Ex Parte Kramer

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 8, 2015

12605269 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 8, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/605,269 10/23/2009 David A. Kramer 004860.P3421C 1356
45217 7590 09/09/2015
APPLE INC./BSTZ
BLAKELY SOKOLOFF TAYLOR & ZAFMAN LLP
1279 OAKMEAD PARKWAY
SUNNYVALE, CA 94085-4040
EXAMINER
WOOLCOCK, MADHU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2451
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/09/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte DAVID A. KRAMER1
________________

Appeal 2013-006780
Application 12/605,269
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before JOHN G. NEW, JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

NEW, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as Apple, Inc. App. Br. 3.
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SUMMARY

Appellant files this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–43. Specifically, claims 1–3, 9, 13,
21–23, 26, 29, 33, 34, 37, 38, and 41–43 stand rejected as unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Bayliss
et al. (US 7,240,059 B2, July 3, 2007) (“Bayliss”), Lee (US 5,642,506, June
24, 1997) (“Lee”), and Ohno et al. (US 5,768,277, June 16, 1998) (“Ohno”).
Claims 4–7, 14–17, 24, 25, 27, 35, and 39 stand rejected as
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Bayliss, Lee, Ohno, and Fellenstein et al. (US 2005/0154789
A1, July 14, 2005) (“Fellenstein”).
Claims 8, 10, 18, 28, 30, 36, and 40 stand rejected as unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Bayliss,
Lee, Ohno, and William Gropp and Ewing Lusk, Dynamic Process
Management in an MPI Setting, MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
DIVISION, ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY (April 20, 1995) (“Gropp”).
Claims 11, 19, and 31 stand rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Bayliss, Lee, Ohno,
Gropp, and Wilson (US 7,225,243 B1, May 29, 2007) (“Wilson”).
Claims 12, 20, and 32 stand rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Bayliss, Lee, Ohno,
Gropp, Wilson, Anker et al. (US 7,675,869 B1, March 9, 2010) (“Anker”),
and Addessi (US 2005/0237949 A1, October 27, 2005) (“Addessi”).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

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NATURE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s invention is directed to a method and system for
configuring information for a distributed computing environment. The
method and system comprises providing a job containing a list of tasks to a
controller, the tasks including a bootstrap tool and configuration information
related to the computer network. The method and system also comprises
providing a task to each of a plurality of agents on the distributed computer
network, each task being based on one of the tasks of the job. The method
and system further comprises executing code by each of the plurality of
agents based upon the tasks process, wherein the code provides
configuration information for a master process and a plurality of slave
processes within the distributed computer network. Abstract.

REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM

Claim 1 is illustrative of the claims on appeal and recites:
1. A method for configuring a distributed computer
network; the method comprising:
receiving a job containing a list of tasks; the tasks
including a first task and a second task;
sending the first task including a first bootstrap tool and
configuration information to a first agent on the distributed
computer network;
sending the second task including a second bootstrap tool
and configuration information to a second agent on the
distributed computer network,
wherein the first bootstrap tool contains a first bootstrap
code executed to run a first bootstrap process on the first agent
based upon the first task and the second bootstrap tool contains
a second bootstrap code executed to run a second bootstrap
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process on the second agent based upon the second task,
wherein the first bootstrap code is configured to generate a first
configuration file based upon the first task for one of a master
process and a plurality of slave processes within the distributed
computer network and the second bootstrap code is configured
to generate a second configuration file based upon the second
task for one of a master process and a plurality of slave
processes within the distributed computer network.

App. Br. 26.

ISSUES AND ANALYSES
A. Claims 1–3, 9, 13, 21–23, 26, 29, 33, 34, 37, 38, and 41–43
Issue 1
Appellant argues these claims together and selects claim 1 as
representative. App. Br. 10. Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding
the combination of Bayliss, Lee, and Ohno teach or suggest all of the
limitations of claim 1, because Lee does not teach or suggest the use of a
“distributed computer network,” as required by claim 1. App. Br. 11.

Analysis
Appellant argues that, rather than teaching a distributed computer
network, Lee instead teaches the use of a high-speed internal bus, without
regard to distributed or networked computing. App. Br. 11. Appellant
disputes the Examiner’s finding that the broadest reasonable interpretation of
“distributed computer network” includes, “any collection or group of
computers, or processors, interconnected to each other electronically and
which can send and receive information to and from one another.” Id.
(quoting Advisory Action at 2, December 12, 2012). According to
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Appellant, this interpretation is improper because it encompasses all parallel
or multithreaded processing, whether conducted locally on a single computer
or conducted on a global electronic network, and disregards the express
features of “distributed” and “network.” Id.
Appellant contends that, at the time of the invention, a person of
ordinary skill in the art would not have interpreted a high-speed system bus,
as taught by Lee, as a distributed computer network. App. Br. 12. Appellant
argues the high-speed system bus of Lee provides direct communication
between processors, and with system memory, and the processor boot code
is stored locally in NVRAM. Id. (citing Lee col. 2, ll. 55–67, Fig. 1).
Appellant asserts the teachings of Lee are specific to “the process of testing
and configuring a computer system when the system is turned on or receives
a restart signal.” Id. (citing Lee col. 2, ll. 18–25). The operations described
by Lee, argues Appellant, are entirely local to the system, and Appellant
argues the Examiner has not cited, within Lee or within an additional
reference, how the teachings of Lee can be modified such that a system can
participate on a distributed computer network before processor initialization.
Id.
Appellant argues further that, the findings of the Examiner to the
contrary notwithstanding, not all communications are equivalent in form and
function. App. Br. 13. Appellant contends a person of ordinary skill in
contemporary art would have been aware that data processing system
functionality was limited prior to the initialization of one or more processors
on a data processing system. Id. Specifically, Appellant argues, prior to
processor initialization, external communication over the network would not
have been feasible, because the network functionality required for
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participation on a distributed computer network would not have been
functional. Id. Appellant argues that such functionality is predicated on the
initialization of one or more processors in the system: the distinction in this
case is not “wired” or “wireless, as Appellant alleges the Examiner finds, but
one of local communication over a localized system bus. Id. Therefore,
Appellant argues, the plain meaning of “distributed computer network:”
properly encompasses the distributed networking claimed. Id.
The Examiner responds that Bayliss, and not Lee, is relied upon by
the Examiner as teaching processing nodes, or computers, connected in a
distributed computer network and which receive software code for
configuring parallel processing. Ans. 4; see also Final Act. 3–4.
The Examiner notes Appellant’s argument that the distributed and
networked nature of distributed computer network applies an additional
layer of technology complexity based on networking protocols, latency,
reliability, and packetized communications. Ans. 4. However, the Examiner
finds, the claim language is silent with respect to any of these distinguishing
characteristics of the particular type of distributed network described by
Appellant. Id. Therefore, finds the Examiner, the claims are not
distinguishable from the network of distributed processors taught by Lee.
Id.
The Examiner finds the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim
term “distributed computer network,” in light of Appellant’s Specification,
includes any collection or group of computers, or processors, interconnected
to each other electronically, and which can send and receive information to
and from one another. Ans. 4–5. The Examiner finds that Lee is directed to
parallel processing by a plurality of computing processors and is relied upon
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for teaching that the code used for configuring the processors is boot code.
Id. at 5. Whether this boot code is communicated over, for example, a
wireless IP network or a high speed bus, the functionality remains the same
for a processor receiving the code to execute a particular task. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. As an initial matter,
Appellant’s argument is not responsive to the Examiner’s findings, because
Bayliss, and not Lee, is relied upon as teaching a “distributed computer
network,” as recited in claim 1. “The test for obviousness is not whether …
the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references
would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (C.C.P.A. 1981). We agree with the Examiner that Lee’s
teaching that the code used for configuring the processors is boot code is
equally applicable to the specific teachings of Lee as well as to the
distributed computer network of claim 1.
Furthermore, in attempting to discredit the Examiner’s broadly
reasonable interpretation of the claim term “distributed computer network,”
Appellant makes extensive arguments concerning the scope of knowledge of
a person of ordinary skill in the art, but Appellant adduces no evidence in
support of such assertions. As such, Appellant’s arguments constitute little
more than attorney argument, and we accord them little probative weight.
See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
In summary, Appellant fails to show that Bayliss does not teach a
distributed computer network or that the Examiner’s definition of the claim
term “distributed computer network” is either overly broad or unreasonable.
We consequently agree with the Examiner’s definition of the term.
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Issue 2
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because the combination of
Bayliss and Lee fails to teach or suggest the limitation of claim 1 reciting:
[W]herein the first bootstrap tool contains a first bootstrap code
executed to run a first bootstrap process on the first agent based
upon the first task and the second bootstrap tool contains a
second bootstrap code executed to run a second bootstrap
process on the second agent based upon the second task,
wherein the first bootstrap code is configured to generate a first
configuration file based upon the first task for one of a master
process and a plurality of slave processes within the distributed
computer network and the second bootstrap code is configured
to generate a second configuration file based upon the second
task for one of a master process and a plurality of slave
processes within the distributed computer network.

App. Br. 14.

Analysis
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because Lee teaches only a
single, centrally stored boot code, and not “a second bootstrap code executed
to run a second bootstrap process on the second agent based upon the second
task,” as required by claim 1. App. Br. 13–14. According to Appellant, Lee
teaches “a single copy of the boot code is stored in a global read-only
memory (ROM) for utilization by each of the multiple processors.” Id. at 14
(quoting Lee col. 2, ll. 23–24). Appellant asserts Lee explicitly teaches the
advantage of using only a single boot code by minimizing storage and easing
manufacture, maintenance and upgrading of the processor. Id. (citing Lee
col. 6, ll. 23–28).
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The Examiner finds the language of claim 1 does not provide a
distinction between the claimed first bootstrap code and second bootstrap
code other than specifying the first bootstrap code process is based upon a
first task and the second bootstrap code is based upon a second task. Ans. 6.
The Examiner finds that, although Lee teaches the use of a centrally stored
boot code, Lee also teaches that upon obtaining the master flag, or taking on
the task of being the master processor, the first processor obtains the boot
code necessary to initiate configuration of the system as the master node. Id.
In other words, the Examiner finds, this code, which enables a processor to
be the master node, corresponds to the first boot code, which is configured to
the first task of the node executing a master process. Id.
The Examiner finds Lee also teaches that, following the assigning of a
processor as the master processor, the remaining processors enter slave
mode and call the task from the boot code to perform based on a second
task, i.e., a slave task. Ans. 6–7. The Examiner therefore finds Lee teaches
boot code which is executed based both upon a first, master, process and
boot code which is executed based on a second, slave, process. Id. at 7.
We agree with the Examiner. The disputed limitation of claim 1
requires that the “first bootstrap tool contains a first bootstrap code executed
to run a first bootstrap process on the first agent … is configured to generate
a first configuration file based upon the first task for one of a master process
and a plurality of slave processes within the distributed computer network”
and that the “second bootstrap code executed to run a second bootstrap
process on the second agent … is configured to generate a second
configuration file based upon the second task for one of a master process and
a plurality of slave processes.” App. Br. 26. Lee teaches:
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[T]he processor then reads a first section of centrally stored
boot code 176 for receiving instructions to initiate booting. In
an alternative embodiment, this first portion of the boot code
may be separately stored in dedicated storage areas for each
processor and individually provided upon request to each
processor. The processor will then read additional sections of
boot code 176 as needed throughout the boot process.
….
In step 380, the processor then attempts to obtain the master
flag 166 from memory controller 165. If the processor is the
first processor attempting to get the master flag, then the
processor will be successful, the flag will be turned on by the
memory controller to prevent other processors from obtaining
the flag, and the processor will proceed on to step 400.
….
If the processor has obtained the master flag, then the processor
is a master processor and will initiate the overall system test
and configuration. Preferably, the master processor obtains the
necessary boot code for this portion of the boot process from
NVRAM at this time. In step 400 the master processor will
power-on reset (POR) all the other processors. This will help
synchronize all the other processors.

Lee cols. 3–4, ll. 45–14 (emphasis added). Lee thus teaches a first portion of
boot code obtained by a processor as the processor initiates booting and, if it
is the first to initiate booting, become the master processor. Lee also teaches
that, when the processor becomes the master (i.e., “obtains the master flag),
a second portion of boot code is obtained by the master processor to initiate
and configure the overall (i.e., master and slave) system.
We therefore agree with the Examiner that Lee teaches both first and
second boot codes as required by claim 1. The language of Lee explicitly
recites distinct first and second portions of boot code that perform distinct
first and second tasks for one of a master process and a plurality of slave
processes. Appellant argues Lee teaches only a single copy of the entire
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boot code is stored in a central location, (App. Br. 14 (citing Lee col. 6, ll.
23–28)), however, we agree with the Examiner that it would be obvious to a
person of ordinary skill that the distinct portions of the boot code, which
perform distinct tasks, could constitute first and second bootstrap codes, as
required by claim 1.

Issue 3
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the combined cited
prior art references teach or suggest the limitation of claim 1 reciting:
[W]herein the bootstrap code is configured to generate a
configuration file based upon the task for a master process and
a plurality of slave processes within the distributed computer
network and the second bootstrap code is configured to
generate a second configuration file based upon the second task
for one of a master process and a plurality of slave processes
within the distributed computer network.

App. Br. 15.

Analysis
Appellant argues Bayliss, Lee, and Ohno, either individually or in
combination, fail to teach or suggest “generating a first configuration file
based upon the first task, nor generating a second configuration file based
upon the second task.” App. Br. 15. Appellant argues Ohno teaches a
“management table 12 for the slave LAN instrument composition.” Id.
(quoting Ohno col. 3, ll. 56–61). According to Appellant, the management
table of Ohno teaches a master LAN instrument can provide configuration
information to slave LAN instruments over an exclusive management port,
but does not teach any manner of generating configuration files based upon a
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task, or any manner of configuration file generation. Id. Instead, Appellant
argues, Ohno discloses “ID assigning command packet transmitted from the
master LAN to the slave LAN instruments.” Id. (quoting Ohno col. 4, ll.
26–28). Appellant contends the command packets are not used to either
“generate a first configuration file based upon the first task,” or to “generate
a second configuration file based upon the second task.” Id.
The Examiner finds Ohno teaches a system and method in which a
configuration file is generated based on the particular task, depending upon
whether the instrument executing the file is either a master or slave. Ans. 8.
The Examiner finds Ohno teaches the master instrument generates the stored
management table based on information collected from polling the slave
instruments of the system. Id. The Examiner further finds the master
process also transmits ID assigning commands to the slave instruments; the
slave instruments receive this ID assigning command, and then configure
their own self ID. Id. The Examiner finds Ohno’s management table (in the
case of the master task) and the self ID (in the case of the slave task) is
information which is generated and set by the instruments, based upon their
respective tasks, and which is used for the configuration of the system. Id.
The Examiner also points to Figure 7 of Appellant’s Specification,
which the Examiner finds discloses that the configuration file based on the
master task is made up of information communicated from the slave
processes, which the Examiner concludes is synonymous with the
information in the management table of Ohno. Ans. 8 (citing Spec. Fig. 7).
Appellant replies that the similarity of the claim language between
Ohno and representative claim 1 in the use of “a master process” and “a
plurality of slave processes,” and some manner of configuration, is not
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sufficient to teach or suggest, even in combination with Bayliss and Lee,
each and every limitation of representative claim 1. Reply Br. 9.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Ohno teaches two
methods by which a configuration file (i.e., a system ID) can be generated:
(1) either via self-assigned ID (when the slave LAN instrument has not yet
been assigned an ID); and (2) after having been recognized and polled by the
master LAN instrument. Ohno col. 3, ll. 41–45; 52–67. We agree with the
Examiner that, when combined with the Examiner’s findings with respect to
the teachings of Lee, which we have related supra, Ohno teaches the
disputed limitation of claim 1.

Issue 4
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because the combination of
Bayliss, Lee, and Ohno is improper. App. Br. 16.

Analysis
Appellant argues that a person of ordinary skill would not have been
motivated to combine the teachings of the cited prior art references because
the technologies taught by the references are incompatible. App. Br 16.
Furthermore, Appellant contends the Examiner improperly employed
hindsight in combining the references. Id.
According to Appellant, Bayliss is directed to addressing known
problems in the field of database management, specifically, parallel
processing of database queries in a parallel processing system. App. Br. 16
(citing Bayliss col. 1, ll. 7–9). Appellant asserts that Bayliss neither teaches
nor suggests sending a task including a bootstrap tool to an agent on the
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distributed network. Id. Appellant contends Lee teaches a “method and
apparatus for booting a multiprocessor computer system,” which is unrelated
to the teachings of Bayliss concerning “efficiently processing database
operations on a relatively large database.” Id. (quoting Bayliss col. 2, ll. 64–
66). Appellant contends, therefore, the combination of Bayliss and Lee can
only come from the improper use of hindsight. Id.
Furthermore, asserts Appellant, Ohno is directed towards a device for
“automatically assigning respective identification numbers to each of a
plurality of instruments constituting a network.” App. Br. 17. Appellant
therefore contends that none of the references cited by the Examiner is
directed towards the same end, solve the same problems, or provide
teachings in line with the claimed invention, such that it would have been
obvious to one having ordinary skin in the art at the time of the invention to
combine the references in the manner claimed. Id.
The Examiner finds Bayliss teaches configuring a parallel-processing
system. Ans. 9. The Examiner finds one of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that, upon initializing processing nodes in a system, boot code, as
taught by Lee, is commonly used for configuring the processors of the
system. Id. Furthermore, the Examiner finds, Ohno relates to generating
configuring files for master and slave instruments in a network, based upon a
task. Final Act. 8–9. The Examiner therefore finds the references are
concerned with the set up and configuring of a system with multiple
processors, wherein the processors receive necessary code to be configured
as either a master or a slave. Ans. 10.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. It is well-settled that
any conclusion with respect to obviousness is “necessarily a reconstruction
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based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only
knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the
claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only
from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.” In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Appellant does not
argue that the references are non-analogous art, but only that they are not
directed to solving the same problem. We agree with the Examiner that the
references are analogous art, as all are directed to increasing efficiencies in a
distributed computer network, as defined by the Examiner, supra. More
importantly, however, Appellant has provided no evidence to show that a
person of ordinary skill would not be motivated to combine the teachings of
the analogous prior art references, nor does Appellant attempt to show the
Examiner must have relied on Appellant’s Specification to arrive at
combining the references. We therefore conclude Appellant has not met his
burden of showing the Examiner impermissibly employed hindsight in
combining the references, and we affirm the rejection of the claims.

B. Claim 4
Issue
Claim 4 recites: “The method of claim 1 wherein the job includes
arguments for determining the master and slave processes and a unique
identifier.” Id. at 26. Appellant argues the combined cited prior art
references fail to disclose the additional limitation of claim 4. Id. at 18.

Analysis
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Appellant cites the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action that
“Bayliss, in view of Lee, and further in view of Ohno do not explicitly
disclose that the job includes arguments for determining a unique identifier,
and cites Fellenstein to remedy that deficiency.” App. Br. 18. Appellant
then states: “the rejection in view of the Fellenstein reference is moot in light
of the above remarks with respect to Bayliss, in view of Lee, and further in
view of Ohno.” Id.
We have related supra why we find that the combination of Bayliss,
Lee, and Ohno teaches the limitations of claim 1, which are incorporated
into claim 4 by reference. Appellant does not argue the Examiner erred in
finding that Fellenstein teaches the additional limitation of claim 4, viz., “the
job includes arguments for determining the master and slave processes and a
unique identifier.” See Final Act. 40. Any such argument is waived. We
consequently affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4.

C. Claim 5
Issue
Appellant argues dependent claim 5 separately. App. Br. 18. Claim 5
recites: “The method of claim 4 wherein the master process includes a list of
slave processes and their port numbers.” Id. at 26. Appellant argues the
Examiner erred in finding the combined cited prior art references teach or
suggest the additional limitation of claim 5. Id. at 18

Analysis
Appellant argues Ohno does not teach the limitation of claim 5, but
teaches only “[i]n a system where up to four of the slave LAN instruments
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can be connected to one port of the master LAN instrument, the table
allowing the information of up to four instruments is provided to every
port.” App. Br. 19 (quoting Ohno col. 4, ll. 12–16). Appellant contends the
Examiner has not cited any reference to indicate why the teaching of “up to
four of the slave LAN instruments can be connected to one port of the
master LAN instrument,” would teach or suggest to one of ordinary skill,
“wherein the master process includes a list of slave processes and their port
numbers.” Id.
The Examiner finds the master management table in column 4 of
Ohno is composed of information from the polled slave LAN instruments
and, as in the claim limitation, includes the slave processes of the up to four
slave instruments, which are represented by the ID numbers, and
information relating to their port numbers. Ans. 11. The Examiner states
that support for this finding is evident in Ohno’s teaching that the
information of the slave LAN instruments, in particular the state at the ports
of the slave LAN instruments, is collected and recorded in the master
management table. Id.
We agree with the Examiner. Lines 1–9 of column 4 of Ohno
comprise a table which is reproduced below:

Table reproduced from column 4 of Ohno, depicting slave LAN
instrument composition management table
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The table of Ohno’s column 4 explicitly depicts a list of slave
LAN instruments, their ID numbers and the status of their various port
connections. We therefore agree with the Examiner that Ohno teaches
the disputed limitation of claim 5 and we affirm the Examiner’s
rejection.

D. Claims 6, 7, 14–17, 24, 25, 27, 35, and 39
Issue
Appellant argues these claims together and chooses claim 6 as
representative. App. Br. 18. Appellant relies upon the arguments
presented above, and presents no new arguments or evidence related
to claim 6. We consequently affirm the Examiner’s rejection of the
claims for the reasons presented supra.

E. Claims 8, 10, 18, 28, 30, 36, and 40
Appellant argues these claims together. Appellant advances no new
arguments nor adduces any new evidence in support of the contention that
the claims are allowable, other than those already presented. For the reasons
set forth supra, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of the claims.

F. Claims 11, 19, and 31
Issue
Appellant argues these claims together and selects claim 11 as
representative. App. Br. 20. Dependent claim 11 recites: “The method of
claim 10 wherein the task that generates the master process opens a network
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port and advertises the port via a multicast signal.” Id. at 27. Appellant
argues the Examiner erred in finding Ohno teaches the additional limitation
of claim 11. Id. at 20.

Analysis
Appellant argues Ohno fails to teach or suggest the task that generates
the master process opens a network port, as required by claim 11. App. Br.
20. Instead, argues Appellant, Ohno states only that
the device according to the present invention comprises a
master LAN instrument 1 and a plurality, four in the present
instance, of slave LAN instruments 2–5 which are connected
respectively in series to a port of the master LAN instrument 1
through data lines L for exclusive management use.

Id. (quoting Ohno col. 3, ll. 19–24). Appellant argues the serial connection
of LAN instruments via a management port, as opposed to a network port,
does not teach or suggest “the task that generates the master process opens a
network port.” Id.
Appellant argues further Ohno fails to teach or suggest “advertises the
port via a multicast signal.” App. Br. 20. According to Appellant, Ohno
teaches only that:
The foregoing master LAN instrument can transmit a broadcast
signal (general simultaneous transmission signal) which can be
received by all slave LAN instruments connected to the ports of
the master LAN instrument. At this time, the master LAN
instrument transmits an ID reset command for the slave LAN
instruments with the broadcast signal upon source re-making
and reset operation after source breaking.

Id. at 20–21 (quoting Ohno col. 6, ll. 13–20). Appellant argues this fails to
teach the disputed limitation. Id. at 21.
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The Examiner finds Ohno teaches the slave LAN instruments being
subjected to polling by the master LAN instrument in order to collect
information from the slave LAN instruments. Ans. 13. The Examiner finds
this port must be opened to the slave instruments by the master task to
permit connection, communication, and collection of information from the
slave instruments. Id. The Examiner finds claim 11 does not specify a
particular type of network or the configuration of connections between the
processors of the network. Id. at 13–14.
The Examiner also finds Ohno teaches the master instrument
transmits a broadcast signal to the slave instruments to reset and start the
assignment, and thus implicitly teaches the master must provide an identifier
of the port to which the information should be sent. Ans. 14. However, the
Examiner finds Ohno does not explicitly disclose this latter feature, and
consequently relies upon Wilson as teaching a master process which
advertises a port via a multicast signal. Id. The Examiner further finds
Wilson provides additional support for this exchange of information over a
network, because Wilson is directed to device discovery on a network and
explicitly discloses a master identity packet which is multicasted to identify
the master initiator as an initiator to any receiving targets (i.e., slaves) and to
supply the initiator’s address. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Ohno teaches, in
relevant part, that the master and slave instruments are connected via a port
opened by the master to communicate with the slave instruments. See Final
Act. 60 (citing Ohno col. 3, ll. 21–24). Furthermore, Ohno teaches:
The foregoing master LAN instrument can transmit a broadcast
signal (general simultaneous transmission signal) which can be
received by all slave LAN instruments connected to the ports of
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the master LAN instrument. At this time, the master LAN
instrument transmits an ID reset command for the slave LAN
instruments with the broadcast signal upon source re-making
and reset operation after source breaking.

Ohno col. 6, ll. 13–20.
Furthermore, Wilson teaches: “[T]he master identity packet, in one
embodiment, is multicasted and may be utilized to identify the master
initiator as an initiator to any receiving targets and supply the initiator’s IP
address (or any other type of address depending on the transmission
protocol).” Wilson col. 12, ll. 42–46; see Final Act. 60. Ohno and Wilson
both, therefore, teach a port opened between slave and master instruments,
and Wilson explicitly teaches the use of multicast messaging by which the
master instrument identifies (i.e., “advertises”) the port employed by the
master. We therefore agree with the Examiner that the combined cited prior
art references teach the limitations of claim 11.

G. Claims 12, 20, and 32
Issue 1
Appellant argues these claims together and selects claim 12 as
representative. App. Br. 21. Claim 12 recites:
12. The method of claim 11 wherein each of the tasks for the
slave processes browses for the network port and sends the
network port its address; if it is the first time the master process
has seen the address the master process returns a base port
number; for each subsequent instance of the same address
received, the master process sends a last port number
incremented by one.

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Id. at 27. Appellant argues the Examiner erred by finding Ohno teaches or
suggests the limitation of claim 12 reciting “wherein each of the tasks for the
slave processes browses for the network port and sends the network port its
address.” App. Br. 22.

Analysis
Appellant admits Ohno teaches that slave LAN instruments may be
connected to the master instrument, and the master instrument has not
recognized any slave LAN instruments. App. Br. 22. However, Appellant
argues Ohno does not teach or suggest “wherein each of the tasks for the
slave processes browses a network port.” Id. Furthermore, argues
Appellant, Ohno fails to teach or suggest slave LAN instruments that browse
for the network power; indeed, argues Appellant, the explicit focus of Ohno
is directed to the master LAN instrument configuring the slave LAN
instruments. Id.
The Examiner finds Ohno teaches the slave instruments being in an
initial state before an ID has been set and that, during this time, the ID
recognizing means recognizes this and places the upper and under ports of
the slave in an open state to wait for the master instrument. Ans. 16. The
Examiner finds this teaching is within the broadest reasonable interpretation
of “the slave process browsing for the master process.” Id.
The Examiner also finds Wilson provides additional support for this
limitation by teaching the target, or slave instruments, wait for a multicast
signal from a master initiator. Ans. 16 (emphasis added).
We are not persuaded by the Examiner’s findings. The Examiner
cites the following passage of Ohno as teaching the disputed limitation:
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It is assumed here that, as in FIG. 1, four of the slave LAN
instruments are connected to the master LAN instrument, and,
in the initial state, the master LAN instrument still has not
recognized anyone of the slave LAN instruments. In this state,
nothing is registered in the management table of the slave LAN
instrument’s composition, and Registered ID is all zero with
respect to Composition Nos. 1-4. On the other hand, the
respective slave LAN instruments are all in the state where an
ID has not been set yet, so that the ID recognizing means 9 in
the respective slave LAN instrument recognizes this, the upper
or under port connecting or disconnecting means 6 is
controlled, and the upper and under ports are placed in open
state. In this state, there flows no data from the upper port to the
under port, whereby the packet transmitted from the master
LAN instrument is received by the first slave LAN instrument 2
but does not reach the following slave LAN instruments 3–5.

Ohno col. 4, ll. 39–55. Ohno thus teaches that, prior to recognition of the
slave instruments by the master, the slave instruments are all placed in an
open state, so that no information flows between the upper and lower ports.
Moreover, Wilson teaches “the new target is passive and waits for a
multicast signal from a master initiator.” Wilson col. 4, ll. 26–27. We
disagree with the Examiner that being in an “open state” or passively
“waiting” can be reasonably construed as browsing, as the latter term
indicates an active, searching state, whereas the former terms do not. We
consequently reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12, 20, and 32.
Because we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of these claims on this
ground, we do not reach Appellant’s additional arguments.

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DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–11, 13–19, 21–31, and 33–43 as
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 12, 20, and 32 as unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2013).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART
ACP