Ex Parte Klein

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 3, 2016

12170612 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 3, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/170,612 07/10/2008
128996 7590 11/07/2016
DICKE, BILLIG & CZAJA- MICRON
100 S 5TH ST STE 2250
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Dean Klein
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
M3400.649.101 1402
EXAMINER
SADLER, NATHAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2139
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/07/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
USPTO.PA TENTS@dbclaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DEAN KLEIN
Appeal2014-009911
Application 12/170,612 1
Technology Center 2100
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, TERRENCE W. McMILLIN, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOW ARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection
of claims 1-27, which constitute all of the claims pending in this application.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm-in-part.
1 Appellant identifies Micron Technology, Inc. as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 1.
Appeal2014-009911
Application 12/170,612
THE INVENTION
The disclosed and claimed invention is directed to data collection and
compression in a solid state storage device. Abstract.
Claims 1 and 9, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method for data collection and compression in a solid
state storage device, the method comprising:
reading a status bit for each memory page that indicates
whether a respective memory page is only partially programmed;
collecting, in response to its respective status bit, data from
a memory page indicated as only partially programmed;
compressing, in response to its respective status bit, the
collected data; and
programmmg the compressed data to the solid state
storage device.
9. A method for data collection and compress10n m a
memory device having a memory array, the method comprising:
determining whether memory pages of the memory array
are only partially programmed \vi th valid data by reading a status
bit for each page, wherein the partially programmed memory
pages have an unprogrammed area;
reading the valid data from the partially programmed
memory pages in response to the respective status bit for each
memory page;
compressing the read data in response to the respective
status bit for each memory page; and
programming the compressed data back to the memory
array.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the
claims on appeal is:
Lee
Dye
us 5,930,167
us 6,145,069
2
Jul. 27, 1999
Nov. 7, 2000
Appeal2014-009911
Application 12/170,612
Radermacher US 2002/0116424 Al Aug. 22, 2002
Balasundaram US 2007/0291571 Al Dec. 20, 2007
Colecchia US 2008/0228998 Al Sept. 18, 2008
Giovanni De Micheli, Synthesis and Optimization of Digital Circuits (1994)
(hereinafter "De Micheli").
Eran Gal and Sivan Toledo, "Algorithms and Data Structures for Flash
Memories" Vol. 37. Iss. 2. (June 2005) (hereinafter "Toledo").
John L. Hennessy and David A. Patterson, Computer Organization and
Design The Hardware/Software Interface, Morgan Kaufmann. 2nd ed. (1998)
(hereinafter "Patterson").
REJECTIONS
A. Claims 1-9, 12, 14--17, 20, and21 stand rejected underpre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lee in view of De
Micheli. Final Act. 2-8.
B. Claims 10 and 11 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lee in view of De Micheli and
Radermacher. Final Act. 8-9.
C. Claim 13 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Lee in view of De Micheli and Colecchia. Final
Act. 9-10.
D. Claims 18 and 19 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lee in view of De Micheli and Toledo.
Final Act. 10-11.
E. Claim 22 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Lee in view of De Micheli and Dye. Final Act. 11-
12.
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Application 12/170,612
F. Claim 23 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Lee in view of De Micheli and Balasundaram.
Final Act. 12.
G. Claims 24--27 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Lee in view of Dye, Patterson, and Colecchia.
Final Act. 12-17.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection in light of Appellant's
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellant. We
are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments regarding claims 1-8.
However, we are persuaded by Appellant's arguments that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 9-27 based on the present record.
Claims 1---8
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Lee "teaches 'reading
a status value for each memory page that indicates whether a respective
memory page is only partially programmed."' App. Br. 7-8; see also Reply
Br. 2-3. Particularly, Appellant asserts:
What the Advisory Action asserts is that when the file allocation
table of Lee indicates that cells are programmed with two data
states, that entry in the file allocation table is the claimed status
value showing that a page is partially programmed. By this
reasoning, then, when the file allocation table of Lee indicates
that cells are programmed with four data states, that entry must
necessarily be the claimed status value showing that a page is
fully programmed. By this interpretation, which is the only
interpretation that allows a file allocation table indicating data is
programmed in two states to indicate that the page is partially
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Application 12/170,612
programmed, then when any file allocation table indicates that
data is programmed in four states, that indicates that the page is
fully programmed. As can clearly be seen, this is incorrect, and
Appellant requests reconsideration and reversal of this incorrect
assertion and interpretation.
App. Br. 6-7 (emphasis added).
The Examiner finds Lee teaches that each memory call can be
programmed with either four states or two states. Final Act. 2; Adv. Act. 2;
Ans. 3--4. The Examiner also concludes the broadest reasonable
construction of "partially programmed" (claim 1) is broad enough to
encompass the two state memory cells because those cells store "data in only
two states per cell rather than the maximum of four states per cell." Adv.
Act. 2; see also Ans. 3--4 ("[T]he Examiner is interpreting that when the file
allocation table of Lee indicates that cells are programmed with two states,
the corresponding page is within the broadest reasonable interpretation of
being partially programmed, while when the file allocation table of Lee
indicates that cells are programmed with four states, the corresponding page
is within the broadest reasonable interpretation of being fully
programmed.").
Appellant does not provide persuasive argument or evidence to
support the assertion that Lee's memory cells with two states are not
partially programmed. It is well settled that mere attorney argument and
conclusory statements unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little
probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is
not evidence). Although Appellant asserts in the Appeal Brief that the
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Application 12/170,612
Examiner's finding "can clearly be seen ... [to be] incorrect," App. Br. 7,
Appellant does not say why that is so.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in construing
the partially programmed limitation to be broad enough to encompass Lee's
two state memory cells. Reply Br. 2-3.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner
erred. This argument was raised for the first time in the Reply Brief.
Because Appellant did not raise that argument in the opening brief and good
cause has not been shown why it should be considered, we will not consider
this argument. 37 C.F.R. §41.41(b )(2) (2014); Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d
1473, 1474 (BPAI2010) (Informative) ("[T]hereplybrief[isnot] an
opportunity to make arguments that could have been made in the principal
brief on appeal to rebut the Examiner's rejections, but were not.").
Appellant also argues the Examiner erred in finding Lee teaches the
collecting step recited in claim 1. App. Br. 8. However, Appellant merely
restates the point discussed above regarding the construction of partially
programmed. Id. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed supra, we
are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner erred. See
Final Act. 2; Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 4.
Appellant further argues the Examiner erred in finding Lee teaches the
compressing step recited in claim 1. According to Appellant, column 8 of
Lee - cited by the Examiner - has nothing to do with compressing data.
Appellant also argues that the description of Figure 4C in column 7 teaches:
that data is compressed "either in response to detailed control
signals from the controller 23 through the control logic 51, or
from the control logic 51 itself by including within the logic a
state machine or the like." The text of Lee itself clearly and
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unequivocally teaches that compression is not performed in
response to any status bit, but is instead performed in response to
detailed control signals from the controller, or from the control
logic itself.
App. Br. 9.
The Examiner finds Lee teaches "compressing, in response to its
respective status bit, the collected data." Final Act. 3 (citing Lee fig. 4C,
8:30-33). The Examiner further finds that Figure 4C shows the compression
of data and column 8 was being cited "to indicate that the compression was
done in response to the status value as explained above. The text of Lee
clearly teaches that compression is performed after a determination was
performed based on reading the file allocation table." Adv. Act. 2; see also
Ans. 5. Accordingly, the Examiner finds that "Lee teaches the compression
is performed in response to the status value." Adv. Act. 2.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner
erred. Figures 4B and 4C shows data written in two states being read and
then compressed. As the sentence directly following the one quoted by
Appellant make clear, it is only data written in two states - which the
Examiner finds, and we agree, is partially programmed - that is read and
compressed. Lee 7:50-57. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in finding the compression in Lee being performed in
response to a status value indicating the data block is written in two states.
With regard to De Micheli, Appellant argues that "De Micheli does
not teach or reasonably suggest the numerous limitations of claim 1 shown
above not to be present in Lee." App. Br. 9. As discussed above, we are not
persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner erred in finding Lee
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teaches any of the disputed claim limitations. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner erred.
Finally, Appellant argues the Final Action did not make a prima facie
case obviousness. App. Br. 15. Specifically, Appellant argues:
Appellant submits that the Examiner changed the standard for
meeting a prima facie case of obviousness to state that
Appellant's attempt to counter arguments shows that a prima
facie case of obviousness had been made. Were that the
standard, since Appellant is required to respond to all points of
an Office Action, then any statement in any Office Action on
obviousness would, in the Examiner's view, constitute a prima
facie case. The MPEP has multiple sections discussing prima
facie cases of obviousness. None of those indicate that an
attempt to counter an Examiner's argument validates an improper
prima facie case. Appellant requests reconsideration of the
Examiner's incorrect assertion regarding pnma facie
obviousness.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument. As our reviewing
Court has held, "all that is required of the office to meet its prima facie
burden of production is to set forth the statutory basis of the rejection and
the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and
informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of [35 U.S.C.] § 132."
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We have reviewed the
Examiner's rejection (Final Act. 2--4) and conclude that the notice
requirement is satisfied in this case by "the examiner's discussion of the
theory of invalidity ... , the prior art basis for the rejection ... , and the
identification of where each limitation of the rejected claims is shown in the
prior art reference by ... [paragraph] number." Jung, 637 F.3d at 1363.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1, along
with the rejection of claims 2-8, which are not separately argued.
Claims 9-27
With regard to claim 9, Appellant relies on the same arguments
discussed above for claim 1. Additionally, Appellant argues that even if the
Examiner was correct that data stored in two states is partially programmed,
that "is not in any way relevant to the limitation 'wherein the partially
programmed memory pages have an unprogrammed area' which it allegedly
teaches." App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 3--4. Stated differently, Appellant argues
"regardless of whether Lee et al. programs its memory cells to one of two
states or one of four states, the same area of memory is programmed."
Reply Br. 4.
The Examiner finds Lee "Figure 3A shows how different read
currents indicate different memory values" and teaches the "the partially
programed memory pages have an unprogramed area," as recited in claim 9.
Final Act. 5. The Examiner further finds this is related to the teaching in the
Appellant's Specification relating to "at least one cell in a sector retains the
erased value." Ans. 6 (citing Spec. i123).
We have reviewed the cited sections of Lee and conclude the
Examiner's finding is not supported by the cited evidence. Specifically, the
cited evidence does not support the additional limitation of claim 9 requiring
"the partially programmed memory pages have an unprogrammed area."
Accordingly, we are constrained on this record to reverse the
Examiner's rejection of claim 9, along with the rejections of claims 17 and
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Application 12/170,612
24, which recite limitations commensurate in scope to the disputed
limitations discussed above, and dependent claims 12, 14--16, 20, and 21.
Regarding the remaining rejection (rejections B, C, D, E, F and G),
the Examiner has not shown that any of the secondary references
(Radermacher (rejection B), Colecchia (rejections C and G), Toledo
(rejection D), Dye (rejections E and G), Balasundaram (rejection F), or
Patterson (rejection G)) overcomes the aforementioned deficiency of Lee.
Therefore, we reverse rejection B of dependent claims 10 and 11, rejection C
of dependent claim 13, rejection D of dependent claims 18 and 19, rejection
E of dependent claim 22, rejection F of dependent claims 23, and rejection G
of dependent claims 24--27.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner's decisions rejecting
claims 1-8.
For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner's decisions rejecting
claims 9-27.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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