Ex Parte Kipman et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 12, 201613192305 (P.T.A.B. May. 12, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/192,305 07/27/2011 AlexKipman 41505 7590 05/16/2016 Baker & Hostetler LLP (MICROSOFT CORPORATION) CIRA CENTRE, 12TH FLOOR 2929 ARCH STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA 19104-2891 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 326454.03/103680.006762 5747 EXAMINER LIM, STEVEN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2686 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/16/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): usdocket@microsoft.com eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ALEX KIPMAN, KUDO TSUNODA, TODD ERIC, JOHN CLAVIN, and KATHRYN STONE PEREZ Appeal2014-007512 Application 13/192,305 Technology Center 2600 Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges. WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of claims 1-20, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 The real party in interest identified by Appellants is Microsoft Corporation. (App. Br. 1.) Appeal2014-007512 Application 13/192,305 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants' disclosed invention relates to presenting a user with a three-dimensional (3-D) virtual environment as well as non-visual virtual feedback, such as haptic feedback, for interactions that the user makes with virtual objects in that environment. (Abstract.) Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows: 1. A system for providing non-visual sensory feedback to a user interacting with a virtual object, comprising: a processor; and a memory communicatively coupled to the processor when the system is operational, the memory bearing processor- executable instructions that, when executed on the processor, cause the system to at least: receive data captured by a capture device, the data reflecting a user location; predict, based on the data, that a user is likely to interact with the virtual object at a future time; compute, prior to the future time, a non-visual sensory feedback for the predicted future interaction; and provide the computed non-visual sensory feedback to the user at the future time. The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims: 2 Davis us 5,423,554 June 13, 1995 Mor us 6,088,020 July 11, 2000 Doi US 6,278,418 Bl Aug. 21, 2001 Schleppenbach et al. US 6, 705,868 B 1 Mar.16, 2004 ("Schleppenbach") 2 See Notice of References Cited (PT0-892), Feb. 16, 2012; Notice of References Cited (PT0-892), Oct. 26, 2012. 2 Appeal2014-007512 Application 13/192,305 Rosenberg et al. ("Rosenberg") Hughes et al. ("Hughes") US 2006/0030383 Al Feb. 9, 2006 US 2006/0061545 Al Mar. 23, 2006 Appellants' admitted prior art ("AP A"). Claims 1---6, 11, 13, 14, and 18-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis, Hughes, and APA. (See Final Act. 2-5.) Claims 7-9 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis, Hughes, APA, and Rosenberg. (See Final Act. 5.)3 Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis, Hughes, AP A, Rosenberg, and Doi. (See Final Act. 5-6.) Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis, Hughes, APA, and Doi. (See Final Act. 6.) Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis, Hughes, AP A, and Schleppenbach. (See Final Act. 6-7.) Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis, Hughes, APA, and Mor. (See Final Act. 7.) Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Briefs ("App. Br." filed Dec. 23, 2013; "Reply Br." filed June 24, 2014) and the Specification ("Spec." filed July 27, 2011) for the positions of Appellants and the Final Office Action ("Final Act." mailed June 21, 2013) and Answer 3 We treat the failure to mention AP A in the rejections of claims that depend, directly or indirectly, from independent claims 1 and 11 to be an oversight of no consequence. (See Final Act. 5-7.) 3 Appeal2014-007512 Application 13/192,305 ("Ans." mailed Apr. 24, 2014) for the reasoning, findings, and conclusions of the Examiner. Only those arguments actually made by Appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments that Appellants did not make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2013). ISSUE Based on Appellants' arguments, we discuss the appeal in reference to claim 1. (Compare App. Br. 9-12 with App. Br. 5-9.) The issue presented by Appellants' contentions is as follows: Does the combination of Davis, Hughes, and APA teach or suggest a system that "compute[s], prior to [a] future time, a non-visual sensory feedback for [a] predicted future interaction" (the "disputed limitation") as recited in claim 1? ANALYSIS The Examiner finds that Davis teaches a system that "predict[s], based on ... data [reflecting a user location], that a user is likely to interact with [a] virtual object at a future time," as recited in claim 1. (Final Act. 2 (citing Davis col. 13, 11. 13-15, Fig. 9A (items xp, yp)).) The Examiner relies on Hughes to teach a system that "compute[s], prior to [a] future time, a non- visual sensory feedback" to be presented at a future time "for [a] predicted future interaction" as taught by Davis. (Final Act. 3 (citing Hughes i-fi-1 39, 42, 44, Fig. 1 (items 103-107, 113-117, 125 (microcomputer))).) Appellants contend as follows: [W]hile both Hughes and the claimed subject matter involve computing vibrations to send to a user before an interaction that causes this vibration to be sent to the user, their difference is as 4 Appeal2014-007512 Application 13/192,305 follows: Hughes computes possible vibrations to provide to a user in the abstract, without regard to any predicted future interaction that will cause the vibration to be provided to a user. In contrast, the claimed subject matter involves computing a specific vibration based on a specific predicted future interaction that will cause the vibration to be provided to the user. (App. Br. 6.) Appellants further explain as follows: Hughes computes possible vibrations to provide to a user in the abstract because Hughes does not calculate those vibrations based on (or applied to) some specific interaction. That is, Hughes calculates a variety of vibrations that could theoretically be applied to a future interaction, and then later on, when there is actually an interaction, calculates which of these predetermined vibrations corresponds to the interaction. So, Hughes is not computing the non-visual sensory feedback for that specific predicted future interaction before the time at which that future interaction occurs. Put another way, Hughes has a set of pre-determined vibrations stored, but does not determine which of these vibrations is to be given in response to a particular future interaction until that future interaction actually occurs. (Reply Br. 4--5.) We find Appellants' contention unpersuasive because it argues limitations not found in claim 1, i.e., that the claimed system computes a "specific vibration based on a specific predicted future interaction" (App. Br. 6 (emphases added)). During prosecution, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification, In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997), without importing un-recited limitations into the claims, In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The disputed limitation of claim 1 merely requires that the "non-visual sensory feedback for the predicted future interaction" be computed at some time "prior to the future time." The claim recites no other limitations on the time, manner, or nature of the computation. Indeed, nothing in claim 1 precludes 5 Appeal2014-007512 Application 13/192,305 the computation of the "non-visual sensory feedback" from being performed by the processor prior to the recited "receiv[ing]" and "predict[ing]" limitations. Furthermore, as pointed out by the Examiner, Appellants' contention does not take into account the Examiner's reliance on Davis in combination with Hughes. (See Ans. 7-8 (§ (5)a.1.c ).) "[O]ne cannot show non- obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on combinations of references." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Accordingly, we conclude that Hughes's teaching of computing and storing a set of predetermined vibrations for use when an interaction actually occurs (see Reply Br. 4), when considered in light of Davis's teaching of predicting a future user interaction, is encompassed within the broadest reasonable interpretation of the disputed limitation. Appellants do not persuade us of error in the rejection of claim 1. Although nominally argued separately, Appellants' arguments for independent claims 11 and 19 substantially repeat the arguments made for claim 1. (See App. Br. 9-10.) Appellants contend that none of Rosenberg, Doi, Schleppenbach, and Mor cures the deficiencies of the combination of Davis and Hughes (id. at 10-12), but do not otherwise separately argue dependent claims 2-10, 12-18, and 20 with particularity (see id. at 9-12). Accordingly, we sustain the rejections of claims 1-20. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-20 is affirmed. 6 Appeal2014-007512 Application 13/192,305 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2013). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation