Ex Parte Krapp et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 16, 2016

13021478 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/021,478 02/04/2011 Steven John Krapp 7242 4636
21924 7590 12/20/2016
ARRTS2 F.ntp.mrisp.s T ! C
EXAMINER
Legal Dept - Docketing
101 Tournament Drive
PATEL, HARDIKKUMAR D
HORSHAM, PA 19044 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2473
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/20/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
arrisdocketing @ arris.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN JOHN KRAPP and WILLIAM TURNER HANKS
Appeal 2016-004267
Application 13/021,47s1
Technology Center 2400
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., HUNG H. BUI, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.
BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Office Action rejecting claims 1—17, which are all the
claims pending on appeal. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is ARRIS Group, Inc.
App. Br. 2.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed Aug. 25, 2015
(“App. Br.”); Reply Brief filed Mar. 14, 2016 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s
Answer mailed Jan. 14, 2016 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed Mar. 24,
2015 (“Final Act.”); and original Specification filed Feb. 04, 2011 (“Spec.”).
Appeal 2016-004267
Application 13/021,478
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants ’ invention
According to Appellants, “admission control processes” between
devices in a network for network resources, such as the cable network
resources in a data-over-cable service interface specification (DOCSIS)
based system, “are typically complex and require detailed information about
the service flow being added, information about the existing flows, and
information about the system, for example, prior to making an admission
control decision.” Spec H 6—7. In particular, “existing admission control
processes rely on complex signaling and state information to determine
whether network resources exist for a requested service across a network.”
Id. 117.
Appellants acknowledge, however, new communication protocols
such as Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) for use in a DOCSIS-
based system do not require signaling protocols for admission control. Id.
As such, Appellants propose an example “stateless admission control
process . . . that does not maintain state information and does not require
complex signaling between devices [in such a network].” Id. 118.
According to Appellants:
each new service flow that is subject to admission control is first
activated on a probationary basis as a probationary flow with a
reduced priority. As the network demonstrates its continued
stability by the addition of the new probationary flows, each
probationary service flow can be re-assigned to its original
priority thereby promoting the probationary . . . flow to a non­
probationary status.
Id.
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Appeal 2016-004267
Application 13/021,478
Illustrative Claims
Claims 1, 9, and 17 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of
Appellants’ invention and is reproduced with disputed limitations
emphasized below:
1. A method for admission control to manage network
resources, the method comprising:
automatically adding a probationary service flow having
a probationary priority at a first priority to a network to deliver
traffic across the network for an application session;
determining whether the network is stable as a result of
the addition of the added probationary service flow at the
probationary priority, and
updating the probationary service flow by promoting
status of the probationary service flow to become a conventional
service flow and removing the probationary nature of the initially
assigned priority by assigning a second priority based on the type
of service implicated by the conventional service flow to the
added probationary service flow if the network is stable.
App. Br. 12 (Claims App.).
Examiner’s Rejections and References
(1) Claims 1, 7, 9, 15, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Iwamoto et al. (US 2006/0087681 Al;
published Apr. 27, 2006; “Iwamoto”) and Alexander et al. (US
2011/0158095 Al; published June 30, 2011; “Alexander”). Final Act. 2-4.
(2) Claims 2—6 and 10—14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Iwamoto, Alexander, and Harrison et al. (US
6,091,709; issued July 18, 2000; “Harrison”). Id. at 4—9.
(3) Claims 8 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Iwamoto, Alexander, and Zhong (US 2007/0230348
Al; published Oct. 4, 2007). Id. at 9-10.
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Appeal 2016-004267
Application 13/021,478
ISSUE
Based on Appellants’ arguments, the dispositive issue presented on
appeal is whether the combination of Iwamoto and Alexander teaches or
suggests all the limitations of Appellants’ claimed invention. App. Br. 4—8;
Reply Br. 2—3.
ANALYSIS
With respect to independent claims 1, 9, and 17, the Examiner finds
Iwamoto teaches a method for admission control to manage network
resources comprising “automatically adding a probationary service flow
having a probationary priority at a first priority to a network to deliver traffic
across the network for an application session” in the form of a new job
received and registered in a job list table, and then executed based on
priorities of jobs, via a network. Ans. 2 (citing Iwamoto 1 62, Fig. 3).
Iwamoto’s Figure 3 is reproduced below:
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fstart]
Iwamoto’s Figure 3 shows a job list table including an order of execution,
priority of orders, user names, and image data titles.
The Examiner then relies on Alexander for teaching the remaining
limitations to support the conclusion of obviousness, i.e., (1) “determining
whether the network is stable as a result of the addition of the added
probationary service flow at the probationary priority” in the form of a
JOB L!ST
USER
HA ME
' CHANGE
( 4 j Waiting j User4 \ Doc4 ]|
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Appeal 2016-004267
Application 13/021,478
bandwidth broker 130, shown in Figure 1, to determine if bandwidth is
available on a network 150 in response to a request to allow a service flow
over the network 150; and (2) “updating the probationary service flow by
promoting status of the probationary service flow to become a conventional
service flow and removing the probationary nature of the initially assigned
priority by assigning a second priority based on the type of service
implicated by the conventional service flow to the added probationary
service flow if the network is stable” in the form of an interim policy used
for admission control to access network resources and specify a service flow
allowed to start with packets marked with different priority levels. Final
Act. 3 (citing Alexander || 44, 64; see also id. at Fig. 1).
Alexander’s Figure 1 is reproduced below:
Alexander’s Figure 1 shows admission control system 100 for managing
communications (i.e., service flows) over network 150.
Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s rationale for combining
Iwamoto and Alexander. Instead, Appellants dispute the Examiner’s factual
findings regarding Iwamoto and Alexander. In particular, Appellants
contend Iwamoto “only describes an ordering of print jobs at an image
150
UO-v FLOW
INITIATOR
'' BROKER
5
Appeal 2016-004267
Application 13/021,478
forming apparatus (e.g., Iwamoto [0052])” and “provides absolutely no
mention, suggestion, or hint of a service flow being probationary in nature,
a service flow being given a probationary priority, or the priority being
associated with a network for delivering traffic” as recited in claim 1.
App. Br. 6. According to Appellants, the term “service flow” is defined by
Appellants’ Specification as a medium for the “unidirectional transport of
packets.” Spec. 1 3. Appellants argue nowhere in Iwamoto is there any
disclosure of a “service flow” or adding a “probationary service flow to a
network.” App. Br. 6. Appellants further argue the print jobs described by
Iwamoto are not “probationary.” Reply Br. 2.
Appellants acknowledge Alexander teaches admission control of
“service flow” based on available network resources. App. Br. 8 (citing
Alexander 141). However, Appellants contend Alexander does not teach
(1) any “probationary” limitation associated with the service flow; (2) any
determination as to whether the “network is stable as a result of the addition
of the added probationary service flow at the probationary priority” and
(3) “the removal of a probationary status and the upgrading of a priority for
a service flow based on an associated network’s actual reaction to the
addition of the service flow to the network.” App. Br. 7—8; Reply Br. 2—3.
We do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive. Instead, we find
the Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellants’
arguments supported by a preponderance of evidence. Ans. 14—15.
Therefore, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and explanations provided
therein. Id. At the outset, we note claim terms, during prosecution before
the PTO, are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the specification. In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
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Appeal 2016-004267
Application 13/021,478
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, claim
terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
As recognized by Appellants, the term “service flow” is defined as a
medium for the “unidirectional transport of packets.” Spec. 13. Based on
Appellants’ definition, we interpret “service flow” as encompassing data
packets transported from terminal 30 (PC) to image forming apparatus 10,
via network 20, shown in Iwamoto’s Figure 1. In addition, we also find
Alexander teaches a similar method for controlling network access including
sending a request to allow a communication flow (i.e., “service flow”) over a
network. Alexander H 1, 5, Fig. 1.
In contrast, the term “probationary” associated with the “service flow”
is not explicitly defined by Appellants’ Specification. However,
“probationary service flow” is described in the context of each new “service
flow” that is subject to admission control in the same manner described by
Alexander. For example, Appellants’ Specification describes:
[generally, each new service flow that is subject to admission
control is first activated on a probationary basis as a probationary
flow with a reduced priority. As the network demonstrates its
continued stability by the addition of the new probationary flows,
each probationary service flow can be re-assigned to its original
priority thereby promoting the probationary service flow to a
non-probationary status. This process minimizes the effect of the
newly added probationary service flows on existing non-
probationary service flows.
Spec. 118 (emphasis added). In other words, the term “probationary service
flow” refers to any new service flow that is subject to admission control. Id.
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Appeal 2016-004267
Application 13/021,478
Based on Appellants’ Specification, the Examiner has implicitly
interpreted the term “probationary service flow” as encompassing
(1) Iwamoto’s request for a new job and (2) Alexander’s request to allow a
service flow over a network, because both requests are conditional or
probationary at least until granted. Ans. 14—15 (citing fwamoto 1 64;
Alexander 144). We find the Examiner’s interpretation reasonable and
consistent with Appellants’ Specification. “Absent an express definition in
their specification, the fact that [Appellants] can point to definitions or
usages that conform to their interpretation does not make the PTO’s
definition unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that
support its interpretation.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (emphasis added).
Moreover, as correctly recognized by the Examiner, when
Alexander’s request to allow a service flow over network 150 is received,
the bandwidth broker 130, shown in Alexander’s Figures 1 and 3,
determines if bandwidth (i.e., network resources) is available on network
150. Ans. 15 (citing Alexander 144). As such, we agree with the Examiner
that Alexander’s bandwidth broker 130 teaches “determining whether the
network is stable as a result of the addition of the added probationary service
flow at the probationary priority” as recited in Appellants’ claim 1.
Similarly, if the bandwidth is available on network 150 and communications
would not burden network 150 (i.e., the network is stable), Alexander’s
bandwidth broker 130 prioritizes communication or service flows using
network admission policy. Id. (citing Alexander 144; see also id. 1145-51,
Fig. 3). As such, we also agree with the Examiner that Alexander’s
bandwidth broker 130 teaches:
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Appeal 2016-004267
Application 13/021,478
updating the probationary service flow by promoting status of the
probationary service flow to become a conventional service flow
and removing the probationary nature of the initially assigned
priority by assigning a second priority based on the type of
service implicated by the conventional service flow to the added
probationary service flow if the network is stable
as recited in Appellants’ claim 1.
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants have not persuaded us of
Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of independent claim 1 and similarly independent claims 9 and 17,
and their respective dependent claims 2—8 and 10—16, which Appellants do
not argue separately. App. Br. 9-11.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellants have not
demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1—17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—17.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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