Ex Parte Kurata et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 26, 2018

13107468 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/107,468 05/13/2011 Yoshinori KURATA
22850 7590 03/28/2018
OBLON, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
1940 DUKE STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
452373US8PPMSH 7484
EXAMINER
COPPOLA, JACOB C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/28/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
patentdocket@oblon.com
oblonpat@oblon.com
tfarrell@oblon.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YOSHINO RI KURA TA, JUNICHIRO TSUJI,
HIROSHI NAKAYAMA, SHOUICHI DOI, and MASAHIRO MORITA
Appeal2017-000215 1
Application 13/107,4682
Technology Center 3600
Before BRUCE T. WIEDER, BRADLEY B. BAY AT, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.
BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's final
rejection of claims 1-8 and 10-13. 3 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b ).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
1 Our Decision references Appellants' Appeal Brief ("Br.," filed Jan. 29,
2016), the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed July 28, 2016) and the Final
Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed Nov. 27, 2015).
2 Appellants identify "Sony Corporation" as the real party in interest. Br. 1.
3 Claim 9 is withdrawn from consideration. Id. at 29 (Claims App'x).
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THE INVENTION
Appellants' "invention relates to a coupon selection support
apparatus, a coupon selection support system, a coupon selection support
method, and a program." Spec. 1. Independent claim 7, reproduced below
with bracketed notations and added formatting, is illustrative of the subject
matter on appeal and recites:
7: A coupon selection support method comprising:
[(a)] acquiring commercial product information
associated with commercial products subject to a coupon;
[ (b)] analyzing, by processing circuitry, the commercial
products subject to a coupon on the basis of the acquired
commercial product information to relate coupons of the
commercial products having associated commercial product
information with each other,
wherein analyzing the commercial products includes
associating each of the commercial products with at least one of
a plurality of product classifications;
acquiring a coupon usage log of a user;
[ ( c)] analyzing a purchase timing of a certain
commercial product of the commercial products purchased by
the user in the past on the basis of a usage log acquired at the
usage log acquisition step;
[(d)] predicting a next purchase timing of said certain
commercial product, based on the analyzed purchase timing;
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[ ( e)] determining the product classification which the
user prefers based on the coupon usage log of the user, the
product classification indicating a grade of the certain
commercial product; and
[(t)] preferentially presenting, via Internet in a form of
data, based on the determined product classification which the
user prefers, at said next purchase timing, a certain coupon for
said certain commercial product and coupons with the
determined product classification which the user prefers and
related by the processing circuitry to the certain coupon.
Br. 27-28 (Claims Appendix).
THE REJECTIONS
Claims 1-8 and 10-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to an abstract idea without significantly more.
Claims 1-8 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Rapoport (US 2009/0031209 Al, pub. Jan. 29, 2009) and
Deaton (US 6,684,195 Bl, iss. Jan. 27, 2004). 4
Claims 11-13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Rapoport, Deaton, and Turner (US 2005/0173522 Al,
pub. Aug. 11, 2005).
4 We treat the Examiner's inadvertent exclusion of claim 10 in the statement
of the rejection as harmless error because claim 10 is subsequently rejected
in the body of the rejection. See Final Act. 9.
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ANALYSIS
Non-Statutory Subject Matter Rejection
At the outset, we note that Appellants argued the Examiner's § 101
rejection of claims 1-8 and 10-13 as a group. See Br. 12-19. We select
independent claim 7 as the representative claim for this group, and, thus,
claims 1-6, 8, and 10-13 stand or fall with claim 7. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
In determining whether claim 7 is drawn to patent-ineligible subject
matter, the Examiner applied the now common two-step test introduced in
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012) and further explained by the Supreme Court in Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). The first step in that
analysis is to determine whether the claim at issue is directed to a patent-
ineligible concept such as an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. If so,
the inquiry proceeds to step two to look at the claim for "something more"
by "examin[ing] the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains
an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into
a patent-eligible application." Id. at 2354, 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at
1294, 1298). This inventive concept must do more than simply recite "well-
understood, routine, conventional activity." Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
Under the first step of that analysis, the Examiner determined that the
claims "are directed to the abstract idea of analyzing commercial products
subject to a coupon on the basis of acquired commercial product information
to relate coupons of the commercial products having associated commercial
product information with each other ... " Final Act. 2-3. The Examiner
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additionally determined that the process steps recite an abstract idea because
they can be performed mentally and/or with a pen and paper, "and therefore
the above process is an idea 'of itself,' and consequently merely an abstract
idea." Id. at 3; see also Ans.4 (citing CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
Appellants argue that the claims are not directed to a judicial
exception because they are not directed to any abstract idea identified by the
Supreme Court in Alice, e.g., "fundamental economic practices, certain
methods of organizing human activities, ideas, and mathematical
relationships or formulas." Br. 12-13. This argument is not persuasive
because the Examiner identifies the abstract idea as an "idea 'of itself"' and
cites CyberSource in support of that determination. See supra.
"The 'abstract idea' step of the inquiry calls upon us to look at the
'focus of the claimed advance over the prior art' to determine if the claim's
'character as a whole' is directed to excluded subject matter." Affinity Labs
of Tex. v. DirectTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016 (quoting
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2016)); see also Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Although there is no definitive rule to determine what
constitutes an "abstract idea," the Federal Circuit has explained that "both
[it] and the Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare claims at
issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in
previous cases." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1334. Contrary to Appellants'
contention that the claimed features need to "have been explicitly identified
as abstract ideas" (Br. 13), "the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to
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examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be
seen - what prior cases were about, and which way they were decided."
Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841F.3d1288, 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that "there
is no requirement for an Examiner to only reject claims to abstract ideas
'that have been explicitly identified as abstract ideas' by the courts." Ans. 5.
To that end, we note the similarity between the steps recited in claim 7
and the claims before the Federal Circuit in Electric Power. There, the court
held that the claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas,
explaining that "[ t ]he advance they purport to make is a process of gathering
and analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying the results,
and not any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing those
functions." Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354 ("we have treated analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the
abstract-idea category.").
As in Electric Power, the focus of the claim here is not on "an
improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract
ideas that use computers as tools." Id. The steps of "acquiring" (collecting
information), "analyzing," "predicting" (identifying from past purchases),
"determining," and "presenting" (displaying), taken individually are
themselves directed to an abstract idea. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F .3d at
1343 (When "the focus of the asserted claims" is "on collecting information,
analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,"
the claims are directed to an abstract idea.). Merely combining these
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abstract ideas as claimed does not render the combination any less abstract.
Cf Shortridge v. Found. Constr. Payroll Serv., LLC, No. 14-CV-04850-JCS,
2015 WL 1739256 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2015), ajfd, 655 F. App'x 848 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). The steps are abstract ideas because, for example, they could be
performed through human intelligence alone. "[A ]pplication of [only]
human intelligence to the solution of practical problems is no more than a
claim to a fundamental principle." In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 965 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en bane), aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (quotation marks omitted).
Looking at the steps recited in claim 7, steps (a), (c), (d), and (e) are
not attached to any device, and as the Examiner determined, can reasonably
be practiced by human intelligence alone or by pen and paper. See Ans. 5---6.
Step (b) is the only step attached to a device and the only step that could be
argued as being difficult to perform mentally. But the device that performs
"analyzing" step (b) is recited in the claim simply as "processing circuitry,"
a well-known generic computer element. Adding such an element to a step
that could otherwise be performed mentally does little to transform the step's
abstract character. See Bancorp Services LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("the computer simply
performs more efficiently what could otherwise be accomplished
manually").
For example, Appellants' disclosure describes a coupon database that
"stores four types of coupons (coupon IDs=OOOl, 0002, 0003, and 0004)
with shampoos as the coupon subject commercial product." Spec. 24. The
recited "analyzing, by processing circuitry, the commercial
products ... " step of claim 7 is described as:
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analyzing the character strings included in the commercial
product names can sort the commercial products having coupon
IDs=OOOl, 0002, 0003, and 0004 in a series called "shampoo"
from a common character string. From this analysis result, the
coupon analysis module 104 sorts coupon IDs=OOO 1, 0002,
0003, and 0004 into a series called "shampoo."
Id. Appellants, thus, describe this process of "analyzing" as comparing and
sorting information and displaying the results, without "any particular
assertedly inventive technology for performing those functions ... [which
the court has held to be] directed to an abstract idea." Elec. Power Grp., 830
F.3d at 1354. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (organizing, displaying, and
manipulating data encoded for human and machine-readability is directed to
an abstract concept); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity
Company, 850 F.3d 1315, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("creating and using an
index to search for and retrieve data ... an abstract concept.").
We disagree with Appellants' contention that this case is similar to
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
because "the claims are rooted in computer technology, and address issues
associated with presenting coupons via Internet." Br. 15-16. We see no
parallel between the present claims and those in DDR Holdings. In DDR
Holdings, the Federal Circuit determined that, although the patent claims at
issue involved conventional computers and the Internet, the claims
addressed the problem of retaining website visitors who, if adhering to the
routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be
transported instantly away from a host's website after "clicking" on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
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The court, thus, held that the claims were drawn to patent-eligible subject
matter because they claim a solution "necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks." Id.
No such technological advance is evident in the present invention.
Unlike the situation in DDR Holdings, Appellants do not identify any
problem particular to computer networks and/or the Internet that claim 7
allegedly overcomes. See Ans. 6. In other words, the claimed invention in
DDR Holdings did not merely use the Internet but rather changed how
interactions on the Internet operated. Instead, Appellants' coupon
management process of claim 7 merely employs a generic computing
element to perform the generic computer functions of analyzing and of
presenting (a coupon) via the Internet. Contrary to Appellants' argument,
the solution here is not rooted in computer technology. Rather, the solution
here is rooted in presenting desired coupons to users, a business solution.
Spec. 36 ("the user checks the display list shown on the display section of
the user terminal 40 for desired coupons.").
Although computer implementation may make the coupon
management process convenient, more accurate or more efficient (Br. 16
("the time and labor for using coupons are reduced, thereby significantly
enhancing user convenience."), that does not make the claimed invention
any less abstract. "[R ]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more
quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible."
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Furthermore, Appellants' allegation that "the present claims enable a
reduction of network traffic load and thus increasing the speed of network
communication via Internet by not transmitting to a user, via Internet,
unrelated coupons ... and inextricably tied to computer network
technology" (Br. 16 (emphasis omitted)) is unpersuasive because merely
presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
information, without more, is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection
and analysis. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. Indeed, we find that
the only recitation in the claims related to computer networks is
"preferentially presenting, via Internet ... a certain coupon" (see Br., Claims
App.), which merely recites the display function in general terms (i.e., via
Internet) and the only technical means of performing that function by
generic processing circuitry. Appellants do not point us to any claim
language in light of the Specification to support their allegation. See Ans. 8
("Appellants reach a conclusion regarding the benefits of the present claims,
but have not provided any evidence to support their conclusion."). See also
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) ("The district court erred in relying on technological details set
forth in the patent's specification and not set forth in the claims to find an
inventive concept."); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2018) ("[Claim 1] does not recite any of the purportedly unconventional
activities disclosed in the specification."). In short, Appellants have not
persuasively shown that the claimed invention provides any technological
improvement to the functioning of any computing network.
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Turning to the second step in Alice, we agree with the Examiner and
conclude that claim 7 does not contain an inventive concept sufficient to
"'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application."
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citation omitted). The introduction of "computer
circuitry" into the claim does not alter the analysis here. 5 The claim here
does no more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract
idea on a generic computer. In fact, the only portion of claim 7 that could be
considered "technological" lies in process step (b ), which is inadequate to
confer subject matter eligibility. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355
("Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the specification, requires
anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and
display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired
information"); see also Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333
5 [T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it"' is not
enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea "'to a particular technological environment."'
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a
computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to "implemen[ t ]" an abstract idea
"on . . . a computer," that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the pre-emption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation
is not generally the sort of "additional featur[ e ]" that provides
any "practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself."
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted).
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(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Simply adding a 'computer aided' limitation to a claim
covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render [a]
claim patent eligible") (citation omitted).
Appellants contend that "even if the present claims are interpreted to
be directed to an abstract idea ... the present claims recite significantly
more than merely an abstract idea." Br. 17. In support of this argument,
Appellants merely reproduce the claim language, indicate that there is no
mention of the claimed features in the July 2015 Update, and assert that "the
claimed features are recited with specificity and are not 'claimed in a merely
generic manner."' Id. at 18. But repeating the claim language fails to
advance Appellants' position by apprising us of error by the Examiner.
Moreover, "the fact that the present claims patentably distinguish over the
applied references ... is [not] evidence that the claims recite features that
amount to significantly more than merely the abstract idea." See Br. 19.
Actually, a finding that the claims may be novel and nonobvious does not
conflict with a finding of ineligible subject matter, because "a claim for a
new abstract idea is still an abstract idea." Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566
U.S. at 90). Even if the claimed concept is "[g]roundbreaking, innovative,
or even brilliant" does not by "itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry." Ass 'n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013).
The question in step two of the Alice framework is not whether an additional
feature is novel, but whether the implementation of the abstract idea
involves "more than performance of 'well-understood, routine, [and]
conventional activities previously known to the industry."' Content
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Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass 'n, 776 F.3d
1343, 1347--48 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Alice, 134
S. Ct. at 2359). Indeed, "[t]he 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process,
or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-189.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded for the reasons set forth above that
the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 7, including claims
1-6, 8, and 10-13, which fall with claim 7.
Obviousness Rejections
Claims 1-8 and 10
In contesting the Examiner's obviousness rejection over Rapoport and
Deaton, Appellants argue that Deaton, on which the Examiner relies (Final
Act. 7 (citing Deaton col. 74, 11. 6-27)) fails to disclose "determin[ing] the
product classification which the user prefers based on the coupon usage log
of the user," as required by independent claim 1. Br. 21. According to
Appellants:
Deaton is understood to determine a related coupon to be
generated based on purchase history of a user (e.g., purchase
history that a user bought coffee), and not based on "coupon
usage log" of the user (e.g., a log that a user used a coupon of
coffee). Deaton stores coupon cashing history of a customer, but
the coupon cashing history is used to identify a "bargain
shopper" and generate incentives at the point of-sale in order to
enable the customer to be incented (col. 74, lines 50-62), and not
to determine a product classification (indicating a grade of a
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certain commercial product) which the customer prefers and
preferentially present coupons with the determined product
classification.
Id. at 21-22 (emphasis omitted).
In response, "the Examiner finds this argument has been withheld
from the Examiner during prosecution (the 2015 November Final Office
Action closed prosecution) and has now been presented for the first time to
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board." Ans. 13. According to the Examiner,
"[ o Jn this basis alone, the withheld arguments should not be found
persuasive by the Board, since such arguments are untimely and contrary to
the orderly prosecution of the instant application." Id. (citing "Jn re
Goodman, 3 USPQ2d 1866, 1872 (Comm'r Pat. 1987)").
We do not agree with the Examiner because the prosecution history
shows that Appellants amended the independent claims to include this
disputed limitation on October 6, 2015, just prior to the issuance of the Final
Office Action on November 27, 2015. Therefore, Appellants could not have
had the opportunity to argue any findings made by the Examiner as to this
limitation prior to the issuance of the final rejection, and, for that matter,
withhold any corresponding arguments.
We also do not agree with "the Examiner[' s] conclu[ sion] that the
'customer database' of Deaton is reasonably interpreted to read on the
claimed 'coupon usage log."' Ans. 14. Although the Examiner
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acknowledges that Deaton's customer database merely logs transaction data6
and does not expressly disclose "determining the product classification
which the user prefers based on the coupon usage log of the user," the
Examiner however reasons that "one of ordinary skill would understand
(and/or find it obvious) to store the coupon cashing history in the customer
database." Id. (citing Deaton col. 74, 11. 50-62). But we find Deaton's
purpose of a coupon cashing history is to store the amount of redemption of
coupons by a customer "to identify a 'bargain shopper,' such that incentives
may be generated at the point-of-sale in order to enable the customer to be
incented." Deaton col. 74, 11. 50-62. There is no suggestion in the relied
upon portions of Deaton that the stored coupon cashing history includes any
information associated with a particular coupon used by a customer (i.e.,
grade of the certain commercial product) in order to determine the product
classification which the customer prefers, as required by claim 1. The
Examiner has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for the rejection
and may not resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions, or hindsight
reconstruction to supply deficiencies in its factual basis.
that
Furthermore, we disagree with the Examiner's alternative reasoning
one of ordinary skill in the art would find it obvious for the
coupon usage history to include product information similar to
that in the "shopping history" ... [and] to determine a product
6 "The customer records also include customer information, such as
verification data (such as verification status) as well as other selected
transactional data (such as transaction frequency and dollar volume), the
verification and transaction data being regularly updated with new data
(such as during transaction verification)." Deaton col. 4, 11. 43--46.
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classification indicating the grade of the product . . . [because
s ]uch modification to Deaton would be readily understood by
one of ordinary skill in this art and would be a mere matter of
design choice.
Ans. 16. There clearly are cases where minor changes in the location and/or
orientation of elements to arrive at the claimed invention may be an obvious
matter of design choice. For example, "when a patent simply arranges old
elements with each performing the same function it had been known to
perform and yields no more than one would expect from such an
arrangement, the combination is obvious." KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (citations and emphasis omitted). However, we
find this reasoning inapplicable to the subject matter claimed and
insufficient to support a conclusion of obviousness under the facts of this
case.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 as
obvious over Rapoport and Deaton, including independent claims 6-8,
which recite substantially similar subject matter and are rejected based on
the same deficient finding. See Final Act. 4--9. For the same reasons, we do
not sustain the rejection of claims 2-5 and 10, which depend from claim 1.
Cf In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("dependent claims
are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are
nonobvious").
Claims 11-13
Claims 11-13 depend directly or indirectly from independent claim 1,
and the Examiner's reliance on Turner does not cure the above discussed
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deficiency. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 11-13 as
obvious over Rapoport, Deaton, and Turner.
DECISION
The rejection of claims 1-8 and 10-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The rejections of claims 1-8 and 10-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are
reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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