providing user control over revealing user identity
information was a persistent problem. Ans. 30. Although the Pew Privacy
Report may suggest users may want “to better control their identities and
exercise more choice about who knows what,” there is no indication as to
how long this perceived problem has been recognized or what the level of
control over one’s user identity information was (in other words, the Report
indicates a desire for better control and more choice—suggesting, at least,
some level of control and choice already existed). Br. 38 (emphasis altered).
Accordingly, as mentioned above, failure to establish a nexus results
in attribution of very little weight to the objective evidence. Further,
assuming arguendo a nexus were present, as discussed infra, we find the
objective evidence does not outweigh the combined teachings of Moonka,
King, and Amaudruz and the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
3 Available at http://www.pewintemet.Org/2014/l 1/12/public-privacy-
perceptions/.
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For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1. Additionally, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2—13,
which depend therefrom and were not argued separately.
Appellants advance similar arguments of patentability regarding
independent claims 14 and 18 as were presented with respect to independent
claim 1. See Br. 31—34. For similar reasons, these arguments are not
persuasive of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claims 14 and 18. Additionally, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 15—17, 19, and 20, which depend therefrom
and were not argued separately.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—20 under
35U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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