Ex Parte JeonDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 29, 201311322555 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte SEUNG-HUN JEON ____________________ Appeal 2011-003007 Application 11/322,555 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and KERRY BEGLEY, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-003007 Application 11/322,555 2 STATEMENT OF CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-7. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 8-23 have been withdrawn. We AFFIRM-IN-PART and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Introduction According to Appellant, the claims are directed to a method for authenticating and transmitting personal contents, thus sharing the contents with other parties, by using a display apparatus capable of being connected to a network having a server (Spec. 1, [02]). Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of transmitting personal contents to be shared with at least one acquaintance, by using a display apparatus that accesses a server through a network, wherein the display apparatus comprises a transmission and reception unit, a storage unit, an input unit, a control unit and a display unit, the method comprising: receiving at least one personal content of the at least one acquaintance from the server through the network and the transmission and reception unit when the at least one personal content of the at least one acquaintance is to be updated; Appeal 2011-003007 Application 11/322,555 3 updating personal contents of the at least one acquaintance stored in the storage unit based on the received at least one personal content by using the control unit; and if the personal contents of the at least one acquaintance are requested by a user of the display apparatus using the input unit, reading the personal contents of the at least one acquaintance among the personal contents stored in the storage unit by the control unit and displaying the read personal contents on the display unit by using the control unit. REFERENCES Abrams US 7,069,308 B2 Jun. 27, 2006 REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: (1) Claims 2 and 6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention (Final Rej. 5). (2) Claims 1-7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Abrams (Ans. 4-9). We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011). Appeal 2011-003007 Application 11/322,555 4 ISSUE 1 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph: Claims 2 and 6 Appellant has not presented any arguments to persuade us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2 and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2 and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. ISSUE 2 35 U.S.C. § 102(e): Claims 1-7 Appellant argues the invention is not anticipated by Abrams (App. Br. 9-14). This presents us with the following issue: Issue 2: Has the Examiner erred in finding Abrams discloses “updating personal contents of the at least one acquaintance stored in the storage unit” and “reading the personal contents of the at least one acquaintance among the personal contents stored in the storage unit by the control unit and displaying the read personal contents on the display unit by using the control unit” as recited in claim 1? ANALYSIS Appellant initially argues that in contrast to the claimed invention, Abrams stores all data in the remote apparatus 110 (server) and not in the graphical user interfaces 102 and 104/user devices 106 and 108 (App. Br. 10 Appeal 2011-003007 Application 11/322,555 5 and 11). Therefore, Appellant contends, Abrams does not disclose the obtained descriptive data is stored in a storage unit in the user’s device (id.). We agree with the Examiner that Abrams discloses personal contents and the receiving, updating, and reading of the personal contents (Ans. 11- 14). However, we are constrained to find Abrams does not disclose the personal content or the at least one acquaintance is stored in the storage unit. Although Abrams discloses the user interface means obtains descriptive data and relationship data for users of the system (col. 4, ll. 65-67 and col. 7, ll. 43-45), and the user interface may be any device capable of presenting data, including but not limited to, cellular telephones, television sets, or hand-held “personal digital assistants” (col. 8, ll. 6-12), Abrams does not disclose “updating personal contents of the at least one acquaintance stored in the storage unit” and “reading the personal contents of the at least one acquaintance among the personal contents stored in the storage unit by the control unit and displaying the read personal contents on the display unit by using the control unit,” as recited in claim 1 (emphases added). However, we do determine storing “the personal contents of the at least one acquaintance” in the user interface device/graphical user interface would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention. Accordingly, we pro forma reverse the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 1-7 in light of the new grounds of rejection set forth infra. Appeal 2011-003007 Application 11/322,555 6 NEW GROUND OF REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1-7 Using our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we reject claims 1-7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Abrams. While we have found supra that Abrams does not anticipate claims 1-7, we nevertheless find that Abrams would have at least suggested the invention as recited to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant’s invention. We adopt the Examiner’s findings that Abrams discloses personal contents and the receiving, updating, and reading of the personal contents (Ans. 11-14). As to the recitation that the “personal contents of the at least one acquaintance [is ]stored in the storage unit,” we find Abrams renders this limitation obvious. Specifically, Abrams teaches a user that wishes to invite friends or acquaintances may import e-mail addresses from a standard computerized address book such as Microsoft™ Outlook™ (col. 14, ll. 18-32). As the address book stores acquaintances and personal content, and is resident on the user interface device, Abrams teaches or at least suggests at least one acquaintance and personal content is stored on the user interface device. Additionally, as Abrams teaches “receiving at least one personal content of the at least one acquaintance from the server” (see e.g., col. 7, ll. 43-45; Ans. 4, 5, 10-11), we find it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan to update the address book with the received personal content, such as an updated telephone number, address, or other fields available in a computerized address book, or to update personal content stored in the address book. We also find it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan that if a user requested the personal contents of an acquaintance Appeal 2011-003007 Application 11/322,555 7 stored in their computerized address book stored on their cellular telephone as taught by Abrams, the personal contents of the acquaintance would be read from among the personal contents stored in the storage unit (memory of the cellular telephone) and the read personal contents would be displayed on the cellular telephone display (see Ans. 5-6). Accordingly, we conclude Abrams renders obvious the limitations recited in independent claims 1 and 5. Appellant did not present separate arguments for dependent claims 2-4, 6, and 7, relying instead on the dependency from their respective independent claims; therefore, we conclude Abrams also renders obvious the limitations recited in claims 2-4, 6, and 7. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 2 and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-7 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Abrams is reversed. In a new ground of rejection, we reject claims 1-7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Abrams. This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (2010). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of Appeal 2011-003007 Application 11/322,555 8 the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . . No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) msc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation