Ex Parte Kristinsson et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 23, 201613007729 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 23, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/007,729 01/17/2011 28395 7590 06/27/2016 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L 1000 TOWN CENTER 22NDFLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Johannes G. Kristinsson UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 83169256 7357 EXAMINER JOS,BASILT ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3668 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/27/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JOHANNES G. KRISTINSSON, HAI YU, and RYAN A. MCGEE Appeal2014-005439 Application 13/007,729 Technology Center 3600 Before MICHAEL L. HOELTER, THOMAS F. SMEGAL, and MARK A. GEIER, Administrative Patent Judges. HOELTER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a decision on appeal, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), from a final rejection of claims 1-13, 15, 16, and 18-20. App. Br. 1. Claims 14 and 17 have been canceled. See Appellants' Amendment dated June 13, 2013. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We REVERSE. Appeal2014-005439 Application 13/007,729 THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The disclosed subject matter "relates to a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle and a method of control." Spec. 1: 16-17. Claims 1, 9, and 16 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claims on appeal and is reproduced below: 1. A method for controlling an electric vehicle, the method compnsmg: after the vehicle is recharged, estimating, by a vehicle system controller, a distance until charge (DUC) value based on historical distance between charges (DBC) values each indicative of the distance the vehicle has been driven between a respective pair of consecutive charges of the vehicle; and controlling battery usage of the vehicle as a function of the DUC value. REFERENCES RELIED ON BY THE EXAMINER Vickers US 2004/0204797 Al Oct. 14, 2004 Yamada US 2008/0319597 Al Dec. 25, 2008 Fincham US 2010/0017249 Al Jan. 21; 2010 THE REJECTIONS ON APPEAL Claims 1-5, 8-13, 15, 16, and 18-20 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Fincham and Vickers. Claims 6 and 7 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Fincham, Vickers, and Yamada. 2 Appeal2014-005439 Application 13/007,729 ANALYSIS The rejection of claims 1-5, 8-13, 15, 16, and 18-20 as unpatentable over Fincham and Vickers Independent claims 1 and 9 include the limitation, "a distance until charge (DUC) value based on historical distance between charges (DBC) values each indicative of the distance the vehicle has been driven between a respective pair of consecutive charges of the vehicle." Independent claim 16 recites, "a distance until charge (DUC) value indicative of the distance from a current position that the vehicle is intended to be driven before the vehicle is recharged." For each limitation, the Examiner relies on Fincham for its teaching, and particularly Paragraph 72 thereof. 1 Final Act. 3, 6, 9. The Examiner replicates that portion where Fincham teaches an "estimate of how far the vehicle can travel" and that this estimate may be a "general average" value. Final Act. 3, 6, 9; Fincham i-f 72. Appellants focus on the above limitation as recited in claim 1 (App. Br. 5-10) and state, "independent claims 9 and 16 include similar features" (App. Br. 10). Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, we understand that the recitation found in claim 16 is similar to that recited in claims 1 and 9; and Appellants do not inform us of any distinction between these claim limitations that might warrant separate investigation. Regarding claim 1, Appellants describe the recited DUC value as being the distance "the vehicle has been driven in the past each time after being recharged (i.e., distance driven between consecutive charging events)." App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 2. In contrast, Appellants contend, 1 The Examiner relies on the secondary reference to Vickers for teaching other limitations of these three independent claims. Final Act. 3--4, 6, 10. 3 Appeal2014-005439 Application 13/007,729 "Fincham describes such a DUC value that is estimated based on distances the vehicle has been driven in the past in conjunction with the consumed charge." App. Br. 7; see also Reply Br. 2. To clarify this distinction further, Appellants state that the claimed case is directed to the inquiry of "how far is the vehicle typically driven before the driver recharges the vehicle again[.]" Reply Br. 2. In contrast, Appellants state that Fincham is directed to the inquiry of "how far is the vehicle typically driven on, for example, a full tank of electrical fuel[.]" Reply Br. 2. There is merit to Appellants' understanding of Fincham and its teachings. Paragraph 72 of Fincham (relied on by the Examiner, see supra) addresses Figure 7 and describes "charge range level 720." This charge range level 720 is slidable by the user along charge indicator 714. Fincham i-f 72. As depicted in Figure 7, charge range level 720 indicates that if the battery were charged to the level shown (80% ), the range would be 110 miles. Hence, as stated, charge range level 720 provides "[a Jn estimate of how far the vehicle can travel on a given charge amount." Fincham i-f 72. In other words, we understand that if the battery were charged to the level selected, then charge range level 720 would provide an estimate of the distance the vehicle can travel on that charge before fully depleting the battery. Accordingly, we agree with Appellants that Fincham provides an estimate of how far the vehicle is typically driven on "a full tank of electrical fuel," which is different from how far the vehicle is typically driven "between charge events" as asserted. Reply Br. 2. The Examiner's response to Appellants' contention is for the driver to simply "set[] the charge percent level to 100% upon a recharge and never make[] any changes to said percent level." Ans. 3. In that fashion, "the 4 Appeal2014-005439 Application 13/007,729 distance indicated as reference character 720 in Fig. 7 would necessarily correspond to [Appellants'] DBC value and would be taken into account when computing the DUC value." Ans. 4. However, even setting item 720 to 100% and leaving it there only provides an indication of the mileage to be expected until the battery is fully depleted. Fincham does not provide any indication that item 720 provides "the distance the vehicle has been driven between a respective pair of consecutive charges of the vehicle" as recited. For example, the Examiner does not identify any disclosure in Fincham directed to the charge level of the battery when charging occurs or the distance traveled between that charge event and the last one. Instead, Fincham's 720 provides an estimate of the distance expected to be traveled on a given charge amount. Thus, lacking any indication by the Examiner that Fincham teaches estimating a distance "driven between a respective pair of consecutive charges," we are not persuaded the Examiner has presented articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support a legal conclusion of obviousness. In other words, we are of the opinion that Appellants have successfully rebutted any prima facie case of obviousness that may have been established by the Examiner. We reverse the Examiner's rejection of independent claims 1, 9, and 16, and, by extension, dependent claims 2-5, 8, 10-13, 15, and 18-20. The rejection of claims 6 and 7 as unpatentable over Fincham, Vickers, and Yamada Claim 6 depends from claim 1 while claim 7 depends from claim 6. The Examiner relies on the additional teachings of Yamada for disclosing the additional limitations found in these two dependent claims. Final Act. 14--15. The Examiner does not rely on Yamada to cure the defect of the 5 Appeal2014-005439 Application 13/007,729 combination of Fincham and Vickers discussed supra. Accordingly, we likewise do not sustain the Examiners' rejection of dependent claims 6 and 7 as being obvious over Fincham, Vickers, and Yamada. DECISION The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-13, 15, 16, and 18-20 are reversed. REVERSED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation