Ex Parte KiddDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 24, 201411828511 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/828,511 07/26/2007 Deanna R. Kidd PD-207035 9455 20991 7590 01/24/2014 THE DIRECTV GROUP, INC. PATENT DOCKET ADMINISTRATION CA / LA1 / A109 2230 E. IMPERIAL HIGHWAY EL SEGUNDO, CA 90245 EXAMINER NEWLIN, TIMOTHY R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2424 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/24/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte DEANNA R. KIDD ____________________ Appeal 2011-007648 Application 11/828,511 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, JUSTIN BUSCH, and PETER P. CHEN, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-007648 Application 11/828,511 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-41. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Introduction According to Appellant, the claims are directed to a method and system for populating a menu structure on a user device. The method and system include a user device and a content processing system that establish a structure for a menu. The content processing system receives content and metadata corresponding to the content from a content provider and communicates the metadata to the user device. The user device then populates the menu with the metadata (Abstract). Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method comprising: establishing a plurality of content provider homepage templates for content providers; receiving content at a content processing system; receiving a homepage metadata package from a content provider to define a format of a content provider homepage from the plurality of content provider homepage templates including menu selections; receiving metadata corresponding to the content from a content provider at the content processing system; Appeal 2011-007648 Application 11/828,511 3 communicating the metadata corresponding to the content and metadata corresponding to the metadata package to a user device; and populating the content provider template with the metadata corresponding to the content and metadata corresponding to the metadata package at the user device. REFERENCES Hendricks US 6,515,680 B1 Feb. 4, 2003, filed Sept. 12, 1997 Weisman US 2004/0148638 A1 Jul. 29, 2004, filed Oct. 9, 2003 REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 1-20, 22-38, 40, and 41 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C § 102(b) as being anticipated by Hendricks (Ans. 4-10). Claims 21 and 39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks and Weisman (Ans. 11). We have considered only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2011). Appeal 2011-007648 Application 11/828,511 4 ISSUE 1 35 U.S.C. § 102(b): Claims 1-20, 22-38, 40, and 41 Appellant argues the invention as recited in claim 1 is not anticipated by Hendricks (App. Br. 4-11). The pivotal issue raised by Appellant’s arguments concerns the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term “homepage template.” Specifically, Appellant contends the Examiner erroneously conflates “homepage” with “homepage template” because the Examiner failed to consider the definition of “homepage template” provided by the Specification (Rep. Br. 2, (citing Spec. ¶[0046])). Thus, Appellant reasons the proper interpretation of the claims distinguishes “homepage templates” from both “the content that is used to form the templates and the format of the content provider page” (Rep. Br. 2). Under this interpretation, Appellant asserts a difference exists between metadata used to select a template and metadata provided to populate the template (id.). Therefore, Appellant maintains the Examiner erred in finding Hendricks’ menu templates disclose the claimed “homepage templates” because Hendricks’ metadata used to select the menu templates is indistinguishable from Hendricks’ metadata used to populate the menu templates (id.). Issue 1: Has the Examiner erred in finding Hendricks discloses: “establishing a plurality of content provider homepage templates;” “receiving metadata corresponding to the content from a content provider at the content processing system;” “receiving a homepage metadata package from a content provider to define a format of a content provider homepage from the plurality of content provider homepage templates including menu selections;” and Appeal 2011-007648 Application 11/828,511 5 “communicating the metadata corresponding to the content and metadata corresponding to the metadata package to a user device,” as recited in claim 1? ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s conclusions. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. However, as outlined infra, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis. First, Appellant has not explicitly defined “homepage template” in the Specification. Appellant points to a portion of the Specification as support for the proffered definition (Reply Br. 2, citing Spec. ¶¶[0043], [0044], and [0046])); however, paragraph 46 of the Specification, which Appellant highlights, states: The metadata for the home page may also include a home construct template that represents a template number that may be filled in by the various content providers. The operator of the content processing system may establish various home page templates for which various information may be provided by the content providers to fill in the home page. Various categories and the like may be filled in by the content providers within the various parameters of the various templates. This portion of the metadata may be used to identify the pre-made templates. Appeal 2011-007648 Application 11/828,511 6 The Specification additionally states a “home page is a portion of the program guide for selecting content to be downloaded to the user device,” which may be formed as a menu structure (Spec. ¶¶[0043]-[0044]). Accordingly, we are not persuaded Appellant has acted as her own lexicographer because the Specification merely describes, but does not explicitly define, the term “homepage templates.” Furthermore, Appellant has not identified sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us the Examiner’s interpretation is in error. Therefore, we find Hendricks discloses “establishing a plurality of content provider homepage templates.” Second, we note the Specification does not explicitly define the term “metadata,” but instead provides examples of what metadata may include (see e.g. ¶¶[0037]-[0051]). For example, paragraph 38 describes metadata may include, e.g., a “short description of the content” and a “provider ID.” We also note the Specification does not explicitly define the term “homepage metadata package from a content provider.” Appellant has not identified sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of error in the Examiner’s interpretations. In light of these interpretations, we agree with the Examiner that Hendrick’s disclosure of menu sequences which includes the Discovery Channel™ homepage, describes “receiving a homepage metadata package from a content provider to define a format of a content provider homepage from the plurality of content provider homepage templates including menu selections” as set forth by the Examiner (Ans. 5 and 14). Third, we find the Specification states a “content provider” may include various types of content providers including those that provide Appeal 2011-007648 Application 11/828,511 7 content by way of a network as a file (Spec. ¶[0035]). We further note the “content provider” may also provide graphics, content description, and other metadata to the system (id.). As such, we agree with the Examiner in finding Hendricks’ set top box discloses “receiving metadata corresponding to the content from the content provider at the content processing system” (Ans. 5 and 13). Lastly, in light of the claim term interpretation, we find Hendricks discloses “metadata corresponding to the content” because the program control information signal includes a description of the program (metadata corresponding to the program) (see Ans. 5 and 13). Furthermore, we find Hendricks discloses “metadata corresponding to the metadata package” because Hendricks’ set top box receives the Discovery Channel™ logo, which is a provider ID, along with programming choices (id., (citing Hendricks col.38, ll. 36-60, fig. 22b)). These metadata, therefore, correspond to the metadata package. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Hendricks discloses the invention as recited in claim 1 and commensurately recited in claim 24. Claims 2-20, 22, 23, 25-38, 40, and 41: Appellant specifically disputes the rejection of each of claims 2-4, 6, 7, 10, 14, 15, 17, and 18 (App. Br. 7-11). Appellant contends Hendricks does not disclose “content provider specific categories” and “content specific guide categories” as recited in claims 2, 3, and 4, respectively (App. Br. 7-8). We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments and the Examiner’s Appeal 2011-007648 Application 11/828,511 8 findings and reasoning. In light of our review, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings and reasoning. Appellant additionally asserts Hendricks does not disclose “satellite or optical fiber” as a first communications means and “a digital file” as the second communication means as recited in claim 6; metadata being provided through a satellite as recited in claim 7, “communicating a material identification . . . to the content processing system,” as recited in claim 10; and communicating a material identification or the metadata through a broadband communication system or through a terrestrial system, as recited in claims 14, 15, 17, and 18 (App. Br.. 8-10). Again, we have reviewed Appellant’s arguments and are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Claims 5, 8-9, 11-13, 16, 19-20, 22-38, and 40-41 were not separately argued, instead relying on arguments set forth for other claims (see App. Br. 8-10). Therefore, with respect to claims 2-20, 22, 23, 25-38, 40, and 41, we have reviewed Appellant’s arguments and the Examiner’s findings and reasoning. In light of our review, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings and reasoning. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1- 20, 22-38, and 40-41 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for anticipation by Hendricks. ISSUE 2 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 21 and 39 Appellant asserts her invention is not obvious over Hendricks in view of Weisman because Weisman does not teach the claimed mobile user device (App. Br. 11). Appeal 2011-007648 Application 11/828,511 9 Issue 2: Has the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Hendricks and Weisman teaches a mobile user, as recited in claims 21 and 39? ANALYSIS We find Appellant has not proffered sufficient argument or evidence to rebut the Examiner’s findings (App. Br. 11). Thus, we do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive of any error in the Examiner’s stated position (Ans. 11). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 21 and 39 over the combination of Hendricks and Weisman. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-20, 22-38, and 40-41 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Hendricks is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 21 and 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks and Weisman is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED ELD Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation