Ex Parte Kaufholz

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jul 31, 2008

09928553 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 31, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
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Ex parte PAUL AUGUSTINUS PETER KAUFHOLZ
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Appeal 2008-1378
Application 09/928,5531
Technology Center 2600
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Decided: July 31, 2008
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Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, SCOTT R. BOALICK, and
KEVIN F. TURNER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BOALICK, Administrative Patent Judge.

1 Application filed August 13, 2001. The real party in interest is
Koninklijke Philips N.V.
Appeal 2008-1378
Application 09/928,553

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1-17, all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's invention relates to "a method for operating a multi-device
system, wherein echo canceling has been designed on the level of the
various devices, but is operative on the level of the comprehensive system."
(Spec. 1:20-22.)

Claim 1 is exemplary:
1. A method for operating a user-interactive,
multi-device, audio-video system that contains user speech
recognizing facilities and echo canceling facilities for avoiding
the recognizing of speech output from the system as user
speech, the method comprising:

in the presence of a plurality of devices, each including a
functionally separate speech recognizing facility, and echo
canceling facility, driving each echo canceling facility to
combine each facility's functional ability for canceling one or
more mutually unique cancelable speech entities, and
combining such cancelled entities for overall non-recognition
by the system.

The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Knittle U.S. 5,761,638 Jun. 2, 1998
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Finn U.S. 6,505,057 B1 Jan. 7, 2003
(filed Jan. 23, 1998)
Stammler U.S. 6,839,670 B1 Jan. 4, 2005
(filed Sep. 9, 1996)

Claims 1, 5-8, and 12-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over Finn and Stammler.
Claims 2-4 and 9-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over Finn, Stammler, and Knittle.

Rather than repeat the arguments of Appellant or the Examiner, we
make reference to the Brief and the Answer for their respective details.
Only those arguments actually made by Appellant have been considered in
this decision. Arguments that Appellant did not make in the Brief have not
been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).2

ISSUE
The issue is whether Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). The issue turns on whether
Finn and Stammler teach or suggest "driving each echo canceling facility to
combine each facility's functional ability for canceling one or more mutually

2 Except as will be noted in this opinion, Appellant has not presented any
substantive arguments directed separately to the patentability of the
dependent claims or related claims in each group. In the absence of a
separate argument with respect to those claims, they stand or fall with the
representative independent claim. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
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unique cancelable speech entities, and combining such cancelled entities for
overall non-recognition by the system."

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
All timely filed evidence and properly presented arguments are
considered by the Board in resolving an obviousness issue on appeal. See In
re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
In the examination of a patent application, the Examiner bears the
initial burden of showing a prima facie case of unpatentability. Id. at 1472.
When that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the Applicant to rebut.
Id.; see also In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding
rebuttal evidence unpersuasive). If the Applicant produces rebuttal evidence
of adequate weight, the prima facie case of unpatentability is dissipated. In
re Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472. Thereafter, patentability is determined in
view of the entire record. Id. However, on appeal to the Board it is the
Appellant's burden to establish that the Examiner did not sustain the
necessary burden and to show that the Examiner erred. See In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("On appeal to the Board, an applicant can
overcome a rejection [for obviousness] by showing insufficient evidence of
prima facie obviousness or by rebutting the prima facie case with evidence
of secondary indicia of nonobviousness.") (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
"Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when 'the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
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subject matter pertains.'" KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727,
1734 (2007). In KSR, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[t]he combination
of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious
when it does no more than yield predictable results." Id. at 1739. The Court
explained:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill.
Id. at 1740. The Court also explained that:
[o]ften, it will be necessary . . . to look to interrelated teachings
of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design
community or present in the marketplace; and the background
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the
art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent
reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed
by the patent at issue.
Id. at 1740-41.
"[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness." In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. "To facilitate review, this
analysis should be made explicit." KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741. However, "the
analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject
matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences
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and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ."
Id.
The Supreme Court noted that "[u]nder the correct analysis, any need
or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in
the manner claimed." Id. at 1742 The Court also noted that "[c]ommon
sense teaches . . . that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their
primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able
to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle." Id.
"A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton." Id.
During examination of a patent application, a claim is given its
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In re
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969). "[T]he words of a claim 'are
generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.'" Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal citations
omitted). The "ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the
patent application." Id. at 1313.

ANALYSIS
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-17 as
being obvious. Reviewing the record before us, we do not agree. In
particular, we find that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner failed
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to make a prima facie showing of obviousness with respect to claims 1-17.
Appellant fails to meet the burden of overcoming that prima facie showing.
Regarding claim 1, Appellant argues that Finn does not teach or
suggest "driving each echo canceling facility to combine each facility's
functional ability for canceling one or more mutually unique cancelable
speech entities, and combining such cancelled entities for overall
non-recognition by the system," as claimed. (Br. 5-7.) We do not agree.
Appellant's argument amounts to an attack on the references
individually. But it is well settled that "[o]ne cannot show non-obviousness
by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on
combinations of references." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
The test of obviousness is what the "combined teachings would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." Id.
As the Examiner correctly found, under a broad but reasonable
interpretation of the claim consistent with the Specification, the combined
teachings of Finn and Stammler meet the limitation of "driving each echo
canceling facility to combine each facility's functional ability for canceling
one or more mutually unique cancelable speech entities, and combining such
cancelled entities for overall non-recognition by the system." (Ans. 4-9;
Final Office Action 5-6.) In particular, Finn teaches a method and system
where multiple devices (microphones 20, 22, 38, 40) each include an
individual automatic echo canceling (AEC) facility that uses an echo
cancellation summer (162A, 162B, 172A, 172B) to produce an echo
cancelled signal (170A, 170B, 170C, 170D) by subtracting echo cancellation
signals produced by adaptive acoustic echo cancellers (AEC11,11, AEC12,11,
AEC12,12, AEC11,12, AEC21,21, AEC22,21, AEC22,22, AEC21,22 -- which use
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signals from loudspeakers 24, 26, 42, and 44 as input) from the signals
produced by the microphones (20, 22, 38, 40). (Ans. 4-6; Final Office
Action 5-6; Finn Fig. 9A, col. 15, l. 61 to col. 18, l. 6.) Finn also teaches
that the system may further include a noise reduction filter (182A, 182B,
182C, 182D) to remove background noise from the echo cancelled signal of
each microphone. (Finn Fig. 9B; col. 19, ll. 16-39.) The echo cancelled
signals of the microphones are combined (by a telephone steering switch
80A) to create an overall echo-cancelled input that is forwarded to a cellular
telephone (58). (Ans. 4-6; Final Office Action 5-6; Finn Figs. 9A & 9B,
col. 18, ll. 7-16, col. 20, ll. 12-25.)
As the Examiner also correctly found, Finn discloses the desirability
of implementing its echo canceling method and system in a vehicle speech
recognition system but does not explicitly disclose a speech recognizing
facility used with the echo cancellation facility. (Ans. 5, 7, 9; Final Office
Action 5; Finn col. 3, ll. 17-23.) We further agree with the Examiner that
Stammler discloses the use of a speech recognition facility with an echo
cancellation facility. (Ans. 5, 7, 9; Final Office Action 5; Stammler col. 1,
l. 56 to col. 4, l. 39, col. 6, ll. 40-47, col. 7, ll. 25-48, col. 8, ll. 18-19, col. 9,
ll. 34-37, Figs. 1, 2.) An embodiment of Stammler teaches that a speech
dialog system in a motor vehicle may be used for multiple functions, such as
operating various devices (phone, radio, navigation system, heating system,
etc.). (Stammler col. 19, l. 22 to col. 20, l. 20.) Stammler suggests that each
individual device may have its own speech dialog system by teaching that
"[i]t is furthermore possible that with the aid of one or several interfaces:
. . . the individual devices to be selected do not respectively comprise their
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own speech dialog system, but are serviced by a single (joint) speech dialog
system." (Stammler col. 20, ll. 35-36, 54-56.)
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combined teachings of
Finn and Stammler fully meet the claimed limitation of "driving each echo
canceling facility to combine each facility's functional ability for canceling
one or more mutually unique cancelable speech entities, and combining such
cancelled entities for overall non-recognition by the system."
Appellant does not argue that the Examiner erred in finding that
Stammler teaches a speech recognizing facility used with an echo canceling
facility. However, Appellant argues that the Examiner has not provided a
proper motivation to combine the teachings of Finn and Stammler and has
relied upon improper hindsight reasoning. (Br. 7-8.) We do not agree.
Instead, the Examiner articulated a reason with rational underpinnings
for combining the teachings of Finn and Stammler. (Ans. 5-6, 9-10; Final
Office Action 5-6.) We agree with the Examiner that the teachings of
Stammler that speech recognizers enable convenient, hands-free device
control and the teachings of Finn that its echo cancellation system could
improve speech recognition performance would provide a reason for one of
ordinary skill in the art to have combined the teachings of Finn and
Stammler. (Ans. 6, 10; Final Office Action 6; Stammler col. 2, ll. 19-23;
Finn col. 3, ll. 17-23.) We find no improper use of hindsight reasoning in
the rationale articulated by the Examiner.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Dependent
claims 5-7 were not argued separately, and fall together with claim 1 from
which they depend. Independent claim 8 was argued on the same basis as
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independent claim 1 (Br. 6), and we find that Appellant has failed to show
error in the rejection of claim 8 for the same reasons discussed with respect
to claim 1. Dependent claims 12-14 were not argued separately, and fall
together with claim 8 from which they depend.
Regarding claim 15, Appellant argues that the Examiner has failed to
cite where the applied art teaches or suggests a "speech input/output means
interposed between said speech recognizing and echo canceling facilities, for
intercoupling another speech-enhanced device," as claimed. (Br. 7.) We do
not agree.
Instead, we find that the Examiner has articulated where Finn and
Stammler teach the limitations of claim 15. (Ans. 6-7, 9-10; Final Office
Action 5-6.) Moreover, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 6-7, 9-10; Final
Office Action 5-6) that the teachings of Finn and Stammler discussed above
with respect to the "combining such cancelled entities for overall non-
recognition by the system" limitation of claim 1 also satisfy the "speech
input/output means . . . for intercoupling another speech-enhanced device"
limitation of claim 15.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 16
and 17 were not argued separately, and fall together with independent claim
15 from which they depend.
Regarding the obviousness rejection of claims 2-4 and 9-11, Appellant
summarily alleges that "because the independent claims [1 and 8] are
patentable, the noted dependent claims [i.e., 2-4 and 9-11] are also
patentable at least because of their dependence thereon." (Br. 9.) Because
Appellant has not provided any arguments regarding Knittle, nor any
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additional arguments for claims 2-4 and 9-11, we will sustain the rejection
for the reasons discussed with respect to independent claims 1 and 8, from
which claims 2-4 and 9-11 depend.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
We conclude that Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1-17 for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

DECISION
The rejection of claims 1-17 for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
affirmed.

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

tdl/gw

PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
P.O. BOX 3001
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