Ex Parte Kaminsky et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Feb 23, 2011

10635598 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 23, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/635,598 08/06/2003 David Louis Kaminsky RSW920030090US1 (103) 1386
46320 7590 02/23/2011
CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP
STEVEN M. GREENBERG
950 PENINSULA CORPORATE CIRCLE
SUITE 2022
BOCA RATON, FL 33487
EXAMINER
TANG, KAREN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2447
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/23/2011 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________
Ex parte DAVID LOUIS KAMINSKY and DAVID M. OGLE
____________
Appeal 2009-007281
Application 10/635,5981
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, JEAN R. HOMERE, and
CAROLYN D. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL2

1 Filed on August 6, 2003. The real party in interest is International Business
Machines Corp. (App. Br. 1.)
2 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing,
as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE”
(paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery
mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision.
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2002) from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1 through 24. (App. Br. 2.)3 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2008).
We affirm.
Appellants’ Invention
Appellants invented a system, method, and machine readable storage
for detecting e-mail delivery impairments in an e-mail delivery system.
(Spec. 4, ¶ [0001], [0008].)
Illustrative Claim
Independent claim 1 further illustrates the invention as follows:
1. An intelligent electronic mail (e-mail) gateway comprising:

a message store configured to store received messages
forwarded by senders over a network to a mail server coupled to the e-
mail gateway and associated with corresponding intended recipients;
and,

a notification manager coupled both to the gateway and said
message store, said manager having a configuration for notifying
selected ones of said senders when delivery to said intended recipients
has become impaired.

Prior Art Relied Upon
The Examiner relies on the following prior art as evidence of
unpatentability:
Horvitz US 2002/0087649 A1 Jul. 4, 2002
Tomkow US 2002/0144154 A1 Oct. 3, 2002
(hereinafter “Tomkow II”)

3 All references to the Appeal Brief are to the Appeal Brief filed on August
8, 2008, which replaced the prior Appeal Brief filed on August 30, 2007.
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Tomkow US 2006/0112165 A9 May 25, 2006
(hereinafter “Tomkow I”) (filed on Mar. 8, 2002)
Delaney US 2006/0177021 A1 Aug. 10, 2006
(filed on Jan. 19, 2006)

Rejections on Appeal4
The Examiner rejects the claims on appeal as follows:
Claims 1 through 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1, 4 through 6, 9, 15, 16, and 19 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Tomkow I.
Claims 2, 12 through 14, and 22 through 24 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Tomkow I
and Horvitz.
Claims 7, 8, 17, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Tomkow I and Delaney.
Claims 3, 10, 11, 20, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combination of Tomkow I and Tomkow II.
Appellants’ Contentions
1. Appellants contend that independent claim 1 is directed to
statutory subject matter because the present Specification indicates that the
claimed invention can be realized in a centralized fashion in one computer
system, or in a distributed fashion where different elements are spread out

4 The Examiner objects to Appellants' Specification for failing to provide
proper antecedent basis for the “machine readable storage” recited in
independent claim 15 and dependent claims 16 through 24. (Ans. 3-4.)
Appellants correctly acknowledge that this is not an appealable issue. (App.
Br. 5.) Since the Examiner's objection to Appellants' Specification is a
petitionable matter as opposed to an appealable one, this issue is not
properly brought before us. See 37 C.F.R. 1.181.
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across several interconnected computer systems. (App Br. 5-6.) Appellants
also argue that independent claim 1 cannot be construed as software per se
because Appellants’ figure 1 clearly depicts that the both the notification
manager and the message store are integrally tied into the mail gateway and,
therefore, amount to a computing device. (Reply Br. 4-5.)
2. Appellants contend that Tomkow I discloses an RPost server
(16) that is only associated with a single intended recipient and, therefore,
does not teach associating the claimed “mail server” with multiple intended
recipients, as recited in independent claim 1. (App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 7.)
Further, Appellants argue that Tomkow I’s disclosure of the content of a
receipt fails to teach a message store, let alone a message store associated
with intended recipients. (Reply Br. 6-7.) Additionally, Appellants contend
that Tomkow I’s disclosure of Mail User Agent (hereinafter “MUA”)
notifications does not teach “notifying ones of said senders when delivery to
said intended recipients has become impaired,” as recited in independent
claim 1. (App. Br. 10.) Moreover, Appellants allege that Tomkow I fails to
teach how selected ones of the senders are notified when delivery of the e-
mail becomes impaired, as claimed. (Reply Br. 7-8.) (Emphasis added.)
Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
1. The Examiner finds that independent claim 1 is directed to non-
statutory subject matter because the claimed “intelligent e-mail gateway”
and corresponding “message store” and “notification manager” can be
construed as software per se. (Ans. 9-10.)
2. The Examiner finds that Tomkow I’s discloses a first RPost
server (16) coupled to a second RPost server (14) and, therefore, teaches a
mail server coupled to an e-mail gateway, as recited in independent claim 1.
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(Id. at 10.) Further, the Examiner finds that Tomkow I’s disclosure of a
plurality of recipients who receive messages, in conjunction with a plurality
of senders who send messages, teaches that the claimed system is not limited
to only a single recipient and sender. (Id. at 11.) Additionally, the Examiner
finds that Tomkow I discloses that RPost server (14) is capable of storing
messages forwarded by senders and, therefore, teaches the claimed “message
store.” (Id.) The Examiner also finds Tomkow I’s RPost server (14) both
notifies the sender when delivery of a message to a recipient has failed, and
collaborates with the RPost server (16) to deliver messages to recipients.
(Id. at 11-12.) Therefore, the Examiner finds that Tomkow I’s RPost server
(14) teaches the claimed “notification manager.” (Id.)

II. ISSUES
1. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
independent claim 1 is directed to non-statutory subject matter? In
particular, the issue turns on whether the claimed “intelligent e-mail
gateway” and corresponding “message store” and “notification manager”
can be construed as software per se.
2. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
Tomkow I anticipates independent claim 1? In particular, the issue turns on
whether Tomkow I teaches the following claim limitations:
(a) “a mail server coupled to the e-mail gateway and associated
with corresponding intended recipients,” as recited in independent claim 1;
and
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(b) “a notification manager…having a configuration for notifying
selected ones of said senders when delivery to said intended recipients has
become impaired,” as recited in independent claim 1.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT
The following Findings of Fact (hereinafter “FF”) are shown by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Appellants’ Specification
FF 1. Appellants’ figure 1 depicts that the mail gateway (140), which
may be a formalized computing device, includes a message store such as a
list or a queue (180) for storing received e-mail messages (190). (Spec. 8, ¶
[0018].)
Tomkow I
FF 2. Tomkow I discloses verifying delivery and integrity of
electronic messages by providing information from a first party pertaining to
a second party, and for allowing the first party to transmit such information
to a third party on a secure basis. (1: ¶ [0001].)
FF 3. Tomkow I discloses that the RPost server (14) stores a copy of
the original message and the corresponding attachments for later retrieval
before transmission to the recipient’s Mail Transport Agent (hereinafter
“MTA”). (5: ¶ [0079]-[0081].)
FF 4. Tomkow I utilizes RP servers (14 & 16) and MTAs
interchangeably. (Fig. 1 & 3; see also 4: ¶ [0049].)
FF 5. Tomkow I discloses identifying the sender of a message to
which returned MUA notifications refer, such that the notification
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information can be passed to the sender in the form of a receipt. (6: ¶
[0097].)
FF 6. Tomkow I discloses that a receipt is an e-mail sent to the
original sender of a made-of-record message. (9: ¶ [0147].) Tomkow I
discloses that a receipt includes an identifier, that data and time at which the
receipt was generated, the quoted body of the original message together with
the e-mail addresses of its intended recipients, the date and time at which the
RPost server received the message, and a table for each destination listing
(i.e., FAILED, UDELIVERABLE, DELIVERED, DELIVERED-AND-
WAITING, or DELIVERED-TO-MAILBOX). (9-10: ¶ [0148]-[0157].)
Tomkow I discloses that the purpose of a receipt is “to accurately apprise the
reader of the form of verification of delivery the system has been able to
achieve.” (10: ¶ [0158].)
Horvitz
FF 7. Horvitz generally relates to computer systems and, in particular,
to minimizing the disruption caused by notifications from various
communications modules via bounded deferral policies associated with
notification platform architecture. (1: ¶ [0002].)
FF 8. Horvitz discloses a notification or alerting system that estimates
when a user is expected to return, such that it transmits priority e-mails
before the user returns. (14-15: ¶ [0268].) In particular, Horvitz discloses
automatically notifying the senders of highly urgent messages when a
recipient is expected to return. (Id.) Horvitz discloses that message senders
receive feedback when a user is expected to return, such that he or she can
reply to the messages. (Id.)
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FF 9. Horvitz’s figure 24 depicts a routing system (420) that serves as
a forwarding mechanism by forwarding a prioritized text to a different e-
mail address. (15-16: ¶ [0277].) Horvitz discloses that the forwarding
mechanism may be useful when a user has e-mail access to a different e-mail
address and desires to be kept informed of high priority e-mails at the
alternative address. (Id.)
Delaney
FF 10. Delaney generally relates to communication services and,
in particular, to delivery of messages to selected recipients through one or
more communication modes. (1: ¶ [0002].)
FF 11. Before transmitting a message, Delaney discloses that a
transaction server checks for recipient restrictions, such as blocking
messages during specified times, in both the message sender’s data records
and the recipient’s data records. (6: ¶ [0058].)

IV. ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
Claim 1
Independent claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “intelligent e-mail
gateway” and corresponding “message store” and “notification manager.”
As detailed in the Findings of Fact section above, Appellants’
Specification discloses that the mail gateway, which may be a computing
device, includes a message store for storing received e-mails. (FF 1.) We
find that the claimed “message store” entails the use of memory in a
computing device programmed or configured to store received e-mails.
Consequently, we find that the claimed “intelligent e-mail gateway” and
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corresponding “message store” amounts to a machine5 and, therefore, cannot
be reasonably construed as software per se. It follows that Appellants have
shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 2 through 4
Since dependent claims 2 through 4 also incorporate the claimed
“message store,” we find that that these claims are also directed to statutory
subject matter for the reasons set forth in our discussion of independent
claim 1.
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejection—Tomkow I
Claim 1
Independent claim 1 recites, in relevant part:
1) a mail server coupled to the e-mail gateway and associated with
corresponding intended recipients; and 2) a notification
manager…having a configuration for notifying selected ones of said
senders when delivery to said intended recipients has become
impaired.

As detailed in the Findings of Fact section above, Tomkow I discloses
a system that verifies the delivery and the integrity of e-mails. (FF 2.) In
particular, Tomkow I discloses an RPost server associated with a sender that
stores a copy of an original e-mail and its corresponding attachments before
transmission to an MTA, or RPost server associated with a recipient. (FFs 3

5 “A machine is a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices
and combination of devices. This includes every mechanical device or
combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function
and produce a certain effect or result.” In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364
(quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh'g denied
en banc, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 70
(2008)).
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& 4.) Further, Tomkow I discloses a notification in the form of a receipt that
includes e-mail addresses pertaining to intended recipients. (FF 6.)
We find that Tomkow I’s disclosure teaches a first RPost server that is
capable of receiving and storing e-mails designated for intended recipients
prior to sending such e-mails to a second RPost server. In particular, we
find that Tomkow I’s first RPost server amounts to a gateway because it
receives and stores e-mails prior to their receipt in the second RPost server.
Moreover, while figures 1 and 3 of Tomkow I depict that the second RPost
server is associated with one intended recipient of an e-mail, we find that the
depicted sender-recipient pair is merely illustrative of the basic scheme for a
typical e-mail communication between a sender and a recipient. We
therefore do not agree with Appellants’ attempt to restrict the cited
illustration to a single dedicated sender-recipient pair. Rather, we find that
the second RPost server is intended to be associated with multiple sender-
recipient pairs. Consequently, since the second RPost server is coupled to
the first RPost server and is capable of being associated with multiple
sender-recipient pairs, we find that Tomkow I teaches “a mail server coupled
to the e-mail gateway and associated with corresponding intended
recipients,” as recited in independent claim 1.
Next, Tomkow I discloses identifying the sender of an e-mail to which
a returned MUA notification refers. (FF 5.) Tomkow I discloses passing
such notification information to the sender in the form of a receipt. (Id.)
Further, Tomkow I’s discloses that a receipt contains the delivery status of
an e-mail, which includes “FAILED,” “UNDELIVERABLE,” and
“DELIVERED-TO-MAILBOX.” (FF 6.)
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Upon utilizing returned MUA notifications to determine the senders
of respective e-mails, we find that the first RPost server passes the
corresponding notification information to each sender as a receipt. We also
find that Tomkow I’s disclosure teaches that a receipt notifies the senders of
respective e-mails whether delivery of an e-mail has failed, or the e-mail is
undeliverable. Since the claimed “selected ones of said senders”
encompasses all senders, we find that Tomkow I’s first RPost server is
capable of utilizing returned MUA notifications in order to notify senders of
respective e-mails that deliver of an e-mail has failed, or the e-mail is
undeliverable. Thus, we find that Tomkow I teaches “a notification
manager…having a configuration for notifying selected ones of said senders
when delivery to said intended recipients has become impaired,” as recited
in independent claim 1.
Alternatively, we note that the disputed claim limitation only requires
“a notification manager…having a configuration for notifying selected ones
of said senders…”. (Claims App'x) (emphasis added.) We find that this
recitation merely requires that the notification manager be capable of
performing the recited function of notifying selected senders when delivery
of an e-mail has become impaired. Such recitation does not require,
however, that the notification manager actually perform the recited function
of notifying selected senders when delivery of an e-mail has become
impaired. This recitation is a statement of intended use, which is fully met
by a prior art structure that is capable of performing the recited function. A
statement of intended use in an apparatus claim cannot distinguish over a
prior art apparatus that discloses all the recited limitations and is capable of
performing the recited function. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477
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(Fed. Cir. 1997). We note that “[a]n intended use or purpose usually will not
limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than
define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim
Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2003). Although “[s]uch statements often … appear in the claim's
preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of
intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id. We are
therefore satisfied that the Tomkow I teaches an equivalent structure that is
capable utilizing a notification manager to perform the recited function of
notifying selected senders when delivery of an e-mail has become impaired.
(FFs 3-6.) It follows that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner
erred in finding that Tomkow I anticipates independent claim 1.

Claims 4 through 6, 9, 15, 16, and 19
Appellants do not provide separate arguments for patentability with
respect to independent claims 5 and 15, and dependent claims 4, 6, 9, 16,
and 19. Therefore, we select independent claim 1 as representative of the
cited claims. Consequently, Appellants have not shown error in the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 5 and 15, and dependent claims
4, 6, 9, 16, and 19, for the reasons set forth in our discussion of independent
claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejection—Combination of Tomkow I and Horvitz
Claim 2
Appellants contend that Horvitz’s disclosure of a routing system that
can route text to a different e-mail address does not teach or fairly suggest
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“an alternate e-mail address with which said selected ones of said senders
can retransmit said messages to corresponding intended recipients,” as
recited in dependent claim 2. (App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 8-9.) We do not
agree.
As set forth in the Findings of Fact section above, Horvitz discloses
minimizing the disruption caused by notifications from various
communications modules. (FF 7.) In particular, Horvitz discloses a routing
system that forwards a prioritized text to a different e-mail address. (FF 9.)
Horvitz discloses that the forwarding mechanism is useful when a recipient
of an e-mail has access to a different e-mail address and desires to be kept
informed of high priority e-mails at the alternative e-mail address. (Id.)
We find that Horvitz’s disclosure teaches that a sender of an e-mail
can utilize a different or alternative e-mail address for an intended recipient
in order to forward or re-transmit the e-mail to the recipient. Accordingly,
when delivery of an e-mail has failed at an intended recipient’s first e-mail
address, we find that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have appreciated
substituting or replacing the first e-mail address with Horvitz’s different or
alternative e-mail address. Thus, we find that Horvitz teaches or fairly
suggests the disputed limitation. It follows that Appellants have not shown
that the Examiner erred in concluding that he combination of Tomkow I and
Horvitz renders dependent claim 2 unpatentable.

Claim 12
Appellants contend that Tomkow I’s disclosure of indicating that
delivery of an e-mail has failed does not teach or fairly suggest “formatting a
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detailed notification describing the nature of the impairment,” as recited in
dependent claim 12. (App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 9.) We do not agree.
As set forth above, we find that Tomkow I’s disclosure teaches
passing a notification to a sender of an e-mail in the form of a receipt.
Moreover, Tomkow I discloses that a receipt includes an identifier, that data
and time at which the receipt was generated, the quoted body of the original
message together with the e-mail addresses of its intended recipients, the
date and time at which the RPost server received the message, and a table for
each destination listing (i.e., FAILED or UNDELIVERABLE). (FF 6.)
Further, Tomkow I discloses that a receipt verifies the delivery status of a
respective e-mail. (Id.)
We find that the contents of the disclosed receipt amount to a detailed
notification, including information describing that the delivery of an e-mail
has failed, or that the e-mail is undeliverable. Thus, we find that Tomkow I
teaches or fairly suggests the disputed limitation. It follows that Appellants
have not shown that the Examiner erred in concluding that he combination
of Tomkow I and Horvitz renders dependent claim 12 unpatentable.

Claims 14, 22, and 24
Appellants do not provide separate arguments for patentability with
respect to dependent claims 14, 22, and 24. Therefore, we select dependent
claim 12 as representative of the cited claims. Consequently, Appellants
have not shown error in the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 14,
22, and 24 for the reasons set forth in our discussion of dependent claim 12.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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Claim 13
Appellants contend that Horvitz’s disclosure of estimating when a
user is expected to return does not teach or fairly suggest “an estimate of
when normal mail delivery service can resume,” as recited in dependent
claim 13. (Reply Br. 10-11.) We do not agree.
As detailed in the Findings of Fact section above, Horvitz discloses a
notification or alerting system that estimates when a user is expected to
return. (FF 8.) In particular, Horvitz discloses automatically conveying to
the senders of highly urgent messages when a recipient is expected to return,
such that he or she can reply to the messages. (Id.) We find that an
ordinarily skilled artisan would have appreciated that Horvitz’s disclosure of
estimating when an intended recipient of an e-mail is expected to return and
reply to the e-mail amounts to estimating when the normal exchange of e-
mail between a sender and an intended recipient can resume. Thus, we find
that Horvitz teaches or fairly suggests the disputed limitation. It follows that
Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in concluding that he
combination of Tomkow I and Horvitz renders dependent claim 13
unpatentable.
Claim 23
Appellants do not provide separate arguments for patentability with
respect to dependent claim 23. Therefore, we select dependent claim 13 as
representative of the cited claim. Consequently, Appellants have not
shown error in the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 23 for the
reasons set forth in our discussion of dependent claim 13. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejection—Combination of Tomkow I and Delaney
Claims 7, 8, 17, and 18
Appellants contend that Delaney’s disclosure of a recipient’s
schedule, or state information, amounts to information pertaining to
customers. (App. Br. 13; Reply Br. 12.) Therefore, Appellants argue that
Delaney does not teach or fairly suggest “consulting a data store of state
information for selected ones of said respective mail servers to recall an
already identified impairment,” as recited in dependent claim 7. (Id.) We
do not agree.
As detailed in the Findings of Fact section above, Delaney discloses
delivering messages to selected recipients through one or more
communication nodes. (FF 10.) In particular, Delaney discloses that a
transaction server checks both the data records for the sender and recipient
of an e-mail for restrictions outlined by the recipient of the e-mail (i.e.,
blocking messages during specified times). (FF 11.) We find that Delaney’s
disclosure teaches consulting the data records of a transaction server in order
to identify restrictions, such as blackout times for receiving an e-mail,
outlined by an intended recipient of the e-mail. In particular, we find that an
ordinarily skilled artisan would have appreciated that such blackout times
for receiving an e-mail outlined by an intended recipient amount to a
previously identified impairment associated with that recipient. Thus, we
find that Delaney teaches or fairly suggests the disputed limitation. It
follows that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in
concluding that he combination of Tomkow I and Delaney renders
dependent claim 7 unpatentable.
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Appellants do not provide separate arguments for patentability with
respect to dependent claims 8, 17, and 18. Therefore, we select dependent
claim 7 as representative of the cited claims. Consequently, Appellants have
not shown error in the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 8, 17, and
18 for the reasons set forth in our discussion of dependent claim 7. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejection—Combination of Tomkow I and Tomkow II
Claims 3, 10, 11, 20, and 21
Appellants offer the same arguments set forth in response to the
obviousness rejection of independent claim 1 to rebut the obviousness
rejection of dependent claims 3, 10, 11, 20, and 21. (App. Br. 13-14.) We
have already addressed these arguments in our discussion of independent
claim 1, and we found them unpersuasive. Consequently, Appellants have
not shown that the Examiner erred in concluding that dependents claims 3,
10, 11, 20, and 21 are unpatentable over the combination of Tomkow I and
Tomkow II.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Appellants have shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1 through 4 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter under
35 U.S.C. §101.
2. Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1, 4 through 6, 9, 15, 16, and 19 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e).
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3. Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 2, 3, 7, 8, 10 through 14, 17, 18, and 20 through 24 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

VI. DECISION
1. We reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 through 4
as being directed to non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101.
2. We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 through
45 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
3. We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 2, 3, 7, 8, 10
through 14, 17, 18, and 20 through 24 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
Since we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with respect to
each claim on appeal, the Examiner's decision is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED

Vsh

CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP
STEVEN M. GREENBERG
950 PENINSULA CORPORATE CIRCLE
SUITE 2022
BOCA RATON, FL 33487