Ex Parte Klein

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 24, 2011

10424206 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 24, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________________

Ex parte DEAN A. KLEIN
____________________

Appeal 2009-007979
Application 10/424,2061
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, JEAN R. HOMERE, and
JAMES R. HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Application filed April 25, 2003. The real party in interest is Micron
Technology, Inc. (App. Br. 1.)
Appeal 2009-007979
Application 10/424,206

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 32-35, 38,
39, and 41 under authority of 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). Claims 1-31, 36, 37, 42,
and 43 have been canceled. (Notice 1; see Response 2; App. Br. 2; Ans. 2)2
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) has jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appellant’s Invention
The invention at issue on appeal relates to data transfer methods for
transferring data between an integrated circuit memory and an external data
port, in particular transferring compressed data from the data port to the
memory, writing the compressed data to the memory, decompressing the
data and writing the decompressed data to the memory. (Spec. 1:2-3; 3:20-
24; 7:26-8:2.)
Representative Claim
Independent claim 32 further illustrates the invention and is
reproduced below with the key disputed limitations emphasized:
32. A method of transferring data between an integrated
circuit memory device and an external data port, comprising:

2 We refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”); Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”)
filed June 19, 2006; Response to Notification of Non-Compliant Appeal
Brief (“Response”) filed February 21, 2007; and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”)
filed January 30, 2007. We also refer to the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”)
mailed December 4, 2006 and Office Communication (“Notice”) mailed
October 23, 2008.
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transferring a first set of compressed data to the memory
device through the external data port, and writing the first set
of compressed data to the memory device;
within the integrated circuit, reading the first set of
compressed data from the memory device, decompressing the
read data, and writing the decompressed data to the memory
device;
within the integrated circuit, performing a processing
operation on the decompressed data that was written to the
memory device to produce uncompressed results data;
within the integrated circuit, reading the uncompressed
results data from the memory device, compressing the read
results data, and writing the compressed results data to the
memory device; and
reading the compressed results data from the memory
device, and transferring the compressed results data from the
memory device through the external data port.

Reference
The Examiner relies on the following reference as evidence in support
of the rejections:
Aleksic US 6,704,022 B1 Mar. 9, 2004
(filed Feb. 25, 2000)

Rejection on Appeal
The Examiner rejects claims 32-35, 38, 39, and 41 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by Aleksic.3

3 The statement of rejection in the Answer lists claims 32-35, 39, and 41 as
being anticipated by Aleksic (Ans. 2-3), but also discusses claims 38 and 39
(Ans. 4-5). The Office Communication (October 23, 2008) and Response to
Notification of Non-Compliant Appeal Brief (February 21, 2007) clarify that

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ISSUES
Based on our review of the administrative record, Appellant’s
contentions, and the Examiner’s findings and conclusions, the pivotal issues
before us are as follows:
1. Does the Examiner err in finding that Aleksic discloses
“transferring a first set of compressed data to the memory device through the
external data port, and writing the first set of compressed data to the memory
device; within the integrated circuit, reading the first set of compressed data
from the memory device, decompressing the read data, and writing the
decompressed data to the memory device” as recited in claim 32?
2. Does the Examiner err in finding that Aleksic discloses
“coupling a first set of compressed data to the external data port” as recited
in claim 38 and “after coupling the first set of compressed data to the
external data port, writing the first set of compressed data to memory
device” as recited in claim 39?

FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Answer and Final Office
Action as our own, except as to those findings that we expressly overturn or
set aside in the Analysis that follows.

claims 32-35, 38, 39, and 41 are the rejected claims. (See Notice 1;
Response 2.)
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ANALYSIS
Appellant argues independent claims 32 and 34 and dependent claims
33 and 35 together as a group based on claim 32. (App. Br. 3-9.) Although
Appellant presents nominal arguments with respect to claim 34, these
arguments simply reiterate those made with respect to claim 32. (See App.
Br. 8-9.) Appellant also makes nominal arguments with respect to
independent claim 38 and dependent claim 39. (App. Br. 9-10.) Appellant
does not separately argue dependent claim 41. Therefore, we select
independent claim 32 as representative of Appellant’s arguments and
groupings with respect to the Examiner’s anticipation rejection and also
address Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 38 and 39. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii). See In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
We have considered only those arguments that Appellant has actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments that Appellant could have made but chose
not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Anticipation is a question of fact. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473,
1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “[a] claim is anticipated only
if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly
or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros.,
Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see
Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
Appellant has the opportunity on appeal to the BPAI to demonstrate
error in the Examiner’s position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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The Examiner sets forth a detailed explanation of the anticipation rejection
in the Examiner’s Answer with respect to each of Appellant’s claims 32-35,
38, 39, and 41 (Ans. 3-7) and, in particular, claim 32 (Ans. 3-4, 5-7) as well
as claims 38 and 39 (Ans. 4-5). Therefore, we look to the Appellant’s Briefs
to show error in the proffered findings and reasoned conclusions. See Kahn,
441 F.3d at 985-86.
Arguments Concerning the Examiner’s Rejection
of Representative Claim 32 Under § 102
The Examiner rejects claim 32 as being anticipated by Aleksic. (Ans.
3-4, 5-7.) Specifically, the Examiner finds Aleksic discloses writing
compressed data to a buffer – which the Examiner finds is a memory. (Ans.
6-7 (citing Aleksic – col. 4, ll. 26-42).)
Appellant contends that “[t]he sole issue for consideration in this
Appeal is whether the Aleksic patent teaches that compressed data
transferred to the embedded memory 20 is stored in memory prior to being
decompressed.” (App. Br. 5.) In particular, Appellant asserts that “[t]he
Examiner has not cited any support for his contention that a ‘buffer’
inherently stores data . . . . Instead, Applicant contends the term ‘buffers’ is
commonly used to describe devices that simply retransmit[] data, such as by
using an inverter or driver, to provide a high input impedance.” (App. Br. 5;
see App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 1-3.)
Based on the record before us, we do not find error in the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection of claim 32. We agree with the Examiner that Aleksic
discloses “transferring . . . compressed data to the memory device through
the external data port, and writing the . . . compressed data to the memory
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device [prior to] decompressing the . . . data, and writing the decompressed
data to the memory device” as recited in claim 32. (See Ans. 3, 6-7.)
We find that Aleksic discloses buffering compressed data and that the
buffer receives “a predetermined number of transmitted words needed for
[the] subsequent . . . [de]compression steps. In one embodiment, eight
double words (512 bytes) are received by the buffer.” (Aleksic – col. 4, ll.
28-31; Ans. 6.) Although Aleksic’s input buffer (that receives the
compressed data) is not described in detail, Aleksic describes the output
buffer that receives and holds compressed data prior to transfer to a graphics
processor as a First In First Out (FIFO) memory. (Aleksic – col. 5, ll. 15-20;
Ans. 6-7.) The input and output buffers serve the identical purpose of
receiving and holding compressed data. Based on Aleksic’s disclosure, we
find the input and output buffers both receive and, at least temporarily, hold
compressed data – i.e., store data. In addition, Aleksic discloses that the
received compressed data “can be stored to a register.” (Aleksic – col. 4, l.
32; Ans. 6.)
Appellant argues that Aleksic’s input buffer is not a “memory” but
rather a high input impedance driver that does not store data. (App. Br. 5-7.)
Appellant cites a number of patents in support of this position. (App. Br. 7.)
We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive and decline to adopt
Appellant’s narrow interpretation of Aleksic’s buffer. Nothing in Aleksic
supports such an interpretation. In fact, as we explain supra, Aleksic
describes storing compressed data in the input buffer. Further, we cannot
consider Appellant’s cited extrinsic support, which is not part of the record.
See 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.33(d)(2) and 41.63(b).
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Thus, we find that Aleksic discloses the disputed claim limitation of
transferring compressed data to the memory device through the external data
port and writing the compressed data to the memory device prior to
decompressing the data. We find Appellant’s contrary arguments
unpersuasive for the reasons stated above. Appellant does not separately
argue independent claim 34 or dependent claims 33 and 35 (supra), all of
which include the disputed limitations and are anticipated by Aleksic for the
reasons explained with respect to claim 32. It follows that Appellant does
not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims
32-35, and we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.
Arguments Concerning the Examiner’s Rejection of
Claims 38 and 39 Under § 102
The Examiner rejects Appellant’s claims 38 and 39 as being
anticipated by Aleksic (Ans. 4-5). The reasoning is very similar to that of
claim 32.
Appellant, on the other hand, merely reiterates the limitations of claim
38 and 39 (App. Br. 9-10) and state that “[a]s explained above with
reference to claim 32, the Aleksic patent does not teach ‘coupling a first set
of compressed data to the external data port’ and then ‘writing the first set of
compressed data to memory device’” (App. Br. 10). Such reiterations and
general allegations do not amount to a separate patentability argument. See
Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, 2009 WL 2477843 at *3-4 (BPAI Aug.
10, 2009) (informative); see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Appellant’s
argument “do[es] not . . . explain why the Examiner’s explicit fact finding is
in error.” Belinne, 2009 WL 2477843 at *4.
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Based on the record before us, we do not find error in the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection of claims 38 and 39 for the reasons previously set forth
with respect to claim 32. Further, we do not see how the recitation of
“coupling” data distinguishes these claims from the recitation of transferring
data in claim 32. Appellant does not separately argue claim 41 (supra). It
follows that Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection of claims 38, 39, and 41, and we affirm the Examiner’s
rejection of these claims.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
32-35, 38, 39, and 41 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 32-35, 38, 39, and 41
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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