Ex Parte KroeningDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesSep 8, 201111029163 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 8, 2011) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte JAMES L. KROENING ____________ Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before WILLIAM F. PATE III, MICHAEL W. O’NEILL, and STEFAN STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judges. O’NEILL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE James L. Kroening (Appellant) seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1-16, 19, and 20. Claims 17 and 18 were withdrawn from consideration. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 2 The Invention The claimed invention is to a method and apparatus for commercial advertising on a vehicle roadway. Claim 1 and 20, reproduced below, are illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method for commercial advertising on a vehicle roadway comprising the steps of: placing a visual commercial advertising message on one or more roadway components such that the visual commercial advertising message is capable of falling within a field of view of one or more of a driver and one or more passengers in a vehicle, the field of view associated with the roadway component during operation of a vehicle; and providing a cue to the visual commercial advertising message, wherein the visual commercial advertising message contains one or more of: a horizontally placed message, a vertically placed message, and wherein the cue includes one or more of an audible cue, a visual cue, and a tactile cue such that the visual commercial advertising message is within the field of view of the one or more of a driver and one or more passengers in the vehicle when the cue is received by the one or more of a driver and one or more passengers in the vehicle. 20. An apparatus for commercial advertising on a vehicle roadway comprising: one or more roadway components; a visual commercial advertising message associated with at least one of the one or more roadway components such that the visual commercial advertising message is capable of falling within a field of view of one or more of a Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 3 driver and one or more passengers in a vehicle, the field of view associated with the roadway component during operation of a vehicle; and a cue to the visual commercial advertising message provided on another of the one or more roadway components, wherein the visual commercial advertising message contains one or more of: a horizontally placed message, a vertically placed message, and wherein the cue comprises a modified surface associated with the vehicle roadway such that when the vehicle is traveling across the modified roadway surface, an audible cue is provided. The Prior Art The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Chapel US 1,526,742 Feb. 17, 1925 Wheeler US 2,457,512 Dec. 28, 1948 White US 3,102,352 Sep. 3, 1963 Schmanski US 4,249,832 Feb. 10, 1981 Adams US 4,790,684 Dec. 13, 1988 Reisman US 5,322,385 Jun. 21, 1994 Gort US 7,033,013 B2 Apr. 25, 2006 City of Elk River - Signs in Right-of-Way, www.ci.elk-river.mn.us, last accessed Jul. 7, 2007. The Rejections The following Examiner’s rejections are before us for review: Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. Ans. 3. Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 4 Claim 19 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Reisman. Ans. 3. Claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wheeler. Ans. 4. Claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wheeler in view of Chapel or White. Ans. 4-5. Claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wheeler in view of Reisman. Ans. 5. Claims 1-16, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Adams in view of Gort. Ans. 5-6. Claims 1-16, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gort in view of Adams. Ans. 6. Claims 5, 8, 13, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wheeler, Wheeler/Chapel, Wheeler/White, or Wheeler/Reisman and further in view of Schmanski. Ans. 6-7. DISCUSSION We have carefully reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of the Appellant’s arguments and the Examiner’s response. As a result of this review, we determine that the Examiner’s rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for claim 20, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for claim 19, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Wheeler in view of Reisman for claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Adams in view of Gort or Gort in view of Adams for claims 1-16, 19, and 20, under 35 Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 5 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Wheeler/Reisman and further in view of Schmanski for claims 5, 8, 13, and 16 are in error for the reasons given within the Appellant’s Brief. We also determine that the Examiner’s rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Wheeler and Wheeler and Chapel or White for claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 and Wheeler, Wheeler and Chapel or White, and Schmanski for claims 5, 8, 13, and 16 are not in error. Our reasons for such a determination follow. Obviousness based on Wheeler alone Given the Examiner’s position, the determinative issue for this ground of rejection is whether the printed matter patentably distinguishes the claimed invention from Wheeler. Printed matter may patentably distinguish a claimed invention from the prior art when the critical question of whether there is a new and unobvious functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate is answered in the affirmative. In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004). To show a new and unobvious functional relationship, it has to be shown that the printed matter would not achieve its purpose without the substrate and the substrate without the printed matter would similarly be unable to produce the desired result. Id. at 1339. Contrary to the Appellant’s belief, the substrate is neither the roadway nor the associated cue. App. Br. 17. The substrate is the roadway component that the visual commercial advertising message is placed upon. See Claim App’x. (“placing a visual commercial advertising message on one or more roadway components …. within a field of view . . . . of a driver . . . in a vehicle . . . during operation of a vehicle”). Appellant has not established that the printed matter would not achieve its purpose without the Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 6 substrate and the substrate without the printed matter would similarly be unable to produce the desired result. As such, Appellant has not shown a new and unobvious functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate. For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as unpatentable over Wheeler alone. Appellant does not argue separately claims 2-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 for this ground of rejection. Thus, claims 2-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 fall with claim 1. Obviousness based on Wheeler and Chapel or White Claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, and 15 Appellant does not separately argue this set of claims for this ground of rejection. We select claim 1 as representative. The determinative issue for this set of claims within this ground of rejection is whether the combined teachings of Wheeler and Chapel or White teach the visual commercial advertising message being within the field of view of one or more of a driver and one or more passengers in the vehicle when the cue is received by the one or more of a driver and one or more passengers in the vehicle. See App. Br. 18. The Examiner and Appellant agree that the combined teachings of Wheeler and Chapel or White would teach placement of the visual commercial advertising message on the back of the stop sign meant for oncoming traffic that is disclosed in Wheeler. Ans. 5 and App. Br. 18. We concur and we additionally find that Wheeler’s figure 2 “is a plan view, greatly reduced in scale of a highway intersection provided with signal generating areas of the present invention.” Wheeler, col. 2, ll. 22-24. We also find that Wheeler’s purpose is to provide a cue to inattentive drivers Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 7 with audible and tactile signals. See Wheeler, col. 1, ll. 5-10 and col. 5, ll. 11-29. The Appellant posits that since the advertisement is on the back of the stop sign, then the cue from the “rumble strips” is not received at a time when the advertisement is visible. Thus, Appellant concludes the aforementioned element is missing from the combination of references. App. Br. 18. However, the Examiner explains that a person having ordinary skill in the art when viewing Wheeler’s figure 2 would understand that the back of the stop sign meant for traffic coming from the right would be visible to the traffic coming from the left and we further find vice versa. Ans. 11. The Examiner further finds that when combined with the advertising messages of Chapel and White, the advertisements would be within the field of view when the cue was provided. Id. We agree with the Examiner’s findings of fact and analysis and the comparison of such to the claim element in dispute. As shown in Wheeler’s figure 2, vehicle E approaching from the left would cross the “rumble strips” D which serve as the cue that the vehicle is approaching the left stop sign. Wheeler teaches the cue intrudes into the driver’s consciousness as a warning signal. The intrusion into the driver’s consciousness would cause the driver to look in advance, i.e., down the road toward the intersection A. Upon looking, the approaching stop sign would be in the driver’s field of view. In addition, since the stop sign for the opposing lane of traffic is proximate the intersection A, the back of that opposing stop sign would also be within the driver’s field of view. As such, contemporaneously within the driver’s field of view are both the stop sign and the back of the stop sign for Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 8 the opposing lane of traffic. Since the combined teachings of Wheeler and Chapel or White teach placement of advertising on the back of a stop sign and generating a cue to signal the approach of an intersection, contemporaneously within the driver’s field of view is the stop sign and the back of the other stop sign having advertisements when the vehicle traverses the “rumble strips” D. The claim language is not limited to having the advertising message on the roadway component in the direction of the traveling vehicle. All that is required is the advertising message be within the field of view. As such, the combined teachings of Wheeler and Chapel or White teach the visual commercial advertising message being within the field of view of at least the driver in the vehicle when the cue is received by the driver in the vehicle which satisfies the claim language as set forth in claim 1. For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Claims 2-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, and 15 fall with claim 1 since Appellant did not argue these claims separately. Claims 19 and 20 For the same reasons above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19. Claim 20 falls with claim 19 since the Appellant did not argue separately claim 20. Obviousness based on Wheeler, Chapel or Wheeler, and Schmanski Appellant does not separately argue claims 5, 8, 13, and 16 for this ground of rejection. As such, we select claim 8 as representative since it directly depends from claim 1. In addition to incorporating Appellant’s previous arguments, which have been addressed supra, Appellant rhetorically posits why one would Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 9 desire to alert a driver to the presence of a jersey barrier via rumble strips. App. Br. 21. The determinative issue for obviousness in this case is not one of desires. Rather, the determinative issue is whether the claim at issue is more than a simple arrangement of old elements, with each element performing the same function it had been known to perform, and which yields more than a person having ordinary skill in the art would expect from such an arrangement. In this case, claim 8 further limits claim 1 to include a roadway component that at least includes a jersey wall. The Examiner found providing the combination of Wheeler and Chapel or White with a jersey wall modified with indicia as taught by Schmanski would not have required any major reconfiguration of any element of the combination. Ans. 7. We agree. From a review of the combined teachings of Wheeler, Chapel or White, and Schmanski and comparing these teachings to the claim at issue, we conclude that the claim at issue appears to be no more than simple arrangement of old elements with each element performing the same function it had been known to perform and which yields no more than a person having ordinary skill in the art would expect from such an arrangement. As such, we conclude claim 8 is obvious. For the reasons above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8. Claims 5, 13, and 16 fall with claim 8. DECISION The Examiner’s decision to reject claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is reversed. Appeal 2010-000196 Application 11/029,163 10 The Examiner’s decision to reject claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Reisman is reversed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wheeler is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wheeler in view of Chapel or White is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claim Claims 1-4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wheeler in view of Reisman is reversed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-16, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Adams in view of Gort or Gort in view of Adams is reversed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claim Claims 5, 8, 13, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wheeler, Wheeler and Chapel, or Wheeler and White and further in view of Schmanski is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 5, 8, 13, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wheeler and Reisman and further in view of Schmanski is reversed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010). AFFIRMED Klh Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation