Ex Parte Kuhmann et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 15, 201713639765 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 15, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/639,765 10/05/2012 Karl Kuhmann 404556US99PCT 5534 22850 7590 06/19/2017 OBLON, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. 1940 DUKE STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314 EXAMINER PATTERSON, MARC A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1782 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/19/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patentdocket @ oblon. com oblonpat @ oblon. com tfarrell@oblon.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KARL KUHMANN, ANDREAS DOWE, and RAINER GOERING Appeal 2016-000186 Application 13/639,7651 Technology Center 1700 Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, BEVERLY A. FRANKLIN, and GEORGE C. BEST, Administrative Patent Judges. DELMENDO, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL The Applicants (hereinafter “Appellants”) appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Primary Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1 and 4—20.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 The Appellants state that the real party in interest is “EVONIK DEGUSSA GmbH” (Appeal Brief filed January 20, 2015, hereinafter “Appeal Br.,” 1). 2 Appeal Br. 5—22; Reply Brief filed September 16, 2015, hereinafter “Reply Br.,” 2—14; Final Office Action entered June 19, 2014, hereinafter “Final Act.,” 2—7; Advisory Action entered October 23, 2014; Examiner’s Answer entered July 16, 2015, hereinafter “Ans.,” 2—12. Appeal 2016-000186 Application 13/639,765 We affirm.3 BACKGROUND The subject matter on appeal relates to a flexible pipe having a multilayer structure with unbonded layers (Specification, hereinafter “Spec.,” 1,11. 2—3). Representative claim 1 is reproduced from page 24 of the Appeal Brief (Claims Appendix), with key limitations bolded and italicized: 1. A flexible pipe having a multilayer structure with unhanded layers, where the pipe comprises an interior lining comprising layers (a) and (b): a) at least one layer comprising a molding composition, wherein the molding composition comprises a polymer selected from the group consisting of: a polyarylene ether ketone, polyphenyl sulfone, polyphenylene sulfide, a blend of a polyarylene ether ketone and polyphenylene sulfide, and semiaromatic polyamide, where from 5 to 100 mol% of a dicarboxylic acid content thereof derives from an aromatic dicarboxylic acid having from 8 to 22 carbon atoms, and which has a crystallite melting point Tm of at least 260°C, determined according to ISO 11357 in the 2nd heating procedure; b) at least one layer comprising a fluoropolymer molding composition; wherein the flexible pipe is operable at temperatures from above 130°C to 200°C to convey a fluid selected from the group consisting of crude oil, natural gas, methanol, and super critical carbon dioxide and resistant to the diffusion of gases from the conveying fluid; and wherein the interior lining is a three-layer lining having a layer sequence a/b/a. 3 We heard oral arguments from the Appellants’ counsel on June 6, 2017. 2 Appeal 2016-000186 Application 13/639,765 REJECTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, the Examiner modified the Final Office Action by withdrawing the final rejections and entering new grounds of rejections (Ans. 2-8): I. Claims 1, 4, 5, 8—15, and 17—20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by or, in the alternative, under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Braad (WO 2005/028198 Al, published March 31, 2005); II. Claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Braad; and III. Claims 6 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Braad in view of Topoulos (US 2010/0160008 Al, published June 24, 2010). DISCUSSION A. Anticipation With respect to claim 1, the Examiner finds that Braad describes a flexible pipe having unbonded layers in which an interior lining comprises two layers—one layer, which is a “polymer layer” (polyphenylene sulfide), and another layer, which is a “film layer” (fluoropolymer) (Ans. 2). The Examiner also finds that Braad teaches an “a/b/a” structure as specified in claim 1 because it discloses a film layer disposed between two polymer layers (id.). Furthermore, the Examiner finds that Braad teaches that the pipe is capable of resisting high temperatures of fluid conveyed from 130 to 180-C, is impermeable to a fluid comprising carbon dioxide, would be operable to convey supercritical carbon dioxide, and “would be expected to 3 Appeal 2016-000186 Application 13/639,765 be resistant to diffusion of gases from supercritical carbon dioxide” {id. at 3). The Appellants contend Braad does not anticipate because “Braad teaches the ordinary artisan to pick and choose polymers from a broad listing without any guidance, direction, or distinction” (Reply Br. 3—4). See also Appeal Br. 9, 12—14. We agree with the Appellants on this issue. Braad describes polyphenylene sulfide and fluoropolymer as one of multiple suitable polymer materials for the “polymer layer” and “film layer,” respectively (Braad at 4,1. 21—5,1. 11, and 6,11. 1—26). In addition, a lining in which a film layer is sandwiched between two polymer layers is disclosed as one embodiment {id. at 12,11. 1—12). Because some picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures from the prior art disclosure would be required to arrive at a pipe falling within the scope of claim 1, we find that Braad does not describe every limitation recited in the claim with sufficient specificity as required under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is not enough [for anticipation] that the prior art reference discloses part of the claimed invention, which an ordinary artisan might supplement to make the whole, or that it includes multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.”); In reArkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972) (plurality) (anticipation requires that the prior art reference “disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.”). 4 Appeal 2016-000186 Application 13/639,765 For these reasons, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection. B. Obviousness As a preliminary matter, we address claims separately only to the extent that they are separately argued pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Otherwise, the claims stand or fall with claim 1, which we select as representative pursuant to the rule. Although we have ruled that Braad does not anticipate, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 ’s subject matter would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. Arkley, 455 F.2d at 587 (“[Pjicking and choosing may be entirely proper in the making of a [§] 103, obviousness rejection”). As we pointed out above, Braad discloses an embodiment in which a film layer, which may be selected from various materials such as fluorous polymers, is disposed between two polymer layers, which may be selected from various materials such as polyphenylene sulfide (Braad 4,1. 21—5,1. 11; 6,11. 1—26; 12,11. 1—2). Thus, contrary to the Appellants’ position that Braad’s inner lining has a “b/a/b” structure that “teaches away” from the claimed invention (Appeal Br. 12, 14—18; Reply Br. 6), Braad’s disclosure would have reasonably suggested a pipe with an interior lining having the same “a/b/a” configuration and the same materials disclosed and specified as suitable for layers “a” and “b” in the claimed pipe. Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Labs. Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“That the [reference] discloses a multitude of effective combinations does not render any particular formulation less obvious.”); In re Corkill, 111 F.2d 1496, 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (obviousness rejection of claims affirmed in light of 5 Appeal 2016-000186 Application 13/639,765 prior art teaching that “hydrated zeolites will work” in detergent formulations, even though “the inventors selected the zeolites of the claims from among ‘thousands’ of compounds”). The Appellants argue that Braad does not describe or suggest the limitation “operable at temperatures from above 130-C to 200-C” in claim 1 (Appeal Br. 19). According to the Appellants (Reply Br. 14), “Braad nowhere recognizes that flexible pipe with the inner lining Applicants] claim[] is operable at temperatures higher than 18 (PC' (emphasis added). Thus, it appears to be the Appellants’ position that obviousness is not established unless the prior art discloses or suggests operability at all temperatures between 130-C to 200-C. We find no merit in the Appellants’ argument. The broadest reasonable interpretation of the disputed limitation includes any temperatures within the claimed range, including temperatures ranging anywhere between 130-C to 180-C, as disclosed in Braad (Braad 4,11. IS IS). Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECOInc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen a patent claims a chemical composition in terms of ranges of elements, any single prior art reference that falls within each of the ranges anticipates the claim.”) (citing Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). See also Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d at 782 (“It is also an elementary principle of patent law that when, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is ‘anticipated’ if one of them is in the prior art.”). To construe the disputed limitation “operable at temperatures from above 130-C to 200-C” in light of the Specification disclosure (Spec. 2,1. 18—3,1. 25; 11,11. 12—14) to require operability at all temperatures within the 6 Appeal 2016-000186 Application 13/639,765 claimed range including 200-C would render the limitation “from above 130-C” (the recited minimum temperature) to be meaningless or superfluous. See, e.g., Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950—51 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (refusing to construe claim terms in a way that made other limitations meaningless). The Appellants argue that Braad teaches that “any polymer selected from the broad grouping Braad presents at pages 4—5 must be chemically or physically bonded to any polymer forming the film layer selected from the same large group Braad presents at page 6 in order to prevent swelling, blistering, and microfoaming” whereas, in the claimed invention, “strong bonding or layer adhesion between the layers ‘is not a vital requirement for operation’” (Appeal Br. 18). The Appellants do not direct us to sufficient evidence that Braad requires such strong bonding. To the contrary, Braad teaches “flexible unbonded pipe” and provides the same definition for “unbonded” as in the current Specification (Braad 1,11. 5—6, 25—27; Spec. 1, 11. 22-24). Regarding claims 6, 7, and 16, the Appellants argue (Appeal Br. 21): The Examiner does not explain why persons having ordinary skill in the art would pick and choose either a polyarylene ether ketone having the structure of Claim 16 or a semi-aromatic polyamide having a melting point of at least 270°C of Claim 6 or at least 280°C of Claim 7 for polymer a) of the three-layer a/b/a structure claimed. In addition, the Appellants assert that “Topoulos appears to be non- analogous art” {id.). Also, to the extent that the argument is applicable to obviousness, the Appellants offer similarly skeletal arguments against claims 8-11 {id. at 21-22). 7 Appeal 2016-000186 Application 13/639,765 These skeletal arguments fail to identify a reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection (Ans. 3, 7—8; Final Act. 3—4). The Appellants fail to provide any basis for us to review why the Examiner’s findings and analyses are fatally flawed or why Topoulos is believed to be non-analogous art. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In reLovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For these reasons, we uphold the Examiner’s obviousness rejections. SUMMARY The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) of claims 1, 4, 5, 8—15, and 17—20 as anticipated by Braad is reversed. The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 1, 4, 5, 8—15, and 17—20 as obvious over Braad is affirmed. The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claim 16 as unpatentable over Braad is affirmed. The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 6 and 7 as unpatentable over Braad in view of Topoulos is affirmed. Therefore, the Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1 and 4—20 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation