Ex Parte King et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 15, 2019

12784033 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 15, 2019)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/784,033 05/20/2010 Nigel King 088325-0774159
(097300US)
8003
51206 7590 05/17/2019
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP/Oracle
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
AN, IG TAI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
4142
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/17/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
oraclepatentmail@kilpatricktownsend.com
KT S Docketing2 @ kilpatrick. foundationip .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte NIGEL KING and DANIELA KANTOROVA
Appeal 2018-0024541
Application 12/784,0332
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. FETTING, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER Administrative Patent Judges.
MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 3—19, 21, and 22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
August 1, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed January 2, 2018), and
the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed October 31, 2017) and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed February 21, 2017).
2 Appellants identify Oracle International Corporation as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 2.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention “relates, in general, to enterprise
software applications and more particularly, to tools and techniques for
accounting and providing for shared services within such applications”
(Spec. 13).
Claims 3, 4, and 22 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 3,
reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
3. A non-transitory computer-readable medium
comprising sets of instructions stored thereon which, when
executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform:
[(a)] retrieving, within an application executing on the
computer, a plurality of service outsourcing definitions, each
service outsourcing definition associated with service provider
business and a plurality of client services;
[(b)] generating a shared services model based on the
plurality of service outsourcing definitions, wherein the shared
services model associates a shared software function with the
service provider;
[(c)] receiving, in the application executing on the
computer, a plurality of transaction requests;
[(d)] routing, in the application executing on the
computer, the plurality of transaction requests to the service
provider, based on the shared service model;
[(e)] processing, in the application, the plurality of
transactions with the service provider on behalf of the plurality
of client services, in accordance with the shared service model,
using the shared software function;
[(f)] determining, for each of the plurality of
transactions, a client service associated with the transaction and
a type for the transaction as processed by the service provider;
[(g)] determining, in the application, for each transaction,
a cross-recovery value for the service provider of providing the
shared software function, based at least in part on the transaction
type;
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[(h)] determining, in the application, for each transaction,
a cross-charge value for the client services associated with the
transaction, based at least in part on the transaction type;
[(i)] allocating values of the shared software function
among the plurality of client services, based at least in part on
the determined cross-recovery values and determined cross­
charge values for the plurality of transactions; and
[(j)] recording a plurality of entries in the application
corresponding to the allocated values to two or more of the
plurality of client services.
REJECTION
Claims 3—19, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
ANALYSIS
Appellants argue the pending claims as a group (App. Br. 5—11). We
select independent claim 3 as representative. The remaining claims stand or
fall with claim 3. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CIS Banklnt’l, 573 U.S.
208,216(2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
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The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217—18 (alteration in original).
In rejecting independent claims 3 and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
Examiner determined that the claims are directed to
processing, in [an] application, a plurality of transactions with [a]
service provider business unit on behalf of [a] plurality of client
business units, in accordance with [a] shared business function;
identifying, for each of the plurality of transactions, a client
business unit associated with the transaction and a type for the
transaction as processed by the service provider business unit;
allocating the recorded cost of the shared business function
among the plurality of client business units based at least in part
on the formal definition of the relationships between the service
provider business unit and the client business units; and
performing a plurality of accounting entries in the application to
charge the allocated recorded cost to one[,] two[,] or more of the
plurality of client business units, wherein performing the
plurality of accounting entries in the application comprises
posting, each of the plurality accounting entries to a general
ledger account of the enterprise, and thereby accounting for costs
to the two or more of the plurality of client business units and
recoveries by the provider business unit[,]
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i.e., to a fundamental economic practice and a method of organizing human
activity, and, therefore, to an abstract idea similar to other concepts that the
courts have held abstract (Final Act. 5—7).3 The Examiner also determined
that these claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to
amount to more than the judicial exception {id. at 9—10).
Addressing the remaining claims, the Examiner determined that
dependent claims 5—13, 16—19, and 21 recite the same abstract idea as
independent claims 3 and 4; that claims 14 and 15 recite additional elements
of receiving and outputting data, i.e., generic computer functions; and that
independent claim 22 is patent-ineligible for the same reasons set forth with
respect to independent claims 3 and 4 {id. at 10-11).
3 Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the Examiner did not merely repeat the
claim language verbatim in identifying the concept to which the claims are
directed (App. Br. 6; see also Reply Br. 2). And although Appellants argue
that the rejection cannot be sustained because the Examiner failed to identify
“a succinct abstract idea” (App. Br. 6—7 (observing that according to a 2015
study, the average length of an abstract idea, as identified by district courts,
is 10.85 words long, and arguing that “the Examiner’s inability to identify a
succinct abstract idea to characterize the claims at issue is strong evidence
that the claims are not in fact directed to an abstract idea”)), we note that an
abstract idea can be described at varying levels of abstraction. That the
Examiner used more words than Appellants would have used, or more words
that district courts have used on average, in describing the concept to which
the claims are directed is an insufficient basis for persuasively arguing that
the claims are not directed to an abstract idea. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth,
Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea can generally
be described at different levels of abstraction. As the Board has done, the
claimed abstract idea could be described as generating menus on a computer,
or generating a second menu from a first menu and sending the second menu
to another location. It could be described in other ways, including, as
indicated in the specification, taking orders from restaurant customers on a
computer.”).
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After Appellants’ briefs were filed in this appeal, and the Examiner’s
Answer mailed, the USPTO published revised guidance for use by USPTO
personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). That
guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the
first step of the Mayo I Alice framework by (1) providing groupings of subject
matter that are considered an abstract idea; and (2) clarifying that a claim is
not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated
into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The 2019 Revised
Guidance, by its terms, applies to all applications, and to all patents resulting
from applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019. Id.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A)
The first step in the Mayo!Alice framework, as mentioned above, is to
determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible
concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. This first step,
as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is a two-prong test;
in Step 2 A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas:
(1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human
activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or
legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. Id. at 54. If so, we next
consider whether the claim includes additional elements, beyond the judicial
exception, “that integrate the [judicial] exception into a practical
application,” i.e., that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
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the clam is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). Id. at 54—55. Only if the claim
(1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into
a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the
judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea.
Here, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the
Examiner erred in determining that claim 3 is directed to an abstract idea
(App. Br. 7—8). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the
[Specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to
excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327,
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp., 790 F.3d at 1346). It
asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant
technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335—36. Here, it
is clear from the Specification, including the claim language, that the claims
focus on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or
a technical field.
The Specification is entitled “PROCESSES AND APPARATUS TO
GENERATE CROSS CHARGE AND RECOVERIES FOR SHARED
SERVICE CENTERS, and states that the disclosure relates, in particular, “to
tools and techniques for accounting and providing for shared services within
[enterprise software] applications” (Spec. 13) — applications that the
Specification discloses are used by many businesses (and other
organizations) to “organize their business affairs, track business
performance, and/or the like” {id. 14). “For a variety of reasons, a modem
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business (or other organization) may be organized into several business
units”; each of these business units is a discrete entity within the business,
and, from the perspective of an enterprise application, may perform a variety
of business functions, e.g., a payroll function, an accounts payable function,
a sales order function, etc., not only for itself but also for other business
units within the enterprise {id. 5, 6). The Specification describes that a
provider business unit often will have costs associated with the services that
it provides, and that the allocation and recovery of these costs is an
important consideration in ensuring the integrity of the enterprise’s financial
reporting and monitoring {id. 1 8).
Embodiments of the present invention, as disclosed in the
Specification, provide tools and techniques “that facilitate the process of
accounting for shared services in an enterprise application” and “employ a
service provider model that codifies best practices in accounting for shared
services” {id. 110). Thus, “[v]arious embodiments can post transactions to
statistical accounts in the general ledger system of the enterprise to account
for costs and recoveries related to provided services, and/or create
appropriate cross charge and recovery entries directly”; the system then “can
use this information to create the entries in the accounting system to charge
the portion of the costs incurred by the shared service center to each client
based on the percentage of the total transactions processed on behalf of each
client” {id. 111).
Consistent with this disclosure, claim 3 recites a method for
accounting for shared services in an enterprise application by: (1) retrieving
accounting best practices for shared services, i.e. “retrieving ... a plurality
of service outsourcing definitions, each service outsourcing definition
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associated with service provider business and a plurality of client services”
(step (a)); (2) generating a shared services model, based on the best
practices, that associates a shared function with a service provider business
unit, i.e., “generating a shared services model based on the plurality of
service outsourcing definitions, wherein the shared services model associates
a shared software function with the service provider” (step (b)); (3) receiving
transaction requests from client business units and routing the requests to the
service provider business unit, i.e., “receiving ... a plurality of transaction
requests” and “routing ... the plurality of transaction requests to the service
provider, based on the shared service model” (steps (c) and (d));
(4) processing, by the service provider, the requested transactions on behalf
of the client business units, i.e., “processing, in the application, the plurality
of transactions with the service provider on behalf of the plurality of client
services, in accordance with the shared service model, using the shared
software function” (step (e)); (5) determining, for each transaction, the client
business unit associated with the transaction, the type of transaction, the
cross-recovery value to the service provider business unit, and the cross­
charge value to the client business unit, i.e., “determining, for each of the
plurality of transactions, a client service associated with the transaction and
a type for the transaction as processed by the service provider,”
“determining ... for each transaction, a cross-recovery value for the service
provider of providing the shared software function, based at least in part on
the transaction type,” and “determining, in the application, for each
transaction, a cross-charge value for the client services associated with the
transaction, based at least in part on the transaction type” (steps (f), (g), and
(h)); and (6) allocating values of the shared service among the client
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business units based on the cross-recovery and cross-charge values, and
recording corresponding entries in the accounting system, i.e., “allocating
values of the shared software function among the plurality of client services,
based at least in part on the determined cross-recovery values and
determined cross-charge values for the plurality of transactions” and
“recording a plurality of entries in the application corresponding to the
allocated values to two or more of the plurality of client services” (steps (i)
and (j)). These limitations, given their broadest reasonable interpretation,
recite a commercial interaction, i.e., between a service provider business unit
and one or more client business units, which is a method of organizing
human activity and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also, e.g., Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(summarizing cases discussing “claims directed to the performance of
certain financial transactions as involving abstract ideas”).
Having concluded that claim 3 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong 1), we next consider whether the claim recites
“additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application” (Step 2A, Prong 2).
The only additional element recited in claim 3, beyond the abstract
idea, is the claimed “computer,” which performs the method steps. And that
element is described in the Specification at a high level of generality, i.e., as
a generic computer component (see, e.g., Spec. 43).
We find no indication in the Specification, nor do Appellants direct us
to any indication, that the operations recited in claim 3 invoke any assertedly
inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other
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inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the
claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings,
LLCv. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). In fact, the
Specification discloses just the opposite, i.e., that the claimed invention may
be implemented using only generic computer components to perform generic
computer functions (see, e.g., Spec. 42-47).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes an improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
as that phrase is used in the Revised Guidance.4
Appellants argue that the claims do not meet the requirements for a
method of organizing human activity and that the claim elements are instead
directed to “a solution specific to a technical problem” (App. Br. 7).
Appellants, thus, maintain that although the claims recite features including
4 The 2019 Revised Guidance references the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)-(c) and (e)-(h) in
describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or
combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract
idea, into a practical application. Id. at 55. If the recited judicial exception
is integrated into a practical application, as determined under one or more of
these MPEP sections, the claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception.
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determining cross-recovery and cross-charge values for client services, and
allocating values among a plurality of client services, “it is the recited
technical features such as the generation of a shared services module and the
routing of transaction requests based on the shared services model that
enable[ ] cross-recovery and cross-charge values to be determined” (id. at 8).
Therefore, according to Appellants, the claims are “technical in nature and
solve a technical problem rooted in computer technology” (id.).
Pointing particularly to limitations (b) through (f), as recited in
claim 3, Appellants assert that the recited operations “relate to a specific
technical infrastructure including a shared services model that is generated
in order to route/process transactions across a distributed network of service
providers” (App. Br. 8), and that the claims, accordingly, are not directed to
an abstract idea (id. ). Yet, no “specific technical infrastructure” is apparent
in these steps, which merely recite a computer. And, although claim 3
recites “generating a shared service model,” the claim provides no technical
details for achieving that result. Appellants, by their argument, suggest such
details exist, but those details are not reflected in the claim. For example,
claim 3 does not specify how to generate “a shared services model based on
the plurality of service outsourcing definitions, wherein the shared services
model associates a shared software function with the service provider.”
Instead, “the claim language here provides only a result-oriented solution
with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it. Our law
demands more.” Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
We also are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the claims
are not directed to an abstract idea because, similar to the claims at issue in
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Enfish, the claims are “directed toward solving a specific problem in the
software arts” (App. Br. 9). The Federal Circuit, in Enfish, rejected a § 101
challenge at the step one stage of the Mayo I Alice analysis because the claims
at issue focused on “a specific type of data structure [i.e., a self-referential
table for a computer database] designed to improve the way a computer
stores and retrieves data in memory.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. Based on
the “plain focus of the claims,” the court, thus, held that the claims were
directed to “a specific improvement to the way computers operate, embodied
in the self-referential table,” and, as such, were more than a mere abstract
idea. Id. at 1336. We find no parallel here between claim 3 and the claims
in Enfish nor any comparable aspect in claim 3 that represents an
improvement to computer functionality.
Appellants assert that it is desirable in enterprise systems to share
specific client services within the enterprise infrastructure; that such sharing
raises “various technical challenges, including security considerations,
measuring performance of client service providers, transaction allocation^]
and tracking[ ] recovery based on [the] allocation of transactions”; and that
the pending claims address the problems associated with providing client
services by “generating a shared services model based on a plurality of
service outsourcing definitions, routing transaction requests based on the
shared services model, and processing transactions with a service provider
on behalf of a plurality of client services, in accordance with the shared
service model, and using shared software functions” (App. Br. 9).
Appellants, thus, argue that “[generating shared services model based on
service outsourcing definitions, and routing/processing transaction requests
based on the shared services model... is a ‘specific implementation of the
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solution to a problem in the software arts’” (id. at 10). But, we are not
persuaded that sharing client services within an enterprise infrastructure is a
problem in the software arts, as opposed to a business problem, or that
generating a shared services model based on service outsourcing definitions,
and routing/processing transaction requests based on the shared services
model is a technical solution where, as here, there is no indication that
operations recited in claim 3 require any specialized or inventive computer
components, invoke any assertedly inventive programming, or that the
claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions.
Finally, Appellants misapprehend the controlling precedent to the
extent Appellants argue that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea,
and are patent-eligible because the claims do not stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103 (id. at 10-11; see also Reply Br. 2—3). Neither a
novelty finding nor a non-obviousness determination automatically leads to
the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is patent-eligible.
“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass ’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). A novel and non-obvious claim
directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188—89
(1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of
a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject
matter.”).
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We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 3 recites a
method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the
additional element recited in the claim is no more than a generic computer
component used as a tool to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, it
does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice
Corp., 573 U.S. at 223—24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is
not generally the sort of ‘additional feature[e]’ that provides a ‘practical
assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 3 is directed to an
abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo!Alice framework that
claim 3 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo!Alice framework,
whether claim 3 adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field, or simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.
As described above, the only element recited in claim 3, beyond the
abstract idea, is the claimed “computer” that performs the method steps.
Appellants cannot reasonably maintain, nor do they, that there is a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether operation of this component is well-
understood, routine, or conventional, where, as here, there is nothing in the
Specification to indicate that the operations recited in claim 3 require any
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specialized hardware or inventive computer components or that the claimed
invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to
perform generic computer functions, e.g., receiving, processing, and
transmitting information. Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in accordance with
Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to
eligibility” where claims have been defended as involving an inventive
concept based “merely on the idea of using existing computers or the
Internet to carry out conventional processes, with no alteration of computer
functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also BSG Tech. LLC v.
BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“BSG Tech does
not argue that other, non-abstract features of the claimed inventions, alone or
in combination, are not well-understood, routine and conventional database
structures and activities. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
determining that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept.”).
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3, and claims 4—19, 21, and 22,
which fall with claim 3.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 3—19, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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