Ex Parte Kamperman et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 24, 2014

10565663 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte FRANCISCUS L. A. J. KAMPERMAN,
ROBERT PAUL KOSTER, and GEERT JAN SCHRIJEN
____________________

Appeal 2011-011432
Application 10/565,663
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before: JOHN C. KERINS, LYNNE H. BROWNE, and
ANNETTE R. REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1-
3, 4, 6-12, 14, 15, and 17-23. Claims 2, 5, 13, and 16 are canceled. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method and system for generating an
authorized domain. Claims 1 and 12 are independent. Claim 1 is
reproduced below:
1. A method of generating an Authorized Domain (AD)
comprises:
selecting a domain identifier (Domain_ID) uniquely
identifying the Authorized Domain (AD),
binding at least one user (P1, P2, . . . , PN1) to the domain
identifier (Domain_ID),
binding at least one device (D1, D2, . . . , DM) to the
domain identifier (Domain_ID), and
binding at least one content item (C1, C2, . . . , CN2) to
the Authorized Domain (AD) given by the domain identifier
(Domain_ID),
thereby obtaining a number of devices (D1, D2, . . . ,
DM) and a number of users (P1, P2, . . . , PN1) that are
authorized to access content items (C1, C2, . . . , CN2) of said
Authorized Domain (AD)
wherein access to the at least one content item (C1, C2,
... , CN2) is obtained, via an authorization certificate, by
verifying that the at least one content item (C1, C2, . . . , CN2)
and the at least one user (P1, P2, ... , PN1) are linked to the
same domain identifier (Domain_ID) or by verifying that the at
least one device (D1, D2, . . . , DM) and the at least one content
item (C1, C2, . . . , CN2) ) are linked to the same domain
identifier (Domain_ID);
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wherein the authorization certificate includes the domain
identifier (Domain_ID) as a holder of the authorization
certificate.

PRIOR ART
Andrews US 6,324,645 B1 Nov. 27, 2001
Nakahara US 2003/0018491 A1 Jan. 23, 2003

GROUNDS OF REJECTION
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 14, 15, and 17-23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§103(a) as being unpatentable over Nakahara and Andrews.

OPINION
Independent claims 1 and 12 each require “binding at least one user
(P1, P2, . . . , PN1) to the domain identifier (Domain_ID).” App. Br., Clms.
App’x. The Examiner finds that Nakahara discloses “binding at least one
user (P1, P2, …, PN1) to the domain identifier (Domain_ID)(Nakahara et al.
disclose searcher X belonging to the domain - Page 13, ¶¶ [0197 and
0200]).” Ans. 4.
Appellants argue that in Nakahara “‘Searcher X’ is a pseudonym for a
kind of role that a device/unit may have, but not a user.” App. Br. 15. In
response to this argument, the Examiner determines that “[t]he term ‘user’ is
not defined as a ‘person’ or ‘human’ in Claims 1 and 12. Therefore, using
the broadest reasonable interpretation, a user may be a device.” Ans. 11.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue that, “the Examiner has broadly
construed a ‘user’ to be a ‘device’ without giving proper regard to the
specification or the perspective of the person skilled in the art.” Reply Br. 4.
In support of this argument, Appellants note that “[t]he specification recites,
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‘Accordingly, the present invention provides a method and corresponding
system for providing an Authorized Domain structure based on both persons
and devices.’” Id. (citing, Spec. para. [0015]).
We note that the portion of the Specification identified by Appellants
discusses persons and devices, as opposed to users and devices.
Furthermore, the Specification specifically addresses the step of binding at
least one user stating:
In one embodiment, the step of binding at least one user
to the domain identifier comprises: obtaining or generating a
Domain Users List (DUC) comprising the domain identifier and
a unique identifier for a user thereby defining that the user is
bound to the Authorized Domain and/or the step of binding at
least one device to the domain identifier [which] comprises:
obtaining or generating a Domain Devices List comprising the
domain identifier and a unique identifier for a device thereby
defining that the device is bound to the domain.
Spec., p. 4, ll. 6-11 (emphasis added).

In accordance with this portion of the Specification, binding of the user can
be achieved in one of two ways: by obtaining or generating a DUC or by the
step of binding at least one device to the domain identifier. Id. The
Examiner’s interpretation of the limitation “binding at least one user” meets
the second way in which binding can be achieved in accordance with the
Specification, and thus, is reasonable and consistent with the Specification.
Claim 11 requires “binding at least one content item (C1, C2, …, CN2)
to the Authorized Domain (AD).” App. Br., p. 24. The Examiner finds that
Nakahara discloses “binding at least one content item (C1, C2, …, CN2) to

1 Beginning on page 15 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants direct their
arguments specifically to claim 1; however, it appears that their intention is
for claim 1 to be representative of both claim 1 and claim 12. See App. Br.
15, 16, and 22.
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the Authorized Domain (AD) given by the domain identifier (Domain 10)
(Nakahara et al. disclose the content usage devices belonging to the domain -
Page 13, ¶ [0200]).” Ans. 4.
Appellants argue that “‘content usage devices’ are entirely different
from ‘content items’.” App. Br. 15. In response to this argument, the
Examiner notes that Appellants “fail[] to argue or support how the broad
claim term ‘item’ has to be narrowly construed to exclude a device . . .
[stating that] [a]n ‘item’ can certainly be a ‘device.” Ans. 13.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants contend that, “‘content item’ is a well-
defined term which is never interpreted as a ‘content device’.” Reply Br. 7.
Appellants’ contention is not well taken. The portions of the Specification
identified by Appellants as providing a definition of “content items”
describe preferred properties of the “content items” rather than a definition
of what constitutes a “content item.” See App. Br. 17; Spec. p. 7.
Appellants have provided no evidence or persuasive argument that “content
item” is a term of art. Accordingly, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive.
Reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations
explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from reading
limitations of the specification into a claim, to thereby narrow the scope of
the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations, which have no express
basis in the claim. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, (CCPA 1969).
Appellants argue that “[a]s previously discussed above, Nakahara
does not disclose at least one user or content items belonging to the domain.
It therefore follows that Nakahara does not disclose at least one user and/or
content item being disclosed in the domain list.” App. Br. 15-16.
Appellants’ argument is not persuasive for the reasons discussed supra.
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Appellants argue that “[a]ccording to the invention, a certificate
creates or defines part of the domain, while in Andrews, it refers to members
of the domain. In further contrast, the types of domains referred to in
Andrews is a privilege/administrative domain [sic], while the invention
refers to content-access domains.” App. Br. 16; see also Reply Br. 10. In
response to this argument, the Examiner notes that “there is absolutely
nothing in the language of the argued [c]laims 1 and 12 that indicates that ‘a
certificate creates or defines part of the domain.’” Ans. 14. We agree.
Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations
from the specification are not read into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988
F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1 and 12.
Appellants do not present separate arguments for the patentability of
dependent claims 3, 4, 6-11, 14, 15, and 17-23. App. Br. 11. Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 14, 15, and 17-23 is
AFFIRMED.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2009).

AFFIRMED
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