Ex Parte Kavipurapu

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jul 24, 2007

09826240 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 24, 2007)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today
is not binding precedent of the Board.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

__________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
__________

Ex parte ANIL KAVIPURAPU
__________

Appeal 2007-1427
Application 09/826,240
Technology Center 2100
__________

Decided: July 24, 2007
__________

Before ALLEN R. MACDONALD, JEAN R. HOMERE, and
ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 21-40. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal 2007-1427
Application 09/826,240

THE INVENTION
The disclosed invention relates generally to electronic circuits. More
particularly, the disclosed invention is directed to a power selection system
for use with a reconfigurable circuit (Specification 1).
Independent claims 21, 28, and 34 are illustrative:
21. A power selection system for use with a reconfigurable circuit,
comprising:

a monitoring circuit configured to determine a transition rate of
at least one node located within said reconfigurable circuit; and

a mode selection circuit coupled to said monitoring circuit and
configured to reconfigure said reconfigurable circuit by altering a
power characteristic applied to at least a portion thereof based on
a comparison between said transition rate and a predetermined
operating range.

28. A method of operating a reconfigurable circuit, comprising:

determining a transition rate of at least one node located within
said reconfigurable circuit; and

reconfiguring said reconfigurable circuit by altering a power
characteristic applied to at least a portion thereof based on a
comparison between said transition rate and a predetermined
operating range.

34. A reconfigurable circuit, comprising:

a monitored sub-circuit, including:

a delay element, associated with a node of said reconfigurable
circuit, having a switch;
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a multiplier interposed between said node and an output of said
reconfigurable circuit; and

a power selection system, including:

a monitoring circuit that determines a transition rate of
said node; and

a mode selection circuit coupled to said monitoring
circuit that reconfigures said monitored sub-circuit by altering a
power characteristic applied thereto based on a comparison
between said transition rate and a predetermined operating
range.

THE REFERENCE
Mittal US 5,719,800 Feb. 17, 1998

THE REJECTIONS
Claims 21-25 and 28-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Mittal.
Claims 26, 27, and 33-40 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Mittal.
Rather than repeat the arguments of Appellant or the Examiner, we
make reference to the Briefs and the Answer for the respective details
thereof.
Independent claims 21 and 28
We consider first the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 21
and 28 as being anticipated by Mittal. Since Appellant’s arguments with
respect to this rejection have treated these claims as a single group which
stand or fall together, we will select independent claim 28 as the
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representative claim for this rejection because we find it is the broadest
independent claim in this group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004).
Appellant argues that “Mittal does not teach reconfiguring the
reconfigurable circuit but instead teaches maintaining the configuration of
the circuit and reducing power consumption of the circuit by throttling
performance thereof.” (Br. 10). Appellant asserts that “Mittal discloses
changing power consumption by altering a rate but does not disclose
reconfiguring a reconfigurable circuit by, for example, altering a rate.” (Br.
11, ¶ 1). Therefore, Appellant concludes that Mittal “does not teach
reconfiguring a reconfigurable circuit as recited in independent Claims 21
and 28.” (id.).
The Examiner disagrees. The Examiner asserts that Appellant has
defined “reconfiguring a reconfigurable circuit” in the claims as “altering a
power characteristic applied to at least a portion thereof ...” (Answer 6; see
also claims 21 and 28). The Examiner reads the claimed “reconfigurable
circuit” on Mittal’s microprocessor (Answer 6; see also Mittal, col. 2, ll. 14-
19). The Examiner further reads the recited “at least one node located
within said reconfigurable circuit” on Mittal’s functional unit that the
Examiner corresponds to a node located within the processor (see Mittal,
col. 2, ll. 14-19; see also claims 21 and 28). The Examiner interprets
switching the functional unit between a normal mode of operation and a
reduced-power mode in Mittal as altering a power characteristic of the
functional unit (see Mittal, col. 5, ll. 25-30) (Answer 6).
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102, a single prior art reference
that discloses, either expressly or inherently, each limitation of a claim
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invalidates that claim by anticipation. Perricone v. Medicis Pharm., 432
F.3d 1368, 1375-76, 77 USPQ2d 1321, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted).
We begin our analysis by broadly but reasonably construing the
recited term “reconfiguring” in a manner fully consistent with Appellant’s
definition set forth in the Specification:
A reconfigurable circuit, such as a reconfigurable
digital filter or a reconfigurable digital Pseudo Random Binary
Sequence (PRBS) generator, is a circuit (perhaps with analog
components), that has certain relevant digital design
characteristics that are designed to be revocably modifiable at
the direction of a client.
(Specification 1, ¶ 0002).
Our reviewing court has determined that “the specification is ‘the
single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,’ and that the
specification ‘acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the
claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303, 1321, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(internal citation omitted).
In light of Appellant’s broad definition of a “reconfigurable circuit,”
we agree with the Examiner’s reading of the claim on the reference. In
particular, we find that Mittal discloses altering a power characteristic
applied to a device or component in at least two ways: (1) by reducing the
applied voltage, and (2), by reducing the clock rate (see Mittal, col. 5,
ll. 1-3). Because Mittal discloses a microprocessor and/or functional unit
that has certain relevant digital design characteristics that are designed to
be revocably modifiable at the direction of a client, such as power
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consumption, we find the weight of the evidence supports the Examiner’s
position that Mittal discloses “reconfiguring said reconfigurable circuit by
altering a power characteristic applied to at least a portion thereof …,” as
claimed (claim 28).
Furthermore, we note that Appellant acknowledges in the
Specification that “power consumption in a digital circuit is directly related
to the frequency of switching of its internal nodes.” (Specification 17,
¶ 0031). We find Mittal explicitly discloses dividing a system clock by two
to implement a reduced-power mode (col. 8, ll. 29-32, Fig. 2). Because the
frequency of switching transitions in clock-driven digital circuits (e.g., a
microprocessor) is a function of the clock frequency, we agree with the
Examiner that Mittal also discloses the recited step of “determining a
transition rate of at least one node located within said reconfigurable
circuit,” as claimed (claim 28). Specifically, we find the recited step of
“determining a transition rate …” broadly but reasonably reads on altering a
clock rate to save power, as disclosed by Mittal (col. 5, ll. 1-3; col. 8, ll. 29-
32, Fig. 2).
Because we find Mittal discloses all that is claimed, we conclude the
Examiner has met the burden of presenting a prima facie case of
anticipation. Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
representative claim 28 as being anticipated by Mittal.
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii), we have decided the appeal
with respect to the remaining claims in this group on the basis of the selected
claim alone. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
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independent claim 21 as being anticipated by Mittal for the same reasons
discussed supra with respect to representative claim 28.

Dependent claim 22
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22 as being
anticipated by Mittal.
Appellant argues that Mittal does not teach a switching counter
configured to determine the transition rate of the at least one node but
instead discloses an up/down counter that indicates the current utilization of
a monitored functional unit (col. 6, ll. 13-16) (Br. 11).
When we look to Appellant’s Specification for context, we find only a
single mention of the claimed “switching counter” described as an
incremental counter:
The output of the aggregator 220 is then read by a switching
counter or an incremental counter 230. A value of a stored
memory of the incremental counter 230 may then be increased
by a function of the output of the aggregator 220. An output of
incremental counter 230 is then utilized by the mode selection
circuit 257 as will be explained below. After a predetermined
interval, the value of the incremental counter 230 will then be
reset to the value of “zero” by the timing circuit 235 [emphasis
added].
(Specification 12, ¶ 0021).

We broadly but reasonably construe the recited “transition rate” as a
clock rate or frequency (or as a function of same). Because Mittal discloses
an incremental counter (i.e., an up/down counter that in one mode
increments its contents by one during each clock cycle, col. 6, ll. 12-25), we
agree with the Examiner that the language of the claim reads on the
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reference. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22
as being anticipated by Mittal.

Dependent claims 23 and 30
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claims 23 and 30 as
being anticipated by Mittal.
Appellant argues that Mittal does not disclose where altering the
power characteristic is performed by an action selected from the claimed
group (see claims 22 and 30). Instead, Appellant asserts that Mittal merely
teaches switching functional units between high-performance and low
performance states (see Mittal, col. 5, ll. 25-30) (Br. 12).
We disagree. We find Mittal expressly discloses removing power to
at least a portion of the reconfigurable circuit, as claimed (see Mittal, col. 5,
ll. 1-3, i.e., “reducing overall power consumption by reducing voltage and/or
clock rate”). Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
23 and 30 as being anticipated by Mittal.

Dependent claim 24
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 as being
anticipated by Mittal.
Appellant acknowledges that Mittal discloses incrementing and
decrementing a counter at each clock cycle based on the activity of a
functional unit (see Mittal, col. 6, ll. 13-19). However, Appellant argues that
Mittal does not disclose an edge detection circuit (Br. 12-13).
The Examiner disagrees. The Examiner argues that in order to detect
a voltage level change, some sort of edge detection circuitry must be used to
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detect voltage level changes in the signals associated with Mittal’s
functional unit [emphasis added]. Thus, the Examiner finds Mittal
[inherently] discloses at least one edge detection circuit configured to
determine a voltage change in the at least one node and also that the
transition rate is based on the voltage change (Answer 8, ¶ 1).
We note that “[i]n relying upon the theory of inherency, the Examiner
must provide a basis in fact and/or technical reasoning to reasonably support
the determination that the allegedly inherent characteristic necessarily flows
from the teachings of the applied prior art.” Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d
1461, 1464 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990) (emphasis in original). “[A]fter
the PTO establishes a prima facie case of anticipation based on inherency,
the burden shifts to appellant to ‘prove that the subject matter shown to be in
the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on.’” In re King, 801
F.2d 1324, 1327, 231 USPQ 136, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting In re
Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 229 (CCPA 1971)). See
also MPEP §§ 2112 (IV.), (V.).
This reasoning is applicable here. We find the Examiner has provided
a rationale in the Answer that reasonably supports the finding of inherent
anticipation. We see no response in the Reply Brief that specifically
addresses the Examiner’s finding that some sort of edge detection circuitry
must be used to detect voltage level changes in the signals associated with
Mittal’s functional unit (see Answer 8, ¶ 1). Therefore, we find Appellant
has not met the burden of proving that the subject matter shown to be in the
prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on by the Examiner.
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Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 as being
anticipated by Mittal for the reasons set forth in the Answer.

Dependent claim 25
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25 as being
anticipated by Mittal.
Appellant argues that Mittal does not teach a timing counter
configured to track a period of operation of a reconfigurable circuit and a
switching counter configured to employ the period of operation to determine
a transition rate (Br. 13).
The Examiner disagrees. The Examiner argues that Mittal discloses a
switching counter (i.e., an up/down counter) configured to determine a
transition rate. The Examiner further argues that a “timing counter must be
used to keep track of the period of time.” (Answer 8, last paragraph).
We find Mittal discloses an up/down counter that, in one embodiment,
increments its contents by one during each clock cycle (i.e., switching
cycle), as discussed supra (see also Mittal, col. 6, ll. 12-19). With respect to
the recited timing counter, we again find the Examiner has provided a
rationale in the Answer that reasonably supports the finding of inherent
anticipation. We find nothing in the Reply Brief that specifically addresses
the Examiner’s finding that a timing counter must be used to keep track of
the period of time.” (See Answer 8, emphasis added). Therefore, we again
find Appellant has not met the burden of proving that the subject matter
shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on by
the Examiner. Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
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claim 25 as being anticipated by Mittal for the same reasons set forth in the
Answer.
Dependent claim 29
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 29 as being
anticipated by Mittal.
Appellant notes that claim 29 additionally requires the determining
step of claim 28 (from which claim 29 depends) to include aggregating a
number of switching transitions associated with the node. Appellant argues
that it cannot be found where Mittal determines a number of switching
transitions associated with a node (Br. 14).
In response, we note again that the frequency of switching transitions
in clock-driven digital circuits (e.g., a microprocessor) is determined by the
clock frequency (or a function of the clock frequency). Mittal explicitly
discloses dividing a system clock by two to implement a reduced-power
mode (col. 8, ll. 29-32, Fig. 2). Therefore, we find Mittal discloses the
argued feature of determining a number of switching transitions associated
with a node (i.e., by altering the clock frequency).
We further find the argued feature of determining a number of
switching transitions associated with a node is met by Mittal’s up/down
counter that, in one embodiment, increments its contents by one during each
clock cycle (i.e., switching cycle or switching transition) that the functional
unit (i.e., node) is active, as discussed supra (see also Mittal, col. 6, ll. 12-
19). Thus, we agree that Mittal’s counter determines the number of
switching transitions by counting. We find the counter value represents the
aggregate number of switching transitions. Therefore, we agree with the
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Examiner that Mittal discloses the recited limitation of “aggregating a
number of switching transitions associated with said node.” (Claim 29).
Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 29 as being
anticipated by Mittal for essentially the same reasons argued by the
Examiner in the Answer.

Dependent claim 31
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 31 as being
anticipated by Mittal.
Appellant notes that Claim 31 additionally requires that the step of
“determining a transition rate” (as recited in claim 28) is based on a number
of voltage changes in the at least one node. Appellant argues that Mittal
does not disclose determining the transition rate based on a number of
voltage changes in the at least one node because Appellant does not see
where Mittal discloses determining a transition rate of a least one node
(Br. 14).
We disagree. We note that we have found supra that Mittal discloses
determining a transition rate of a least one node (see discussion of claims 21
and 28 supra). Specifically, we have found that the recited step of
“determining a transition rate …” broadly but reasonably reads on altering a
clock rate to save power, as disclosed by Mittal (col. 5, ll. 1-3; col. 8, ll. 29-
32, Fig. 2). Because a digital clock signal transitions or switches from a low
or zero voltage potential to a higher voltage potential at a rate that
corresponds to the determined clock frequency, we find Mittal discloses all
that is claimed. Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
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claim 31 as being anticipated by Mittal for essentially the same reasons
argued by the Examiner in the Answer.

Dependent claim 32
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 32 as being
anticipated by Mittal.
Appellant argues that claim 32 additionally requires tracking a period
of operation of the reconfigurable circuit and employing the period of
operation when determining the transition rate. Appellant again contends
that because Mittal does not teach determining the transition rate of at least
one node that it follows that Mittal does not teach tracking a period of
operation of the reconfigurable circuit and employing the period
of operation when determining the transition rate (Br. 15).
We disagree. We have found supra that Mittal discloses determining
the transition rate of at least one node (see discussion of claim 31).
Furthermore, we find Mittal discloses tracking a period of operation of the
reconfigurable circuit (i.e., functional circuit) and employing the period of
operation when determining the transition rate (see Mittal’s up/down counter
and associated activity-level functions, where, in one embodiment, the
activity monitor enforces a maximum sustainable duty cycle of fifty percent,
col. 6, ll. 30-32, and associated discussion col. 6, ll. 13-49). Therefore, we
find the weight of the evidence supports the Examiner’s position.
Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 32 as being
anticipated by Mittal.

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Independent claim 34
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 34 as
being unpatentable over Mittal.
Appellant asserts that Mittal does not teach reconfiguring a
reconfigurable circuit by altering a power characteristic applied to at least a
portion thereof based on a comparison between a transition rate and a
predetermined operating range. More specifically, Appellant argues that
Mittal does not teach reconfiguring a reconfigurable circuit since Mittal
teaches reducing power consumption of a circuit by throttling the
performance of the circuit. (See Mittal, col. 4, lines 19-28). Thus, Appellant
concludes that Mittal provides no motivation to one skilled in the art to
dynamically control the power utilization of a circuit by reconfiguring the
circuit (Br. 15-16).
The Examiner disagrees. The Examiner essentially restates the
arguments previously made with respect to independent claims 21 and 28
(Answer 11).
We note that the initial burden of establishing unpatentability, on any
ground, rests with the Examiner. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24
USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “If that burden is met, the burden of
coming forward with evidence or argument shifts to the applicant. After
evidence or argument is submitted by applicant in response, patentability is
determined on the totality of the record by preponderance of evidence with
due consideration to persuasiveness of argument.” Id. at 1445, 24 USPQ2d
at 1444.
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We have found supra that Mittal discloses reconfiguring a
reconfigurable circuit (see discussion of claims 21 and 28). We further find
that Mittal discloses dynamically controlling the power utilization of a
circuit by reconfiguring the circuit since Mittal explicitly discloses dividing
a system clock by two to implement a reduced-power mode (col. 8, ll. 29-32,
Fig. 2). Thus, we find Mittal teaches altering a power characteristic based
on a comparison between a transition rate (i.e., clock rate or frequency) and
a predetermined operating range (e.g., a 1x clock frequency vs. a divide-by-
two clock frequency).
With respect to the issue of motivation, the Examiner has
acknowledged that Mittal does not disclose the reconfigurable circuit
comprises a monitored circuit with a delay element and a multiplier (see
Answer 5-6). The Examiner asserts in the Answer that it would have been
obvious to an artisan to combine such well known elements (i.e., a delay
element and a multiplier) with the teachings of Mittal (id.).
After carefully reviewing the evidence before us, we find Appellant
has failed to traverse the Examiner’s conclusion that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would have been motivated to combine a delay element and a
multiplier with the teachings of Mittal (id.). Thus, we find Appellant has not
met the burden of coming forward with evidence or argument to rebut the
Examiner’s legal conclusion of obviousness. Because we find the Examiner
has met the burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness, we will
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 34 as being
unpatentable over Mittal.

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Dependent claims 37 and 38
We will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 37 as being
unpatentable over Mittal for the same reasons discussed supra with respect
to claim 23. Likewise, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 38
as being unpatentable over Mittal for the same reasons discussed supra with
respect to claim 24.

Dependent claims 26, 27, 35, 36, 39, and 40
Lastly, we consider the Examiner’s rejection of claims 26, 27, 35, 36,
39, and 40 as being unpatentable over Mittal.
We have considered each of dependent claims 26, 27, 35, 36, 39, and
40, as separately argued by Appellant. With respect to each of claims 26,
27, 35, 36, 39, and 40, we find Appellant has: (1) recited the language of the
claim, (2) asserted that the limitations are not taught or suggested by Mittal,
and, then, (3) failed to respond to the specifics of the Examiner’s rejection
(i.e., we find Appellant has failed to traverse the Examiner’s finding that
combining certain well known elements with Mittal would have been
obvious).
For example, with respect to dependent claims 26 and 39, Appellant
states that both these claims require that the mode selection circuit include a
sample and hold circuit coupled to two voltage comparators. Appellant then
merely asserts that Mittal does not teach or suggest these limitations (See Br
16). We note that the Examiner does not rely on Mittal for the teaching of a
sample and hold circuit coupled to two voltage comparators (See Answer 11,
¶ 3). Instead, the Examiner, as finder of fact, has determined that sample
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and hold circuits and voltage comparators are such well known elements that
it would have been obvious to an artisan to combine such well known
elements with the teachings of Mittal as a way of implementing Mittal’s
mode selection circuitry. Thus, we find Appellant has failed to traverse the
Examiner’s rejection (i.e., the Examiner’s legal conclusion of obviousness)
by explaining why the Examiner erred.
Because Appellant repeats this same pattern of argument for each of
dependent claims 26, 27, 35, 36, 39, and 40, we find in each case the
Examiner’s argument directed to obviousness has not been challenged by
Appellant. Thus, we find Appellant has not met the burden of coming
forward with evidence or argument to rebut the Examiner’s legal conclusion
of obviousness. We note that arguments which Appellant could have made
but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are
deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004). See also In
re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1368, 69 USPQ2d 1453, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
We further find Appellant has failed to comply with the requirements
of 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b) by merely reciting the language of the claim and
asserting that such language is not taught by the reference. We note that a
statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be
considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004). Therefore, after carefully considering the
totality of the record by preponderance of evidence with due consideration to
persuasiveness of argument, we find Appellant has not shown error in the
Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness. Accordingly, we will sustain
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the Examiner’s rejection of claims 26, 27, 35, 36, 39, and 40 as being
unpatentable over Mittal.

DECISION
We have sustained the Examiner’s rejection of all claims on appeal.
Therefore, the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 21-40 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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