Ex Parte Kurien et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 31, 2018

13925619 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/925,619 06/24/2013 T. Varugis Kurien 13768.2307.1 2772
47973 7590 02/02/2018
WORKMAN NYDEGGER/MICROSOFT
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 1000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
EXAMINER
KORSAK, OLEG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2492
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/02/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Docketing @ wnlaw. com
u sdocket @ micro soft .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte T. VARUGIS KURIEN, DONALD FRANK BRINKMAN,
VINAY BALASUBRAMANIAM, SUYASH SINHA,
ALPESH R. GAGLANI, and TUSHAR SUBODH NENE
Appeal 2017-006380
Application 13/925,619
Technology Center 2400
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and
JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges.
REPKO, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1—20. App. Br. 2.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). We affirm.
1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Microsoft Technology
Licensing LLC. App. Br. 2.
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection (“Final Act.”)
mailed February 4, 2016, (2) the Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed July 21,
Appeal 2017-006380
Application 13/925,619
THE INVENTION
Appellants’ invention authenticates a badge. Spec. 14. A badge can
represent an individual’s skills, training, attributes, or qualifications. Id. An
entity may want to determine whether the badge meets certain criteria—e.g.,
whether a trusted certificate authority signed the badge. Id. ^ 18. The entity
can specify this criteria in a “policy.” Id. A “trustworthy verifier” then
executes the policy to determine whether the badge meets the criteria. Id. If
the badge meets the policy’s criteria, the system displays the badge to the
entity in a trustworthy way. Id.
Claim 1 is reproduced below:
1. In a computing environment a method of authentication
badge, the badge representing at least one of skills, training,
attributes, or qualifications of an individual, the method
comprising:
at a trustworthy verifier, accessing a badge image for a
badge that has been presented to a user and identified by the user
to the trustworthy verifier;
at the trustworthy verifier remote from the user, accessing
policy identified by the user to the trustworthy verifier as a policy
which the user desires the badge to be evaluated against, and
where the trustworthy verifier is trusted by the user to execute
the policy identified by the user;
determining that the badge identified by the user is
compliant with the policy by comparing the badge image to the
policy identified by the user; and
as a result of determining that the badge is compliant with
the policy, engaging in a cryptographic security protocol with a
displayer which includes a secure computer display area such
that the displayer only displays content whose trustworthiness it
can verify, as the displayer only accepts elements on the
trustworthy display from trustworthy entities, thereby causing
2016, (3) the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed December 1, 2016, and
(4) the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed January 30, 2017.
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the badge to he displayed by the displayer in a fashion that
indicates that the trustworthy verifier has executed the policy to
indicate to the user that the purported badge is compliant with
the policy.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies on the following as evidence:
Sauve et al. US 2006/0218403 A1 Sept. 28, 2006
Grigsby et al. US 2010/0209006 Al Aug. 19, 2010
Beaumont et al. US 2011/0264922 Al Oct. 27, 2011
Claims 1—6, 8—16, and 18—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Grigsby and Beaumont. Final Act. 2—9.
Claims 7 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grigsby, Beaumont, and Sauve. Final Act. 9-10.
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER GRIGSBY AND BEAUMONT
Independent Claims 1, 11, and 20
I
Independent claim 1 recites, in part, “at the trustworthy verifier
remote from the user, accessing policy identified by the user to the
trustworthy verifier as a policy which the user desires the badge to be
evaluated against” (emphasis added). Independent claims 11 and 20 recite
similar limitations.
In rejecting claim 1 under § 103 as unpatentable over Grigsby and
Beaumont, the Examiner finds that Grigsby teaches the recited policy.
Final Act. 3. In particular, the Examiner finds that Grigsby’s policy
determines whether the badge is valid. Id. (citing Grigsby Fig. 2). In
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rejecting independent claims 11 and 20, the Examiner addresses the
accessing limitation in a similar way. See Final Act. 7—8.
Appellants argue that Grigsby’s user does not provide or identify any
policy that the user desires the credential to be evaluated against.
App. Br. 8—16, 18—20; Reply Br. 2—\. According to Appellants, the user
only provides an image of the unverified badge and authentication
information. App. Br. 11. In Appellants’ view, Grigsby does not evaluate
the user-provided image using any user-identified policy. Id. at 9, 13, 15,
18—20; Reply Br. 2-A.
Notably, Appellants do not dispute that Grigsby’s system accesses a
policy. Reply Br. 3. In particular, Appellants do not dispute that Grigsby’s
steps 520, 522, 524, and 526 in Figure 5 involve accessing a policy. Id.
(citing Ans. 3). In Figure 5’s process, if the user-provided image matches
one in the credential-image database, step 520 compares the user-provided
authentication information with information from the issuing authority.
Grigsby Fig.5,1 80. If the authentication information is also valid,
Grigsby’s response module notifies the user that the unverified credential is
valid. Id. Because Appellants do not dispute that Grigsby’s system accesses
a policy here, the issues are whether Grigsby’s policy is (1) one in “which
the user desires the badge to be evaluated against” and (2) “identified by the
user” to the system performing these steps. Accord Reply Br. 3.
The independent claims do not recite any step requiring the user to
provide the policy itself, as Appellants argue (see, e.g., App. Br. 9, 13, 15).
Rather, the user’s desired policy could be identified to the trustworthy
verifier in a number of ways.
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This reading of the claim is consistent with the Specification. For
instance, according to the Specification, “[t]he policy 110 can be identified
to, or provided to a trustworthy verifier 112.” Spec. 118 (emphasis added).
That is, providing the policy itself is one way to identify the user’s desired
policy, but not the only one. See id.', see also id. 194 (describing the
embodiments as “illustrative and not restrictive”).
The Examiner finds that Grigsby’s user identifies the recited policy by
sending an image to the service. Final Act. 3 (citing Grigsby Fig. 2, step
224). We agree. By sending the information to Grigsby’s badge
information service, the user identifies the service’s policy as the one that
the user desires the badge to be evaluated against. See Grigsby Fig. 2. As
noted above, Grigsby’s badge information service uses some policy.
Id. Fig.5,1 80. Although the user does not provide the policy itself, the act
of choosing Grigsby’s badge information service as the verification tool is
an identification of a policy. For example, a user must use a cell phone and
choose to begin the verification process with Grigsby’s particular service.
See id. ]Hf 54—55 (describing Fig. 2). The user initiates the verification
process by sending the image to the service. Id. Fig. 2. The service treats
this communication as “a request from the user,” and in this way, the user
identifies to the service that the service’s policies are the ones desired.
Id. 1 56. Accordingly, we agree that Grigsby’s user identifies a policy by
sending an image to the system to initiate the verification procedure.
Final Act. 3.
Furthermore, as the Examiner discusses, Grigsby’s policies have
certain selectable criteria. Ans. 3 (discussing various criteria). The
Examiner notes that Grigsby’s criteria include type of badge, the issuing
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state, among others. Id. For example, Grigsby’s user can specify that the
unverified credential is a police badge from California. Grigsby 1 66,
discussed in App. Br. 12. The system then evaluates this credential against
Californian police badges. Grigsby 1 66. In this additional way, we agree
with the Examiner that the user can further identify a policy that the user
desires the badge to be evaluated against. See id.', Ans. 3 (discussing the
criteria in Grigsby 1 66).
On this record, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
finding that Grigsby accesses a “policy identified by the user to the
trustworthy verifier as a policy which the user desires the badge to be
evaluated against,” as recited in the independent claims.
II
Independent claim 1 further recites, in part, “as a result of determining
that the badge is compliant with the policy . . . causing the badge to the
displayed by the displayer” (emphasis added). Independent claims 11 and
20 recite similar limitations.
The Examiner finds that Grigsby teaches all limitations of claim 1
except for the recited cryptographic security protocol with a displayer
including a secured display area. Final Act. 4. For the feature missing from
Grigsby, the Examiner turns to Beaumont. Id. In particular, the Examiner
finds that Beaumont teaches a greyed-out untrusted portion and a displayed
trusted portion. Id. According to the Examiner, Beaumont’s example
includes the recited secure computer display area. Id. The Examiner
combines Beaumont’s teachings with Grigsby’s service, which
communicates issuing authentication information 244 for the user. Id.
(citing Grigsby 159).
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Appellants argue that the Examiner has not shown that Grigsby
displays a badge to the user as recited. App. Br. 9, 11, 13, 15, 20;
Reply Br. 4. According to Appellants, Grigsby causes a “notification to be
displayed,” not the badge. Reply Br. 4. We disagree.
Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive because they do not
squarely address the Examiner’s reliance on Grigsby in combination with
Beaumont to securely deliver a badge image. Accord Ans. 3^4.
In particular, the Examiner relies on Beaumont to teach displaying
only verifiably trustworthy content. Id. at 4 (citing Beaumont 1182). In
Grigsby, the content is the badge image. Grigsby 1 57, cited in Final Act. 3.
For example, Grigsby’s database contains issuing authority information 244.
Grigsby 155. Grigsby’s issuing authority information 244 stores verified
authentication information for all badges included in badge information 232.
Id. 1 58. Badge information 232 may include an image of a valid FBI badge
{id.), and the authentication information may include the officer’s image
{id. 1 60). Grigsby’s service may also deliver a response document with
information to the user. Id. 1 59. Therefore, Grigsby at least suggests
communicating policy-compliant content to the user and teaches that policy-
compliant content includes the badge image. See id. 11 57, 59, cited in
Final Act. 3^4.
The Examiner proposes displaying Grigsby’s policy-compliant
content, including the badge image, using Beaumont to secure the
connection for that display. Final Act. 4 (citing Grigsby 1 59;
Beaumont H 39, 182). In this way, the Examiner’s proposed enhancement
predictably uses the prior art according to established functions, and
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involves a creative step well within the level of those ordinarily skilled in the
art. See KSR Inti Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417, 421 (2007).
On this record, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
finding that Grigsby and Beaumont collectively teach causing the badge to
be displayed by the displayer as a result of determining that the badge is
compliant with the policy, as recited in the independent claims.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1,11, and 20, as well as dependent claims 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16,
and 19, which are not argued separately.
Claims 3, 5, 13, and 15
Claim 3 recites, in part, “providing a report that indicates badges that
are compliant with the policy and provides information about why badges
that are non-compliant with the policy failed the policy.” Claim 13 recites a
similar limitation.
Regarding claims 3 and 13, the Examiner finds that Grigsby teaches
this limitation. Final Act. 5 (citing Grigsby Fig. 5), 7; Ans. 3 (citing
Grigsby 1 53). Appellants argue that Grigsby does not indicate why the
badge is non-compliant. App. Br. 12 (discussing Grigsby 48, 62);
Reply Br. 5(discussing Grigsby 1 53). We are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in this regard.
In the paragraph cited in the Answer (Ans. 3), Grigsby’s response
module notifies the user that unverified credential 112 is invalid.
Grigsby 1 53. Contrary to Appellants’ argument (Reply Br. 5), notification
118 tells the user why. Grigsby 1 53. Specifically, notification 118 tells the
user that the person presenting the badge is not an authorized individual
associated with the Utah state police badge having the user-provided
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number. Id. To verify the credential, Grigsby’s method uses a matching
image, a valid range of numbers, among other criteria. See id. 1 58. So, the
badge could be invalid for several reasons. See id. 1 58. But in the cited
example, badge number 445398 is issued to Officer Frank Hernandez, not
the individual presenting the badge, John Smith. Id. H 51, 52. Here,
Grigsby communicates this to the user. Id. 1 53. Thus, we see no error in
the Examiner’s finding that Grigsby provides the recited report and
information about non-compliance. See Ans. 3 (citing Grigsby 1 53).
Appellants further argue that, in relying on Grigsby’s paragraph 53,
the Examiner has combined features of different embodiments without an
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to do so. Reply Br. 5.
According to Appellants, Grigsby’s Figure 1 and Figure 2 are separate
embodiments. Id. We are not persuaded.
Grigsby describes Figure 1 as “a block diagram illustrating one
embodiment of a system for visual credential verification.” Grigsby 116.
Grigsby describes Figure 2 as “a schematic block diagram illustrating an
exemplary division of tasks and information in a system implementing the
present invention.” Id. 1 54 (emphasis added). That is, these figures
illustrate different types of block diagrams, each showing different
information. Compare id. Fig. 1 with id. Fig. 2. For instance, Figure 1
shows a high-level flow of information through various modules. See id.
Fig. 1. Figure 2, however, shows a series of steps and tasks along with the
entity performing them. See id. Fig. 2. Indeed, Appellants do not explain
how the corresponding embodiments are different. See Reply Br. 5. Nor do
Appellants explain why the system of Figure 1 does not notify the user in the
same way as Figure 2. See id. On this record, we are unpersuaded by
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Appellants’ argument that these figures correspond to different
embodiments. See id.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 13,
as well as claims 5 and 15, which are not argued separately.
Claims 9 and 18
Claims 9 and 18 recite, in part, “the trustworthy verifier is selected to
be a trustworthy verifier by voting of members of a federation.”
The Examiner finds that Grigsby teaches this limitation because the
badge information service is a government-provided service. Ans. 5 (citing
Grigsby 1 55). According to the Examiner, Grigsby’s government-provided
services are controlled by officials selected by voting of members of a
federation, such as the state of Utah or the United States. Ans. 5.
Appellants argue that, although a government-provided service might
be selected to be trustworthy by the recited voting members, Grigsby does
not disclose this is the case. App. Br. 22. Moreover, Appellants contend
that the claims require that the verifier is selected by the recited voting, not
that the verifier is controlled by officials selected to be officials by voting of
a federation’s members. Reply Br. 6.
Notably, claim 9 is a method claim. Yet, claim 9 does not
affirmatively recite a step of voting or selecting. Rather, the selection is
recited as the trustworthy identifier’s source or origin. Essentially, the
claimed selection is an unobservable characteristic of the trustworthy
verifier. That is, one would have to be informed about the vote in order to
distinguish one verifier from another.
Claim 18 further supports reading the recited selection as a
source/origin limitation. Claim 18 is directed to a system. The components
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of the system—i.e., one or more processors and computer readable
medium—do not carry out the selecting and voting. The recited members of
a federation are not part of claim 18’s system. In claim 18, like claim 9, the
selection is recited as a characteristic of the trustworthy verifier.
Given this understanding of the claims, Appellants have not
explained, persuasively, how the recited selection imparts a characteristic
that distinguishes the recited verifier from Grigsby’s verifier. See
App. Br. 22; Reply Br. 9. Because the recited voting and selection are not
recited as method steps in claim 9 or functions that the system in claim 11
carries out, Appellants have not shown how the claimed method and system
differ from Grigsby’s. For at least this reason, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in finding that the limitation at issue would have been
obvious over the Grigsby-Beaumont combination.
Additionally, the Examiner’s finding that Grigsby suggests that the
verifier is selected in the recited manner (Ans. 5) is reasonable. In
particular, Grigsby teaches that authentication information is provided by the
Utah state police. Grigsby 1 52. Grigsby also teaches that a government
provides the badge information service. Id. 1 55.
The Examiner finds that Grigsby’s government-provided services are
controlled by officials selected by voting of members of a federation—i.e.,
citizens of Utah in Grigsby’s example. Ans. 5. Although Appellants argue
that this arrangement would not satisfy the claim (Reply Br. 6), we agree
with the Examiner. Here, the Examiner broadly, but reasonably, construes
the limitation “by voting of members of a federation” to mean that the vote
indirectly determines the selection of the verifier. See Ans. 5. That is, the
claim does not expressly require that the federation members vote on the
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verifier to be the trustworthy verifier, only that the verifier is selected by
voting on something. Here, the Examiner finds that the verifier is selected to
be a trustworthy verifier by members of a federation voting on the officials.
Id. Because the claims broadly cover several ways of using the vote to
select a verifier, we agree that Grigsby suggests that the trustworthy verifier
is selected to be a trustworthy verifier by voting of citizens of Utah. Id.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9 and 18.
THE REMAINING OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
Claims 7 and 17 depend from claims 1 and 11, respectively.
Appellants, however, do not argue claims 7 and 17, separately with
particularity. See App. Br. 7—22; Reply Br. 2—6. Therefore, for the reasons
discussed in connection with claims 1 and 11, we also sustain the rejections
of claims 7 and 17.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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