Ex Parte Kim et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 14, 201513045101 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 14, 2015) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/045,101 03/10/2011 Young Seol KIM 1398-372 (YPF201010-0015) 2250 66547 7590 12/14/2015 THE FARRELL LAW FIRM, P.C. 290 Broadhollow Road Suite 210E Melville, NY 11747 EXAMINER AJAYI, JOEL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2646 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/14/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte YOUNG SEOL KIM, JAE WON LEE, and SUNG GUN JUNG ____________________ Appeal 2013-009281 Application 13/045,101 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, CARLA M. KRIVAK, and AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges. MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2013-009281 Application 13/045,101 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1–14. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Exemplary Claim Exemplary independent claim 1 under appeal reads as follows (emphasis added): 1. A method for executing an application in a mobile device, comprising: receiving a request for execution of the application; determining whether the mobile device is located in a restricted area where execution of the application is controlled; and determining, when the mobile device is located in a restricted area, whether to execute the application requested for execution, according to an application execution policy that allows for execution of the application in the restricted area. Rejections on Appeal The Examiner rejected claims 1–3, 5–10, and 12–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Bocking (US 7,933,611 B2; Apr. 26, 2011).1 The Examiner also rejected claims 4 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Bocking and Weis (US 2011/0087878 A1; Apr. 14, 2011).2 1 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 2–9, 11, 12, and 14. Except for our ultimate decision, these claims are not discussed further herein. 2 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 4 and 11. Rather, these claims are argued by reference to claims 1 and 9. The rejection of these Appeal 2013-009281 Application 13/045,101 3 Appellants’ Contention 1. Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because: [T]here is nothing in Bocking disclosing “determining, when the mobile device is located in a restricted area, whether to execute the application requested for execution, according to an application execution policy that allows for execution of the application in the restricted area” as recited in the claims, only that camera execution is restricted based on restriction data of the restricted area, which is not the same as determining whether to execute an application according to an application execution policy that allows execution in the restricted area, as required in the independent claims. App. Br. 6, footnote omitted, emphases added. 2. Appellants further contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because: [A]n application execution policy that allows for execution, or any policy allowing execution, is simply absent from Bocking. See Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1571. That is, there is nothing in Bocking disclosing determining whether to execute according to a policy that allows execution, or any policy that allows execution at all. Therefore, Bocking fails to disclose each of the recitations of the independent claims the anticipation rejection should be reversed, for at least this reason. Contrary to the Examiner's contention, Bocking merely discloses “data for defining geographical boundaries of a restricted operating area and data that defines a restriction that is selectively imposed on the [device] based on whether the device is located in the restricted area,” set by administrators of a network based on their IT policy. That is, at best, Bocking discloses setting device restrictions within restricted areas. Conversely, the independent claims recite “determining, when claims turns on our decision as to the underlying § 102 rejection. Except for our ultimate decision, these claims are not discussed further herein. Appeal 2013-009281 Application 13/045,101 4 the mobile device is located in a restricted area, whether to execute the application requested for execution, according to an application execution policy that allows for execution of the application in the restricted area.” However, a geographical device restriction in Bocking is not the same as an application execution policy, recited in the claims. That is, Bocking fails to disclose any application execution policy or any policy allowing execution of an application in a restricted area at all. Indeed, a policy allowing execution of an application in a restricted area is simply absent from Bocking. See Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1571. Thus, Bocking fails to anticipate the independent claims for at least this reason. App. Br. 7, footnote omitted, emphases added. 3. Appellants further contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because: An application execution policy that allows for execution of an application in a restricted area is entirely absent from the disclosure of Bocking. That is, Bocking is not concerned with which applications to allow. Instead, Bocking seeks to disable/limit certain device functions. Reply Br. 3, emphasis added. Issue on Appeal Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 because Bocking fails to teach the argued limitations? ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from Appeal 2013-009281 Application 13/045,101 5 which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. As to Appellants’ above contentions 1–3, we disagree. Contrary to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner correctly found that Bocking teaches “determining, when the mobile device is located in a restricted area, whether to execute the application requested for execution, according to an application execution policy that allows for execution of the application in the restricted area.” An artisan would recognize that “an IT policy” (Bocking 4:58) “with respect to [a] restricted area/zone” (Bocking 7:16–17) to “only enable operation on a local network” (Bocking 7:56) is a species of “an application execution policy that allows for execution of the application in the restricted area.” They are the same thing. Appellants appear to be reading far too much into the word “allows.” Although Appellants’ Specification states “[t]he application execution policy 340 contains information about applications that can be executed in a particular restricted area” (Spec. 11:19–20), we find no such specific limitation in claim 1 before us. Rather, we only find a requirement that there must be some mechanism to differentiate what is allowed from what is not allowed. Bocking teaches this mechanism. It is immaterial to the claims whether that result is achieved directly by indicating which applications/functions can be executed or indirectly by indicating which applications/functions cannot be executed. Appeal 2013-009281 Application 13/045,101 6 CONCLUSIONS (1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1–3, 5–10, and 12–14 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). (2) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 4 and 11 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). (3) Claims 1–14 are not patentable. DECISION The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–14 are affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED tj Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation