Ex Parte Kannan et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 20, 201613404619 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2016) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/404,619 02/24/2012 Sudarsun Kannan 82916233 9003 56436 7590 12/22/2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise 3404 E. Harmony Road Mail Stop 79 Fort Collins, CO 80528 EXAMINER RUSSELL, ANDREW D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2136 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/22/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): hpe.ip.mail@hpe.com chris. mania @ hpe. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SUDARSUN KANNAN, DEJAN S. MILOJICIC, and VANISH TALWAR Appeal 2015-007588 Application 13/404,6191 Technology Center 2100 Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, and CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—20, which are the only claims pending. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 The real party in interest is identified as Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2015-007588 Application 13/404,619 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The invention relates to data processing, particularly post processing. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A computing node comprising: an active Non-Volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM) component comprising: memory to store data chunks received from a processor core, said data chunks comprising metadata indicating a type of post processing to be performed on data within said data chunks; and a sub-processor component to perform post-processing of said data chunks based on said metadata. App. Br. 24 (Claims Appendix). THE REJECTION Claims 1—15 and 16—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Neches (US 4,543,630; September 24, 1985) (“Neches”). Final Act. 7—10. ANALYSIS Appellants argue, inter alia, Neches does not disclose the claim 1 limitation an active Non-Volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM) component. App. Br. 9—11; Reply Br. 4—8. According to Appellants: Neches does not teach, suggest or even mention a Non-Volatile Random Access Memory component as claimed. As should be evident from the term itself: non-volatile RAM refers to random access memory that, contrary to standard RAM, is non-volatile. The Action previously conceded this point as follows. “Neches does not appear to explicitly qualify RAM 26 as volatile, but the described operation of RAM 26 2 Appeal 2015-007588 Application 13/404,619 and the date of the disclosure may suggest that RAM 26 is volatile.” (Action, p. 3). Appellant agrees. There is nothing inNeches that teaches or suggests that RAM 26 is nonvolatile. There is nothing in Neches that teaches or suggests the claimed NVRAM component. The Action further stated that “Neches (e.g. at fig.l and 5:4-10) discloses an Access Module Processor (AMP) which includes a microprocessor and RAM 26 to control nonvolatile disk storage. The AMP is therefore an active NVRAM component.” (Action, p. 3). This goes beyond the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. Just because RAM is involved in controlling a non-volatile disk drive does not transform that disk into non-volatile RAM. One of skill in the art would never refer to a disk drive controlled by a microprocessor with RAM as a nonvolatile RAM component. The disk drive is not volatile, but is not RAM. The RAM is RAM, but is volatile. Thus, there is no non-volatile RAM component in Neches. The Answer addresses this argument as follows. “Appellant(s) argue that Neches does not teach an active Non-Volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM) component, because the Access Module Processor (AMP) taught by Neches does not include non-volatile memory.” (Answer, p. 5). This is not entirely accurate. Appellant's point is simply that Neches never teaches or suggests that the AMP includes NVRAM, and the disk drive controlled by the AMP cannot reasonably be considered to be NVRAM. The Answer further argues that “[a] broad reasonable interpretation of the limitation 'memory to store data chunks' would include both volatile and non-volatile memory, even as the component is an active component for managing non-volatile random access memory such as conventional hard disk storage.” (Answer, p. 5). This argument is entirely beside the point. Claim 1 does not simply recite “memory to store data chunks.” Claim 1 recites “an active Non-Volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM) component comprising: memory to store data chunks.” Thus, to anticipate claim 1, Neches must teach the claimed NVRAM component, which Neches simply does not. Reply Br. 4—5. 3 Appeal 2015-007588 Application 13/404,619 We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because the Examiner’s findings are insufficient to establish anticipation. A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claims is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art reference, and arranged as required by the claim. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We note that the Board is a reviewing body and not a place of initial examination. Moreover, it is our view that the rigorous requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 essentially require a one-for-one mapping of each argued limitation to the corresponding portion of the reference, which the Examiner must identify with particularity. Here, in that the Examiner’s anticipation rejection is not well supported by the express disclosure of the Neches reference and relies on conjecture, such conjecture would require us to resort to speculation and unfounded assumptions. We will not resort to such speculation or assumptions to cure the deficiencies in the factual basis in order to support the Examiner’s anticipation rejection. In view of the above, we cannot sustain the rejection of independent claim 1, and independent claims 8 and 15 which recite the disputed limitation. We also do not sustain the rejection of claims 2—7, 9-14, and 16— 20 which depend from independent claims 1, 8, or 15. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[Djependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious . . .”). Because our decision with regard to the disputed limitation is dispositive of the rejection of all pending claims, we do not address additional arguments raised by Appellants. 4 Appeal 2015-007588 Application 13/404,619 DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). REVERSED 5 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation