Ex Parte Krippgans

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 19, 2015

11266140 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/266,140 11/02/2005 Thomas Krippgans 11336-1159 (P04054US) 8068
81166 7590 06/19/2015
BGL/Harman - Chicago
Brinks Gilson & Lione
P.O. Box 10395
Chicago, IL 60610
EXAMINER
KAO, WEI PO ERIC
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2464
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/19/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte THOMAS KRIPPGANS
____________

Appeal 2012-010578
Application 11/266,140
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JOHN A. EVANS, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of Claims 1–20 and 22–242 as obvious. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.3

1 The Appeal Brief identifies Thomas Krippgans, the inventor, as the real
party in interest. Br. 1.
2 Br. 7.
3 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed January 3, 2012
(“Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed April 13, 2012 (“Ans.”); Final Office
(Footnote continued on next page.)
Appeal 2012-010578
Application 11/266,140

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to an audio system for use in a vehicle. See
Abstract.
Claims 1, 8, and 18 are independent. An understanding of the
invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary Claim 1, which is
reproduced below with some formatting added:
1. An audio system for use in a vehicle comprising:
one or more loudspeakers disposed in the vehicle;
a receiver operating to receive digital data in first and
second digital audio data formats, the first digital audio data
format corresponding to a format used by a mobile audio device
to wirelessly transmit digital audio stored on the mobile audio
device, the second digital audio data format differing from the
first digital audio data format;
where the receiver operates in a first routing mode in
response to receiving digital data in the first digital audio data
format to route digital data in the first digital audio data format
for ultimate output as audio at the one or more loudspeakers;
and
where the receiver operates in a second routing mode in
response to receiving digital data in the second digital audio
data format to route digital data in the second digital audio data
format for ultimate output as audio at the one or more
loudspeakers, where selection of the first routing mode or the

Action mailed August 30, 2011 (“Final Act.”); and the original Specification
filed November 2, 2005 (“Spec.”).
Appeal 2012-010578
Application 11/266,140

3
second routing mode is automatic and dependent upon at least
one of the first and second digital audio data formats.

References and Rejections
The Examiner relies upon the prior art as follows:
Rubin US 4,788,543 Nov. 29, 1988
Yamamoto US 2002/0142803 A1 Oct. 3, 2002
Lutter US 2002/0196134 A1 Dec. 26, 2002
Cannon US 2003/0032460 A1 Feb. 13, 2003
Jernigan US 2006/0035586 A1 Feb. 16, 2006

The claims stand rejected as follows:4
1. Claims 1, 2, 4–12, 18, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lutter and Cannon. Ans. 7–15.
2. Claims 3 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lutter, Cannon, and Rubin. Ans. 15–16.
3. Claims 13, 15, 17, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Lutter, Cannon, and Jernigan. Ans. 17–18.

4 Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, we will decide the
appeal on the basis of claims as set forth below. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2011).

Appeal 2012-010578
Application 11/266,140

4
4. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lutter, Cannon, Jernigan, and Rubin. Ans. 19.
5. Claims 23 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lutter, Cannon, and Yamamoto. Ans. 19–21.

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Br. 13), we find
the dispositive issue presented on appeal is whether the Examiner errs in
finding the combination of Lutter and Cannon teaches a receiver that
operates in first and second routing modes, respectively, and where the
selection of the routing mode is automatic and dependent on at least one of
the first and second digital audio data formats.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We are not persuaded the Examiner
has erred. We adopt, as our own, the Examiner’s findings and conclusions.
We set forth the following analysis merely to highlight and emphasize
certain points.
CLAIMS 1, 2, 4–12, 18, 19, AND 20 OVER LUTTER AND CANNON
Appellant argues Claims 1, 2, 4–12, 18, 19, and 20 as a group and
specifically argues Claim 1. Br. 9.
Appeal 2012-010578
Application 11/266,140

5
As an initial matter, Appellant contends the Examiner has not made
out a case of anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 based on the Lutter
reference. See Br. 9. The claims were rejected as rendered obvious, under
35 U.S.C. § 103, by the combination of Lutter and Cannon. Ans. 7.
Appellant’s argument is moot.
Appellant contends Lutter teaches a GUI to allow a user to select both
an audio source device and an audio output device. Br. 10–11. Thus,
Lutter’s receiver does not automatically connect an audio source device to
an audio output device based on a digital data format. Br. 10–11. The
Examiner finds the claimed routing mode(s) convert a received digital audio
signal to an analog audio signal and route the analog signal to the vehicle’s
speakers. Ans. 22. Lutter teaches various audio applications may have
various priorities and security values and Lutter’s audio manager may
replace a lower priority audio feed with a higher priority feed. Ans. 23
(citing Lutter, ¶¶ 22, 23). Thus, Lutter teaches the “automatic” aspects of
the claimed limitation. Lutter discloses the audio manager automatically
routing an audio signal based on its source format indicating a higher
priority:
The audio application priorities are used by the data manager to
determine what audio sources are allowed to be circumvented
by other audio sources. For example, an audio source that
generates a collision warning signal may have a high priority
that can override lower audio applications, such as audio
applications that only play music. As soon as the collision
Appeal 2012-010578
Application 11/266,140

6
warning signal is no longer generated, the previous audio
source is reconnected to the audio output device.
Lutter, ¶ 24. Appellant’s Specification provides no limiting definition of
format and, thus, Lutter’s disclosure of at least two audio sources — a
collision warning signal source and a music source — clearly represents at
least two different audio data formats.
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded of Examiner error, and
we sustain the rejection of claim 1, as well as the rejections of claims 2–20
and 22–24, which are not argued separately with sufficient particularity.

DECISION
The rejection of Claims 1–20 and 22–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

ELD