12713384 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 24, 2018)

Ex Parte Jessen et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 24, 2018

12713384 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 24, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 12/713,384 02/26/2010 Robert Frederic Jessen 76073 7590 09/26/2018 lnfoPrint Solutions/ Blakely 1279 Oakmead Parkway Sunnyvale, CA 94085-4040 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 8185P085 4611 EXAMINER IOSIF, MARIO CINCINAT ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3681 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/26/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): april.piepenburg@jwmhlaw.com mark. watson@jwmhlaw.com eofficeaction@appcoll.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROBERT FREDERIC JESSEN and KRISTIN REISCHEL Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 Technology Center 3600 Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, DENISE M. POTHIER, and JUSTIN BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judges. BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a), Appellants 1 appeal from the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-14 and 16-34, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b ). Claim 15 was cancelled. We affirm. 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Ricoh Company Ltd. App. Br. 3. Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellants' invention relates to a printing system that includes a user interface to display a banner advertisement. Spec. Abstract. Claim 1 is representative and reproduced below: 1. A printing system comprising: a user input keypad; and a processor executing a display page system, including: a storage device to store content messages to be included in banner messages; and a page generator to select one or more messages from the stored content upon detecting user selection of a job at the user input keypad and generate a banner message that includes the selected messages; a display device to display the banner message; and a print engine to record print data corresponding to the job on a medium. REJECTIONS I. Claims 1-14 and 16-34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101, as being directed to ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2--4. II. Claims 1-3, 7-10, 13, 14, 16-18, 21-24, and 29-33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I02(b) as being anticipated by Korhonen (US 2008/0065477 Al; Mar. 13, 2008). Final Act. 5-9. III. Claims 4, 11, 12, 19, 20, 25, 26, and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Korhonen, Bergstrand (US 2004/0257606 Al; Dec. 23, 2004), and Grannan (US 2007/0244750 Al; Oct. 18, 2007). Final Act. 9-11. IV. Claims 5 and 6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Korhonen and Herf (US 2006/0224448 Al; Oct. 5, 2006). Final Act. 11-12. 2 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 V. Claims 27 and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Korhonen and Bergstrand. Final Act. 12-13. VI. Claims 1-3, 7-10, 13, 14, 16-18, 21-24, and 27-33 stand alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Korhonen and Bergstrand. Final Act. 13-16. 2,3 VII. Claims 4, 11, 12, 19, 20, 25, 26, and 34 stand alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Korhonen, Bergstrand, and Grannan. Final Act. 16-17. 4 VIII. Claims 5 and 6 stand alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Korhonen, Bergstrand, and Herf. Final Act. 17. 2 The Examiner rejects claims 27 and 28 as obvious in view of Korhonen and Bergstrand in two different ways. In both rejections the Examiner finds Bergstrand teaches or suggests the additional limitations recited in claim 27 and 28, from which claims 27 and 28 depend. The first rejection (REJECTION V), is based on the Examiner's underlying anticipation rejection of claim 21 by Korhonen (REJECTION II), whereas the second rejection is included as part of the Examiner's alternative obviousness rejection that includes rejecting claim 21 as obvious in view Korhonen and Bergstrand (REJECTION VI). 3 Claim 15 is mistakenly included in the header and body for this rejection, Final Act. 13-14, but is indicated by Appellants as cancelled by amendment. See Amendment 4 (Claims App'x) (Apr. 12, 2016). Claims 27 and 28 are mistakenly omitted from the header of this rejection, Final Act. 13, but otherwise appear in the body of the rejection, id. at 16. We find the Examiner's typographical errors to be harmless. 4 Similar to the situation described in footnote 2 regarding claims 27 and 28, the Examiner rejects claims 4, 11, 12, 19, 20, 25, 26, and 34 as obvious in view of Korhonen, Bergstrand, and Grannan in two different ways. First, based on an underlying rejection of the claims from which these claims depend as anticipated by Korhonen (REJECTION III), and, alternatively, based on the obviousness rejection of the claims from which these claims depend as obvious in view Korhonen and Bergstrand (REJECTION VI). 3 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 ANALYSIS REJECTION I The Alice/Mayo Framework The Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter broadly: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. There is no dispute that claims 1-14 and 16-34 are directed to one of these categories. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012), and Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014), the Supreme Court explained that Â§ 101 "contains an important implicit exception" for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). In Mayo and Alice, the Court set forth a two-step analytical framework for evaluating patent-eligible subject matter: (1) "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to" a patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea; and, if so, (2) "consider the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements" add enough to transform the "nature of the claim" into "significantly more" than a patent-ineligible concept. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79); see Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Step one in the Mayo/Alice framework involves looking at the "focus" of the claims at issue and their "character as a whole." Elec. Power Grp., 4 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead of using a definition of an abstract idea, "the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen-what prior cases were about, and which way they were decided." Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353-54); see also Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding "both [it] and the Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases."). Step two involves the search for an "inventive concept." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353. For an inventive concept, "more is required than 'well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in'" by the relevant community. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79-80). Step One of the Alice/Mayo Framework At the outset, we note Appellants argue the claims as a group. See App. Br. 8-9. We, therefore, select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and the remaining claims 2-14 and 16- 34 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. Â§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) (2016). Turning to step one of the Alice framework, the Examiner concludes claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, namely "serving advertisement( s) in a banner page of a print job." Final Act. 3. The Examiner compares the idea to which claim 1 is directed with ideas courts have found abstract in the 5 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 categories of fundamental economic activities, methods of organizing human activities, and "an idea of itself," specifically: Alice; Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs.for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re TL! Commc 'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'! Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); and CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). See Final Act. 2-3; Ans. 5---6. Appellants contend a printing system that generates and displays banner messages, and prints a job, as recited in the claims, "cannot reasonably be construed as abstract subject matter (e.g., a method to perform a fundamental economic practice, organize human activity, or to perform a mathematical equation)." App. Br. 8-9. We are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Independent claim 1 recites four key steps of a printing system-(A) selecting messages from stored content messages upon detecting a user selection of a job, (B) generating a banner message including the selected messages, (C) displaying the banner message, and (D) recording print data correspond to the job. We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 as a whole is directed to targeting a banner message, or advertisement, to a user. See Ans. 4 6 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 Although "[t]he Supreme Court has not established a definitive rule to determine what constitutes an 'abstract idea' sufficient to satisfy the first step of the [Alice] inquiry," Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1334, we may look to other decisions where similar concepts were previously found abstract by the courts. See Amdocs (Isr.), 841 F.3d at 1294; see also Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1334--35. In that regard, targeting advertisements to a user is a well-known economic practice, and as such, an abstract idea. See Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2014), aff'd, 622 F. App'x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that claims directed to "targeting advertisements to certain consumers" were no more than an abstract idea). Thus, just as in Morsa, we conclude claim 1 here is directed to an abstract idea. Appellants provide no persuasive argument or evidence showing the claims are not directed to an abstract idea. Thus, for the above reasons, we are unpersuaded the Examiner erred in concluding the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Alice/Mayo Framework Next, we tum to step two of the Alice/Mayo framework to determine whether the limitations, when considered both "individually and 'as an ordered combination"' contain an "inventive concept" sufficient to transform the claimed "abstract idea" into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355-58. The Examiner concludes the claims merely recite performing the abstract idea on a computer using a generic computer system-i.e., "generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional 7 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 activities previously known to the industry." Final Act. 4. We agree that no additionally recited elements add significantly more to claim 1 sufficient to render the claim patent eligible. Specifically, other than the abstract concept recited in claim 1, which includes generating targeted banner messages and displaying the messages to a user, claim 1 merely recites a "user input keypad," "a processor," "a storage device," "a display device," and "a print engine to record print data." These generically recited computing elements do not even arguably recite anything other than well-understood, routine, and conventional computing components carrying out their conventional functions. Nor are the elements recited in any particular arrangement that is unconventional. Appellants argue "the present claims include significantly more than an abstract idea," App. Br. 8, but do not otherwise provide persuasive evidence or argument to support their position, see id. at 8-9. Instead of identifying particular limitations, or an ordered combination of limitations, that allegedly amount to significantly more than an abstract idea itself, Appellants merely assert the claims are significantly more than an abstract idea. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the additional limitations, separately, or as an ordered combination, fail to provide meaningful limitations (i.e., do not add significantly more) sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible application of that idea. Final Act. 4; Ans. 6-9. 8 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 Summary For the above reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1, and claims 2-14 and 16-34 not argued separately with particularity, as being directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection. REJECTIONS II-V The Examiner finds Korhonen discloses every recited element of claim 1 including, among other things, a display device to display a banner message. Final Act. 7 ( citing Korhonen ,r,r 15, 24; Fig. 2). According to the Examiner, Korhonen's printer that prints an advertisement on a banner page also displays the banner page because ''printing is a form of display." Id. ( emphases added). Appellants contend Korhonen' s printer that prints an advertisement on a banner page cannot reasonably be construed as displaying a banner message at a display device. App. Br. 13. To resolve the question ofpatentability underÂ§Â§ 102 and 103, we begin by construing the disputed limitation of claim 1, which recites "a display device to display the banner message." Although we recognize that we must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims, see SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004), we must nevertheless give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, In re Smith Int 'l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382-83 (Fed. Circ. 2017). According to Appellants' Specification, Figure 1 illustrates a printing system 100 including two separate components that perform two separate functions-a print engine 104 and a display 105. Spec. ,r,r 16-17; Fig. 1. 9 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 Appellants' Specification indicates that information either prints at the print engine 104 or displays at the display 105. Spec. ,r 44. Thus, contrary to the Examiner's findings, Korhonen's printed advertisements on a banner page are not displayed advertisements because such a construction would not constitute "an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is 'consistent with the specification."' Smith, 871 F.3d at 1382-83 (quoting In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Therefore, the Examiner has not sufficiently explained how Korhonen's printer that prints advertisements discloses the recited display device. The Examiner further finds Korhonen's administrator receives a print job and an advertisement for the print job's banner page. Ans. 10-11 ( citing Korhonen ,r,r 16, 22, 24; Fig. 2). According to the Examiner, Korhonen "anticipates that there is a display interface or display device that displays advertisement content and banner page content so that an administrator can review the content." Id. at 11. In response, Appellants argue Korhonen' s printer administrator approving and filtering information is not equivalent to displaying a banner message at a display device. Reply Br. 2. We agree. "A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference." Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Korhonen's network system includes a source entity that provides advertising material to an intermediate entity, id. ,r 12, and the intermediate entity, in tum, provides the advertising material to a target 10 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 entity, id. ,r 13. Korhonen's intermediate entity may serve as a trusted source to the target entity when an agreement may be in place between the intermediate entity and an administrator of the target entity. Id. ,r,r 13, 16. Korhonen' s administrator is a person who filters advertising material by choosing which advertising material to send to a target entity. Id. ,r,r 16, 22. If permission is received from the administrator, Korhonen's Figure 1 illustrates that the advertising material is delivered from the intermediate entity directly to the target entity's network printer. Id. ,r 24. Contrary to the Examiner's findings, Korhonen does not expressly describe a display device that displays the advertising material for an administrator to filter advertising material. Although it is possible Korhonen's administrator may filter advertising material by displaying the advertising material, "[t]he mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient" to establish an inherent disclosure for purposes of anticipation underÂ§ 102. In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981). Thus, the Examiner has not sufficiently explained how Korhonen necessarily discloses the recited display for displaying the advertising material. Accordingly, we do not sustain the 35 U.S.C. Â§ 102(b) rejection of (1) claim 1; (2) independent claims 13, 21, and 29, which recite a limitation substantially similar to the argued limitation and were rejected on substantially the same bases; and (3) claims 2, 3, 7-10, 14, 16-18, 22-24, 27, 28, and 30-33, which depend, directly or indirectly, from claims 1, 13, 21, and 29, and therefore incorporate the argued limitation. Nor do we sustain theÂ§ 103(a) rejections of(l) claims 4, 11, 12, 19, 20, 25, 26, and 34 11 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Korhonen, Bergstrand, and Grannan, Final Act. 9-11; (REJECTION III) (2) claims 5 and 6 as unpatentable over Korhonen and Herf, id. at 11-12 (REJECTION IV); and (3) claims 27 and 28 as being unpatentable over Korhonen and Bergstrand, id. at 12-13 (REJECTION V). Notably, claims 4---6, 11, 12, 19, 20, 25, 26-28, and 34 depend, directly or indirectly, from claims 1, 13, 21, and 29, and therefore incorporate the argued limitation. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Dependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious."). Although theÂ§ 103(a) rejections of the dependent claims rely on one or more additional references, the additional references were not relied on to cure the deficiency with respect to the recited display device to display a banner message. Because this issue is dispositive regarding our reversing the Examiner's rejections II-V, we need not address Appellants' other arguments. REJECTIONS VI-VIII We sustain the Examiner's alternative obviousness rejection of claim 1 as being unpatentable over Korhonen and Bergstrand. Final Act. 13-16. In the alternative rejection, the Examiner relies on Korhonen to disclose many recited elements of independent claim 1 including, among other things, generating a banner message that includes selected messages. Id. at 14--15 (citing Korhonen ,r,r 16, 22, 24; Fig. 1). Although the Examiner acknowledges that "in the event that [it] could be argued that Korhonen does not appear to explicitly disclose: (a display device to display the banner 12 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 message)," id. at 15, the Examiner cites Bergstrand for teaching this feature, id. at 15-16. In particular, the Examiner finds Bergstrand discloses a user interface (UI) "for inputting commands and displaying messages associated with the public printer device, whereby the UI can be a separate processing/computing device and/or a digital control panel having a LCD display and keys or buttons." Id. at 16 (citing Bergstrand ,r,r 19-21, 27; Figs. 2-3). Appellants argue the combination of Korhonen and Bergstrand does not disclose or suggest a process of displaying a banner message at a display device because Bergstrand's printing of a banner page is not displaying a banner message at a display device, App. Br. 15 ( citing Bergstrand ,r 33), and Korhonen does not disclose displaying banner messages, Reply Br. 4. We are not persuaded of Examiner error. Bergstrand is directed to a system that facilitates public printing. Bergstrand, Abstract; ,r 14; Fig. 1. Bergstrand's Figure 1 illustrates the system including a computing device and a printing device. Id. ,r 14. Bergstrand's printing device possesses similar elements as the computing device, including a user interface. Id. ,r 26; Fig. 3. Bergstrand's user interface of the printing device comprises components with which a user inputs commands, including a liquid crystal display (LCD) display and keys. Id. ,r 37. "The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results," KSR Int'] Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,416 (2007), especially if the combination would not be "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art," Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 13 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). "If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, ... Â§ 103 likely bars its patentability." Id. at 417. On this record, then, using Bergstrand's printing device that includes an LCD display as a means for Korhonen's administrator to view and filter advertising material before printing the advertising material would have merely yielded a predictable result, and, therefore, would have been an obvious variation to an ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of Appellants' invention. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, Appellants' arguments do not persuade us of error in the alternative Â§ 103 (a) rejection of independent claim 1 as unpatentable over Korhonen and Bergstrand. Final Act. 13-16. Accordingly, we sustain the alternative Â§ 103(a) rejection of (1) independent claim 1; (2) independent claim 13, 21, and 29, which are argued relying on the arguments made for claim 1 (see App. Br. 15); and (3) claims 2, 3, 7-10, 14, 16-18, 22-24, 27, 28, and 30-33, which depend, directly or indirectly, from claims 1, 13, 21, and 29, and were not separately argued with particularity (see id.). Moreover, we sustain the alternativeÂ§ 103(a) rejections of (I) claims 4, 11, 12, 19, 20, 25, 26, and 34 as unpatentable over Korhonen, Bergstrand, and Grannan, Final Act. 16-17 (REJECTION VII); and (2) claims 5 and 6 as unpatentable over Korhonen, Bergstrand, and Herf, id. at 17 (REJECTION VIII), which depend, directly or indirectly, from claims 1, 13, 21, and 29, and were not separately argued with particularity, see App. Br. 15. 14 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 CONCLUSION UnderÂ§ 101, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-14 and 16-34. UnderÂ§ 102(b), the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-3, 7-10, 13, 14, 16-18, 21-24, and 29-33. UnderÂ§ 103(a), the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 4, 11, 12, 19, 20, 25, 26, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Korhonen, Bergstrand, and Grannan, Final Act. 9-11 (REJECTION III); claims 5 and 6 as being unpatentable over Korhonen and Herf, id. at 11-12 (REJECTION IV); and claims 27 and 28 as being unpatentable over Korhonen and Bergstrand, id. at 12-13 (REJECTION V). UnderÂ§ 103(a), the Examiner did not err in alternatively rejecting claims 1-3, 7-10, 13, 14, 16-18, 21-24, and 27-33 as being unpatentable over Korhonen and Bergstrand, id. at 13-16 (REJECTION VI); claims 4, 11, 12, 19, 20, 25, 26, and 34 as being unpatentable over Korhonen, Bergstrand, and Grannan, id. at 16-17 (REJECTION VII); and claims 5 and 6 as being unpatentable over Korhonen, Bergstrand, and Herf, id. at 17 (REJECTION VIII). Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner's decision is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. Â§ 4I.50(a)(l). 15 Appeal2017-007330 Application 12/713,384 DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-14 and 16-34. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. Â§ 4I.50(f). AFFIRMED 16