Ex Parte KOSAKA et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 26, 201913928989 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/928,989 06/27/2013 32294 7590 06/28/2019 Squire PB (NV A/DC Office) 8000 TOWERS CRESCENT DRIVE 14THFLOOR VIENNA, VA 22182-6212 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Y osuke KOS AKA UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 059278.00067 2869 EXAMINER LAGUARDA,GONZALO ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3747 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/28/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): IPGENERAL TYC@SQUIREpb.COM SONIA.WHITNEY@SQUIREpb.COM PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte YOSUKE KOSAKA and KOICHIRO SHINOZAKI Appeal 2018-003571 Application 13/928,989 1 Technology Center 3700 Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, ANTON W. PETTING, and ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-3. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 1 The Appellants identify Honda Motor Co., Ltd. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2018-003571 Application 13/928,989 ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM 1. An internal EGR amount calculation device for an internal combustion engine in which a valve overlap time period of an intake valve and an exhaust valve of a cylinder is changed by changing valve timing of at least one of the intake valve and the exhaust valve and an internal EGR amount is changed according to the change in the valve overlap time period, comprising: first exhaust pressure parameter-obtaining means for obtaining a first exhaust pressure parameter indicative of a pressure within an exhaust passage during the valve overlap time period; second exhaust pressure parameter-obtaining means for obtaining a second exhaust pressure parameter separate from the first exhaust pressure parameter and indicative of the pressure within the exhaust passage during a predetermined time period including at least a time period other than the valve overlap time period; blown back gas amount-calculating means for calculating a blown back gas amount, which is an amount of burned gases which temporarily flow out of the cylinder into at least one of an intake system and an exhaust system, and then flow back into the cylinder again, according to the first exhaust pressure parameter; remaining gas amount-calculating means for calculating a remaining gas amount, which is an amount of burned gases remaining in the cylinder, according to the second exhaust pressure parameter; and internal EGR amount-calculating means for calculating the internal EGR amount based on the remaining gas amount and the blown back gas amount, wherein the internal EGR amount is used to change the valve timing of at least one of the intake valve and the exhaust valve. 2 Appeal 2018-003571 Application 13/928,989 REJECTIONS I. Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Koseki et al. (US 2004/0139949 Al, pub. July 22, 2004) (hereinafter "Koseki"). II. Claims 2 and 3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Koseki. FINDINGS OF FACT The findings of fact relied upon, which are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, appear in the following Analysis. ANALYSIS New Ground of Rejection The Appellant argues, in part, that independent claim 1 stands rejected erroneously, as anticipated by Koseki, because Koseki lacks the following recitation ( emphasis added): a second exhaust pressure parameter separate from the first exhaust pressure parameter and indicative of the pressure within the exhaust passage during a predetermined time period including at least a time period other than the valve overlap time period. See Appeal Br. 7-8. According to the Appellant, The Office Action took the position that paragraph [0052] of Koseki discloses the first exhaust pressure parameter, while paragraphs [0062] and [0082] of Koseki disclose the second exhaust pressure parameter. Koseki merely describes an exhaust valve closure in-cylinder residual gas amount (MRESCYL) and a blow-back gas amount (MRESOL) (See Koseki, paragraphs [0059] - [0062]). Both MRESCYL and MRESOL are calculated using a common variable, an exhaust valve closure timing in-cylinder pressure (PEVC) (See Koseki, 3 Appeal 2018-003571 Application 13/928,989 paragraphs [0061], [0062], [0075], and equation 4). PEVC, in other words, describes the pressure at the exhaust valve closure timing, and is used to calculate both the MRESCYL and MRESOL. While Koseki describes one common variable, PEVC, used to calculate two values, MRESCYL and MRESOL, claim 1 recites that a first exhaust pressure parameter is used to calculate a blown back gas amount and a second exhaust pressure parameter is used to calculate a remaining gas amount. The first exhaust pressure parameter is indicative of a pressure within an exhaust passage during the valve overlap time period. A second exhaust pressure parameter, on the other hand, is separate from the first exhaust pressure parameter, and indicative of the pressure within the exhaust passage during a predetermined time period including at least a time period other than the valve overlap time period. Therefore, claim 1 recites using two separate parameters, a first exhaust parameter and a second exhaust pressure parameter, to calculate two different values, the blown back gas amount and the remaining gas amount. Koseki, however, merely describes using a single parameter, PEVC, to calculate two values, MRESCYL and MRESOL. Applicants therefore respectfully submit that Koseki fails to disclose or suggest the first exhaust pressure parameter and the second exhaust pressure parameter, recited in claim 1. Id. See also Reply Br. 4-5. The Examiner's Answer calls into question the meaning of the "separate from" feature of claim 1: The claims require this second parameter to be "separate from the" first parameter, but since they are both "exhaust pressure parameters" this has not been understood as being wholly separate (having nothing to do with) but simply different parameters in the sense that pressure readings during an overlap period would be different than pressure readings during non- overlap periods. [Koseki's] PEVC is the "second exhaust pressure parameter" since it is different than the first parameter and it is a time period other than the valve overlap (the point 4 Appeal 2018-003571 Application 13/928,989 that the valve closes is outside of the overlap period). Further since PEVC is determined by estimation of the exhaust passage pressure than it is also "indicative of the pressure within the exhaust passage". Answer 4. The claimed characterization of the "second exhaust pressure parameter" as being "separate from" the "first exhaust pressure parameter" does not appear in the Specification. Neither the Specification nor the claims themselves adequately reveal the meaning of "separate from" in claim 1. Indeed, the Specification diminishes the Appellant's asserted significance of whether the "first exhaust pressure parameter" and the "second exhaust pressure parameter" might employ a common quantity (e.g., Koseki's PEVC) in their respective calculations, because the Specification acknowledges that both direct measurement of a quantity, as well as estimating a quantity (based upon measurements), are embraced within respective associated "obtaining" steps: Note that throughout the specification, the term "obtain" used in the phrases "obtaining the first exhaust pressure parameter", "obtaining the second exhaust pressure parameter", and so forth is intended to include the meaning of directly detecting the parameters using sensors or the like, and estimating these parameters based on other parameters. Spec. 5. "Without a discemable claim construction, an anticipation analysis cannot be performed." Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Before a proper review of the rejection under§ 102(b), or§ 103(a), can be conducted, the subject matter encompassed by the claim must be reasonably understood without resort to speculation. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962) (a prior art 5 Appeal 2018-003571 Application 13/928,989 rejection cannot be sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of claim language); see also In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) ("If no reasonably definite meaning can be ascribed to certain terms in the claim, the subject matter does not become obvious - the claim becomes indefinite"). During the Office's evaluation, a proposed patent claim violates the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § l 12(b ), when the claim "contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear" - i.e., "ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention." In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310-11 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); see also In re McAward, No. 2015-006416, 2017 WL 3669566, at *3, *5-*6 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential). Because the meaning of "a second exhaust pressure parameter separate from the first exhaust pressure parameter" is unclear, independent claim 1 and its dependent claims 2 and 3 violate the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § l 12(b ). Therefore, we do not assess the merits of the prior-art rejections of claims 1-3; rather, pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we reverse,proforma, the claim rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and § 103(a) and enter a new ground of rejection of the claims as being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § l 12(b). This determination does not reflect on the merits of the underlying prior-art rejections. DECISION We REVERSE the Examiner's decision rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),proforma. 6 Appeal 2018-003571 Application 13/928,989 We REVERSE the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 2 and 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), proforma. We issue a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION for claims 1-3 under 35 U.S.C. § l 12(b), pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). This Decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that "[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review." Section 41.50(b) also provides: When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant, within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: ( 1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. 7 Appeal 2018-003571 Application 13/928,989 Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in MPEP § 1214.01. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § l .136(a)(l )(iv). REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation