Ex Parte Kim et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 14, 2015

13045101 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 14, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/045,101 03/10/2011 Young Seol KIM 1398-372
(YPF201010-0015)
2250
66547 7590 12/14/2015
THE FARRELL LAW FIRM, P.C.
290 Broadhollow Road
Suite 210E
Melville, NY 11747
EXAMINER
AJAYI, JOEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2646
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/14/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte YOUNG SEOL KIM, JAE WON LEE, and SUNG GUN JUNG
____________________

Appeal 2013-009281
Application 13/045,101
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, CARLA M. KRIVAK, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.

MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2013-009281
Application 13/045,101

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–14. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Exemplary Claim
Exemplary independent claim 1 under appeal reads as follows
(emphasis added):
1. A method for executing an application in a mobile device,
comprising:
receiving a request for execution of the application;
determining whether the mobile device is located in a restricted
area where execution of the application is controlled; and
determining, when the mobile device is located in a restricted
area, whether to execute the application requested for execution,
according to an application execution policy that allows for
execution of the application in the restricted area.

Rejections on Appeal
The Examiner rejected claims 1–3, 5–10, and 12–14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by Bocking (US 7,933,611 B2; Apr. 26,
2011).1
The Examiner also rejected claims 4 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combination of Bocking and Weis (US
2011/0087878 A1; Apr. 14, 2011).2

1 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 2–9, 11, 12, and 14. Except
for our ultimate decision, these claims are not discussed further herein.
2 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 4 and 11. Rather, these
claims are argued by reference to claims 1 and 9. The rejection of these
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Application 13/045,101

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Appellants’ Contention
1. Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
because:
[T]here is nothing in Bocking disclosing “determining, when the
mobile device is located in a restricted area, whether to execute
the application requested for execution, according to an
application execution policy that allows for execution of the
application in the restricted area” as recited in the claims, only
that camera execution is restricted based on restriction data of
the restricted area, which is not the same as determining
whether to execute an application according to an application
execution policy that allows execution in the restricted area, as
required in the independent claims.
App. Br. 6, footnote omitted, emphases added.
2. Appellants further contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 because:
[A]n application execution policy that allows for execution, or
any policy allowing execution, is simply absent from Bocking.
See Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1571. That is, there is
nothing in Bocking disclosing determining whether to execute
according to a policy that allows execution, or any policy that
allows execution at all. Therefore, Bocking fails to disclose
each of the recitations of the independent claims the
anticipation rejection should be reversed, for at least this
reason.
Contrary to the Examiner's contention, Bocking merely
discloses “data for defining geographical boundaries of a
restricted operating area and data that defines a restriction that
is selectively imposed on the [device] based on whether the
device is located in the restricted area,” set by administrators of
a network based on their IT policy. That is, at best, Bocking
discloses setting device restrictions within restricted areas.
Conversely, the independent claims recite “determining, when

claims turns on our decision as to the underlying § 102 rejection. Except for
our ultimate decision, these claims are not discussed further herein.
Appeal 2013-009281
Application 13/045,101

4
the mobile device is located in a restricted area, whether to
execute the application requested for execution, according to
an application execution policy that allows for execution of the
application in the restricted area.”
However, a geographical device restriction in Bocking is
not the same as an application execution policy, recited in the
claims. That is, Bocking fails to disclose any application
execution policy or any policy allowing execution of an
application in a restricted area at all. Indeed, a policy allowing
execution of an application in a restricted area is simply
absent from Bocking. See Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1571.
Thus, Bocking fails to anticipate the independent claims for at
least this reason.
App. Br. 7, footnote omitted, emphases added.
3. Appellants further contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 because:
An application execution policy that allows for execution of an
application in a restricted area is entirely absent from the
disclosure of Bocking. That is, Bocking is not concerned with
which applications to allow. Instead, Bocking seeks to
disable/limit certain device functions.
Reply Br. 3, emphasis added.

Issue on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 because Bocking fails to
teach the argued limitations?

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
contentions that the Examiner has erred.
We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions. We adopt as our own
(1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from
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which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner
in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We
concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner.
As to Appellants’ above contentions 1–3, we disagree. Contrary to
Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner correctly found that Bocking teaches
“determining, when the mobile device is located in a restricted area, whether
to execute the application requested for execution, according to an
application execution policy that allows for execution of the application in
the restricted area.” An artisan would recognize that “an IT policy”
(Bocking 4:58) “with respect to [a] restricted area/zone” (Bocking 7:16–17)
to “only enable operation on a local network” (Bocking 7:56) is a species of
“an application execution policy that allows for execution of the application
in the restricted area.” They are the same thing.
Appellants appear to be reading far too much into the word “allows.”
Although Appellants’ Specification states “[t]he application execution policy
340 contains information about applications that can be executed in a
particular restricted area” (Spec. 11:19–20), we find no such specific
limitation in claim 1 before us. Rather, we only find a requirement that there
must be some mechanism to differentiate what is allowed from what is not
allowed. Bocking teaches this mechanism. It is immaterial to the claims
whether that result is achieved directly by indicating which
applications/functions can be executed or indirectly by indicating which
applications/functions cannot be executed.
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CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1–3, 5–10, and
12–14 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
(2) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 4 and 11 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(3) Claims 1–14 are not patentable.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–14 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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