Ex Parte Karaoguz et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 30, 2012

10675843 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte JEYHAN KARAOGUZ and JAMES BENNETT

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Appeal 2010-001823
Application 10/675,843
Technology Center 2400
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Before: JOSEPH L. DIXON, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
CARLA M. KRIVAK, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims
1-5, 7-16, 18-27, and 29-34 (App. Br. 2). We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
The claims are directed to automatically routing media through a
distributed media network. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method for communicating information in a
distributed media network, the method comprising:

automatically transferring one or more of media, data
and/or service to a first view of one or both of a first media
processing system and/or a first personal computer within the
distributed media network, wherein said automatic transfer is
controlled by utilizing at least a first rule hosted by said one or
both of said first media processing system and/or said first
personal computer; and

automatically routing said automatically transferred one
or more of media, data and/or service from said first view of
said one or both of said first media processing system and/or
said first personal computer to a second view of one or both of
a second media processing system and/or a second personal
computer, wherein said first and second views comprise one or
more of a device view, a media view, and/or a channel view.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Fritsch
Saxena
US 2002/0124258 A1
US 2004/0024886 A1
Sept. 5, 2002
Feb. 5, 2004
(filed June 26, 2002)
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REJECTION
Claims 1-5, 7-16, 18-27, and 29-34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C
§103(a) as being unpatentable over Fritsch and Saxena.

ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 2, 12, 13, 23, 24, and 34
Regarding representative claim 1, Appellants contend that Fritsch’s
media delivery center is a headend, in contrast to the claimed “first media
processing system and/or a first personal computer,” which Appellants assert
are client devices (App. Br. 7-8). Appellants also contend that Fritsch’s
transferring of media content to the media delivery center is not controlled
by any rule (App. Br. 8). Specifically, Appellants argue that Fritsch’s
subscription rules and security rules, upon which the Examiner relies to meet
the claimed “first rule,” relate to the transfer of data between Fritsch’s media
delivery center and the clients, not the transfer of media from the media
content source to the media delivery center (App. Br. 9). Appellants further
contend that Fritsch does not disclose transferring media “where the media is
in a first view at the first client device and then it is in a second view at a
second client device,” and that “Fritsch does not disclose displaying media
in any views.” (App. Br. 12). Specifically, Appellants argue that Fritsch’s
communicating media to subscribers via a particular channel “does not
designate a particular view that the media is transferred to at the client
device” (App. Br. 12-13). We disagree.
Appellants’ several arguments are not commensurate with the scope
of claim 1. First, claim 1 recites, in the alternative, “a first media processing
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system and/or a first personal computer,” and similarly, “a second media
processing system and/or a second personal computer,” (emphasis added),
and thus a media processing system alone satisfies the language of each of
these two clauses. Claim 1 does not specify that the “first media processing
system” and “second media processing system” be client devices, as
Appellants argue (App. Br. 7-8).
Second, claim 1 does not recite transferring media content to the first
media processing system according to a first rule, as Appellants argue (App.
Br. 8-9), but rather “transferring one or more of media . . . to a first view of
one or both of a first media processing system . . . utilizing at least a first
rule . . . .” (emphasis added). Accordingly, the claim does not necessarily
require transferring media to the first media processing system, but rather
“to a first view” of the system. In other words, claim 1 does not preclude
transferring media already existing on the first media processing system to
the first view.
Further, claim 1 does not require actually displaying media in any
views, as Appellants argue (App. Br. 12). We find that the claimed “first
view” and “second view” are data structures, according to Appellants’ use of
the term “view” in the Specification. For example, the Specification
describes that certain software “may also provide various views to a user of
a media processing system that may be displayed on a TV screen or monitor
of the MPS [media processing system] 101” (Spec. ¶34]) (emphasis added)
and that “[t]he MPS’s 101, 103 may each include a TV screen or monitor for
viewing a device view, a media view, a channel view, and various sub menus
of each” (Spec. ¶ 38]) (emphasis added). Thus, we broadly, but reasonably
interpret a “view” as a thing upon which a displaying or viewing action
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operates. Claim 1 does not recite actually displaying or viewing the claimed
“first view” and “second view.” Therefore, Appellants’ arguments discussed
above are not persuasive.
Nevertheless, we address the limitations of claim 1. We agree with
the Examiner and find that Fritsch discloses “automatically transferring one
or more of media . . . to a first view of one or both of a first media
processing system . . . wherein said automatic transfer is controlled by
utilizing at least a first rule hosted by said one or both of said first media
processing system . . . ” (claim 1). Specifically, Fritsch discloses: “[T]he
media delivery center 202 operates to receive the different types of
broadcasts and to formulate them into digital content data that is
subsequently broadcasted (e.g., streamed) as scheduled or as demand to
various clients.” (Fritsch, ¶ 0031]). This process is performed, in one
embodiment, as follows:
The media delivery center 300 receives media program content
302 from a source or content provider or from a media storage
device (FIG. 4). The media program content 302 is encrypted
by an encryption unit 304, unless already encrypted. Next, a
protocol conversion unit 306 converts the media program
content from its incoming broadcast format into a packet
format. This process can be referred to as packetization. In one
embodiment, the protocol conversion unit 306 is an IP stack.
The resulting packets are then coupled to a network 308 (e.g.,
IP network 212 or Internet 210) by a network interface 310 and
a multicast delivery unit 312. The multicast delivery unit 312
receives the packets for the media program content from the
protocol conversion unit 306, and produces a multicast stream
of the resulting packets that are provided to the network
interface 310 via a multicast link 313.

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(Fritsch, ¶ 0033]). Claim 1 does not specifically define the “first rule,” and
thus it can be reasonably interpreted as any rule for controlling an aspect of
the transfer of media to the first view. Accordingly, we see no error in the
Examiner’s reliance (see Ans. 3, 6-7) on Fritsch’s paragraph 0033],
partially cited above, for this feature. In particular, we find that both
Fritsch’s encryption and protocol conversion of media program content into
digital content data for transmission in a multicast stream meets the
limitation of “automatically transferring one or more of media . . . to a first
view of one or both of a first media processing system . . . wherein said
automatic transfer is controlled by utilizing at least a first rule hosted by said
one or both of said first media processing system,” as recited in claim 1.
Appellants’ Reply Brief arguments that Fritsch’s alleged rules do not
control “automatic” transfer of media content, and that they are not “hosted”
by Fritsch’s media delivery center (see Reply Br. 4-5), are not persuasive.
As Fritsch’s Figure 3A shows, the encryption unit 304 and protocol
conversion unit 306 are located in the media delivery center 300. Therefore,
the encryption standards and protocols implemented by those units are
“hosted” by the media delivery center. Further, in the above cited portion
Fritsch discloses that the “media delivery center 300 receives media program
content 302 from a source or content provider or from a media storage
device (FIG. 4)” and then encrypts and converts the content, as cited above
(Fritsch, ¶ 0033]). This process is “automatic” because it happens upon
receipt of media program content, and Fritsch does not disclose any required
manual intervention for the media delivery center to perform the encryption
and conversion of received media program content to digital content data
ready for transmission.
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We also agree with the Examiner and find that Fritsch discloses
“automatically routing said automatically transferred one or more of media
. . . from said first view . . . to a second view of one or both of a second
media process system . . .” (claim 1). Specifically, Fritsch discloses:
The multicast delivery unit 312 receives the packets for the
media program content from the protocol conversion unit 306,
and produces a multicast stream of the resulting packets that are
provided to the network interface 310 via a multicast link 313.
The multicast stream carries the resulting packets to a plurality
of the subscribers that tune their client machine to a particular
channel carrying the media program (or subscribers that
otherwise desire to receive the multicast stream).

(Fritsch, ¶ 0033]). Claim 1 defines the first and second views as including
“a channel view.” Claim 1 does not, however, specifically define a “channel
view.” Accordingly, we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance (see Ans. 3-
4) on Fritsch’s transmitting a multicast stream to a “particular channel” of a
client device for meeting the limitation of routing media to a second view.
We are therefore not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
independent claim 1, and independent claims 12 and 23 not separately
argued. Although Appellants group dependent claims 2, 13, 24, and 34
separately, Appellants rely on the arguments presented for claim 1, which
are not persuasive for the reasons discussed above. The rejection of claims
2, 13, 24, and 34 are therefore also sustained.

Claims 3, 14, and 25
Appellants contend that “paragraph 0046 of Fritsch discloses a flow
diagram of how received data packets are processed when a pause has been
requested by a user. However, Fritsch, at the above citation, does not
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disclose the use of a rule that controls consumption of the transferred
media.” (App. Br. 15).
Fritsch discloses events that take place when a user, receiving either
unicast or multicast data packets, requests a pause (Fritsch, ¶ 0046]).
Appellants’ argument is not persuasive because it does not specifically
explain why these events that occur in response to a pause request do not
meet the limitation of a consumption rule.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 3, and claims 14 and 25 not separately argued.

Claims 4, 15, and 26
Appellants contend that “initiating a pause by the client machine 164
or 166 is not related to (and does not cause) scheduling of the consumption
of transferred media. In fact, Fritsch is silent and does not disclose any
scheduling of media consumption.” (App. Br. 16).
We disagree with Appellants on Fritsch’s alleged silence on
scheduling media consumption. Fritsch discloses that “the media delivery
center 202 operates to receive the different types of broadcasts and to
formulate them into digital content data that is subsequently broadcasted
(e.g., streamed) as scheduled or as demand to various clients.” (Fritsch,
¶ 0031]) (emphasis added). Appellants do not explain why Fritsch’s
streaming of digital content data to clients “as scheduled” fails to meet the
limitation of scheduling consumption.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 4, and claims 15 and 26 not separately argued.

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Claims 5, 16, and 27
Claim 5 depends from claim 3 and recites that “said at least a second
rule is a consumption rule.” This does not meaningfully limit claim 3, which
recites “controlling said consumption . . . utilizing at least a second rule.”
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 5,
and claims 16 and 27 not separately argued, for the same reason as claim 3
discussed above.

Claims 7, 18, and 29
Appellants contend that because Fritsch does not disclose “utilizing at
least a first rule,” as recited in claim 1, Fritsch does not disclose “pre-
defining said at least a first rule.” (App. Br. 18). However, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that Fritsch discloses “utilizing
at least a first rule,” for the reasons discussed above regarding claim 1.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 7, and claims 18 and 29 not separately argued.

Claims 8, 19, and 30
Claim 8 depends from claim 1 and recites that “said at least a first rule
is a transfer rule.” This does not meaningfully limit claim 1, which recites
“said automatic transfer is controlled by utilizing at least a first rule.”
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 8,
and claims 19 and 30 not separately argued, for the same reason as claim 1
discussed above.

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Claims 9, 20, and 31
Appellants contend that Fritsch does not disclose using a rule, as
discussed regarding claim 1 (App. Br. 21).
Fritsch discloses that “packets are provided in a multicast format for
efficient delivery to the plurality of subscribers. According to one
embodiment, the destination address (DA) can be expressed in standard
‘dotted-decimal’ notation for IP addresses, with multicast addresses ranging
from 224.0.0.0 to 239.255.255.255.” (Fritsch, ¶ 0033]). Appellants do not
specifically explain why Fritsch’s multicasting address scheme fails to
disclose “said automatic routing utilizing at least a third rule” (claim 9).
Thus, we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance (see Ans. 5) on Fritsch’s
paragraph 0033] for this feature.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 9, and claims 20 and 31 not separately argued.

Claims 10, 21, and 32
Appellants repeat the same arguments made regarding claim 9 (see
App. Br. 22-23). We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 10, and claims 21 and 32 not separately argued, for the same reason as
claim 9.

Claims 11, 22, and 33
Claim 11 depends from claim 9 and recites that “said at least a third
rule is a routing rule.” This does not meaningfully limit claim 9, which
recites “controlling said automatic routing utilizing at least a third rule.”
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim
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11, and claims 22 and 33 not separately argued, for the same reason as claim
9 discussed above.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-5, 7-16, 18-27, and
29-34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the rejection of claims 1-5, 7-16,
18-27, and 29-34.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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