Ex Parte Jensen

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 11, 2016

12691571 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/691,571 0112112010
20350 7590 08/15/2016
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
Lee Samuel Jensen
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
84304-777455 (003600US) 1020
EXAMINER
PARK, GRACE A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2157
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/15/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
j lhice@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LEE SAMUEL JENSEN
Appeal2014-009521
Application 12/691,571
Technology Center 2100
Before HUNG BUI, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and
JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges.
BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's final rejections of claims 1-8, 14, and 22-32. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Ancestry.com
Operations Inc. App. Br. 3.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant's Appeal Brief filed June 03, 2014
("App. Br."); Reply Brief filed August 29, 2014 ("Reply Br."); Examiner's
Answer mailed July 03, 2014 ("Ans."); Final Office Action mailed January
3, 2014 ("Final Act."); and original Specification filed January 21, 2010
("Spec.").
Appeal2014-009521
Application 12/691,571
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's Invention
Appellant's invention is directed to a method of identifying and
correcting duplicate, incomplete, and inconsistent records in a database.
Spec i-f 6. In one embodiment, duplicate records having two persons might
contain the same name and the same city but different birth dates. If the
records refer to the same individual, a determination is made as to what
information is more likely to be correct. Id. i-f 19.
Claims 1 and 14 are independent. Claim 1 is representative of the
invention, as reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized:
1. A method for correcting pedigree information, the
method comprising:
providing a computer system, wherein the computer
system comprises a computer-readable storage device;
receiving, at the computer system, a new pedigree of a
first person;
determining, at the computer system, a stored pedigree of
a second person stored in a database at the computer system is
likely to represent the first person at a confidence level at or
above a threshold confidence level, wherein the stored pedigree
of the second person is selected from a first plurality of stored
pedigrees;
evaluating a completeness level of the new pedigree of
the first person and the stored pedigree of the second person by
calculating an amount of information that is present in each of
the new pedigree of the first person and the stored pedigree of
the second person about each of the first person and the second
person, wherein the one of the new pedigree and the stored
pedigree with more information about its respective person has
a higher completeness level;
comparing, at the computer system, data elements of the
new pedigree of the first person with data elements of the stored
pedigree of the second person;
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Application 12/691,571
identifying, at the computer system, a first data element
of the new pedigree and a second data element of the stored
pedigree that are not equivalent;
analyzing, at the computer system, whether the first data
element of the new pedigree or the second data element of the
stored pedigree is more likely to be correct, wherein the
analysis includes statistical analysis which evaluates a number
of records which corroborate either the first data element or the
second data element;
based on the statistical analysis, the corroboration of the
second data element by the number of records, and the
completeness level of the stored pedigree being higher than the
completeness level of the new pedigree, determining, at the
computer system, the second data element of the stored
pedigree is more likely to be correct;
replacing, at the computer system, the first data element
of the new pedigree with the second data element of the stored
pedigree, thereby creating a modified new pedigree; and
storing, at the computer system, the modified new
pedigree.
Cookson
Ibuki
Bayliss
Evidence Considered
US 2005/0147947 Al
US 7,181,471 Bl
US 2010/0005078 Al
Examiner's Rejection
July 7, 2005
Feb.20,2007
Jan. 7,2010
Claims 1-8, 14, and 22-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Cookson, Ibuki, and Bayliss. Final Act. 5-11.
ISSUE
Based on Appellant's arguments, the dispositive issue on appeal is
whether Bayliss discloses or suggests the disputed limitation:
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Application 12/691,571
[E]valuating a completeness level of the new pedigree of
the first person and the stored pedigree of the second person by
calculating an amount of information that is present in each of
the new pedigree of the first person and the stored pedigree of
the second person about each of the first person and the second
person, wherein the one of the new pedigree and the stored
pedigree with more information about its respective person has
a higher completeness level,
as recited in independent claims 1 and 14. App. Br. 7-10.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner relies on Bayliss as teaching the disputed limitation in
the context of evaluating a completeness level of a data record, i.e.,
[W]hen a plurality of records potentially match a search
query, each field of a record is assigned a weight, and the
weights are summed to compute a match score; fields without
values have zero weight; by assigning zero weight to non-
populated fields, completeness of the record is taken into
consideration \'l1hen computing its match score
and "using the weight ... indicative of the correctness of that data record."
Final Act. 8-9 (citing Bayliss i-fi-161, 142, Table II.6).
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner's factual findings regarding
Cookson and Ibuki. Nor does Appellant dispute the Examiner's reasons to
combine Cookson, Ibuki, and Bayliss. Instead, Appellant only disputes the
Examiner's factual findings regarding Bayliss. In particular, Appellant
acknowledges Bayliss teaches ( 1) each data record is provided with multiple
fields with each field having a weight assigned, (2) weights assigned to
different fields of each data record are summed, and (3) scores of data
records are compared and subsequently "used to determine a confidence
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Appeal2014-009521
Application 12/691,571
level as to whether a given data record is in fact the correct record for the
individual being identified." App. Br. 7 (citing Bayliss i-fi-146, 48, 61, 142,
Tables I. I and I.2). Appellant also acknowledges Bayliss teaches assigning
weights based on an evaluation of (1) whether certain data fields match, and
(2) whether certain fields are populated. Reply Br. 2.
However, Appellant argues Bayliss does not teach evaluation of
completeness of a data record. App. Br. 7-8; Reply Br. 2. According to
Appellant, Bayliss' disclosure relates "to the overall completeness of
information stored in a database and to methodologies for accessing
information, and [does] not relate to evaluating data completeness" (App.
Br. 7-8 citing Bayliss i-fi-139, 56). Appellant also argues Bayliss' scores are
not based on the completeness of a data record or an amount of information
in the data record, and do not reflect whether data fields are populated. App.
Br. 7-10; Reply Br. 2-3. According to Appellant, Bayliss' determination of
whether individual data fields in a data record are populated is not the same
as Appellant's claimed "determining the completeness level of the entire
data record." App. Br. 9; Reply Br. 2 (emphasis in orignal).
We do not find Appellant's arguments persuasive. Instead, we find
the Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellant's
arguments supported by a preponderance of evidence. Ans. 2--4; Final Act.
5-11. As such, we adopt the Examiner's findings and explanations provided
therein. Id. For example, as recognized by the Examiner, "Bayliss teaches
the claimed evaluation of completeness of a data record" because (1) the
term "completeness" of a data record as recited in Appellant's claims 1 and
14 refers to an amount of information present in the data record, and (2)
Bayliss' determination of whether each field of a data record is populated
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Application 12/691,571
can be considered as determining the amount of information present in the
data record, i.e., Appellant's claimed "completeness" of a data record. Ans.
2-3.
In its reply, Appellant further argues that "determining whether
individual data fields in a data record are populated [as disclosed by Bayliss]
is not the same as [Appellant's claimed] determining the completeness level
of the entire data record as a whole." Reply Br. 2. According to Appellant,
"[w]eights are assigned based on an evaluation of (I) whether certain data
fields match and (2) whether certain fields are populated," "[b Jut this
evaluation is not a measure of the completeness of the entire data record in
which the individual fields appear." Id. We disagree. As correctly pointed
out by the Examiner, Bayliss' evaluation of data fields within each data
record can be considered as Appellant's claimed evaluation of "a
completeness level" of a data record. Ans. 2-3.
We further highlight Appellant's contention that Bayliss teaches
assigning weights based on evaluating both whether data fields match and
whether certain fields are populated is inconsistent with paragraph 115 of
Bayliss, which teaches counting a field toward a match score if the field is
populated and a match or non-match occurs. Appellant's contention that the
term "non-match" in paragraph 115 is likely a typographical error (App. Br.
11) is attorney argument that does not take the place of evidence. In re
Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). We also note that Appellant
has not provided persuasive evidence to show calculating an amount of
information in a record that is present was "uniquely challenging or difficult
for one of ordinary skill in the art" who can count a field based on whether
the field is populated as taught by Bayliss. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
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Application 12/691,571
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int'!
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007)).
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant has not persuaded us of
Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness
rejection3 of independent claims 1 and 14 and their respective dependent
claims 2-8 and 22-32, which Appellant does not argue separately.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-8, 14, and 22-32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
3 In the event of any further prosecution of this application, the Examiner
may wish to consider: (1) whether claims 1-8, 14, and 22-32 should be
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject
matter, i.e., an abstract idea in light of the two-steps framework set out in the
Supreme Court decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank lnt'l, 134 S.Ct.
2347 (2014); and (2) whether claims 14 and 24--32 should be rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter, i.e., carrier
waves (see i-fi-158-61 of Appellant's Specification) in light of the Board
precedential decision in Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PT AB
2013) (precedential) (expanded panel). For example, the Examiner should
consider whether the steps of Appellant's process claim 1, including: ( 1)
"determining ... a stored pedigree of a second person ... likely to represent
the first person," (2) "evaluating a completeness level ... " (3) "comparing ..
. data elements ... " (4) "determining ... the second data element of the
stored pedigree is more likely to be correct", ( 5) "replacing ... the first data
element of the new pedigree with the second data element of the stored
pedigree, thereby creating a modified new pedigree" recites anything more
than a mathematical algorithm, which is an unpatentable abstract idea. See
Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1973).
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Application 12/691,571
DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-8,
14, and 22-32.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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