Ex Parte KrzanowskiDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 13, 201912210448 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 13, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/210,448 09/15/2008 25537 7590 06/17/2019 VERIZON PA TENT MANAGEMENT GROUP 1320 North Court House Road 9th Floor ARLINGTON, VA 22201-2909 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Roman Krzanowski UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 20080301 6600 EXAMINER RAPILLO, KRISTINE K ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3626 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/17/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patents@verizon.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROMAN KRZANOWSKI Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 Technology Center 3600 Before MARC S. HOFF, BETH Z. SHAW, and STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-20, i.e., all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm. 1 Appellant identifies the real parties in interest as Verizon Communications Inc. and its subsidiary companies. App. Br. 3. PTO assignment records identify the assignee as Verizon Patent and Licensing Inc. Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Invention According to the Specification, the invention relates to "providing a route selection scheme that may be based on the inclusion and/or exclusion of areal features." Spec. ,-J 11. 2 The scheme includes "receiving a start location and an end location for determining a route, determining an areal feature for at least one of inclusion or exclusion in determining the route, determining the route based on the areal feature, and providing the determined route." Id. at 19 (Abstract). The Specification describes a variety of areal features including the following: ( 1) geographic features, "e.g., a lake, a desert, a forested area, a mountainous area, etc."; (2) administrative features, "e.g., a town, a city, a county, a state, etc."; (3) conceptual features, "e.g., a downtown area, a suburb area, a municipal area, a shopping district, etc."; and ( 4) points of interest, "e.g., a public or national park, a zoo, a mall, etc." Id. ,-i,-i 11, 37, 44. In addition, the Specification explains that exemplary "categories of areal features" include a "downtown, city, park, urban area, etc." Id. ,-i 50, Fig. 5C. Exemplary Claims Independent claims 1 and 9 exemplify the claims at issue and read as follows: 2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: "Spec." for the Specification, filed September 15, 2008; "Final Act." for the Final Office Action, mailed February 9, 2017; "Adv. Act." for the Advisory Action, mailed April 17, 2017; "App. Br." for the Appeal Brief, filed June 15, 2017; "Ans." for the Examiner's Answer, mailed October 20, 2017; and "Reply Br." for the Reply Brief, filed December 4, 2017. 2 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 1. A method performed by a device, comprising: receiving, by the device, a start location and an end location for use in determining a route of travel in response to a user request; presenting, by the device via a user interface and for user selection, multiple categories of areal features for inclusion or exclusion in determining the route, wherein one or more attributes of size associated with the areal features define each of the categories; receiving, via the user interface and responsive to user selection of one of the categories, a user input modifying a value of the one or more attributes of size associated with the areal features of the selected category; redefining, by the device and responsive to the user input, the selected category based on the modified value of the one or more attributes of size of the corresponding areal features; receiving, via the user interface, a user input identifying an areal feature by name, wherein the identified areal feature corresponds to the redefined category; determining, by the device, the route based on the start location, the end location, an exclusion or an inclusion of at least one areal feature, corresponding to the redefined category, from the route, and an exclusion or an inclusion of the identified areal feature corresponding to the redefined category; and outputting, by the device, the determined route via an output component. 9. A device comprising: one or more memories to store instructions; and one or more processors to execute the instructions and configure the one or more processors to: receive a start location and an end location for determining a route of travel connecting the start location and the end location; 3 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 receive a user indication of an areal feature, corresponding to a category selected from multiple categories of areal features presented to the user, to be used as a criterion for determining the route; receive, responsive to the user indication, a user input to modify a value of one or more size parameters that define the selected category of areal features; modify, responsive to the user input, the category of areal features based on the modified one or more size parameters; receive a user input specifying an areal feature that corresponds to the modified category; determine the route based on a first location of the specified areal feature and a second location of at least one areal feature, corresponding to the modified category, with respect to the start location and the end location; and output the determined route. App. Br. 24, 26-27 (Claims App.). The Prior Art Supporting the Re} ections on Appeal As evidence ofunpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner relies on the following prior art: Kaplan et al. ("Kaplan") US 6,401,034 Bl June 4, 2002 Pechatnikov et al. ("Pechatnikov") US 2003/0229441 Al Dec. 11, 2003 Kreft US 7,388,519 Bl June 17, 2008 John Gibson & David McKenzie, Using Global Positioning Systems in Household Surveys for Better Economics and Better Policy, 22 THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 217-41 (2007) ("Gibson") The Rejections on Appeal Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3-5. 4 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 Claims 1 and 3-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kaplan and Gibson. Final Act. 6-13. Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kaplan, Gibson, and Kreft. Final Act. 14-15. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kaplan, Gibson, and Pechatnikov. Final Act. 15-16. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the rejections in light of Appellant's arguments that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the Examiner's conclusions concerning ineligibility under § 101 and unpatentability under§ 103(a). Except as noted below, we adopt the Examiner's findings and reasoning in the Final Office Action, Advisory Action, and Answer. See Final Act. 3-17; Adv. Act. 2-4; Ans. 2-9. We provide the following to address and emphasize specific findings and arguments. The§ 1 OJ Rejection of Claims 1-20 INTRODUCTION The Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter broadly: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. In Mayo and Alice, the Supreme Court explained that § 101 "contains an important implicit exception" for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012); Alice Corp. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014); see Diamond v. 5 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). In Mayo and Alice, the Court set forth a two-step analytical framework for evaluating patent-eligible subject matter. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77-80; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18. Under Mayo/Alice step one, we "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to" a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Step one involves looking at the "focus" of the claims at issue and their "character as a whole." SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In January 2019, the PTO issued revised guidance for determining whether claims are directed to a judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 Guidance"). The 2019 Guidance applies to the Board. Id. at 50-51, 57 n.42; see 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (investing the Director with responsibility "for providing policy direction" for the PTO). Neither the Examiner nor Appellant had the benefit of the 2019 Guidance when advocating their respective positions concerning subject-matter eligibility. The 2019 Guidance specifies two prongs for the analysis under Mayo/Alice step one (PTO step 2A). 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55. Prong one requires evaluating "whether the claim recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon." Id. at 54. "If the claim does not recite a judicial exception, it is not directed to a judicial exception," and it satisfies § 101. Id. "If the claim does recite a judicial exception, then it requires further analysis" under prong two. Id. Prong two requires evaluating "whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception." Id. "When the exception is so integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial 6 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 exception," and it satisfies § 101. Id. "If the additional elements do not integrate the exception into a practical application, then the claim is directed to the judicial exception," and it "requires further analysis" under Mayo/Alice step two (PTO step 2B). Id. Under Mayo/Alice step two, we "consider the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements" add enough to transform the "nature of the claim" into "significantly more" than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18, 221-22 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79). Step two involves the search for an "inventive concept." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18, 221; Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2019). "[A]n inventive concept must be evident in the claims." RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). MAYO/ALICE STEP ONE: PTO STEP 2A PRONG ONE For Mayo/Alice step one, the Federal Circuit has noted that "[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction." Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the Examiner determines that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of "providing directions to a user via a device based upon criteria selected by the user" by "collecting information, analyzing the information, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis." Adv. Act. 3; Ans. 2-3. Further, the Examiner identifies the abstract ideas for the independent claims as follows: • claim 1-"redefining ... a category of features based on ... modified attributes" and "determining ... a route based on ... locations and inclusion or exclusion of features"· ' 7 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 • claim 9-"modify ... a category of features based on ... modified ... parameters" and "determine ... a route based on ... locations and inclusion or exclusion of ... locations"; and • claim 14-"redefining a category of features based on ... modified ... values" and "selecting a route based on ... locations and inclusion or exclusion of ... route selection criterion and locations." Final Act. 3; Ans. 5-6. Appellant disputes that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. See App. Br. 8-13; Reply Br. 4-7. In particular, Appellant contends that the identified abstract ideas are "impermissibly reductive of the features specifically recited in the claims" and that the Examiner "ignores the features that are actually recited in the pending claims." App. Br. 10 ( emphasis omitted). We disagree. In determining that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the Examiner accurately assesses the "focus" of the claims and their "character as a whole." See Final Act. 3; Adv. Act. 2-3; Ans. 2-3, 5-6; see also SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1167. For instance, in making that determination, the Examiner considers claim limitations covering "receiving data, selecting and receiving selected data," "redefining, and determining route," and "outputting the data." Ans. 3. In addition, we determine that the claims recite abstract ideas falling within the three groupings of abstract ideas specified in the 2019 Guidance: mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 51-52. As relevant here, the Guidance identifies the following as mental processes: "concepts performed in the human mind," such as "an observation, evaluation, judgment, [or] 8 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 opinion." Id. at 52 (footnote omitted). As explained in the following paragraphs, each independent claim recites mental processes in various limitations. For instance, claim 1 recites the following limitations: • "receiving ... a start location and an end location for use in determining a route of travel"; • "identifying an areal feature by name"; and • "determining ... the route based on the start location, the end location, an exclusion or an inclusion of at least one areal feature ... and an exclusion or an inclusion of the identified areal feature." App. Br. 24 (Claims App.). The above-quoted limitations encompass an evaluation performed by a human mentally or with pen and paper, i.e., selecting a route from an origin to a destination including selecting intermediate stops or places to avoid ( or both). See, e.g., DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 274-75, 283-84 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (deciding that claims encompassing "selecting meals that align with the user's individual preferences and nutritional goals" and "calculating the dietary impact of the addition or subtraction of certain foods" were directed to an "abstract idea or mental concept"), aff'd, 599 F. App'x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As an example, a visitor to Washington, D.C., may mentally (1) plan to sightsee starting at the Lincoln Memorial and ending at the U.S. Capitol, (2) select as intermediate stops certain museums along the National Mall, and (3) choose to avoid other museums, e.g., due to time constraints. See Spec. ,-J 48, Fig. 5A. Consistent with this example, the Specification explains that "the route selection described herein is not intended to be limited to a user that may travel a route by a vehicle." Id. ,-i 53. The 2019 9 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 Guidance identifies an evaluation performed by a human mentally or with pen and paper as a mental process, and thus an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 & nn.14-15; see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.") ("Symantec"). Similar to claim 1, claim 9 recites the following limitations: • "receive a start location and an end location for determining a route of travel connecting the start location and the end location"; • "receive a user input specifying an areal feature"; and • "determine the route based on a first location of the specified areal feature and a second location of at least one areal feature ... with respect to the start location and the end location." App. Br. 26-27 (Claims App.). The above-quoted limitations encompass an evaluation performed by a human mentally or with pen and paper, i.e., selecting a route from an origin to a destination including selecting intermediate stops or places to avoid ( or both). As noted above, the 2019 Guidance identifies an evaluation performed by a human mentally or with pen and paper as a mental process, and thus an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 & nn.14-15. Similar to claims 1 and 9, claim 14 recites the following limitations: • "determining a start location and an end location associated with a route selection"; • "receiving a route selection criterion," e.g., shortest route or quickest route; • "receiving a user input specifying an areal feature"; 10 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 • "identifying a first location of the specified areal feature and a second location of at least one areal feature ... relative to the start location and the end location"; and • "selecting a route, from a plurality of alternate routes connecting the start location and the end location, based on the route selection criterion and the identified first and second locations." App. Br. 28 (Claims App.); see Spec. ,i,i 1, 11, 15, 44. The above-quoted limitations encompass an evaluation performed by a human mentally or with pen and paper, i.e., selecting a route from an origin to a destination including selecting intermediate stops or places to avoid ( or both). As noted above, the 2019 Guidance identifies an evaluation performed by a human mentally or with pen and paper as a mental process, and thus an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 & nn.14-15. In addition, the above-quoted limitations in claims 1, 9, and 14 amount to "managing personal behavior." For instance, someone manages their personal behavior by selecting a route from an origin to a destination including selecting intermediate stops or places to avoid ( or both). The 2019 Guidance identifies "managing personal behavior" as among "[ c Jertain methods of organizing human activity," and thus an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (deciding that a claim was directed to two types of abstract ideas: a "fundamental economic practice" and a "mathematical formula"). MAYO/ALICE STEP ONE: PTO STEP 2A PRONG Two Because we determine that each independent claim recites abstract ideas, we consider whether each claim as a whole integrates the recited abstract ideas into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55. "Only when a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception 11 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 into a practical application, is the claim 'directed to' a judicial exception .... " Id. at 51. Appellant asserts that the claims here resemble the claims in Enfzsh and that "the pending claims are directed to a specific improvement to computer technology functionality namely, configuring a route selection scheme to include and/or exclude categories of areal features, which categories are defined by a number of attributes that are modifiable via a user interface." App. Br. 12-13 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Spec. ,i,i 11, 44); see Reply Br. 6. Appellant contends that the claimed "implementation of a route selection scheme with respect to user-redefined categories of areal features to be included in and/or excluded from subsequent route determinations" represents "an improvement in software technology." Reply Br. 6-7. Unlike the claims here, the claims in Enfzsh recited a "specific improvement to the way computers operate," i.e., an improved database configuration that permitted faster and more efficient searching. Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1330-33, 1336. The Federal Circuit has explained that the claims in Enfzsh "did more than allow computers to perform familiar tasks with greater speed and efficiency" and "actually permitted users to launch and construct databases in a new way." Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The Federal Circuit has also explained that the claims in Enfish "focused on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity." Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 12 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 In contrast to the claims in Enfish, the claims here use a computer in its ordinary capacity to perform "basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions." See App. Br. 24-30 (Claims App.); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. The claims here do not recite an advance in hardware or software that, for example, causes a computer itself or a database itself to operate faster or more efficiently. Also, the Specification does not describe user-redefined categories of areal features as an improvement over prior-art arrangements, e.g., "software technology." See, e.g., Spec. ,i,i 1, 11-15, 37, 44, 50, 53, 56. Instead, the Specification notes that the invention "may be implemented in many different forms of software, firmware, and hardware." Id. ,i 56. Further, the Specification indicates that the invention addresses a routing problem, stating that "the selected best route" according to prior-art mapping systems "may direct the user through an area that is not desirous to the user or the best route may fail to direct the user through an area that is desirous to the user." Id. ,i l; see id. ,i,i 11-15. In addition, the Specification discusses user modifications, stating that "the user may be able to modify how an areal feature ( e.g., downtown) is defined" in a database by "modifying parameters associated with this areal feature ( e.g., number of people, size of area, density, etc.)." Id. ,i 50. But nothing indicates that the definition-modification ability amounts to an improvement over prior-art arrangements. See, e.g., id. ,i,i 1, 11-15, 37, 44, 50, 53, 56. Appellant analogizes the claims here to the claims in DDR Holdings. App. Br. 15-16 (citingDDRHoldings, LLCv. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). But the claims here do not resemble the claims in 13 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 DDR Holdings. There, the Federal Circuit determined that certain claims satisfied Mayo/Alice step two because "the claimed solution amount[ ed] to an inventive concept for resolving [a] particular Internet-centric problem," i.e., a challenge unique to the Internet. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257-59. The Federal Circuit explained that the patent-eligible claims specified "how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result ... that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink." Id. at 1258. The court reasoned that those claims recited a technological solution "necessarily rooted in computer technology" that addressed a "problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." Id. at 1257. According to the Federal Circuit, "DDR Holdings does not apply when ... the asserted claims do not 'attempt to solve a challenge particular to the Internet."' Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re TL! Commc 'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The claims here do not attempt to solve a challenge particular to the Internet. See App. Br. 24-30 (Claims App.); see also Ans. 6. Among other things, the claims do not require a network or recite transmissions between different devices. App. Br. 24-30. Based on BASCOM, Appellant contends that the claims improve "an existing technological process." App. Br. 14-15 (citing BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appellant misplaces his reliance on BASCOM. There, the claims recited a "specific method of filtering Internet content" requiring "the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with 14 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 customizable filtering features specific to each end user." BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1345-46, 1350. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the claims covered "a technology-based solution ... to filter content on the Internet that overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering systems" and "improve[s] an existing technological process." Id. at 1351 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223); see Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (explaining that "the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process"). In contrast to the claims in BASCOM, the claims here do not cover a technology-based solution that improves an existing technological process. See Final Act. 16-17; Adv. Act. 2-3; Ans. 5-6. As the Examiner determines, "the combination of elements does not 'improve an existing technological process' or 'improve the performance of the computer system itself'." Adv. Act. 3; Ans. 5. As the Examiner also determines, the claims here "do not require any nonconventional computer, network or display components, or even a 'non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces'," in contrast to the claims in BASCOM. Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 5-6. Hence, the claims here do not resemble the claims in BASCOM. Appellant also analogizes the claims here to the claims in Amdocs. Reply Br. 5, 7 (citing Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see App. Br. 16. Appellant misplaces his reliance on Amdocs. There, the patents concerned network components "arrayed in a distributed architecture" that "collect[ ed] and process[ ed] data close to its source," and thus enabled "load distribution" and reduced network congestion. Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1291-92, 1300, 1303, 1306. The Federal 15 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 Circuit decided that the claims satisfied Mayo/Alice step two because they either (1) "entail[ ed] an unconventional technological solution ... to a technological problem" that required generic computer components to "operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality" or (2) "recite[ d] a technological solution to a technological problem specific to computer networks-an unconventional solution that was an improvement over the prior art." Id. at 1299-1306. In contrast to the claims in Amdocs, the claims here do not achieve an improvement in computer functionality or recite a technological solution to a technological problem. Adv. Act. 2-3; Ans. 5-6; see Final Act. 16-17. Rather, the claims recite "abstract ideas that use computers as tools." Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 5. Appellant argues that the claims do not "preempt all ways of route selection using a computer." App. Br. 15. That argument does not persuade us of Examiner error. While preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See Fair Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns "are fully addressed and made moot" by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The 2019 Guidance identifies exemplary considerations indicating that additional elements in claims "may have integrated the uudicial] exception into a practical application." 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 & nn.25-29 (citing Manual of Patent Examining Procedure§§ 2106.05(a)-(c), 2106.05(e) (9th ed. rev. 08.2017 Jan. 2018)). As the above analysis indicates, we have evaluated Appellant's arguments in light of those 16 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 exemplary considerations. For the reasons discussed above, however, we determine that each independent claim as a whole does not integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical application. Thus, each claim is directed to a judicial exception and does not satisfy § 101 under Mayol Alice step one. MAYO/ALICE STEP Two: PTO STEP 2B Because we determine that each independent claim is directed to a judicial exception, we "consider the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements" add enough to transform the "nature of the claim" into "significantly more" than the judicial exception. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18, 221-22 ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79). Under Mayo/Alice step two, we "look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to determine 'whether they identify an "inventive concept" in the application of the ineligible subject matter' to which the claim is directed." Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). An "inventive concept" requires more than "well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in" by the relevant community. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79-80). Here, the Examiner finds that the additional elements in the claims constitute "generic components that are configured to perform activities that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry." Final Act. 4; see Ans. 3. The Examiner determines that the additional elements "do not add meaningful limits to practicing the abstract 17 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 idea." Final Act. 4; see Adv. Act. 4. Thus, the Examiner concludes that each independent claim "as a whole" does not "amount to significantly more to [sic] the abstract idea." Final Act. 5; Adv. Act. 4; Ans. 4. We agree with the Examiner. As explained in the following paragraphs, we conclude that each independent claim lacks an "inventive concept" that transforms the recited abstract ideas into a patent-eligible invention. As additional elements, the claims require a "device" with a "user interface" and an "output component" or "display," "one or more memories," and "one or more processors." App. Br. 24-30 (Claims App.). The Specification describes those elements generically and evidences their conventional nature. See, e.g., Spec. ,-J,-J 17, 24, 28-29, 31, 33; see also Final Act. 4-5; Ans. 3-4. For example, the Specification explains that a "user device" includes "a GPS-based device, a computer, a portable device, a handheld device, a mobile device, a stationary device, a wireless telephone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a web-browsing device, an in-car navigation system, a navigation device, and/or some other type of computational, communicational, and/or geographical information device." Spec. ,-J 17; see id. ,-i 33; Final Act. 4-5; Ans. 3-4. The Specification notes that an "input component" for a "user interface" includes "a keyboard, a keypad, a touch screen, a touchpad, a mouse, a button, a switch, a microphone, an input port, voice recognition logic, and/or some other type of visual and/or auditory input component." Spec. ,-J 31. The Specification notes that an "output component" includes "a display, a speaker, one or more light emitting diodes 18 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 (LEDs), an output port, a vibrator, and/or some other type of visual, auditory, and/or tactile output component." Id. In addition, the Specification explains that a "display" includes "a liquid crystal display (LCD), a plasma display panel (PDP), a field emission display (FED), a thin film transistor (TFT) display, or some other type of display technology." Spec. ,i 24. The Specification identifies "one or more memories" as including the following storage media: a random access memory (RAM), a dynamic random access memory (DRAM), a static random access memory (SRAM), a synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), a ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), a read only memory (ROM), a programmable read only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM), and/or a flash memory. Spec. ,i 29; see id. ,i 30; Final Act. 4-5; Ans. 3-4. Further, the Specification identifies "one or more processors" as including the following components: a general-purpose processor, a microprocessor, a data processor, a co-processor, a network processor, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a controller, a programmable logic device, a chipset, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or some other component that may interpret and/or execute instructions and/or data. Spec. ,i 28; see Final Act. 4; Ans. 3. Moreover, the claimed device, memories, and processors operate to collect, process, and communicate data. See App. Br. 24-30 (Claims App.); see also Final Act. 3-4; Ans. 2-3. Court decisions have recognized that generic computer components operating to collect, process, and 19 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 communicate data are well understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 226; SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1164-65 & n. l, 1170; Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1316-20; Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715-16 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For example, the system claims in Alice recited a "data processing system" with a "communications controller" and a "data storage unit," i.e., a memory. Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. The Supreme Court decided that the system claims failed to satisfy § 101 because "[ n ]early every computer" includes those generic components for performing "basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions" and the system claims simply implemented the same abstract idea as the method claims. Id. at 226-27. The Court reasoned that ( 1) "the system claims are no different from the method claims in substance"; (2) "[t]he method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer"; and (3) "the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea." Id. at 226. Here, the claimed device, memories, and processors perform "basic" functions that nearly every computer performs. See App. Br. 24-30 (Claims App.); see also Final Act. 3-5; Ans. 2-4; Spec. ,i,i 17, 24, 28-31, 33. For instance, nearly every computer includes a processor for manipulating data and a memory for storing data. Hence, the claimed generic computer components do not satisfy the "inventive concept" requirement. See, e.g., Mortg. Grader Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that "generic computer components such 20 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 as an 'interface,' 'network,' and 'database'" did not satisfy the "inventive concept" requirement); FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095-96 (describing the claimed "microprocessor" and "user interface" as "generic computer elements"); Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App'x 1014, 1016-17 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ( describing the claimed "authentication server," "access server," "Internet Protocol network," "client computer device," and "database" as "indisputably generic computer components"). Based on BASCOM, Appellant contends that the "inventive concept" rests on "generat[ing] a user interface that allows users to redefine attributes defining categories of areal features to be included in and/or excluded from a route selection." App. Br. 15 (citing BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350; Spec. ,i 50). As explained above, however, the claims here do not resemble the claims in BASCOM because they "do not require any nonconventional computer, network or display components, or even a 'non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces'." Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 5-6. Further, claim 1 recites a "device" with a "user interface" and an "output component" but fails to specify any technical details about the device, the user interface, or the output component. App. Br. 24. Claim 1 requires no particular presentation tool and nothing unconventional or significant. Id. Claims 9 and 14 do not expressly require a "user interface" or an "output component" and instead recite receiving "user input" through some undefined input component. Id. at 26-29. Like claim 1, claims 9 and 14 require no particular presentation tool and nothing unconventional or significant. Id. A generic "device" with generic input and output components according to the claims at issue fails to satisfy § 101 under 21 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 Mayo/Alice step two. See, e.g., Mortg. Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324-25; FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095-96. "Whether a combination of claim limitations supplies an inventive concept that renders a claim 'significantly more' than an abstract idea to which it is directed is a question of law." BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Given the claimed generic computer components that perform generic computer functions, we conclude that the combination of limitations in each independent claim does not supply an "inventive concept" that renders the claim "significantly more" than an abstract idea. Thus, each claim does not satisfy § 101 under Mayo/Alice step two. SUMMARY FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY For the reasons discussed above, each independent claim fails to satisfy§ 101 under Mayo/Alice step one and step two. Thus, we sustain the § 101 rejection of the independent claims. We also sustain the § 101 rejection of the dependent claims because Appellant does not argue eligibility separately for them. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). The§ 103 (a) Rejection of Claims 1 and 3-19 INDEPENDENT CLAIM 1: THE DISPUTED "PRESENTING" LIMITATION As noted above, the§ 103(a) rejection of claim 1 rests on Kaplan and Gibson. See Final Act. 6-8. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because the references fail to teach or suggest the following limitation: "presenting, by the device via a user interface and for user selection, multiple categories of areal features for inclusion or exclusion in determining the route, wherein one or more attributes of size associated with the areal features define each of the categories." See App. Br. 18-20. 22 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 Appellant contends that the Examiner does not rely on Kaplan for this limitation. Id. at 18-19. Appellant then asserts that Gibson "merely describes population and travel distance data with respect to A TM and bank branch locations, completely unrelated to defining categories" according to claim 1. Id. at 19. Appellant's arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error because they attack the references individually, while the Examiner relies on the combined disclosures in the references to teach or suggest the disputed "presenting" limitation. See Final Act. 6-7; Adv. Act. 4; Ans. 7-8. Where a rejection rests on the combined disclosures in the references, an appellant cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking the references individually. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For the reasons explained below, we agree with the Examiner that the combined disclosures in the references teach or suggest the disputed "presenting" limitation. In particular, Kaplan discloses a navigation system with a user interface presenting multiple categories of areal features for inclusion or exclusion by a user when determining a route. Kaplan, 2:41-44, 3:6-4:11, 6:50-57, 7:9-8:8, Figs. 5-6; see Final Act. 6-7; Ans. 7. Kaplan's Figure 6 (reproduced below) shows a representative user interface: 23 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 j I ,./ I" I I I I I l ' I .• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••r••• •L '-.... -.~~- SELECT POI CATEGORY ( . _ . fowk press [ig] i : L . .., ! • GAS STATIONS i: i • HOTELS I i : ! • MUSEUMS /'<"l· ! [. RESTAURANTS i I 1fi1 . 1e:, ~.-;:. .. ..,..,~. !, [__ ___________ --- - ------------------------' )- I \ I ____ · __ : __· __ ~(~' __ 1ri~ir:_rJ1-~~~-[1 __________________ ,, ·,:,:.(' "--··· '" Figure 6 depicts the user interface after the user has decided to view various point-of-interest ("POI") categories and shows a menu listing different categories, e.g., gas stations, hotels, museums, and restaurants. Kaplan, 7:9-28, Fig. 6; see Ans. 7. Attributes of size define those different categories, e.g., large museums compared to small museums, as a person of ordinary skill would appreciate. In addition, Gibson discloses attributes of size associated with areal features that define categories of areal features. Gibson, 221-23, 236, Fig. l; see Final Act. 7; Adv. Act. 4; Ans. 7-8. In particular, Gibson discusses populations within different travel distances of areal features, i.e., different cash outlets. Gibson, 221-23, Fig. 1. Different travel distances encompassing different populations constitute attributes of size that define categories of areal features, e.g., longer distances encompassing larger 24 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 populations compared to shorter distances encompassing smaller populations. Final Act. 7; Adv. Act. 4; Ans. 8. For instance, Gibson's Figure 1 depicts three different areas having populations within three different distances of a cash outlet, i.e., 2 km, 5 km, and 10 km. Gibson, 223, Fig. 1. The Specification similarly discloses areas associated with populations, such as an urban area "where the population is over' 150,000' and/or where the area is greater than '2 square miles."' Spec. ,i 44; see id. iJ 37. Gibson also discloses geographic analyses employing modifiable user-selected distances associated with different population densities, i.e., "up to 2 km" for urban areas and "up to 5 km" for rural areas. Gibson, 236. Population densities constitute attributes of size that define categories of areal features, e.g., densely populated urban areas compared to sparsely populated rural areas. See Spec. ,i,i 37, 44, 50. The Specification does not disclose how attributes of size define categories of areal features. Instead, the Specification states that a database "may define an areal feature based on various attributes (e.g., population, size of area, etc.)." Spec. ,i 37. The Specification also states that "the user may be able to modify how an areal feature ( e.g., downtown) is defined" in the database by "modifying parameters associated with this areal feature (e.g., number of people, size of area, density, etc.)." Id. ,i 50. The Specification further states that "the user may be able [to] select from a list of categories of areal features, such as, for example, downtown, city, park, urban area, etc." Id.; see id. Fig. 5C. Because the Specification indicates that an areal feature, e.g., "downtown," may correspond to a category of areal features, e.g., "downtown," Kaplan and Gibson disclose attributes of 25 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 size that define categories of areal features consistent with the Specification. See Spec. ,i,i 11, 14, 37, 44, 50, p. 15 (claim 3), Fig. 5C. INDEPENDENT CLAIM 1: THE DISPUTED "RECEIVING" LIMITATION Appellant also argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because the references fail to teach or suggest the following limitation: "receiving, via the user interface and responsive to user selection of one of the categories, a user input modifying a value of the one or more attributes of size associated with the areal features of the selected category." See App. Br. 18-20; Reply Br. 8. Specifically, Appellant asserts that Gibson "merely describes a user-chosen radius of a 'perturbation circle' and the size of the circle is weighted by population density at each point." App. Br. 20. As discussed above, however, population densities constitute attributes of size that define categories of areal features. See Spec. ,i,i 3 7, 44, 50. Thus, Gibson's disclosure of modifiable user-selected distances associated with different population densities, i.e., "up to 2 km" for urban areas and "up to 5 km" for rural areas, teaches or suggests the disputed "receiving" limitation. See Final Act. 7; Adv. Act. 4; Ans. 8; Gibson, 236. In addition, Kaplan discloses user-configurable sizes for search areas for locating points of interest, and thus teaches or suggests "a user input modifying a value of the one or more attributes of size associated with" an areal feature. Kaplan, 8:1-23, 8:37-42, 8:57-63, 9:6-29, Figs. 10-14. SUMMARY FOR INDEPENDENT CLAIM 1 For the reasons discussed above, Appellant's arguments have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 for obviousness based on Kaplan and Gibson. In our view, the claimed subject matter exemplifies the principle that "[t]he combination of familiar elements 26 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007); see Final Act. 7-8. Thus, we sustain the§ 103(a) rejection of claim 1. DEPENDENT CLAIM 3 Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and specifies that "presenting the multiple categories of areal features comprises presenting at least two of: a municipal area, a downtown area, an urban area, a public or national park, a city, a county, a state, a forested area, or a geographic feature." App. Br. 25 (Claims App.). As noted above, the§ 103(a) rejection of claim 3 rests on Kaplan and Gibson. See Final Act. 8. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 3 because Kaplan's "navigation system provides navigation features to an end user using geographic data that includes information about geographic regions or coverage areas" and Gibson's "'geographic regions/coverage areas' cannot be reasonably construed to disclose or suggest at least two of' the categories specified in claim 3. App. Br. 21. Appellant's argument does not persuade us of Examiner error because the Examiner correctly finds that (1) Kaplan discloses a navigation system with a user interface presenting "multiple categories of areal features"; (2) Kaplan's "navigation system uses geographic data about one or more geographic regions"; and (3) Kaplan's "geographic data" includes information about (a) "roads and intersections in the geographic region," i.e., geographic features, and (b) "points of interest," e.g., hotels, restaurants, museums, and national/public parks. Final Act. 6, 8 ( citing Kaplan, 27 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 3:25-40, 7:35-67, Fig. 6); Ans. 8 (citing Kaplan, 1:31-41, 3:25-40, 3:48-58). In particular, Kaplan describes a "geographic database" containing records representing (a) "roads and intersections in a geographic region," i.e., geographic features, and (b) "points of interest, such as hotels, restaurants, museums, stadiums, offices, automobile dealerships, auto repair shops, etc." Kaplan 1:31-41, 3:48-58, 7:21-28, Fig. 6. Also, as discussed above, Kaplan's Figure 6 depicts a user interface after the user has decided to view various POI categories and shows a menu listing different categories, e.g., gas stations, hotels, museums, and restaurants. Id. at 7:9-28, Fig. 6. An obviousness analysis can "take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill" would employ. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Here, a person of ordinary skill would appreciate that Kaplan's "points of interest" include parks and that Kaplan's user interface may display parks along with roads and intersections, i.e., geographic features. See Final Act. 8; Ans. 8. Thus, we sustain the§ 103(a) rejection of claim 3. INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 9 AND 14 AND DEPENDENT CLAIMS 4-8, 10-13, AND 15-19 Appellant asserts that claims 9 and 14 recite "features similar to features" in claim 1 and are "patentable ... for at least reasons similar to the reasons given for" claim 1. App. Br. 20. Appellant's assertions do not amount to separate patentability arguments. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that the applicable rules "require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not 28 Appeal2018-002000 Application 12/210,448 found in the prior art"); see also In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B. V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Because Appellant does not argue the claims separately, we sustain the§ 103(a) rejection of claims 9 and 14 for the same reasons as claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Claims 4-8 depend from claim 1; claims 10-13 depend from claim 9; and claims 15-19 depend from claim 14. Appellant does not argue patentability separately for these dependent claims. See App. Br. 20-21; Reply Br. 8. Thus, we sustain the§ 103(a) rejection of these dependent claims for the same reasons as claims 1, 9, and 14. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). The§ 103(a) Rejections of Claims 2 and 20 Claim 2 depends from claim 1; and claim 20 depends from claim 14. Appellant does not argue patentability separately for these dependent claims. See App. Br. 21-22; Reply Br. 9. Thus, we sustain the§ 103(a) rejections of these dependent claims for the same reasons as claims 1 and 14. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § l.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(±). AFFIRMED 29 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation