Ex Parte Kim et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Dec 9, 2011

10227283 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 9, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte JEONG-JOONG KIM and BON-GUN KU
____________

Appeal 2009-009775
Application 10/227,283
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
CAROLYN L. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final decision rejecting claims 1-13, 15, 17-20, 22-42, 44-46, and 48-83.
Claims 14, 16, 21, 43, and 47 were cancelled during prosecution. We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We Affirm.
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INVENTION
Appellants’ invention relates generally to an information auto
classification method and an information search and analysis method.
(Spec. para [0001]). More particularly, the invention on appeal is
directed to:
an information auto classification method and an information
search and analysis method which are capable of searching
certain information by connecting a user's database system to an
information source, automatically classifying and storing the
searched information into the user's database system and
searching and analyzing information in the user's database
based on various parameters such as a search and analysis
condition and a sample condition which are inputted by a user
using the system.
(Id.).
ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
1. A computerized method for automatically processing patent
materials, comprising the steps of:

accessing raw patent materials from an information source;
locating and analyzing text in individual patents of the raw patent
materials, wherein the text concerns a technical field for the
invention disclosed in an individual patent;

classifying the raw materials based on predetermined classifying
conditions including a technical field of invention and generating a
classified patent-oriented database of the classified patent
materials;

searching for specific patent materials among the classified patent
materials in accordance with predetermined and/or user selected
searching conditions and storing the searched patent materials
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meeting the searching conditions into a specific directory in the
classified patent-oriented database;

analyzing classified patent materials stored in the specific directory
by selected analyzing conditions to generate analyzed patent
materials; and

displaying the analyzed patent materials in a user selected
information format.

REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejected claims 8-13, 29, 38-41, 49 and 61-64 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement
requirement.

2. The Examiner rejected claims 8-13, 22, 24, 29, 33-41, 49, and 61-64
under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph as being indefinite.1

3. The Examiner rejected claims 1-13, 15, 17-20, 22-24, 28-42, 44-46, 48-
51, 53-76, and 78-83 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Rivette
(U.S. 6,339,767 B1). (See Ans. 53, 65, last paragraph).

4. The Examiner rejected claims 52 and 77 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Rivette and Becker (U.S.

1 The Examiner withdrew the §112, second paragraph rejection for claims
1-9 in the Answer, but only with respect to the “predetermined and/or user
selected searching conditions” limitation. (Ans. 8). However, claims 8 and 9
remain rejected under §112, second paragraph, regarding a different
limitation, and are therefore still before us on appeal. (Ans. 9). See also
Ans. 5, “Grounds of Rejection.”

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5,930,803).

5. The Examiner rejected claims 25-27 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Rivette and Guha (U.S. 6,049,797).

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph (enablement)
ISSUE (1)
Under §112, first paragraph, did the Examiner err in concluding that
claims 8-13, 29, 38-41, 49 and 61-64 fail to comply with the enablement
requirement?
ANALYSIS
The Examiner grounds the legal conclusion regarding lack of
enablement on a finding that there is no disclosure in Appellants’
Specification regarding what exactly constitutes the claimed “text related to
a principal/cause of and a result achieved by the invention,” and the term
“principle/cause of an invention” does not have an accepted meaning in the
art, thus rendering the claims non-enabled. (Ans. 7).
Appellants disagree. Appellants contend that the Examiner has
ignored the Wands factors2 and has not provided any objective factual

2 Enablement is a question of law involving underlying factual inquiries. See
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1997);
see also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that
whether undue experimentation is required is a “conclusion reached by
weighing many factual considerations.... includ[ing] (1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature
of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in
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evidence. (App. Br. 13). In particular, Appellants contend that the Examiner
“wholly ignores the level of skill of an ordinary worker in the field of
information search and retrieval of patent information, and simply speculates
that such a worker cannot do this.” (Id.).
When rejecting a claim under the enablement requirement of Section
112, the PTO bears an initial burden of setting forth a reasonable explanation
as to why it believes that the scope of protection provided by that claim is
not adequately enabled by the description of the invention provided in the
specification of the application; this includes, of course, providing sufficient
reasons for doubting any assertions in the specification as to the scope of
enablement. If the PTO meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the
applicant to provide suitable proofs indicating that the specification is indeed
enabling. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing
In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223-24 (CCPA 1971)).
MPEP § 2164.04 provides additional guidance:

While the analysis and conclusion of a lack of
enablement are based on the factors discussed in MPEP
§ 2164.01(a) and the evidence as a whole, it is not necessary to
discuss each factor in the written enablement rejection. The
language should focus on those factors, reasons, and evidence
that lead the examiner to conclude that the specification fails to
teach how to make and use the claimed invention without
undue experimentation, or that the scope of any enablement
provided to one skilled in the art is not commensurate with the
scope of protection sought by the claims. This can be done by
making specific findings of fact, supported by the evidence, and
then drawing conclusions based on these findings of fact.

the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
of the claims.”).

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(Italics added for emphasis).
Here, the Examiner has concluded that specific claim limitations are
not adequately enabled by the description of the invention provided in the
Specification. (Ans. 7). The burden then shifts to the Appellants to provide
suitable proofs indicating that the Specification is indeed enabling. See
Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561-62. “Argument in the brief does not take the place
of evidence in the record.” In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965)
(citing In re Cole, 326 F.2d 769, 773 (CCPA 1964)). Because Appellants
have not pointed to specific enabling support in the Specification, we find
the weight of the evidence supports the Examiner’s position.
We also observe that the Examiner provides a detailed (ten page)
explanation in the “Response to Arguments” section of the Answer (pp. 39-
49). In particular, the Examiner finds that “none of the [claim] terms at
issue in the rejection[] under 35 U.S.C. § 112 first paragraph appear in the
specification even once.” (Ans. 49).
We particularly observe that Appellants’ Reply Brief is silent
regarding any further rebuttal of the Examiner’s position. 3 Therefore, on
this record, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8-13, 29, 38-41,
49, and 61-64 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (enablement).

3 “Silence implies assent.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 572 (1985).

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Rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph
ISSUE (2)
Under §112, second paragraph, did the Examiner err in concluding
that claims 8-13, 22, 24, 29, 33-41, 49, and 61-64 are indefinite?4
ANALYSIS
In making the § 112, 2nd paragraph rejection, the Examiner concludes:
the limitation that patent material is classified based upon text
relating to a principle/cause of and a result achieved by the
invention renders the claims indefinite. One of ordinary skill in
the art would have no basis for interpreting what constituted the
'a principle/cause of the invention', nor the 'result achieved by
the invention', and would have no way to determine how to find
and extract such information from within patent materials.
(Ans. 9).
Appellants disagree, as follows:

one of ordinary skill in the art can readily appreciate what is
meant by the “cause of an invention” and by “a result achieved
by the invention” and “a use of an invention.” Patents contain a
"Background of the Invention" section which explain problems
leading up to and/or solved by an invention. Appellants
respectfully submit that a cause[] of an invention such as, for
example, the inventive entity's motivation to develop the
disclosed invention, can be searched for in the "Background of
the Invention" portion of a patent application.
Similarly, useful results of an invention are routinely
listed for utility patents.
Moreover, as pointed out above, most patent applications
are written with a list of objects of an invention, including
beneficial results of invention.
(App. Br. 17).

4 See n.1 supra.
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A claim is indefinite if, when read in light of the specification, it does
not reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention.
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citations omitted). During prosecution of an application before the
USPTO, the threshold standard of ambiguity for indefiniteness is lower than
it might be during litigation of an issued patent. Ex parte Miyazaki, 89
USPQ2d 1207, 1212 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). “[I]f a claim is amenable
to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in
requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the
claimed invention by holding the claim . . . indefinite.” Miyazaki, 89
USPQ2d at 1211.
Here, the basis for the Examiner’s rejection appears to be similar to
the enablement rejection under §112, first paragraph (discussed above),
given that the Examiner finds no definition for the disputed terms in the
Specification (Ans. 52), and also because the Examiner finds there is a “lack
of a commonly accepted meaning in the art for the terms at issue.” (Id.).
However, for essentially the same reasons articulated by the
Appellants (App. Br. 17-18), we agree that the disputed limitations “[1]
cause of and [2] a result achieved by the invention” (claim 8) reasonably
apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention,5 even though
Appellants have not established that the specification enables an artisan to
make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation, as
discussed above regarding the enablement rejection under §112, first
paragraph. However, this does not conclude our inquiry under §112, second

5 See Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1342.

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paragraph.6
Regarding the lower threshold standard of ambiguity for
indefiniteness as applied by the USPTO under Miyazaki, we observe that the
Examiner does not contend in the Answer (mailed Feb. 11, 2009)7 that the
disputed claim terms are amenable to two or more plausible claim
constructions. See Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d at 1211. We also agree that the
claim limitations directed to an effect of an invention and a use of an
invention do not render claims 9, 40, 41, 63, and 64 indefinite under §112,
second paragraph. (See Ans. 9). Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 8-13, 22, 24, 29, 33-41, 49, and 61-64 under §112,
second paragraph.

Anticipation Rejection over the Rivette patent reference
Claims 1-9
Based on Appellants’ arguments in the principal Brief, we select
representative claim 1 to decide the appeal for the group of claims including
claims 1-9. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

6 The Federal Circuit has held in post-issuance patent infringement cases
that the definiteness requirement does not compel absolute clarity and only
claims not amenable to construction or “insolubly ambiguous” are indefinite.
Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2005).

7 Miyazaki was made precedential on Nov. 19, 2008.
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ISSUE (3)
Under §102, did the Examiner err in finding that Rivette
discloses “classifying the raw patent materials based on
predetermined classifying conditions including a
technical field of invention,” within the meaning of
representative claim 1?

FACTUAL FINDINGS
Regarding the anticipation rejection over Rivette, we adopt the
Examiner’s factual findings as set forth in the Answer. (Ans. 10, et seq.).
1. Rivette discloses that Patent Bibliographic Databases store
information about documents including U.S. and non-U.S. patents.
The patent bibliographic data includes the U.S. and international
classifications. (Col. 18, ll. 56-66; see also Ans. 11).

ANALYSIS
Appellants contend that Rivette does not disclose “classifying the raw
materials based on predetermined classifying conditions including a
technical field of invention,” as recited in claim 1. (App. Br. 18).
In construing the claim language, we observe claim 1 recites that the
patent materials are classified based on “predetermined classifying
conditions including a technical field of invention . . . .” (underline added).
We look to Appellants’ Specification for context:
the classification field is referred to as a field for
classifying the data in the information source by the user. For
example, when the user wishes to classify the patent
information by the field, the classification field is referred to as
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the object of the invention, an embodiment, an effect, claims,
drawings, IPC (International Patent Classification) number, an
application number, a publication number, a patent serial
number etc.

Spec. Para. [0029]).
Although Appellants’ Specification does not define the claim term
“classifying,” we broadly but reasonably construe “classifying” in light of
the Specification to mean “sorting” or “grouping.” 8
According to the express language of claim 1, we observe that the
patent materials are classified based on more than one classifying condition
(“predetermined classifying conditions”) including a technical field of
invention, and not just the technical field of invention alone.
The Examiner contends:
The generation of patent bibliographic information, and in
particular, the classification, and storing [of] that bibliographic
[classification] information in association with the patent from
which it has been extracted, constitutes the claimed 'classifying
the raw patent materials based on predetermined classifying
conditions including a technical field of invention'.
(Ans. 57).
We agree with the Examiner’s interpretation of the claimed
“classifying.” (Id.). Rivette discloses that the patent bibliographic

8 During ex parte prosecution, the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO)
determines the scope of the claims by giving the language “the broadest
reasonable construction ‘in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting In re Am. Acad. of Sci.
Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

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information includes U.S. and international classifications, which we find
are indicative of a technical field of the patented invention (FF 1).
For essentially for the same reasons articulated by the Examiner, and
for the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellants’
arguments that the Examiner erred in finding that Rivette discloses
“classifying the raw patent materials based on predetermined classifying
conditions, including the technical field for the invention,” within the
meaning of representative claim 1.

ISSUE (4)
Under §102, did the Examiner err in determining that
Rivette discloses “searching for specific patent materials
among the classified patent materials in accordance with
predetermined and/or user selected searching conditions
and storing the searched patent materials meeting the
searching conditions into a specific directory in the
classified patent-oriented database,” within the meaning
of representative claim 1?

ANALYSIS
Appellants contend that Rivette does not store the searched patent
materials meeting the searching conditions into a specific directory in
classified patent-oriented database, after classifying raw patent materials
based on predetermined classifying conditions, including the technical field
for the invention and generating a classified patent-oriented database of the
classified patent materials. (App. Br. 20-21)(underline in original).
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The Examiner construes the term “directory” as follows:
The examiner points out that the term 'directory' is not
conventionally applied to the field of databases, but is normally
confined to files on a file system. Furthermore, there is no
explicit disclosure of a specialized definition of the term
'directory' as it is applied to databases, as in the instant claims.
Consequently, the examiner has interpreted the term 'directory',
as applied to a database [such as the claimed 'directory in the
classified patent-oriented database'], as meaning a 'container'
which can be used to segregate specific sets of records (the
records, in this case, constituting patents in the patent database).
(Ans. 60, emphasis added).
Appellants’ Specification discloses: “[a]t this time, the region into
which the data are stored become[s] a specific directory to the user who
logged in on the initial window of Figure 5.” (Spec. para. [0047]) (underline
added)
In light of the “specific directory” example in Appellants’
Specification, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s broad but reasonable
construction of the claimed “specific directory” as a “‘container’ which can
be used to segregate specific sets of records (the records, in this case,
constituting patents in the patent database).” (Ans. 60).
The Examiner finds that Rivette’s disclosure of a data structure called
a “group” anticipates the claimed “specific directory in the classified patent-
oriented database.” (Claim 1) (Ans. 60). Rivette further discloses that
“patents in a group typically follow a common theme or characteristic . . . .”
(Ans. 61). The Answer points to Rivette’s examples of how a collection of
patents are grouped together, i.e., sorted.” (Id. citing Rivette at col. 12, ll.
13-37).
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We observe that Fig. 4 of Rivette shows a database 316 operatively
coupled to grouping module 412. Thus, on this record, we are in agreement
with the Examiner that Rivette discloses that patents are grouped and stored
in the data structure (directory) according to a common theme or
characteristic (classifying).
Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the
Examiner erred in finding that Rivette discloses searching for specific patent
materials among the classified patent materials in accordance with
predetermined and/or user selected searching conditions and storing the
searched patent materials meeting the searching conditions into a specific
directory in the classified patent-oriented database, as recited in
representative claim 1.
Appellants further aver that since Rivette does not disclose the above-
discussed “storing” limitation, “Rivette cannot analyze the searched
materials stored in that non-existent specific directory.” (App. Br. 20). As
discussed above, we find that Rivette does disclose the claimed “directory.”
Therefore, we find this argument unavailing.
Similarly, Appellants advance the same reasoning with regards to the
limitation “displaying the analyzed patent materials in a user selected
information format.” (App. Br. 21). We find this argument unavailing for
the same reasons discussed above.
Based on this record regarding Issues 3 and 4, we find that the
Examiner did not err in rejecting representative claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s §102 rejection of claim 1 and
claims 2-9 which fall therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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Anticipation rejection of claims 10-13, 15, 17-20, 22-24, 28-42,
44-46, 48-51, 53-76, and 78-83.
For these remaining claims rejected under § 102, we observe that
Appellants respond to the Examiner’s rejection by merely: (1) reciting the
claim limitations, (2) and asserting that the recited limitations are not
disclosed by Rivette. (App. Br. 21-23).
Merely reciting the language of the claim is insufficient. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(vii) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim
recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the
claim.”). Merely alleging that the references fail to support an anticipation
rejection, or that the claim is novel over the cited reference, is insufficient to
persuade us of Examiner error. Attorney arguments and conclusory
statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little
probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte
Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip op. at 7-8 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009)
(informative), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd09004693.pdf .
Here, we find Appellants’ arguments are conclusory in nature and fail
to address the Examiner’s specific factual findings. Thus, on this record, we
find Appellants have failed to present substantive arguments and supporting
evidence persuasive of Examiner error. Cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952
F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to
examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for
[patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”).
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We also observe that Appellants’ arguments follow a similar pattern
with regards to independent claims 15, 42, and 65. (App. Br. 22-23).
Therefore, Appellants have not met the burden of showing reversible error in
the Examiner’s prima facie case of anticipation by specifically identifying to
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences what the Examiner did
wrong.9 Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Based on this record, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection
of claims 10-13, 15, 17-20, 22-24, 28-42, 44-46, 48-51, 53-76, and 78-83
over Rivette.
Rejections under §103
ANALYSIS
Dependent claims 52 and 77 rejected under §103 10
Appellants contend that claims 52 and 77 are patentable for the same
reasons argued for independent claims 42 and 65 discussed above, and that
Becker does not cure these deficiencies. (App. Br. 26). We do not find these
arguments persuasive for the same reasons discussed supra regarding claims
42 and 65.

9 See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Jung argues that the
Board gave improper deference to the examiner’s rejection by requiring
Jung to ‘identif[y] a reversible error’ by the examiner, which improperly
shifted the burden of proving patentability onto Jung. Decision at 11. This
is a hollow argument, because, as discussed above, the examiner established
a prima facie case of anticipation and the burden was properly shifted to
Jung to rebut it. . . . ‘[R]eversible error’ means that the applicant must
identify to the Board what the examiner did wrong . . . .”).

10 We select representative claim 52 to decide the appeal for the group of
claims including claims 52 and 77. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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Appellants also contend that the Examiner has not made a prima facie
case of proper motivation to modify Rivette in view of Becker to create and
display a pie chart. (App. Br. 26). In particular, Appellants contend that
Rivette has no need for a pie chart display and the Office Action fails to
indicate which characteristics of Rivette one of ordinary skill in the art
would want to display in a pie chart or how displaying the unidentified
characteristics would improve Rivette. (Id.).
However, it is our view that the Examiner’s proffered combination of
Rivette and Becker is merely an arrangement of familiar elements. “[W]hen
a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same
function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would
expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007) (quoting Sakraida v. Ag
Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)). The operative question is “whether the
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according
to their established functions.” (Id.).
Here, Becker evidences that pie charts were well known in the art for
the graphic display of data. (Fig. 4, col. 3, ll. 32-65). Rivette discloses the
use of a bar graph . (Rivette, Fig. 74). Because the graphic display of data
in the form of pie charts and bar graphs were familiar elements at the time of
Appellants’ invention, we are in accord with the Examiner underlying
factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness. On this
record, we are of the view that Appellants’ claimed subject matter is no
more than the use of familiar prior art elements according to their
established functions to realize a predictable result, and thus would have
been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
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For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claim 52 and dependent claim 77 grouped therewith. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

Dependent Claims 25-27 rejected under §103 11
Appellants contend that claims 25-27 are patentable for the same
reasons argued for independent claim 15 discussed above, and that Guha
does not cure these deficiencies. (App. Br. 27). We do not find these
arguments persuasive for the reasons discussed supra.
Appellants additionally contend that the Examiner did not make out a
prima facie case of proper motivation to modify Rivette in view of Guha to
use statistical sampling. Appellants contend that the Office Action fails to
demonstrate that Rivette has a need for discovering previously unknown
customer buying and calling patterns to improve corporate marketing,
advertising and sales by data mining large corporate databases. (App. Br. 27)
The Examiner relied on Guha to show the use of statistical sampling
(in an input data set) to facilitate data analysis. (Ans. 37, 70). Mirroring our
discussion above, we do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive, i.e., we
conclude that the combination of Rivette and Guha is an merely an
arrangement of familiar elements, using known methods, to realize a
predictable result.
We further observe that Appellants have not rebutted the Examiner’s
legal conclusion of obviousness by showing that the claimed combination of

11 We select representative claim 25 to decide the appeal for the group of
claims including claims 25-27. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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familiar elements produces any new function. Appellants have not provided
any factual evidence of secondary considerations, such as unexpected or
unpredictable results, commercial success, or long felt but unmet need.
Therefore, we find Appellants’ arguments unavailing regarding the
combinability of the cited references for essentially the same reasons
proffered by the Examiner in the Answer (pp. 37 and 70), and as further
discussed above. Accordingly, we find Appellants have not shown the
Examiner erred by improperly combining the cited references under § 103.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claim 25 and dependent claims 26 and 27 grouped therewith.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph rejection of
claims 8-13, 29, 38-41, 49 and 61-64 (enablement).
We reverse the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph
rejection of claims 8-13, 22, 24, 29, 33-41, 49, and 61-64.
We affirm the Examiner’s §102 rejection of claims1-13, 15, 17-20,
22-24, 28-42, 44-46, 48-51, 53-76, and 78-83.
We affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of claims 25-27, 52, and
77.
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

ORDER
AFFIRMED

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