Ex Parte Johnson et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 22, 2018

13376607 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/376,607 12/07/2011 Soren S. Johnson
24737 7590 03/26/2018
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus A venue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2009P00747WOUS 5744
EXAMINER
TIEDEMAN, JASON S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/26/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
patti. demichele@Philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SOREN S. JOHNSON and ERIK JOHNSON
Appeal2016-008187 1
Application 13/376,607
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, MICHAEL W. KIM, and
PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judges.
KIM, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final rejection of claims 1---6, 9--16, 19,
and 20. We have jurisdiction to review the case under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134
and 6.
The invention relates generally to automated time window centering
on a navigable timeline display. Spec. 1 :22-24.
1 The Appellants identify Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal2016-008187
Application 13/376,607
Independent claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A system that facilitates animating and automatically
centering a selected tick mark on a timeline for visual
presentation to a user, including:
a processor that executes computer-executable
instructions stored in a non-transitory memory, the instructions
including:
receiving, from an input tool with which the user
selects a tick mark, information regarding a user-selected
tick mark representing a time on the timeline, which is
linear and comprises a plurality of tick marks representing
discrete points in time;
receiving information regarding a user-selected
time window duration having a start time and end time, the
time window duration including the user-selected tick
mark;
centering the user-selected time window duration
on the user-selected tick mark on the timeline as it is
displayed to the user; and
animating movement of the timeline while
centering the user-selected tick mark on the timeline
during a user-selected predetermined time period, wherein
the animation includes one or more intermediate states
between an initial timeline position and a final timeline
position, wherein the animation of the timeline is
displayed to the user as the timeline appears to shift during
the user-selected predetermined time period from the
initial position to the final position in a manner that is
perceptible to the user, and wherein the time window
remains centered on the user-selected tick mark during the
animation as the user-selected tick mark is shifted;
an imaging device that generates images of a
patient; and
a display that presents the timeline and one or more
generated images to the user;
wherein the processor timestamps and stores the images to
a memory and wherein the processor identifies patient image
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data corresponding to the user-selected time window duration,
and outputs the identified patient image data to the display,
where it is presented to the user.
Claims 1-6, 9-16, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
patent-ineligible subject matter.
Claims 1--4, 6, 9-14, 16, 19, and 20 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Finke-Anlauff et al.
(US 2005/0138066 Al, pub. June 23, 2005) (hereinafter "Finke-Anlauff
'066"), Finke-Anlauffet al. (US 2005/0105374 Al, pub. May 19, 2005)
(hereinafter "Finke-Anlauff '374"), Metsatahti et al. (US 2005/0108253 Al,
pub. May 19, 2005) (hereinafter "Metsatahti"), Barrios et al.
(US 2009/0177998 Al, pub. July 9, 2009) (hereinafter "Barrios"), and
"Demonstrate concepts through animation", 2005 (retrieved from
http://www.studio.adobe.com) (hereinafter "Photoshop").
Claims 5 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Finke-Anlauff '066, Finke-Anlauff '374, Metsatahti, Barrios,
Photoshop, and Kondo et al. (US 2009/0254370 Al, pub. Oct. 8, 2009)
(hereinafter "Kondo").
We AFFIRM and enter a NEW GROUND of rejection pursuant to 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
ANALYSIS
Patentable subject matter
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are
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not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 134 S. Ct.
2347, 2354 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within the excluded category of
abstract ideas, we are guided in our analysis by the Supreme Court's two-
step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296-97
(2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine whether the
claim is "directed to" a patent-ineligible abstract idea. See Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2356 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk."); Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in
petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk."); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) ("Analyzing
respondents' claims according to the above statements from our cases, we
think that a physical and chemical process for molding precision synthetic
rubber products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter."); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--595 (1978)
("Respondent's application simply provides a new and presumably better
method for calculating alarm limit values."); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 64 (1972) ("They claimed a method for converting binary-coded decimal
(BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.").
The following method is then used to determine whether what the
claim is "directed to" is an abstract idea:
[T]he decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine
earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can
be seen-what prior cases were about, and which way they were
decided. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353-54. That
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is the classic common law methodology for creating law when a
single governing definitional context is not available. See
generally Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:
Deciding Appeals (1960). This more flexible approach is also
the approach employed by the Supreme Court. See Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2355-57. We shall follow that approach here.
Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841F.3d1288, 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
The patent-ineligible end of the spectrum includes fundamental
economic practices, Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611;
mathematical formulas, Flook, 437 U.S. at 594--95; and basic tools of
scientific and technological work, Benson, 409 U.S. at 69. On the patent-
eligible side of the spectrum are physical and chemical processes, such as
curing rubber, Diamond, 450 U.S. at 184 n.7, "tanning, dyeing, making
waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores," and a process for
manufacturing flour, Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67.
If the claim is "directed to" a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we then
consider the elements of the claim-both individually and as an ordered
combination-to assess whether the additional elements transform the nature
of the claim into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea. Alice, 134
S. Ct. at 2355. This is a search for an "inventive concept"-an element or
combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to
"significantly more" than the abstract idea itself. Id.
We are persuaded by the Appellants' argument that the Examiner
erred in asserting that the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract
idea. Appeal Br. 8-12; Reply Br. 3-6.
The Examiner initially finds the claims "are directed to an abstract
idea because an abstract idea is recited in the claims." Final Act. 4. The
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Examiner then purportedly identifies the abstract idea in each of independent
claims 1, 11, and 20 by reciting, for each independent claim, the entire body
of each claim. Id. 4--7. The Examiner then summarizes as follows:
Displaying data in the form of an animated time line that shifts
to a user-selected time window and identifies and presents
patient data corresponding to the selection is an abstract idea
because it uses categories (time windows, tick marks) to organize
(select corresponding imaging data), store (stored images), and
transmit (display) information.
Id. The Examiner is, thus, essentially asserting that the claims are
directed to using time windows and tick marks to select corresponding
imaging data, storing images, and displaying information, and that this is
similar to claims found abstract that use categories to organize, store,
and transmit information. We agree with the Appellants that this
analysis is erroneous.
Each independent claim recites language substantially identical to, for
example:
centering the user-selected the time window duration on the user-
selected tick mark on the timeline as it is displayed to the user;
animating, via a processor, movement of the timeline while
centering the user-selected tick mark on the timeline during a
user-selected predetermined time period, wherein the animation
includes one or more intermediate states between an initial
timeline position and a final timeline position, wherein the
animation of the timeline is displayed to the user as the timeline
appears to shift during the user-selected predetermined time
period from the initial position to the final position in a manner
that is perceptible to the user.
We find that these limitations perform specific animation operations
that control the specific technique for displaying information. We find that
these specific operations and techniques are directed to controlling the
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behavior of a display device, which is more than the mere displaying of
information asserted by the Examiner. See, e.g., Spec. 3:10-19
("FIGURE 1 illustrates a system 10 for animating and
automatically centering a timeline on a computer display by
clicking on the time at the center of a desired window along the
timeline. Data corresponding to a temporal window centered on
the selected (e.g., clicked) time is immediately displayed on the
screen. Animation is employed to smoothly shift the timeline
indicator over a predetermined time period (e.g., about 1-3
seconds), such that the selected temporal window is transitioned
into the center of the screen. The user can expand or contract the
window by sliding window boundary tabs or by clicking on or
entering a displayed window size (e.g., 1 hour, 2 hours, etc.).
Since the window is positioned symmetrically about the center
of the window, moving either of the boundary tabs can cause the
other boundary tab to be moved symmetrically.").
To that end, we discern that the instant claims are more like those set
forth in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016), which our reviewing court determined were patent eligible.
Id. at 1315 ("The claimed process uses a combined order of specific rules
that renders information into a specific format that is then used and applied
to create desired results: a sequence of synchronized, animated characters.").
We are persuaded that these specific operations and techniques go
beyond merely selecting, storing, and displaying information, as essentially
asserted by the Examiner. Because the claims recite limitations that extend
outside of the abstract idea essentially asserted, the Examiner has not
sufficiently demonstrated that the claims are similar to patent-ineligible
claims that merely recite organizing, storing, and transmitting information.
Even if we were to accept the Examiner's initial assertion, however,
that every limitation recited in every independent claim is directed on the
whole to abstract ideas, we are persuaded that the Examiner has not shown
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sufficiently that the same "centering" and "animating" operations are not
"significantly more," as they are claimed, and described in the Specification,
as being performed on a "computer screen or other interface." Spec. 8:1-13.
We are not aware that, and the Examiner has not established sufficiently
that, these described functions are within the scope of operations capable of
being performed on a general purpose computer, without special
programming for graphics manipulation.
For the above reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1---6,
9-16, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Rejection of Claim 1under35 US.C. § 103(a)
We are not persuaded by the Appellants' argument that Metsatahti
fails to disclose a tick mark that marks a "point in time," because Metsatahti
instead has marks that mark a "time period." Appeal Br. 12; see also Reply
Br. 9-10. The Appellants further argue "since the selectable units (e.g.,
dates) of Metsatahti represent time durations or windows comprising a range
of time, they cannot also be interpreted to be selectable tick marks that
demarcate one or more discrete points in time," as claimed. Id. at 13.
Specifically, we are unpersuaded that a duration of time cannot be a
"time period" in one context, but a "discrete point in time" in another. We
tum to a dictionary definition of "discrete" as "[ c ]onstituting a separate
thing: Computers treat time as a series of discrete moments rather than a
continuous flow." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, Fifth Edition, 2016. Accordingly, on a scale of a week, a day is
an approximation of a discrete time. In a day, a second is an approximation
of a discrete time. Thus, both a day and a second can be periods of time, but
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also can be "discrete points in time," as claimed, because, any "discrete
point in time" can be broken down into smaller and smaller intervals.
Metsatahti discloses for its time bar:
the time segment defined by a level may either be predefined by
the application or may be dynamically configured by the device
user. For example, in the illustrated embodiment the time
span 350 level may define monthly segments, the time
period 340 level may define weekly segments and the time
unit 330 level may define day segments. Additional levels, such
as a century, decade, year, hour, week, day or second may also
be included.
Metsatahti i-f 59. Metsatahti, thus, discloses smaller time units, within a
more extended timeframe, which serve as markers for discrete points in
time, as claimed.
As to the next argued limitations, the Examiner finds "receiving
information regarding a user-selected time window duration having a start
time and end time, the time window duration including the user-selected tick
mark'' disclosed in Barrios at paragraphs 22-23. Final Act. 11-12. The
Appellants argue Barrios fails to disclose the claim language, because the
"user is not selecting a time window duration having a start and end time in
which the time window duration includes the user-selected tick mark."
Appeal Br. 14. This, according to the Appellants, is because Barrios
discloses moving the selected time period. Id.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellants' argument, because Barrios
also discloses resizing the slider bar, which meets the claim language.
Barrios i-f 22 ("slider bar 225, which a user of computer 100 may move
and/or resize using an input device, such as mouse 120, to adjust the amount
and/or scale, respectively, of document data 210A displayed in window 200.
Slider bar 225 may include a 'graphically-textured' central area."). The
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central area corresponds to the claimed tick mark, and the resizing of the bar
corresponds to receiving information regarding the duration, as claimed.
The Appellants finally argue, with respect to "the time window
remaining centered on the selected tick mark during the animation," that:
When the desired date is evident on the media handle 320, the
user may release the media handle, which will automatically
reposition the media handle in the centerline position and the
desired date and associated media view or calendar view will
underlie the media handle. In other words, the media handle 320
is centered after the user releases the media handle. Thus, the
media handle 320 does not remain centered during animation as
the user moves the media handle to the left.
Appeal Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 10-11.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellants' argument. The claim
language addresses the behavior of the "time window" in relation to the
"tick mark" that is centered in the time window. In Finke-Anlauff '066, the
"media handle 320" corresponds to the claimed "time window," and the
"center mark 420" corresponds to the claimed "tick mark." See Finke-
Anlauff '066 i-f 62. Finke-Anlauff '066 discloses moving the media
handle 320 to the right or left to cause the center mark 420 to line up above
time periods before or after the current time period. Id. i-fi-1 61---69. The
center mark 420, however, remains centered above the time window, and
nowhere is it disclosed that the center mark 420 ceases to be centered on the
time window during movement of the time window. Therefore, Finke-
Anlauff '066 meets the claim language of "the time window remaining
centered on the selected tick mark during the animation."
Indeed, the Appellants' argument is actually misdirected, because it
cites sections of Finke-Anlauff '066 that describe the behavior and
placement of the media handle 320 (time window) with respect to the center
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of the display window, not with respect to the tick mark in the center of the
time window, as recited in the portion of the relevant claim limitation to
which the argument is directed.
The Appellants have, thus, not persuasively shown error in the
Examiner's rejection of claim 1. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection
of independent claim 1under35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of Claims 2. 6. 9-12. 16. 19. and 20 under
35USC§103(a)
The Appellants argue independent claims 11 and 20 by essentially
referring to and repeating the arguments directed to claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 18-20, 23-26. The Appellants do not advance arguments specifically
directed to the language in dependent claims 2, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, and 19, but
instead assert the rejection of each claim is in error for the same reasons as
the independent claim from which each dependent claim depends. See
id. 15-18, 21-23. Therefore, because we discern no error in the rejection of
independent claim 1, we sustain the rejection of claims 2, 6, 9-12, 16, 19,
and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of Claims 3 and 13 under 35 US. C. § 103 (a)
Dependent claim 3 recites "a patient monitor that measures patient
parameter data; wherein the processor timestamps and stores the measured
patient parameter data to a memory." Dependent claim 13 recites
substantially similar language.
We are persuaded by the Appellants' argument that the Examiner has
not adequately shown the prior art to disclose a ''patient monitor that
measures patient parameter data," as claimed in claims 3 and 13. Appeal
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Br. 15-16; see also id. 21-22, Reply Br. 13-14 ("A camera does not
measure anything; rather, a camera simply captures videos/images").
The Examiner finds Finke-Anlauff "'066 teaches an imaging device
that creates (generates) images of a patient and associates metadata with the
images (interpreted as patient parameter data, the Examiner noting that the
Applicant has not defined what must or must not constitute patient parameter
data)." Final Act. 16.
We agree with the Appellants that an imaging device does not
measure a patient, but merely captures images, and the Examiner has not
explained sufficiently how images correspond to measurements. The
Specification describes "[ m ]easured parameter data may include, without
being limited to, heart rate, respiratory rate, electrocardiogram (ECG) data,
blood-oxygen level (Sp02), blood glucose level, temperature, blood
pressure, or any other patient parameter than can be measured by a patient
monitor 26." Spec. 4: 13-16. We find the ordinary and customary meaning
of "measurement" to be the "dimension, quantity, or capacity determined by
measuring: the measurements of a room." AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Fifth Ed., 2016. Again, we are
unclear how an image itself is any of the above "measured parameter data."
Dependent claim 5 depends from dependent claim 3. In rejecting
dependent claim 5, the Examiner additionally cites Kondo (Final Act. 19-
20), which discloses "the values of the electrocardiogram, average blood
pressure, the number of times of respiration, and blood oxygen saturation
which are acquired during measurement are displayed in the graphic chart."
Kondo i-f 124. The Examiner then asserts the following
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it would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art, at the time of the invention, to have modified the
system for animating display of data and a timeline by selecting
a tick mark and a time window on a timeline of [Finke-Anlauff
'066] and Photoshop so as to have included that the data included
various types of body measurement data, in accordance with the
teaching of Kondo, in order to provide for an efficient and
effective means of viewing body measurement data, since so
doing could be performed readily and easily by any person of
ordinary skill in the art, with neither undue experimentation, nor
risk of unexpected results."
Final Act. 20. We are persuaded that the above citations to Kondo and
rationale to combine with Finke-Anlauff '066 account for the limitations of
dependent claim 3. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of dependent
claim 3, however, because we add Kondo, we designate it as a new ground
of rejection. We do the same for similarly-worded dependent claim 13.
Rejection of Claims 4 and 14 under 35 USC § 103(a)
Dependent claim 4 depends from dependent claim 3. The Appellants
assert, concerning dependent claim 4, that "nothing in these cited portions of
Finke-Anlauff '066 describing measured parameter data (22) having
timestamps corresponding to the predefined time window." Appeal Br. 16.
We agree. While the cited portions of Finke-Anlauff '066 disclose
timestamps for the image, we are persuaded that the Examiner has not
shown adequately how the relationship between that timestamp and its
image corresponds to "timestamps corresponding to the predefined time
window," as claimed. We do not sustain the rejection of dependent claim 4,
and also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claim 14 on the same
basis.
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Rejection of Claims 5 and 15 under 35 USC § 103(a)
Dependent claim 5 depends from dependent claim 3. The Appellants
do not advance arguments specifically directed to the language in dependent
claims 5 and 15, but instead assert the rejection of each claim is in error for
the same reasons as the independent claim from which each dependent claim
depends. Appeal Br. 26-27. As noted above, Kondo remedies the
shortcomings in dependent claims 3 and 13 with the cited portions of Finke-
Anlauff '066 we articulated above. As a result, we also sustain the rejection
of claims 5 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
We REVERSE the rejection of 1---6, 9--16, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
We AFFIRMthe rejections of claims 1-3, 5, 6, 9--13, 15, 16, 19, and
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We REVERSE the rejection of claims 4 and 14 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
This decision contains a NEW GROUND of rejection pursuant to 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (2008). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides "[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review."
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
( 1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered
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by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded
to the examiner ....
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record ....
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
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