Ex Parte Kreindlina et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 27, 201713724565 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/724,565 12/21/2012 Olga Kreindlina 0046-046001/2012P00297US 6901 56056 7590 03/01/2017 BRAKE HUGHES BELLERMANN LLP C/O CPA Global 900 Second Avenue South Suite 600 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402 EXAMINER OBISESAN, AUGUSTINE KUNLE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2156 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/01/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): uspto@brakehughes.com docketing@brakehughes.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte OLGA KREINDLINA, OLIVER BERGER, SANTHOSH N., KARTHIK NARAYANAN MOHAN, WALTER ZIMMERMANN, TORSTEN BUECHELER, SOPHIE KRAUT, ALBERT NEUMUELLER, STEFFEN WITT, DIETMAR HENKES, GUANG YANG, THOMAS VOGT, MATTHIAS BECKER, MARTIN HAERTERICH, STEFAN MOELLER, KRITESH VASING, KNUT HEUSERMANN, CHRISTIAN HOHMANN, MARCUS ECHTER, XENIA RIEGER, MOHIT V. GADKARI, and MUKESH KUMAR Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 Technology Center 2100 Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, CATHERINE SHIANG, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—20, which are all the claims pending and rejected in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in- part. Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction According to the Specification, the present invention relates to maintaining and synchronizing data. See generally Spec. 2. Claim 1 is exemplary: 1. A method comprising: receiving, by a software-as-a-service apparatus, a plurality of pieces of master data from a physically remote master database, the software-as-a-service apparatus being communicatively coupled between the physically remote master database and a plurality of remote client devices; replicating, to a software-as-a-service application operating on the software-as-a-service apparatus, the plurality of pieces of master data; converting the plurality of pieces of master data into one or more pieces of local data of the software-as-a-service application; determining whether one or more of the pieces of local data has changed through operation of the software-as-a-service application by a first of the plurality of remote client devices; upon determining one or more of the pieces of local data has changed, synchronizing the pieces of local data that have changed between the remote master database and the software- as-a-service application; determining whether one or more of the pieces of master data has changed at the physically remote master database based on an indication that a second of the plurality of remote client devices caused the change of the one or more of the pieces of master data; and upon determining one or more of the pieces of master data has changed, synchronizing the pieces of master data-that have changed between the remote master database and the software-as-a-service application. References and Rejections Benson US 6,202,085 B1 Mar. 13,2001 2 Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 Sufuentes US 2009/0172082 A1 July 2, 2009 Yueh US 7,783,604 B1 Aug. 24, 2010 Pei US 2011/0161289 A1 June 30, 2011 Gilder US 8,560,568 B2 Oct. 15,2013 Claims 1—6, 9, 19, and 20 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yueh, Sufuentes, Gilder, and Pei. Claims 7 and 8 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yueh, Sufuentes, Gilder, Benson, and Pei. Claims 10-15 and 18 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gilder and Yueh. Claims 16—17 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gilder, Yueh, and Benson. ANALYSIS Claims 1—9, 19, and 20 We disagree with Appellants’ arguments, and agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in (i) the action from which this appeal is taken and (ii) the Answer (excluding claims 9 and 20) to the extent they are consistent with our analysis below.1 On this record, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 1. I Appellants contend Gilder does not teach “determining whether one or more of the pieces of local data has changed through operation of the 1 To the extent Appellants advance new arguments in the Reply Brief without showing good cause, Appellants have waived such arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). 3 Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 software-as-a-service application by a first of the plurality of remote client devices,” as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added). See App. Br. 9—12; Reply Br. 6. In particular, Appellants assert: Gilder discloses copying data from a first local data source (e.g., LOB source database 210) to a second local database (e.g., shadow database 522, 1102) which is then copied to a central data collection site. The data is changed by a Line of Business (“LOB”) application which is a locally executed application. Gilder fails to teach or fairly suggest “determining whether one or more of the pieces of local data has changed through operation of the software-as-a-service application by a first of the plurality of remote client devices,” as required by claim 1. App. Br. 12. Appellants have not persuaded us of error. Because the Examiner relies on the combination of Yueh, Sufuentes, and Gilder to teach the disputed claim limitations, Appellants cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking the references individually. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Examiner finds—and Appellants do not dispute—Yueh teaches “software-as-a-service application.” Final Act. 3^4. Therefore, Gilder does not need to separately teach that term. Further, the Examiner finds—and Appellants fail to offer substantive arguments to dispute—Gilder teaches “local data has changed through operation of’ a processor. See Final Act. 5. Because Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s rationale for combining the teachings of Yueh, Sufuentes, and Gilder, Appellants have not shown error in the Examiner’s finding that the references collectively teach “determining whether one or more of the pieces of local data has changed through operation of the software-as-a-service application by a first of the plurality of remote client devices,” as required by the claim (emphasis added). 4 Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 In addition, in response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner provides further findings showing Yueh, Sufuentes, and Gilder collectively teach the disputed claim limitation. See Ans. 3^4. Appellants fail to persuasively respond to such further findings. Therefore, Appellants fail to show error in the Examiner’s findings. See In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court [or this Board] to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”). II Appellants contend Gilder does not teach “upon determining one or more of the pieces of local data has changed, synchronizing the pieces of local data that have changed between the remote master database and the software-as-a-service application,” as recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 12— 13; Reply Br. 4—7. In particular, Appellants assert: [I]n Gilder, data is extracted by the synchronization step 1120 is copied into a local “shadow” database 522, 1102. The synchronization step 1120 (and thus the extracted data) is based on a comparison process of the local shadow database 522, 1102 and any differences between the LOB database 210 and the shadow database 522, 1102. App. Br. 12. Appellants have not persuaded us of error. As discussed above, it is undisputed Yueh teaches “software-as-a-service application.” Therefore, Gilder does not need to separately teach that term. Further, in response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner provides further findings showing Yueh, Sufuentes, and Gilder collectively teach the disputed claim limitation. See Ans. 3^4. For example, the Examiner finds: 5 Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 G[il]der discloses replication of data between system such as cloud or software as-a-Service (SaaS) system. The system can replicate or synchronize data between multiple Saas or cloud. . . . Data in the shadow database is compared with data source and remote data system to determine any change to the data. The data in the shadow database is synchronize with remote data system based on the outcome of the comparison. Ans. 4. Appellants fail to persuasively respond to such specific findings. Therefore, Appellants fail to show error in the Examiner’s findings. See Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d at 391. Ill Appellants contend Pei does not teach “determining whether one or more of the pieces of master data has changed at the physically remote master database based on an indication that a second of the plurality of remote client devices caused the change of the one or more of the pieces of master data,” as recited in claim 1 (emphases added). See App. Br. 13—17. In particular, Appellants assert “in Pei there is no physically remote master database or master data. Instead, Pei describes a distributed database system.” App. Br. 17. Appellants have not persuaded us of error. Because the Examiner relies on the combination of Yueh, Sufuentes, Gilder, and Pei to teach the disputed claim limitation, Appellants cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking the references individually. See Merck & Co., 800 F.2d at 1097. The Examiner finds—and Appellants do not dispute—Yueh teaches “master data” and “remote master database.” Final Act. 3^4. Therefore, Pei does not need to separately teach those terms. 6 Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 Further, Appellants’ assertion that contrary to the system described in Pei, [in the exemplary Figure 1 of this invention,] there is no need for each of the SaaS Apparatus 102 and/or SaaS applications 117 instant application to even be aware of each other and no need for each of the SaaS Apparatus 102 and/or SaaS applications 117 instant application to be communicatively coupled to each other (App. Br. 17) is unpersuasive of error. Appellants have not shown why and how such assertion about an exemplary figure of this invention renders the Examiner’s mapping incorrect. In addition, in response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner provides further findings showing Yueh, Sufuentes, Gilder, and Pei collectively teach the disputed claim limitation. See Ans. 5. Specifically, the Examiner further cites Pei’s paragraph 11. Ans. 5. Appellants fail to analyze the additional cited paragraph and fail to persuasively respond to the Examiner’s further findings. Therefore, Appellants fail to show error in the Examiner’s findings. See Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d at 391. IV Appellants contend Pei does not teach “upon determining one or more of the pieces of master data has changed, synchronizing the pieces of master data-that have changed between the remote master database and the software-as-a-service application,” as recited in claim 1 (emphases added). See App. Br. 18. In particular, Appellants assert “[t]here is no indication in Pei that... the system is operated as a software-as-a-service application . . . in Pei, there is no physically remote master database or master data.” App. Br. 18. 7 Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 Because the Examiner relies on the combination of Yueh, Sufuentes, Gilder, and Pei to teach the disputed claim limitation, Appellants cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking the references individually. See Merck & Co., 800 F.2d at 1097. As discussed above, it is undisputed Yueh teaches “software-as-a-service application,” “master data” and “remote master database.” Therefore, Pei does not need to separately teach those terms. In addition, in response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner provides further findings showing Yueh, Sufuentes, Gilder, and Pei collectively teach the disputed claim limitation. See Ans. 6. Specifically, the Examiner further cites Pei’s paragraph 13. Ans. 6. Appellants fail to analyze the additional cited paragraph and fail to persuasively respond to the Examiner’s further findings. Therefore, Appellants fail to show error in the Examiner’s findings. See Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d at 391. V Appellants contend the Examiner fails to consider claim 1 as a whole. See App. Br. 21—22. The U.S. Supreme Court has held “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). “If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103” and “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418—19. 8 Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the Examiner has considered the claim as a whole, and provided articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to combine the teachings of Yueh, Sufuentes, Gilder, and Pei. See Non-Final Act. 3—7. Appellants do not persuasively show why such reasoning is incorrect. The Examiner’s findings and conclusion are reasonable because the skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle” since the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420-21. Appellants do not present adequate evidence that the resulting arrangements would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that combining the teachings of Yueh, Sufuentes, Gilder, and Pei would have predictably used prior art elements according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. a 417. Because Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erred, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claim 19 for similar reasons. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of corresponding dependent claims 2—8, as Appellants do not advance separate substantive arguments for those claims. 9 Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 Separately Argued Dependent Claims Regarding dependent claim 9, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner has not adequately mapped “receipt of the of the synchronizing message causes the remote master database to, convert the intermediate transmittal format of the synchronizing message to one or more master business objects” (emphasis added). See App. Br. 23. The Examiner does not explain how Gilder teaches the italicized claim limitation, and does not specifically respond to Appellants’ arguments. Because the Examiner fails to provide sufficient evidence or explanation to support the rejection, we are constrained by the record to reverse the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 9, and dependent claim 20 for similar reasons. Claims 10—18 We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ contentions and the evidence of record. We concur with Appellants’ contention that the Examiner erred in finding Gilder and Yueh collectively teach “receive, via the first network interface, an indication that a second of the plurality of remote client devices has caused a change to one or more of the pieces of master data,” as recited in claim 10.2 See App. Br. 19—20. Initially, the Examiner cites Yueh’s column 9, lines 41 and 42, and finds “factoring technique allows a changed file to efficiently be analyzed. ” 2 Appellants raise additional arguments with respect to this group of claims. Because the identified issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the additional arguments. 10 Appeal 2016-007794 Application 13/724,565 Final Act. 25. However, that finding does not explain how Yueh teaches the disputed claim limitation. In response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner cites Gilder for a different claim limitation, and the Examiner’s further findings do not explain how the cited Gilder portions teach the disputed claim limitation. See Ans. 6. Because the Examiner fails to provide sufficient evidence or explanation to support the rejection, we are constrained by the record to reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10. We also reverse the Examiner’s rejection of corresponding dependent claims 11—18. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—8 and 19. We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 9—18 and 20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation