Ex Parte KWAG et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 7, 2017

14097921 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 7, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/097,921 12/05/2013 Kyungsoo KWAG 0203-1174 6598
68103 7590 06/09/2017
Jefferson IP Law, LLP
1130 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 420
Washington, DC 20036
EXAMINER
TRAN, BAOTRAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2433
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/09/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
u sdocketing @ j effersonip .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KYUNGSOO KWAG, JAEMIN RYU,
JUNGKYUEN LEE, KYUNGIM JUNG, and HYUNJIN CHOI
Appeal 2017-003467
Application 14/097,9211
Technology Center 2400
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
JESSICA C. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges.
KAISER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Introduction
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1—18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION under
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. (App. Br. 2).
Appeal 2017-003467
Application 14/097,921
EXEMPLARY CLAIM
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for executing an application with a processor
supporting a secure mode domain and a non-secure mode
domain, the method comprising:
receiving a request to be processed in the non-secure mode
domain from the application;
determining an access permission level configured to a
resource used for processing the request;
determining, when the access permission level allows for
access from the secure mode domain, a priority of the
application;
changing the access permission level to allow for access
by the non-secure mode domain according to the priority of the
application; and
processing the request of the application using the
resource in the non-secure mode domain.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 16, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
as being anticipated by Schieman (US 2014/0115693 Al; published Apr. 24,
2014). (Final Act. 4—7).
Claims 2—6 and 11—15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Schieman and Delfs (US 2009/0183009 Al;
published July 16, 2009). (Final Act. 7—11).
Claims 9 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schieman and Shi (US 2012/0023573 Al; published
Jan. 26, 2012). (Final Act. 11—12).
2
Appeal 2017-003467
Application 14/097,921
NEW GROUND OF REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
Before addressing the Examiner’s rejections, we must first consider
whether independent claims 1 and 10 (and their associated dependent
claims) are sufficiently definite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). As discussed
below, we determine they are not, and accordingly, we enter a NEW
GROUND OF REJECTION of claims 1-18 under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
ANALYSIS
The Federal Circuit has stated that “[i]t makes good sense, for
definiteness and clarity . . ., for the USPTO initially to reject claims based
on a well-founded prima facie case of lack of clarity (in its several forms)
based on the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the
entire written description and developing prosecution history.” In re
Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Below we identify the ways
in which the language of claims 1 and 10 “is ambiguous, vague, incoherent,
opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed
invention.” Id. at 1311.
Claim 1 recites, in part, “determining, when the access permission
level allows for access from the secure mode domain, a priority of the
application” and “changing the access permission level to allow for access
by the non-secure mode domain according to the priority of the application.”
In the former, we observe that “determining ... a priority of the application”
is conditioned upon “the access permission level allowing] for access from
the secure domain.” We further observe that the subsequent “changing”
limitation has antecedent basis in the “determining” limitation discussed
above, but it does not explicitly recite the same condition. Thus, it is unclear
3
Appeal 2017-003467
Application 14/097,921
how the “changing” limitation functions within the claim, if at all, when the
condition on the “determining” step is not met. That is, the claim does not
determine a priority when the access permission level does not allow for
access from the secure domain, but the recited step of “changing the access
permission level” is “according to the priority.”
Furthermore, the condition on the “determining” step of claim 1 does
not recite “allowing] for access only from the secure mode domain.”
Although the Specification includes examples that allow for access from the
secure domain but preclude access from the non-secure domain (Spec. 7,
57), the Specification does not provide a definition that limits “access from
the secure mode domain” to access only from the secure mode domain such
that access from the non-secure domain is precluded. For example, the
Background Section of the Specification states that for “legacy OSs and
framework operations,” “by configuring the permission level of the
corresponding resource to ‘secure’ in response to a certain application, it
becomes impossible to access and use the corresponding resource although
there is a request from an application in the non-secure mode domain.”
Spec. 17. One embodiment in the Specification likewise teaches preventing
access from the non-secure mode domain (see Spec. 1 57 (“the mode
switching controller 120 ignores the request from the non-secure mode
controller 110 to prevent the non-secure mode controller 110 from accessing
the resource 200”). As discussed above, however, the Specification does not
preclude a permission level allowing for access in both the secure and non-
secure domains. Indeed, the Specification states that the “description of
various embodiments of the present disclosure is provided for illustration
purpose only and not for the purpose of limiting the present disclosure as
4
Appeal 2017-003467
Application 14/097,921
defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.” Spec. 126.
Therefore, when the access permission level allows for access from both the
secure and the non-secure mode domains, as opposed to only the secure
mode, it is unclear how the subsequent step of "changing the access
permission level to allow for access by the non-secure mode domain” is
performed, if at all, because access by the non-secure mode is already
allowed (i.e., no change appears to be required).
In addition, independent claim 10 recites “a request to be processed in
the non-secure mode domain from the application,” “a request for access to a
resource,” and “the request of the application using the resource in the non-
secure mode domain.” We determine it is unclear to which of the preceding
requests “the request” refers (i.e., the antecedent basis for “the request” is
ambiguous).
For the reasons discussed above, we determine independent claims 1
and 10, and claims 2—9 and 11—18 depending therefrom, are ambiguous,
vague, or otherwise unclear. Accordingly, we enter a new ground of
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 AND 103
As discussed above, we determine the claims are ambiguous, vague,
or otherwise unclear. We further determine that analyzing the Examiner’s
rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 would require us to make
unreasonably speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of the claim
language, which we decline to do. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862—863
(CCPA 1962)
5
Appeal 2017-003467
Application 14/097,921
Therefore, we pro forma reverse the Examiner’s rejections of claims
1-18 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(e) and 103(a).2
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 16, and 17 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Schieman is pro forma reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 2—6 and 11—15 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schieman and Delfs is pro forma
reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 9 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Schieman and Shi is pro forma reversed.
In a new ground of rejection, we reject claims 1—18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) as being indefinite.
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (2010). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.”
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the appellant, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of
the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so
2 In the event of further prosecution, we note that the Examiner’s analysis of
Schieman is presently unclear, including which features of Schieman the
Examiner finds disclose “an access permission level” and “a priority of the
application.” See Ans. 4—5; see also Adv. Act. 2; see also Final Act. 2—5.
6
Appeal 2017-003467
Application 14/097,921
rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in
which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard
under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . .
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
REVERSED; 37 C.F.R, $ 41.50(b)
7