Ex Parte Kang

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 28, 2017

13347520 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/347,520 01/10/2012 Taehyen Kang 252361-1 (GEIS:0002) 9767
82438 7590 02/28/2017
(TR Power Rr Water
EXAMINER
Fletcher Yoder PC COOK, BRIAN S
P.O. Box 692289
Houston, TX 77269-2289 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2123
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/28/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TAEHYEN KANG
Appeal 2016-002499
Application 13/347,5201
Technology Center 2100
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and SCOTT E. BAIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—20, which constitute all claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as General Electric Company.
App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2016-002499
Application 13/347,520
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Claimed Invention
The claimed invention relates to modeling electric vehicles in an
electrical network and, specifically, optimizing the charging and discharging
schedules for such vehicles. Spec. Tflf 1, 13. Claims 1, 12, and 18 are
independent. Claims 1 and 18 are illustrative of the invention and the
subject matter of the appeal, and read as follows (with the disputed
limitations emphasized):
1. A device, comprising:
a processor configured to execute one or more instructions
stored in a memory to:
receive an electrical vehicle (EV) location profile
comprising information regarding movement of an EV between
a first and a second charging location of an electrical network;
and
apply an EV mobility model to the EV location profile to
concurrently determine a first optimized schedule for the EV to
charge or discharge a storage cell of the EV at the first charging
location during a scheduling period and a second optimized
schedule for the EV to charge or discharge a storage cell of the
EV at the second charging location during the scheduling period,
wherein the EV mobility model comprises constraints that
describe interactions of the EV with the electrical network,
wherein the processor is disposed external to the EV.
18. A charging station device at a location, comprising:
a charging interface configured to physically couple an
electrical vehicle (EV) to an electrical grid via the charging
station device to allow power to pass between the electrical
vehicle and the electrical grid via the charging station device,
wherein the charging station device is co-located with the EV at
the location and is external to the EV;
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Application 13/347,520
a network interface configured to receive a schedule for
the electrical grid to supply power to or receive power from a
storage cell of the EV when it is coupled to the charging
interface, wherein the schedule is generated by applying an EV
mobility model to an EV location profile, and wherein the
schedule minimizes power costs, power transmission losses, or
both, in the electrical grid; and
a processor configured to use the schedule to instruct the
charging interface when to supply power to or receive power
from the storage cell of the EV during a power transfer between
the storage cell of the EV and the electrical grid.
App. Br. 18 (Claims App.).
The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 18—20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
anticipated Kempton (US 2011/0202217 Al; publ. Aug. 18, 2011). Final
Act. 12-23.
Claims 1—3, 7—14, and 17 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kempton, Abdolreza Karbassi &
Matthew Barth, Vehicle Route Prediction and Time of Arrival
Estimation Techniques for Improved Transportation System
Management, IEEE, 511—16 (2003) (“Karbassi”), and Agassi et al. (US
2011/0071932 Al; publ. Mar. 24, 2011) (“Agassi”). Final Act. 2U-61.
Claims 4—6, 15, and 16 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kempton, Karbassi, Agassi, and Willett
Kempton & Jasna Tomic, Vehicle-to-Grid power fundamentals: Calculating
capacity and net revenue, 144 Journal of Power Sources, 268—79 (Apr. 11,
2005) (“V2G”). Final Act. 61-69.
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Appeal 2016-002499
Application 13/347,520
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments which Appellant could have
made but did not make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41,37(c)(l)(iv). On the record before us, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in
the rejections from which the appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer,
and provide the following for highlighting and emphasis.
Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
Appellant first argues the Examiner erred in rejecting independent
claim 18 as anticipated by Kempton, because Kempton does not disclose a
“charging [station] device that is co-located with the EV.” App. Br. 6—8
(emphasis omitted); Reply Br. 2-4. We disagree. As the Examiner finds,
Kempton discloses “electric vehicle station equipment (EVSE)” for
“interfacing an electric vehicle with the grid;” i.e., a charging station device.
Final Act. 3 (citing Kempton 17). Kempton further discloses the EVSE
may be deployed “at a garage, public parking space, curb, or other location
for automobile parking.” Kempton | 50 (emphasis added); Ans. 7.
Moreover, as the Examiner finds, Kempton discloses the EVSE and EV
must be co-located “in order for [their respective] interfaces ... to be
connected together.” Ans. 7; see also Kempton Figs. 2, 3 (block diagrams of
electric vehicle equipment (EVE) 102 and EVSE 104, respectively).
Accordingly, Appellant’s argument does not persuade us of error.2 * 4
2 Appellant’s attempt to distinguish a charging “device” from a charging
“system,” App. Br. 8, also does not demonstrate error, because as the
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Appeal 2016-002499
Application 13/347,520
Appellant further argues the Examiner erred in finding Kempton
discloses an interface configured to “physically couple an electrical vehicle
(EV) to an electrical grid via the charging station device,” as recited in claim
18. App. Br. 7. As the Examiner finds, however, the figures and
accompanying descriptions in Kempton disclose physical coupling, via the
power grid. Ans. 7. Figure 1, for example, is reproduced below.
---- 100 108
106
v
112b
V/}
Aggregation
Server
ELECTRIC
POWER
TRANSFER
SYSTEM
Electric Vehicle
Equipment
(EVE)
^ 102 110a
112cj f
GRID
110b
Electric Vehicle j
Station Equipment j
{EVSE} |
104 1
FIG. 1
Figure 1 depicts an “electric power transfer system” including an electric
vehicle (EVE 102), electric vehicle station equipment (EVSE) 104, an
aggregation server 106, and the electric grid 108. Kempton || 25—27. As
shown in Figure 1, “[tjhick connection lines” 110a and 110b “represent
electric power flow” from the grid through the EVSE to the electric vehicle.
Id. at 127; see also Ans. 7 (citing Kempton Figs. 2 and 3, which further
Examiner finds, Ans. 5—7, the charging system in Kempton includes a
charging “device.”
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Appeal 2016-002499
Application 13/347,520
describe the manner of coupling to the electrical grid). Accordingly, we
discern no error in the Examiner’s finding.
Finally, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Kempton
discloses an interface configured to receive a “schedule to instruct [power
supply/receive] during a power transfer between the storage cell of the EV
and the electrical grid,” wherein the “schedule minimizes power costs,
power transmission losses, or both, in the electrical grid.” App. Br. 7, 9
(emphasis added). We disagree. As the Examiner finds, Final Act. 15,
Kempton discloses a “predictive schedule” utilized to “determine the amount
of charge needed” between trips, and “when to reach that” amount.
Kempton H 84—85. The “scheduling software” may be hosted in any of a
variety of devices, and “can use the next trips predictions to plan the amount
of electrical capacity to be offered for grid services, at what times, and at
what location on the grid.” Id. 1 82; see also Ans. 7—8.3
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claim 18. Appellant does not argue dependent claims
19 and 20 separately. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 18—20
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Kempton.
3 Appellant’s argument that a “schedule” is different than “instructions” for
charging, App. Br. 9, is unpersuasive, because Kempton discloses a
“schedule” for charging. See supra. Moreover, Appellant’s Specification
equates a “schedule” with instructions for when to charge the vehicle. Spec.
115 (charging station may receive “instructions for charging and
discharging connected EVs 28 at particular times (e.g., a schedule for
charging and discharging the EVs 28 coupled to the charging station 26)”
(emphasis added)).
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Appeal 2016-002499
Application 13/347,520
Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellant argues claims 1—3, 7—14, and 17 as a group, App. Br. 10-
13, and we choose claim 1 as representative of the group. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding Agassi
teaches “concurrent generation (or concurrent determination) of a[n]
optimized schedule for an EV to charge or discharge a storage cell at both a
first and a second charging location during a common scheduling period.”
App. Br. 11 (emphasis omitted). We are not persuaded.
“[0]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where ... the rejections are based on combinations of
references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Here, the
Examiner relies not on Agassi, but on the combination of Agassi with
Kempton and Karbassi as teaching the disputed limitation. Ans. 16—18.
Specifically, as discussed above, Kempton discloses (and teaches) optimal
scheduling for charging and discharging based on projected travel schedule
and power distribution needs of the electrical grid. See id. at 17; Kempton
11 82—85. As the Examiner finds, Agassi teaches determining available
power stations in a geographic radius and making a “reservation” at a next
charging station. Ans. 16 (citing Agassi Figs. 3, 21,1151). We discern no
error in the Examiner’s finding that one of ordinary skill would understand
the cited combination as teaching “concurrent” determination of scheduling
at a first and second charging station during a particular “scheduling period,”
i.e., a period before which the battery is depleted. Ans. 17. Moreover,
Appellant does not argue or dispute the Examiner’s rationale for combining
the references, and we discern no error therein. See Final Act. 30, 37—38.
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Application 13/347,520
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1—3, 7—14, and 17
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kempton, Karbassi,
and Agassi.
Regarding the separate rejection of dependent claims 4—6, 15, and 16,
Appellant argues the claims are allowable based “upon their respective
dependencies from allowable independent claims 1 and 12.” App. Br. 13.
Because we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 to 12, see
supra, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive of error.4 Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claims 4—6, 15, and 16 under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kempton, Karbassi, Agassi, and V2G.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
4 Appellant also asserts that claims 4—6, 15, and 16 include additional
distinguishing “elements individually recited therein,” id., but does not
explain how the Examiner allegedly erred regarding such additional
elements. See In reLovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Rule
41.37 [requires] more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere
recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding
elements were not found in the prior art”).
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