Ex Parte KrippgansDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 19, 201511266140 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2015) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/266,140 11/02/2005 Thomas Krippgans 11336-1159 (P04054US) 8068 81166 7590 06/19/2015 BGL/Harman - Chicago Brinks Gilson & Lione P.O. Box 10395 Chicago, IL 60610 EXAMINER KAO, WEI PO ERIC ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2464 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/19/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte THOMAS KRIPPGANS ____________ Appeal 2012-010578 Application 11/266,140 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before JOHN A. EVANS, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of Claims 1–20 and 22–242 as obvious. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.3 1 The Appeal Brief identifies Thomas Krippgans, the inventor, as the real party in interest. Br. 1. 2 Br. 7. 3 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed January 3, 2012 (“Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed April 13, 2012 (“Ans.”); Final Office (Footnote continued on next page.) Appeal 2012-010578 Application 11/266,140 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The claims relate to an audio system for use in a vehicle. See Abstract. Claims 1, 8, and 18 are independent. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary Claim 1, which is reproduced below with some formatting added: 1. An audio system for use in a vehicle comprising: one or more loudspeakers disposed in the vehicle; a receiver operating to receive digital data in first and second digital audio data formats, the first digital audio data format corresponding to a format used by a mobile audio device to wirelessly transmit digital audio stored on the mobile audio device, the second digital audio data format differing from the first digital audio data format; where the receiver operates in a first routing mode in response to receiving digital data in the first digital audio data format to route digital data in the first digital audio data format for ultimate output as audio at the one or more loudspeakers; and where the receiver operates in a second routing mode in response to receiving digital data in the second digital audio data format to route digital data in the second digital audio data format for ultimate output as audio at the one or more loudspeakers, where selection of the first routing mode or the Action mailed August 30, 2011 (“Final Act.”); and the original Specification filed November 2, 2005 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2012-010578 Application 11/266,140 3 second routing mode is automatic and dependent upon at least one of the first and second digital audio data formats. References and Rejections The Examiner relies upon the prior art as follows: Rubin US 4,788,543 Nov. 29, 1988 Yamamoto US 2002/0142803 A1 Oct. 3, 2002 Lutter US 2002/0196134 A1 Dec. 26, 2002 Cannon US 2003/0032460 A1 Feb. 13, 2003 Jernigan US 2006/0035586 A1 Feb. 16, 2006 The claims stand rejected as follows:4 1. Claims 1, 2, 4–12, 18, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lutter and Cannon. Ans. 7–15. 2. Claims 3 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lutter, Cannon, and Rubin. Ans. 15–16. 3. Claims 13, 15, 17, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lutter, Cannon, and Jernigan. Ans. 17–18. 4 Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, we will decide the appeal on the basis of claims as set forth below. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2011). Appeal 2012-010578 Application 11/266,140 4 4. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lutter, Cannon, Jernigan, and Rubin. Ans. 19. 5. Claims 23 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lutter, Cannon, and Yamamoto. Ans. 19–21. ISSUE ON APPEAL Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Br. 13), we find the dispositive issue presented on appeal is whether the Examiner errs in finding the combination of Lutter and Cannon teaches a receiver that operates in first and second routing modes, respectively, and where the selection of the routing mode is automatic and dependent on at least one of the first and second digital audio data formats. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred. We are not persuaded the Examiner has erred. We adopt, as our own, the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. We set forth the following analysis merely to highlight and emphasize certain points. CLAIMS 1, 2, 4–12, 18, 19, AND 20 OVER LUTTER AND CANNON Appellant argues Claims 1, 2, 4–12, 18, 19, and 20 as a group and specifically argues Claim 1. Br. 9. Appeal 2012-010578 Application 11/266,140 5 As an initial matter, Appellant contends the Examiner has not made out a case of anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 based on the Lutter reference. See Br. 9. The claims were rejected as rendered obvious, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, by the combination of Lutter and Cannon. Ans. 7. Appellant’s argument is moot. Appellant contends Lutter teaches a GUI to allow a user to select both an audio source device and an audio output device. Br. 10–11. Thus, Lutter’s receiver does not automatically connect an audio source device to an audio output device based on a digital data format. Br. 10–11. The Examiner finds the claimed routing mode(s) convert a received digital audio signal to an analog audio signal and route the analog signal to the vehicle’s speakers. Ans. 22. Lutter teaches various audio applications may have various priorities and security values and Lutter’s audio manager may replace a lower priority audio feed with a higher priority feed. Ans. 23 (citing Lutter, ¶¶ 22, 23). Thus, Lutter teaches the “automatic” aspects of the claimed limitation. Lutter discloses the audio manager automatically routing an audio signal based on its source format indicating a higher priority: The audio application priorities are used by the data manager to determine what audio sources are allowed to be circumvented by other audio sources. For example, an audio source that generates a collision warning signal may have a high priority that can override lower audio applications, such as audio applications that only play music. As soon as the collision Appeal 2012-010578 Application 11/266,140 6 warning signal is no longer generated, the previous audio source is reconnected to the audio output device. Lutter, ¶ 24. Appellant’s Specification provides no limiting definition of format and, thus, Lutter’s disclosure of at least two audio sources — a collision warning signal source and a music source — clearly represents at least two different audio data formats. Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded of Examiner error, and we sustain the rejection of claim 1, as well as the rejections of claims 2–20 and 22–24, which are not argued separately with sufficient particularity. DECISION The rejection of Claims 1–20 and 22–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is AFFIRMED. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED ELD Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation