11932771 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 16, 2014)

Ex Parte Konopka et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 16, 2014

11932771 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 16, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/932,771 10/31/2007 Courtney C. KONOPKA 7114-86900-US 2875 22242 7590 09/16/2014 FITCH EVEN TABIN & FLANNERY, LLP 120 SOUTH LASALLE STREET SUITE 1600 CHICAGO, IL 60603-3406 EXAMINER SPOONER, LAMONT M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2657 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/16/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte COURTNEY C. KONOPKA and LARS CRISTIAN ALMSTRAND ____________________ Appeal 2012-006028 Application 11/932,771 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, CAROLYN D. THOMAS, and DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.2 1 The Appeal Brief identifies Sony Electronics, Inc. and Sony Corporation as the real parties in interest. App. Br. 3. 2 Our decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed on August 2, 2011 (“App. Br.”); Appellants’ Reply Brief filed January 17, 2012; Examiner’s Answer mailed November 17, 2011 (“Ans.”); and original Specification filed October 31, 2007 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2012-006028 Application 11/932,771 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Claims on Appeal Appellants’ application relates to speech recognition for controlling applications. Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1 is reproduced below: 1. A method of speech recognition in a network that is implemented by a processor, the method comprising: receiving a communication in a network, the communication including an attention word; searching for an attention word in the communication based on a first context including a first set of models, grammars, and lexica; and switching, upon finding the attention word in the communication, to a second context to search for an open- ended user request within the same communication, wherein the second context includes a second set of models, grammars, and lexicons that are different from the first set and wherein the open-ended user request does not follow a predetermined format. ANALYSIS The Examiner concluded that the combination of Geilhufe3 and Ramaswamy4 renders obvious claims 1, 2, 5–8, 14, and 15. Ans. 5–12. Appellants contend that “[t]he models, grammars, and lexicons recited in claim 1 are not properties of words or phrases in received speech. Instead, these are actual constructs, implemented in hardware and/or software, that are used to determine the meaning of a received speech phrase.” App. Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 3–4. Appellants argue that Geilhufe is a script-based 3 Geilhufe et al., U.S. Patent 6,584,439 B1, issued June 24, 2003. 4 Ramaswamy et al., U.S. Patent 7,016,827 B1, issued March 21, 2006. Appeal 2012-006028 Application 11/932,771 3 system and has no need for different models, grammars, and lexica. App. Br. 9–10. Appellants further argue that Ramaswamy does not disclose the use of different models, grammars, and lexica. App. Br. 10. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. As an initial matter, claim 1 does not recite any particular hardware or software in which the models, grammars, and lexica must be implemented. Therefore, Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has failed to find particular hardware or software elements in Geilhufe are not commensurate with the scope of the claims. In response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner explained his findings that Geilhufe discloses a model, grammar, and lexicon for a device. Ans. 20–22 (citing Geilhufe, col. 5, ll. 55–58, col. 8, ll. 10–16, col. 11, ll. 45–46, col. 12, ll. 33–51, col. 16, ll. 52–54, col. 17, l. 60 – col. 18, l. 4); see also Geilhufe, col. 17, ll. 11–24 (discussing “Vocabulary”). Appellants have not directed us to evidence sufficient to overcome the Examiner’s findings. Furthermore, the Examiner explained that Geilhufe teaches multiple devices with sets of grammars, lexica, and models specific to those devices. Ans. 20–22 (citing Geilhufe, col. 12, ll. 33–51, col. 16, ll. 52–54, col. 17, l. 60 – col. 18, l. 4). The Examiner also explained that Ramaswamy provides for an open-ended user request having a set of models, grammars, and lexica. Ans. 8 (citing Ramaswamy, col. 1, ll. 32–49). Appellants argue: Hence, neither reference cited by the Examiner teaches or suggests a first set of models, grammars, and lexica; or making a switch to a second context to search for an open-ended user request within the same communication where the second context includes a second set of models, grammars, and lexicons that are different from the first set all as recited in claim 1. Since at least one element of claim 1 is not taught or suggested by either of the references, it is submitted that claim 1 is allowable over the proposed combination. Appeal 2012-006028 Application 11/932,771 4 App. Br. 10. This argument is not persuasive because it fails to address the Examiner’s conclusion that the combination of Geilhufe and Ramaswamy would have suggested the claimed subject matter to one of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, Appellants challenge the teachings of the references individually. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck &Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus, Geilhufe and Ramaswamy must be read, not in isolation, but for what they fairly teach in combination. Id. Appellants also argue that there is no reason to combine Geilhufe and Ramaswamy and that the combination would alter the operating principles of Geilhufe. App. Br. 10–12; Reply Br. 4–5. However, Appellants have not provided any persuasive evidence to support the argument that modifying Geilhufe with Ramaswamy would render Geilhufe unsatisfactory for its intended purpose. Arguments of counsel cannot take the place of factually supported objected evidence. See, e.g., In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-40 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Examiner’s rationale underlying the proposed combination of Geilhufe and Ramaswamy suffices as an articulated reason with some rational underpinning to establish a conclusion of obviousness. For example, in the rejection, the Examiner explained that the combination would allow “a user to input an attention word and command by natural language, allowing a user access to devices without having to formally know how to operate the device by specific commands.” Ans. 9. In response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner further explained that the combination simply enhances the user input to allow an open-ended request. Ans. 24–25. Appeal 2012-006028 Application 11/932,771 5 Thus, the Examiner has provided a sufficient basis for combining Geilhufe and Ramaswamy. As such, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. For the reasons set forth above, the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 is sustained. Appellants state that independent claim 7 has limitations similar to claim 1 and is allowable for the same reasons. App. Br. 10. As such, we also sustain the rejection of claim 7.5 Claims 2–6 depend from claim 1, and claims 8–15 depend from claim 7. Appellants do not advance additional persuasive arguments for patentability of these claims. App. Br. 13–15. Therefore, the rejections of these claims also are sustained. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011). DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–15. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED msc 5 We note an inconsistency in the language of these claims. The receiving step of claim 1 recites that the received communication includes “an attention word,” and the next step recites “searching for an attention word in the communication . . . .” Claim 7 similarly recites that the received communication includes “an attention word,” but the subsequent limitation recites that the controller is “configured and arranged to search for the attention word in the communication . . . .” Therefore, claim 7 makes explicit reference to the aforementioned attention word, whereas the language of claim 1 suggests that the claim covers searching for any attention word, rather than the one received in the first step of the claim.