Ex Parte Kidd

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 24, 2014

11828511 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/828,511 07/26/2007 Deanna R. Kidd PD-207035 9455
20991 7590 01/24/2014
THE DIRECTV GROUP, INC.
PATENT DOCKET ADMINISTRATION
CA / LA1 / A109
2230 E. IMPERIAL HIGHWAY
EL SEGUNDO, CA 90245
EXAMINER
NEWLIN, TIMOTHY R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2424
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/24/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte DEANNA R. KIDD
____________________

Appeal 2011-007648
Application 11/828,511
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, JUSTIN BUSCH, and PETER P. CHEN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-41. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

Introduction
According to Appellant, the claims are directed to a method and
system for populating a menu structure on a user device. The method and
system include a user device and a content processing system that establish a
structure for a menu. The content processing system receives content and
metadata corresponding to the content from a content provider and
communicates the metadata to the user device. The user device then
populates the menu with the metadata (Abstract).

Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method comprising:
establishing a plurality of content provider homepage
templates for content providers;
receiving content at a content processing system;
receiving a homepage metadata package from a content
provider to define a format of a content provider
homepage from the plurality of content provider
homepage templates including menu selections;
receiving metadata corresponding to the content from a
content provider at the content processing system;
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communicating the metadata corresponding to the
content and metadata corresponding to the metadata
package to a user device; and
populating the content provider template with the
metadata corresponding to the content and metadata
corresponding to the metadata package at the user device.
REFERENCES

Hendricks

US 6,515,680 B1 Feb. 4, 2003, filed
Sept. 12, 1997

Weisman US 2004/0148638 A1 Jul. 29, 2004, filed
Oct. 9, 2003
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1-20, 22-38, 40, and 41 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Hendricks (Ans. 4-10).
Claims 21 and 39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hendricks and Weisman (Ans. 11).
We have considered only those arguments Appellant actually raised
in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make
in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2011).

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ISSUE 1
35 U.S.C. § 102(b): Claims 1-20, 22-38, 40, and 41
Appellant argues the invention as recited in claim 1 is not anticipated
by Hendricks (App. Br. 4-11). The pivotal issue raised by Appellant’s
arguments concerns the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term
“homepage template.” Specifically, Appellant contends the Examiner
erroneously conflates “homepage” with “homepage template” because the
Examiner failed to consider the definition of “homepage template” provided
by the Specification (Rep. Br. 2, (citing Spec. ¶[0046])). Thus, Appellant
reasons the proper interpretation of the claims distinguishes “homepage
templates” from both “the content that is used to form the templates and the
format of the content provider page” (Rep. Br. 2). Under this interpretation,
Appellant asserts a difference exists between metadata used to select a
template and metadata provided to populate the template (id.). Therefore,
Appellant maintains the Examiner erred in finding Hendricks’ menu
templates disclose the claimed “homepage templates” because Hendricks’
metadata used to select the menu templates is indistinguishable from
Hendricks’ metadata used to populate the menu templates (id.).
Issue 1: Has the Examiner erred in finding Hendricks discloses:
“establishing a plurality of content provider homepage templates;”
“receiving metadata corresponding to the content from a content
provider at the content processing system;”
“receiving a homepage metadata package from a content provider to
define a format of a content provider homepage from the plurality of content
provider homepage templates including menu selections;” and
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“communicating the metadata corresponding to the content and
metadata corresponding to the metadata package to a user device,” as recited
in claim 1?
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s
conclusions. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and the reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal
Brief. However, as outlined infra, we highlight and address specific
findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis.
First, Appellant has not explicitly defined “homepage template” in the
Specification.
Appellant points to a portion of the Specification as support for the
proffered definition (Reply Br. 2, citing Spec. ¶¶[0043], [0044], and
[0046])); however, paragraph 46 of the Specification, which Appellant
highlights, states:
The metadata for the home page may also include a home construct
template that represents a template number that may be filled in by the
various content providers. The operator of the content processing
system may establish various home page templates for which various
information may be provided by the content providers to fill in the
home page. Various categories and the like may be filled in by the
content providers within the various parameters of the various
templates. This portion of the metadata may be used to identify the
pre-made templates.
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The Specification additionally states a “home page is a portion of the
program guide for selecting content to be downloaded to the user device,”
which may be formed as a menu structure (Spec. ¶¶[0043]-[0044]).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded Appellant has acted as her own
lexicographer because the Specification merely describes, but does not
explicitly define, the term “homepage templates.” Furthermore, Appellant
has not identified sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us the
Examiner’s interpretation is in error. Therefore, we find Hendricks discloses
“establishing a plurality of content provider homepage templates.”
Second, we note the Specification does not explicitly define the term
“metadata,” but instead provides examples of what metadata may include
(see e.g. ¶¶[0037]-[0051]). For example, paragraph 38 describes metadata
may include, e.g., a “short description of the content” and a “provider ID.”
We also note the Specification does not explicitly define the term
“homepage metadata package from a content provider.” Appellant has not
identified sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of error in the
Examiner’s interpretations.
In light of these interpretations, we agree with the Examiner that
Hendrick’s disclosure of menu sequences which includes the Discovery
Channel™ homepage, describes “receiving a homepage metadata package
from a content provider to define a format of a content provider homepage
from the plurality of content provider homepage templates including menu
selections” as set forth by the Examiner (Ans. 5 and 14).
Third, we find the Specification states a “content provider” may
include various types of content providers including those that provide
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content by way of a network as a file (Spec. ¶[0035]). We further note the
“content provider” may also provide graphics, content description, and other
metadata to the system (id.). As such, we agree with the Examiner in
finding Hendricks’ set top box discloses “receiving metadata corresponding
to the content from the content provider at the content processing system”
(Ans. 5 and 13).
Lastly, in light of the claim term interpretation, we find Hendricks
discloses “metadata corresponding to the content” because the program
control information signal includes a description of the program (metadata
corresponding to the program) (see Ans. 5 and 13). Furthermore, we find
Hendricks discloses “metadata corresponding to the metadata package”
because Hendricks’ set top box receives the Discovery Channel™ logo,
which is a provider ID, along with programming choices (id., (citing
Hendricks col.38, ll. 36-60, fig. 22b)). These metadata, therefore,
correspond to the metadata package.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
Hendricks discloses the invention as recited in claim 1 and commensurately
recited in claim 24.

Claims 2-20, 22, 23, 25-38, 40, and 41:
Appellant specifically disputes the rejection of each of claims 2-4, 6,
7, 10, 14, 15, 17, and 18 (App. Br. 7-11). Appellant contends Hendricks
does not disclose “content provider specific categories” and “content
specific guide categories” as recited in claims 2, 3, and 4, respectively (App.
Br. 7-8). We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments and the Examiner’s
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findings and reasoning. In light of our review, we agree with and adopt the
Examiner’s findings and reasoning.
Appellant additionally asserts Hendricks does not disclose “satellite or
optical fiber” as a first communications means and “a digital file” as the
second communication means as recited in claim 6; metadata being provided
through a satellite as recited in claim 7, “communicating a material
identification . . . to the content processing system,” as recited in claim 10;
and communicating a material identification or the metadata through a
broadband communication system or through a terrestrial system, as recited
in claims 14, 15, 17, and 18 (App. Br.. 8-10). Again, we have reviewed
Appellant’s arguments and are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Claims 5,
8-9, 11-13, 16, 19-20, 22-38, and 40-41 were not separately argued, instead
relying on arguments set forth for other claims (see App. Br. 8-10).
Therefore, with respect to claims 2-20, 22, 23, 25-38, 40, and 41, we
have reviewed Appellant’s arguments and the Examiner’s findings and
reasoning. In light of our review, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s
findings and reasoning. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-
20, 22-38, and 40-41 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for anticipation by
Hendricks.

ISSUE 2
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 21 and 39
Appellant asserts her invention is not obvious over Hendricks in view
of Weisman because Weisman does not teach the claimed mobile user
device (App. Br. 11).
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Issue 2: Has the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Hendricks and Weisman teaches a mobile user, as recited in claims 21 and
39?

ANALYSIS
We find Appellant has not proffered sufficient argument or evidence
to rebut the Examiner’s findings (App. Br. 11). Thus, we do not find
Appellant’s argument persuasive of any error in the Examiner’s stated
position (Ans. 11). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 21 and 39 over the combination of Hendricks and Weisman.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-20, 22-38, and 40-41 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Hendricks is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 21 and 39 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks and Weisman is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

ELD