Ex Parte Lad et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 5, 201811143092 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/143,092 06/02/2005 Pankaj B. Lad P60V150 7534 25108 7590 02/06/2018 CANON NANOTECHNOLOGIES, INC. PO BOX 81536 AUSTIN, TX 78708-1536 EXAMINER PADGETT, MARIANNE L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1717 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/06/2018 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte PANKAJ B. LAD, IAN M. MCMACKIN, VAN N. TRUSKETT, NORMAN E. SCHUMAKER, SIDLGATA V. SREENIVASAN, DUANE VOTH, PHILIP D. SCHUMAKER, and EDWARD B. FLETCHER1 ____________ Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 Technology Center 1700 ____________ Before JAMES C. HOUSEL, MONTÉ T. SQUIRE, and BRIAN D. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judges. SQUIRE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL2 Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38, which constitute all 1 Canon Nanotechnologies, Inc. and Molecular Imprints, Inc. (collectively referred to hereinafter as “Appellant”) are identified as the real party in interest. App. Br. 4. 2 In our Decision, we refer to the Specification filed June 2, 2005 (“Spec.”); Non-Final Office Action dated June 26, 2015 (“Non-Final Act.”); Advisory Action dated October 7, 2015 (“Adv. Act.”); Appeal Brief filed February 29, 2016 (“App. Br.”); Examiner’s Answer dated August 9, 2016 (“Ans.”); and Reply Brief filed September 22, 2016 (“Reply Brief”). Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 2 the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. The Claimed Invention Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to a method of dispensing a volume of a liquid on a substrate to fill the features of a template during imprint lithography processes. Spec. ¶ 2; Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 30) (key disputed claim language italicized and bolded): 1. A method for dispensing polymerizable material on a substrate during an imprint lithography process, comprising: dispensing a plurality of spaced-apart droplets of the polymerizable material on regions of the substrate based on a drop pattern, the drop pattern based on an imprint lithography template, each droplet of said droplets having a unit volume associated therewith, with an aggregate volume of the droplets in each region of the regions, each said aggregate volume being a function of a volume of a regional portion of the pattern to be formed thereat, and where the regions include residual regions and feature regions characterized in that dispensing comprises: disposing in the residual regions where the pattern has only a residual layer to be formed, droplets having an aggregate volume dependent upon a thickness of the residual layer to be formed on the residual regions; and disposing in the feature regions where the pattern to be formed has a non residual feature, droplets having an aggregate volume dependent upon the Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 3 thickness of a residual layer to be formed on each region of the feature regions and upon the size of a feature to be formed at said each region of the feature regions, respectively; and; patterning the polymerizable material dispensed on the substrate, using the imprint lithography template to form a patterned layer, the patterned layer having features that are the features in each region of the feature regions, and the residual regions. The References The Examiner relies on the following prior art references as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal: Watts et al., US 2004/0021866 A1 Feb. 5, 2004 (hereinafter “Watts ’866”) Watts et al., US 2004/0038552 A1 Feb. 26, 2004 (hereinafter “Watts ’552”) Rubin US 2004/0089979 A1 May 13, 2004 (hereinafter “Rubin ’979”) Choi et al., US 2004/0112153 A1 June 17, 2004 (hereinafter “Choi ’153”) Sreenivasan et al., US 2004/0124566 A1 July 1, 2004 (hereinafter “Sreenivasan ’566”) Choi et al., US 6,871,558 B2 Mar. 29, 2005 (hereinafter “Choi ’558”) Rubin US 6,929,762 B2 Aug. 16, 2005 (hereinafter “Rubin ’762”) Xu et al., US 2005/0187339 A1 Aug. 25, 2005 (hereinafter “Xu ’339”) Xu et al., US 2005/0192421 A1 Sept. 1, 2005 (hereinafter “Xu ’421”) Watts et al., US 7,027,156 B2 Apr. 11, 2006 (hereinafter “Watts ’156”) Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 4 Watts et al., US 7,071,088 B2 July 4, 2006 (hereinafter “Watts ’088”) Sreenivasan et al., US 7,077,992 B2 July 18, 2006 (hereinafter “Sreenivasan ’992”) Sreenivasan et al., US 7,727,453 B2 June 1, 2010 (hereinafter “Sreenivasan ’453”) McMackin et al., US 2011/0031650 A1 Feb. 10, 2011 (hereinafter “McMackin ’650”) Sreenivasan et al., US 7,943,081 B2 May 17, 2011 (hereinafter “Sreenivasan ’081”) Schumaker US 8,119,052 B2 Feb. 21, 2012 (hereinafter “Schumaker ’052”) Sreenivasan et al., US 8,187,515 B2 May 29, 2012 (hereinafter “Sreenivasan ’515”) Schumaker US 8,512,797 B2 Aug. 20, 2013 (hereinafter “Schumaker ’797”) Schumaker US 8,586,126 B2 Nov. 19, 2013 (hereinafter “Schumaker ’126”) Sreenivasan et al., US 2015/0048050 A1 Feb. 19, 2015 (hereinafter “Sreenivasan ’050”) Choi WO 02/06902 A2 Jan. 24, 2002 (hereinafter “Choi ’902”) The Rejections On appeal, the Examiner maintains the following rejections: 1. Claims 35–38 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, 4th paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends, or for failing to include all the limitations of the claim upon which it depends (“Rejection 1”). Non-Final Act. 3; Ans. 3. Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 5 2. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Choi ’902 (“Rejection 2”). Non-Final Act. 5; Ans. 3. 3. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Xu ’421 or Xu ’339 (“Rejection 3”). Non-Final Act. 11; Ans. 3. 4. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1 and 7– 14, or claims 30–31, or claims 1–20, or claims 1–24, or claims 1–28, or claims 1–71, or claims 1–16 and 21–22, or claims 7–14, or claims 1–8, or claims 1–14, or claims 1–8 of Sreenivasan ’515, or Watts ’156, or Rubin ’762, or Choi ’558, or Watts ’088, or Sreenivasan ’992, or Sreenivasan ’453, or Sreenivasan ’081, or Schumaker ’797, or Schumaker ’052, or Schumaker ’126, respectively; in view of Choi ’902 (“Rejection 4”). Non-Final Act. 14; Ans. 3. 5. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Watts ’156 or Watts ’866 in view of Choi ’902 (“Rejection 5”). Non-Final Act. 20; Ans. 4. 6. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rubin ’762 or Rubin ’979 in view of Choi ’902 (“Rejection 6”). Non-Final Act. 21; Ans. 4. 7. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Choi ’558 or Choi ’153 in view of Choi ’902 (“Rejection 7”). Non-Final Act. 22; Ans. 4. Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 6 8. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Watts ’088 or Watts ’552 in view of Choi ’902 (“Rejection 8”). Non-Final Act. 23; Ans. 4. 9. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sreenivasan ’992 or Sreenivasan ’453 or Sreenivasan ’081 or Sreenivasan ’566 in view of Choi ’902 (“Rejection 9”). Non-Final Act. 24; Ans. 4. 10. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1–36, or claims 1–20 of copending Application No. 14/462,198 (published as Sreenivasan ’050), or Application No. 12/846,211 (published as McMackin ’650), respectively; in view of Choi ’902 (“Rejection 10”). Non-Final Act. 24; Ans. 4–5. OPINION Having considered the respective positions advanced by the Examiner and Appellant in light of this appeal record, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections based on the fact finding and reasoning set forth in the Answer, Advisory Action, and Non-Final Office Action, which we adopt as our own. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments below for emphasis. Rejection 1 Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s § 112 rejection of claims 35–38 as being of improper dependent form (Rejection 1, stated above). See Appeal Br. 10–11 (omitting the Examiner’s § 112 rejection from the listing Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 7 of “Grounds of Rejection to be Reviewed on Appeal”).3 See also Reply Br. 1–4 (providing no discussion of or substantive response to the Examiner’s § 112 rejection of claims 35–38). Accordingly, because the Examiner’s Rejection 1 has not been withdrawn and is not disputed by Appellant, we summarily affirm this rejection. Cf. Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (“If an appellant fails to present arguments on a particular issue — or, more broadly, on a particular rejection — the Board will not, as a general matter, unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the rejection”) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Rejection 2 In response to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 as being obvious over Choi ’902 (Rejection 2, stated above), Appellant presents substantive argument for the patentability of independent claims 1 and 34, but does not present any additional substantive argument for the separate patentability of dependent claims 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 35–38. App. Br. 13–14, 18–19. We select claims 1 and 34 as representative and claims 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 35–38 stand or fall with claims 1 and 34, respectively. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). 3 Because Appellant omits the Examiner’s § 112 rejection from the Appeal Brief, Appellant’s numbering of the rejections in the Appeal Brief does not correctly correspond to the numbering of the rejections maintained by the Examiner and set forth at pages 4–6 of this Decision. For example, Appellant’s reference to “Rejection 1” in the Appeal Brief, actually corresponds to the Examiner’s “Rejection 2,” stated above. Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 8 Claim 1 The Examiner determines that Choi ’902 teaches or suggests a method of automatically dispensing a polymerizable fluid on a substrate surface for imprint lithography processes satisfying all of the steps of claim 1 and thus, concludes that the reference would have rendered claim 1 obvious. Non- Final Act. 6–11 (citing Choi ’902, Abstract, pp. 2, 3, 10–12, 18, Figs. 10, 12, 13, 15A, 15B, 30, 49A, 49B, 49C, 50A, 50B, 50C, claims 1–33, 148). Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 should be reversed because it is based upon the mistaken conclusion that Choi ’902’s process includes or renders obvious the claim steps of “disposing in the residual regions where the pattern has only a residual layer to be formed” and “disposing in the feature regions where the pattern to be formed has a non residual feature.” App. Br. 14. In particular, Appellant contends that Choi ’902 does not teach or suggest “verifying whether or not there is a recess (or feature) in any given region” or “changing the dispensed volume in a region depending upon either the presence or absence of features in that region.” App. Br. 14. Appellant contends that Choi ’902 also makes no mention of the “particular volumes of individual liquid spots” or “any relationship between the volume of the liquid and the features to be formed in any given region of the substrate.” Id. at 14. Appellant also suggests that the Examiner improperly relies on the “unscaled drawing” of Choi ’902’s Figure 13 in making findings regarding the appearance and different sizes of the liquid spots. Id. at 14. Appellant further argues that, in contrast to the claimed invention, Choi ’902 “teaches not filling the gap between the substrate and the Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 9 template” and the reference “does not recognize the need for a thin and uniform residual layer.” App. Br. 16. Lastly, Appellant argues that “someone starting from the teachings of Choi” would not have been led to the claimed invention and the rejection does not provide a “cognizable reason” why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the teachings of Choi ’902 to arrive at the specific method of claim 1. App. Br. 16. We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection. On the record before us, we find that a preponderance of the evidence and sound technical reasoning support the Examiner’s analysis and determination (Ans. 5–15; Non-Final Act. 6–11) that Choi ’902 teaches or suggests all of the steps of claim 1, and conclusion that the reference would have rendered the claim obvious. Choi ’902, Abstract, pp. 2, 3, 10–12, 18, Figs. 10, 12, 13, 15A, 15B, 30, 49A, 49B, 49C, 50A, 50B, 50C, claims 1–33, 148. The Examiner also provides a reasonable basis and identifies a preponderance of the evidence in the record to evince why one of ordinary skill would have been led to Appellant’s claimed method based on Choi ’902’s teachings. Ans. 10–11; Non-Final Act. 8–11. Appellant’s argument that Choi does not teach or suggest “verifying whether or not there is a recess (or feature) in any given region” or “changing the dispensed volume in a region depending upon either the presence or absence of features in that region” (App. Br. 14) is not persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection because, as the Examiner correctly points out (Ans. 9), the claims do not recite or require Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 10 these steps. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184–85 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[L]imitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.”). Moreover, as the Examiner finds (Ans. 9–10) and contrary to what Appellant contends, Choi ’902 does suggest changing the dispensed volume in a region depending upon the presence or absence of features in that region. In particular, as the Examiner finds (Ans. 9), Choi ’902 discloses selecting a template having a predetermined pattern designed to deliver volumes of liquid to the locations in the pattern depending on the features of the template. See, e.g., Choi ’902, p. 3 (disclosing that the fluid may be added in “a variety of patterns” and “[s]uch patterns may be predetermined”), p. 28 (disclosing that “the predetermined pattern is selected such that the liquid fills the gap in a shape that is substantially the same as a shape of the patterned template”). We do not find Appellant’s contention that Choi ’902 makes no mention of the “particular volumes of individual liquid spots” or “any relationship between the volume of the liquid and the features to be formed in any given region of the substrate” (App. Br. 14) persuasive of reversible error based on the fact finding and for the well-stated reasons provided by the Examiner at pages 9–11 of the Answer. In particular, as the Examiner finds (Ans. 10), Choi ’902 is directed to a method of dispensing fluid on the surface of a substrate to fill the features of a template for an imprint lithography process, and teaches applying the fluid to the substrate in a predetermined pattern that may be a pattern of droplets and controlling the amount of fluid added to the substrate to, for example, minimize or eliminate the formation of air bubbles or pockets between the template and the substrate. Choi ’902, Abstract, pp. 2–3, 10 Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 11 (disclosing “spreading the fluid across the entire gap between the imprinting template and the substrate, without unnecessary wastage of excess fluid” and that the “dispensed volume may typically be less than about 130 nl (nano- liter) for a l inch2 imprint area”), 11 (disclosing that the “fluid dispensing method may dispense multiple small drops of liquid that may later be formed into a continuous body as they expand”). The reference also discloses that “[s]mall drops of liquid whose volume may be accurately specified may be dispensed” and a “pattern effective for use in this method should be dispensed in such a way that as droplets expand, they do not trap any air between the template and substrate.” Id. at 11. In addition, the Choi ’902 reference teaches that: Successful imprint lithography may require precise alignment and orientation of the template with respect to the substrate to control the gap in between the template and substrate. Embodiments presented herein may provide a system capable of achieving precise alignment and gap control in a production fabrication process. Id. at 12. Based on Choi ’902’s teachings, we concur with the Examiner’s determination (Ans. 10–11; Non-Final Act. 8–11) that one of ordinary skill in the art would have readily recognized the relationship between the volume of liquid dispensed, pattern of droplets, and the feature pattern of the template to arrive at the claimed method, including selecting an aggregate volume of droplets necessary to fill the features depending on the size and shape of patterned template and sufficient so as to avoid trapping any air between the template and substrate. Choi ’902, pp. 2–3, 10–12, Figs. 10, 12, 13. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (explaining that “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 12 the specific subject matter of the challenged claim . . . a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ”); id. at 416 (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”). Appellant fails to direct us to sufficient evidence or provide an adequate technical explanation to establish why the Examiner’s articulated reasoning lacks a rational underpinning or is otherwise based on some other reversible error. Appellant’s assertions that “someone starting from the teachings of Choi” would not have been led to the claimed invention and the Examiner does not provide a “cognizable reason” why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the teachings of the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention (App. Br. 16) are not persuasive of reversible error because they are conclusory and based on attorney argument. Attorney argument is not evidence. In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Appellant also does not provide an adequate technical explanation sufficient to support these assertions or otherwise rebut the Examiner’s contrary findings in this regard. Moreover, as previously discussed above, we find that the Examiner identifies sufficient evidence in the record and provides articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning explaining why one of ordinary skill in the art would have arrived at Appellant’s claimed invention based on Choi ’902’s disclosure. See Ans. 10–11; Non-Final Act. 8–11. Appellant’s suggestion that the Examiner improperly relies on the “unscaled drawing” of Choi ’902’s Figure 13 in making findings regarding Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 13 the appearance and different sizes of the liquid spots (App. Br. 14) is not persuasive of reversible error because the fact that Choi ’902’s Figure 13 may be an unscaled drawing is irrelevant to the Examiner’s findings and rejection. The Examiner relies on Figure 13 along with pages 2–3 of Choi ’902 for disclosing that a fluid may be applied to the substrate in a predetermined pattern and the predetermined pattern may be a plurality of spaced-apart droplets. Contrary to what Appellant’s argument seems to suggest, the Examiner does not rely on or make any findings regarding the appearance and different sizes of the liquid spots related to or dependent upon whether Figure 13 is drawn to scale. We do not find Appellant’s argument that Choi ’902 teaches not “filling the gap between the substrate and the template” (App. Br. 16) persuasive of reversible error because, as the Examiner notes (Ans. 12), claim 1 does not recite or require the filling of any gaps. Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1184–85. Rather, as the Examiner finds (Ans. 12), the claim recites “feature regions” and “residual regions” and is directed to dispensing droplets with sufficient volume to fill the features of the patterned template. Moreover, as the Examiner finds (Ans. 8) and Appellant acknowledges (App. Br. 14), Choi ’902 does teach filling the gap between the substrate and the template insofar as is necessary to fill the features of the patterned template. See Choi ’902, p. 12 (disclosing dispensing fluid to fill the features of the template and controlling “the gap between the template and substrate”), p. 28 (disclosing that “the predetermined pattern is selected such that the liquid fills the gap in a shape that is substantially the same as a shape of the patterned template”). Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 14 Appellant’s contention that Choi ’902 “does not recognize the need for a thin and uniform residual layer” (App. Br. 16) is not well-taken because no such limitation is recited in the claim (Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1184–85) and the fact that Appellant may have “recognized another advantage which would flow naturally from following the suggestion of the prior art cannot be the basis for patentability when the difference would otherwise [have been] obvious” (Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58, 60 (BPAI 1985)). Claim 34 Although Appellant includes a separate heading and section of the Appeal Brief in response to the Examiner’s rejection regarding independent claim 34 (App. Br. 18), Appellant does not present any new or additional arguments for the patentability of this claim. Rather, Appellant repeats and relies on the same arguments previously presented in support of the patentability of claim 1. Id. at 19–20. We do not find these arguments persuasive for reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection for principally the same reasons previously discussed above in affirming the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Choi ’902. Rejection 3 In response to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 as obvious over Xu ’421 or Xu ’339 (Rejection 3, stated above), Appellant presents substantive argument for the patentability of independent claims 1 and 34 only. App. Br. 16–18, 20–21. The arguments as to claims 1 and 34 do not differ in substance. We select claim 1 as representative and Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 15 claims 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). The Examiner determines that Xu ’421 or Xu ’339 teaches or suggests a method satisfying all of the steps of claim 1 and thus, concludes the references would have rendered the claim obvious. Non-Final Act. 11–14 (citing Xu ’421, Figs. 2, 3, ¶¶ 25–29; Xu ’339, Figs. 2, 3, 5, 6, ¶¶ 5, 16–24, 29). Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection should be reversed for principally the same reasons previously presented and discussed above in response to the Examiner’s Rejection 2 regarding the Choi ’902 reference. Compare App. Br. 16–17 (Rejection 3) with App. Br. 14–16 (Rejection 2). Regarding the Xu ’412 reference, as with the Choi ’902 reference, Appellant argues that the reference is “silent with respect to dispensing different volumes in various regions of the surface depending upon the presence or absence of features in the pattern to be formed at each such region” and “makes no mention of any distribution of the droplets with regard to a desired pattern, or distribution of the droplets with regard to the presence or absence of features.” App. Br. 16. Appellant also argues that Xu ’421 does not teach or suggest “verifying whether [or not] there is a recess (or feature) [] in any given region” or “changing the dispensed volume in a region depending upon either the presence or absence of features in that region.” Id. at 17. Regarding the Xu ’339 reference, Appellant contends that the reference is deficient for the same reasons as Xu ’421 and is “merely cumulative” of the Xu ’421 reference. App. Br. 17. Appellant also contends that the reference makes no mention of the spacing of the droplets and the Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 16 Examiner’s conclusion is “based on an improper assertion of the relative proportions of features in a patent drawing that is not to scale.” Id. at 17–18. We do not find these arguments persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection for principally the same reasons previously discussed above in affirming the Examiner’s Rejection 2 and based on the fact-finding and well-stated reasons provided by the Examiner at pages 12–16 of the Answer and pages 11–14 of the Non-Final Action. Moreover, on the record before us, we find that a preponderance of the evidence and sound technical reasoning support the Examiner’s analysis and determination (Ans. 12–16; Non-Final Act. 11–14) that Xu ’421 and Xu ’339 each teaches or suggests all of the steps of claim 1, and conclusion that the references would have rendered the claim obvious. Appellant’s assertion that the dispensing droplets of a material on a surface step of Xu ’421 is not the same as the “disposing in the residual regions” and “disposing in the feature regions” steps recited in the claims (App. Br. at 16–17) is not persuasive of reversible error because it is conclusory and Appellant does not provide an adequate technical explanation or direct us to any evidence in the record to support it. De Blauwe, 736 F.2d at 705; cf. also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that a “naked assertion” that the references fail to disclose or suggest a claim limitation is not an argument in support of separate patentability). We do not find Appellant’s assertions that the Xu ’339 reference makes no mention of the spacing of the droplets and the Examiner’s conclusion is “based on an improper assertion of the relative proportions of features in a patent drawing that is not to scale” (App. Br.17–18) persuasive Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 17 based on the fact finding and for the reasoning set forth by the Examiner at page 14 of the Answer. In particular, as the Examiner explains (Ans. 14) and previously discussed above with respect to Figure 13 of Choi ’902, the Examiner does not rely on or make any findings regarding the scale of Figure 3 of Xu ’339 and the scale of the figure is irrelevant to the Examiner’s findings and obviousness conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Xu ’421 or Xu ’339. Rejection 4 In response to the Examiner’s nonstatutory double patenting rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 (Rejection 4, stated above), Appellant presents argument for the patentability of independent claims 1 and 34 only. App. Br. 21–24. We select claims 1 and 34 as representative and claims 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 stand or fall with claims 1 and 34. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claim 1 Appellant contends that the Examiner’s nonstatutory double patenting rejection of claim 1 should be reversed because none of the claims of the cited references4 teaches or suggests the limitations: 4 As stated above for Rejection 4, the Examiner cites the following references: Sreenivasan ’515, or Watts ’156, or Rubin ’762, or Choi ’558, or Watts ’088, or Sreenivasan ’992, or Sreenivasan ’453, or Sreenivasan ’081, or Schumaker ’797, or Schumaker ’052, or Schumaker ’126, respectively, in view of Choi ’902. Non-Final Act. 14; Ans. 3. Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 18 “disposing in the residual regions where the pattern has only a residual layer to be formed, droplets having an aggregate volume dependent upon a thickness of the residual layer to be formed on the residual regions” and “disposing in the feature regions where the pattern to be formed has a non residual feature, droplets having an aggregate volume dependent upon the thickness of a residual layer to be formed on each region of the feature regions and upon the size of a feature to be formed at said each region of the feature regions, respectively.” App. Br. 21 (quoting claim 1). Appellant further contends that “none of the claims of Schumaker1 and Schumaker3” teaches or suggests “patterning the polymerizable material dispensed on the substrate, using the imprint lithography template to form a patterned layer,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 22. Claim 34 Appellant contends that the Examiner’s nonstatutory double patenting rejection of claim 34 should be reversed because none of the claims of the cited references teaches or suggests all of the limitations of the claim. App. Br. 22–23 (quoting claim 34). In particular, Appellant contends that “none of the claims of Sreenivasan1, Watts1, Rubin 1, Choi2, Watts2, Sreenivasan2, Sreenivasan3, Sreenivasan 4, Schumaker1, Schumaker2, and Schumaker3, teaches or suggests ‘identifying an imprint lithography template, the imprint lithography template including i) a feature-independent portion, ii) a recessed portion, and iii) a partially-recessed portion,’” as required by claim 34. Id. at 23. We do not find Appellant’s contentions regarding the patentability of claims 1 and 34 persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection because they are conclusory and, without more, insufficient to rebut or Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 19 otherwise show reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection (see De Blauwe, 736 F.2d at 705; Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1356–57), which we find is supported by a preponderance of evidence in the record and based on sound technical reasoning (Non-Final Act. 14–20). Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 for nonstatutory double patenting (Rejection 4, stated above). Rejections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 Appellant does not present any additional substantive arguments in response to the Examiner’s Rejections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, stated above. Rather, Appellant relies on the same arguments presented above in response to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 34 as obvious over Choi ’902 (Rejection 2, stated above). App. Br. 24–26. Accordingly, based on the findings and technical reasoning provided by the Examiner and for the same reasons discussed above for affirming the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 34 as obvious over Choi ’902 (Rejection 2, stated above), we affirm the Examiner’s Rejections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Rejection 10 In response to the Examiner’s provisional nonstatutory double patenting rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 (Rejection 10, stated above), Appellant does not present any new or additional substantive arguments. App. Br. 26–28. Rather, Appellant repeats and relies on essentially the same arguments presented above in response to the Examiner’s nonstatutory double patenting rejection previously discussed above (Rejection 4, stated above). Compare Appeal 2016-008761 Application 11/143,092 20 App. Br. 21–24 (Rejection 4, stated above) with App. Br. 26–28 (Rejection 10, stated above). Appellant also contends that the Examiner’s Rejection 10 should be reversed for the reasons discussed above with respect Rejection 2 regarding claims 1 and 34 because Choi ’902 “fails to provide the aspects . . . missing from the references overall (and from their claims).” Id. at 26, 27. Accordingly, based on the findings and technical reasoning provided by the Examiner and for essentially the same reasons discussed above in affirming the Examiner’s Rejections 2 and 4, stated above, we affirm the Examiner’s Rejection 10. DECISION/ORDER The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 29, 30, and 34–38 are affirmed. It is ordered that the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). 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