Ex Parte Kandekar et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 21, 2015

12232805 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 21, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/232,805 09/24/2008 Kunal Kandekar CT-STR-006/US (P271) 2405
71739 7590 09/22/2015
Concert Technology Corporation
5400 Trinity Road, Suite 303
Raleigh, NC 27607
EXAMINER
LANGHNOJA, KUNAL N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2427
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/22/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KUNAL KANDEKAR, RICHARD J. WALSH, and
RAVI REDDY KATPELLY
____________

Appeal 2013-007913
Application 12/232,805
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before LINZY T. McCARTNEY, JESSICA C. KAISER, and
KAMRAN JIVANI, Administrative Patent Judges.

KAISER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–9, 11–22, and 24–33, all of the claims pending
in the application.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Porto Technology,
LLC. (Br. 3.)
2 Appellants mistakenly include claims 10 and 23 in the Claims Appendix of
the Appeal Brief (Br. 15, 17), but Appellants have withdrawn those claims.
(See Dec. 12, 2011 Resp. to Oct. 13, 2011 Final Act., pg. 8 (“Claims 10 and
23 were previously withdrawn.”).)
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EXEMPLARY CLAIMS
Claims 1, 12, and 33 are exemplary and are reproduced below:
1. A method of smart trick mode display, comprising:
providing playback of a media item in a trick play mode;
analyzing a content of the media item during the trick
mode playback of the media item;
identifying at least one segment of the content that is of
interest to a user, by analyzing at least a viewing history of a
person in a social network associated with the user; and
displaying the at least one segment that is identified as
being of interest to the user with emphasis to catch the user’s
attention during the trick mode playback of the media item.

12. A method of smart trick mode display, comprising:
providing playback of a media item in a trick play mode;
analyzing a content of the media item during the trick
mode playback of the media item;
identifying at least one segment of the content that is
objectionable to a user and therefore should not be displayed to
the user; and
avoiding the at least one segment that is identified as
being objectionable to the user during the trick play mode
playback of the media item.

33. A method of smart trick mode display, comprising:
providing playback of a media item in a trick play mode;
analyzing a content of the media item during the trick
mode playback of the media item;
identifying at least one segment of the content that is of
interest to a user; and
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displaying the at least one segment that is identified as
being of interest to the user with emphasis to catch the user’s
attention during the trick mode playback of the media item.

REJECTIONS
The Examiner has rejected claim 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
anticipated by Craner.3 (Final Act. 4–5.)
The Examiner has rejected claims 1–9, 11, 14–22, 24, 27, 29, 31, and
32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Craner and Jacoby.4
(Final Act. 5–9.)
The Examiner has rejected claims 12, 25, 28, and 30 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Craner and Stone.5 (Final Act. 9–10.)
The Examiner has rejected claims 13 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Craner, Stone, and Kweon.6 (Final Act. 10–11.)

ISSUES
The issues raised by Appellants’ arguments are:
Did the Examiner err in finding Craner discloses “content that is of
interest to a user,” as recited in claim 33?
Did the Examiner err in combining (a) Craner and Jacoby and (b)
Craner and Stone because those combinations would make Craner unsuitable
for its intended purpose?

3 Craner et al., US 2008/0155585 A1; published June 26, 2008.
4 Jacoby et al., US 2006/0271997 A1; published Nov. 30, 2006.
5 Stone, US 2006/0015895 A1; published Jan. 19, 2006.
6 Kweon, US 7,802,278 B2; issued Sept. 21, 2010.
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ANALYSIS
Claim 33
Appellants argue Craner does not disclose “content that is of interest
to a user” as recited in claim 33 because Craner’s substitute advertisements
are not of interest to a user. (Br. 9–11.) Specifically, Appellants argue “[n]o
one would consider the forced viewing of the advertisements absent input
from the user as ‘content of interest.’” (Id. at 10.)
The Examiner finds Craner’s substitute advertisements disclose the
disputed limitation. (Ans. 4–5 (citing Craner ¶¶ 63, 64, 69, 81, 82, Figs. 8–
11).) As the Examiner recognizes, Craner discloses that “substitute
advertisement media is provided while [a] user is skipping over an
advertisement(s),” and a “user is able to utilize an option provided . . . on [a]
display screen to view [the] entire advertisement from the beginning.” (Id.
at 4–5.) We agree with the Examiner. Specifically, Figure 9 of Craner
discloses that a user can select option 914 to view an advertisement. (See
also Craner ¶ 82.). We find that “content that is of interest to a user” under
the broadest reasonable interpretation encompasses an advertisement the
user selects to watch. In other words, Craner discloses “identifying at least
one segment of the content that is of interest to a user” (i.e., an
advertisement the user has selected) and displaying that segment of content.
(See Craner ¶¶ 81–82, Figs. 8–11.)
For the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner’s § 102(e)
rejection of independent claim 33.

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Claims 1–9, 11, 14–22, 24, 27, 29, 31, and 32
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in combining the teachings of
Craner and Jacoby in rejecting claims 1–9, 11, 14–22, 24, 27, 29, 31, and 32
because those references are “fundamental[ly] incompatib[le].” (Br. 11.)
Specifically, Appellants argue “Craner is designed to force individuals to
watch content they are trying to skip,” and thus, “looking at the content from
the viewing history of a person in a social network” as recited in the rejected
claims would make “Craner unsuitable for its intended purpose.” (Id.)
Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. The
Examiner finds the references can properly be combined because “the
advertisers seeking some of benefit of their dollars . . . would be interested in
‘viewing history of a person in a social network associated with the user’ . . .
because user is more likely to share same interests and view advertisements
as their friends/family than fast-forwarding it.” (Ans. 8 (citing Craner ¶ 3;
Jacoby ¶¶ 12, 65, 66).) We agree with the Examiner.
We also find there is no fundamental incompatibility between Craner
and Jacoby. Craner teaches displaying substitute media when a user is fast
forwarding through an advertisement. (See e.g., Craner ¶ 69.) Craner,
however, does not preclude selecting that substitute media based on user
information such as the viewing history of a person in a social network.
Indeed, Figures 8–11 of Craner show substitute media for different products
of Apple Inc. (e.g., an iPod) displayed in response to fast forwarding an
advertisement for Mac computers. (Craner ¶¶ 78–82, Figs. 8–11.)
Appellants have not persuasively explained why, consistent with Craner’s
teachings, an advertiser could not select substitute media (e.g., media related
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to a certain product or service) based on the viewing history of a person in a
social network.
For the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103
rejection of claims 1–9, 11, 14–22, 24, 27, 29, 31, and 32.

Claims 12, 13, 25, 26, 28, and 30
Appellants argue the Examiner errs in combining the teachings of
Craner and Stone in rejecting claims 12, 13, 25, 26, 28, and 30. (Br. 12–13.)
Claim 12 recites, in relevant part, “identifying at least one segment of the
content that is objectionable to a user” and avoiding that segment during
playback. Appellants again argue “the purpose of Craner is to force the
viewer to watch the advertisement that the viewer is trying to skip.” (Id. at
12.) Appellants reason “[a]llowing the user to skip that content is
fundamentally at odds with Craner’s teaching and purpose.” (Id.)
We find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive. The Examiner finds the
combination of Craner and Stone “would suggest substitute media being
displayed [as taught in Craner] while the portions of actual advertisement is
being fast-forwarded which was identified by the data set [as taught in
Stone]. Thus, both references serv[e their] intended purpose.” (Ans. 9.) We
agree with the Examiner.
We also disagree with Appellants that the purpose of Craner is to
force the user to watch the advertisement the user is trying to skip (Br. 12).
Instead, Craner displays substitute media while the user is fast forwarding
through an advertisement; the substitute media need not be the
advertisement the user is trying to skip. (See, e.g., Craner Figs. 10, 11.)
Claim 12 does not preclude additional steps such as displaying substitute
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media (such as taught in Craner) while the recited objectionable content is
avoided. Appellants have not persuaded us that the Examiner improperly
combined Craner and Stone.
For the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103
rejection of claims 12, 25, 28, and 30 and the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of
claims 13 and 26, for which Appellants rely on the same arguments (Br. 13).

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9, 11–22, and 24–33 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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