Ex Parte Jayasimha et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 22, 201612714810 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 22, 2016) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/714,810 03/01/2010 Doddaballapur N. Jayasimha 026517-0058PX 7532 34284 7590 Rutan & Tucker, LLP 611 ANTON BLVD SUITE 1400 COSTA MESA, CA 92626 12/27/2016 EXAMINER LINDLOF, JOHN M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2183 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/27/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patents @ rutan. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DODDABALLAPUR N. JAYASIMHA, LUC HOA TON, and DREW E. WINGARD Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,8101 Technology Center 2100 Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, LARRY J. HUME, and NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Non- Final Rejection of claims 1—17 and 19—22. The Examiner indicates that claim 18 would be allowable if rewritten in independent form. Non-Final Act. 14. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Sonics, Inc. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The Invention Appellants' disclosed and claimed inventions "generally relate to methods and apparatus for optimizing concurrency in multiple Intellectual Property core systems including target and initiator cores." Spec. 12. Exemplary Claims Claims 1,21, and 22, reproduced below, are representative of the subject matter on appeal (emphases added to contested limitations): 1. An interconnect for an integrated circuit to communicate transactions between one or more initiator Intellectual Property (IP) cores and one or more target IP cores coupled to the interconnect, wherein components making up the interconnect are implemented in electronic circuits, software coding, or any combination of the two, and where components implemented in software coding are stored in an executable format on a non-transitory machine-readable medium, comprising: tag logic located in an agent interfacing an IP core to the interconnect, configured to assign different interconnect tag identification numbers to two or more transactions from a same thread from a first multiple threaded initiator IP core to improve overall system performance by allowing the two or more transactions from the same thread of a first multiple threaded initiator IP core to be outstanding over the interconnect to two or more different target IP cores at the same time, 2 Our decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed Jan. 5, 2015); Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed July 30, 2015); Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed June 1, 2015); Non-Final Office Action ("Non-Final Act.," mailed Aug. 5, 2014); and the original Specification ("Spec.," filed Mar. 1,2010). 2 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 wherein the tag logic is further configured to allow the two or more transactions from the same thread to be processed in parallel over the interconnect and potentially serviced out of issue order while being returned back to the first multiple threaded initiator IP core realigned in expected execution order and eliminates any need for a re-order buffer per thread per initiator core, and wherein an interconnect tag identification number is used to link a response to a transaction with a thread generating the transaction that triggered the response from a first target IP core. 21. A method of routing transactions over an interconnect for an Integrated Circuit between one or more initiator IP cores and one or more target IP cores including one or more multiple channel aggregate target IP cores coupled to the interconnect, comprising: routing a first transaction, from a first thread from a first initiator IP core to a first multiple channel aggregate memory target IP core, in which transaction traffic consists of both non channel-splitting requests and channel-splitting requests, and wherein a first multiple channel aggregate memory target IP core includes two or more memory channels that populate an address space assigned to the first multiple channel aggregate memory target IP core, and the first multiple channel aggregate memory target IP core appears as a single target to the one or more initiator IP cores; assigning with tag logic located in an agent interfacing the first initiator IP core to the interconnect a first interconnect tag id number to a first transaction and a second interconnect tag id number to a second transaction from a first thread from a first initiator IP core being routed to the first multiple channel aggregate memory target IP core; and detecting whether a request of the first transaction from the first thread spans over at least a first and second memory channel in the first multiple channel aggregate memory target IP core and applying interlocks via the tag logic within the interconnect, so that in terms of correctness, all of the responses of the first transaction and second transaction are 3 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 routed back across the interconnect to the first initiator IP core in the expected execution order. 22. An Integrated Circuit, comprising: multiple initiator IP cores; multiple target IP cores including memory IP cores; an interconnect to communicate transactions between the multiple initiator IP cores and the multiple target IP cores coupled to the interconnect; and tag logic located within an agent of the interconnect configured to support dynamic mapping of one tag id space to another tag id space as a transaction moves through the interconnect to allow allocation and de-allocation of internal interconnect tag id numbering during the operation of the integrated circuit, where an assigned internal interconnect tag id number is released for use again by the tag logic when a response, from a given target IP core, corresponding to a last outstanding transaction of a series of transactions associated with both 1) a given thread ID and 2) the assigned internal interconnect tag id number issued by the initiator agent is received back by the initiator agent containing the tag logic that assigned the internal interconnect tag id number. Prior Art The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal: Weber et al. ("Weber") US 2003/0208611 A1 Wiseman et al. ("Wiseman") US 6,810,470 B1 Gehman US 2007/0067549 Al Hamilton US 2008/0301708 Al Nov. 6, 2003 Oct. 26, 2004 Mar. 22, 2007 Dec. 4, 2008 4 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 Rejections on Appeal Rl. Claims 1, 2, 7—9, 15, 16, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Gehman and Weber. Non-Final Act. 3. R2. Claims 17 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Gehman, Weber, and Wiseman. Non-Final Act. 7. R3. Claims 3—6, 10-14, 19, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Gehman, Weber, and Hamilton. Non-Final Act. 9. CLAIM GROUPING Based on Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 8—21), we decide the appeal of obviousness Rejection Rl of claims 1, 2, 7—9, 15, 16, and 20 on the basis of representative claim 1; we decide the appeal of obviousness Rejection R2 of claims 17 and 21 on the basis of representative claim 21; and we decide the appeal of obviousness Rejection R3 of claims 3—6, 10-14, 19, and 22 on the basis of representative claim 22. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments actually made by Appellants. We do not consider arguments that Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs, and we deem any such arguments waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). We disagree with Appellants' arguments with respect to claims 1—17 and 19-22, and we incorporate herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings 5 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Non-Final Office Action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' arguments. We incorporate such findings, reasons, and rebuttals herein by reference unless otherwise noted. However, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1,21, and 22 for emphasis as follows. 1. $103 Rejection R1 of Claims E 2, 7—9, 15, 16, and 20 Issue 1 Appellants argue (App. Br. 9-16; Reply Br. 4—18) the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Gehman and Weber is in error. These contentions present us with the following issues: (a) Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or suggests "[a]n interconnect for an integrated circuit to communicate transactions between one or more initiator Intellectual Property (IP) cores and one or more target IP cores coupled to the interconnect," that includes, inter alia, the limitations of: tag logic located in an agent . . . configured to assign different interconnect tag identification numbers to two or more transactions from a same thread ... by allowing the two or more transactions from the same thread of a first multiple threaded initiator IP core to be outstanding over the interconnect to two or more different target IP cores at the same time, wherein the tag logic is further configured to allow the two or more transactions from the same thread to be . . . potentially serviced out of issue order . . . and eliminates any need for a re-order . . ., as recited in claim 1? 6 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 (b) Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 under § 103 because, purportedly, the Examiner failed to provide proper motivation to combine Gehman and Weber in the manner suggested? Analysis (a) All Limitations not Taught Appellants contend: It appears that the Examiner equates the "agents" of Weber that are located in the on-chip interconnects with the "agent[s] interfacing an IP core to the interconnect" of Claim 1 and further equates the "bridge_agent" and/or "bridge_forward" configuration parameters of the agents of Weber as the tag identification numbers of Claim 1. The "agents" of Weber, however, are not "configured to assign different interconnect tag identification numbers" because the values of the configuration parameters bridge_agent or bridge_forward are only one value of "yes" or "no". Weber is silent if these configuration parameters are assigned to the transactions but even if the configuration parameters of the agents are assigned to the transactions there is only one value for each agent and thus the agents of Weber do not assign different tag identification numbers to the transactions and thus Weber does not disclose the required tagging logic located in the interconnect. To the contrary, Claim 1 recites "tag logic located in an agent . . . configured to assign different interconnect tag identification numbers to two or more transactions from a same thread from a first multiple threaded initiator IP". App. Br. 11. In response, the Examiner finds Appellants' arguments are misplaced because they have "argued against a different combination than what has been used in the rejection of record. Weber has not been relied upon to explicitly teach assigning interconnect tag identification numbers. Weber 7 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 was relied upon to teach the location in which tagging can occur — specifically an agent in an interconnect." Ans. 3. We agree with the Examiner's findings. Appellants further contend, the combination of Gehman and Weber fails to disclose a tag logic that allows "two or more transactions from the same thread of a first multiple threaded initiator IP core to be outstanding over the interconnect to two or more different target IP cores at the same time", and allows "two or more transactions from the same thread to be processed in parallel over the interconnect and potentially serviced out of issue order while being returned back to the first multiple threaded initiator IP core realigned in expected execution order and eliminates any need for a re-order buffer per thread per initiator core". App. Br. 13—14. While Appellants admit Gehman shows use of multiple slaves, they contend Gehman's disclosure is "silent about transactions going to multiple slaves at the same time." App. Br. 14 (emphasis omitted). In response, the Examiner disagrees because "[t]he limitations argued by Appellant pertain to what the tag logic allows. That is, the tag logic is claimed to not prevent the claimed functionality from happening. The logic of Gehman certainly does not prevent the claimed functionality from happening (see e.g. para. [0030-1])." Ans. 4 (emphasis added). We agree with the Examiner's findings.3 3 "The OCP revision 2.0 and release candidate 2.1 order rules are as follows: Transfers within a single thread must remain ordered (rev 2.0); Transfers within a single thread must remain ordered or follow the tag ordering rules . . . ." Gehman 130. "The interconnect and target (slave) can reorder transactions ONLY if they take on the responsibility of resolving hazards/dependencies. A simple implementation of OCP interconnect is to not let the interconnect reorder the transactions." Id. ^ 31. As cited by the 8 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 The Examiner further finds that claim language such as "to improve overall system performance," "potentially serviced . . or "eliminates any need for ..." represent optional limitations, or mere statements of intended use or desired result.* * * 4 Ans. 4. "An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates." Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although "[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim's preamble ..." (In re Examiner, we find these disclosures of Gehman teach, or at least suggest allowing "two or more transactions from the same thread ..." to be carried out. 4 Appellants argue, the Examiner has failed to provide sufficient weight to the limitation requiring eliminating the need for a re-order buffer per thread per initiator core alleging merely that this is "intended use" language. (Office Action of August 5, 2014, p. 4.) This language is at least functional language that interrelates structural components expressly stated in the claims. Indeed, this language clarifies the relationship between structural components, including the tag logic, interconnect, IP cores, and agents. Functional language must be evaluated by the Examiner for at least the reasons laid out in Applicants' January 31, 2014 Response to Office Action. See also, In re Barr, 444 F.2d 588, 170 USPQ 33 (CCPA 1971) (holding that the limitation used to define a radical on a chemical compound as "incapable of forming a dye with said oxidizing developing agent" although functional, was perfectly acceptable because it set definite boundaries on the patent protection sought.) Accordingly, the Examiner must evaluate functional limitations, and cannot merely ignore them. App. Br. 15. 9 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987)), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id. This reasoning is applicable to the contested functional limitations of: [said] tag logic . . . configured to assign ... to improve overall system performance by allowing the two or more transactions ... to be outstanding . . . wherein the tag logic is further configured to allow the two or more transactions ... to be processed in parallel . . . and potentially serviced out of issue order . . . and eliminate[] any need for a reorder buffer. . . . Claim 1. Contrary to Appellants' assertion (see n.4), we find these intended uses or desired results do not further limit the structure of the claimed computer system apparatus.5 Therefore, a question arises as to how much patentable weight, if any, should be given to the contested functional limitation. 5 The patentability of an apparatus claim "depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure." Catalina Marketing Int 7, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). "It is well settled that the recitation of a new intended use for an old product does not make a claim to that old product patentable." In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). See also Superior Indus., Inc. v. Masaba, Inc., 553 Fed.Appx. 986, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Rader, J., concurring) stating: [A] system claim generally covers what the system is, not what the system does. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 . . . (1875) ("The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not."). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 10 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 Even assuming our reviewing court were to give full patentable weight to the claimed functional limitations and recited intended uses, we agree with the Examiner's findings and legal conclusions because the Examiner rejects the claims as obvious over the combined teachings of Gehman and Weber, and the test for obviousness is not what the references show individually, but what the combined teachings would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For these reasons, on this record, and by a preponderance of the evidence, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or at least suggests the contested limitations. (b) Motivation to Combine Appellants contend, "[t]he Office Action fails to show the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the system of Gehman to incorporate the agent(s) of Weber as the tag logic in the interconnect." App. Br. 12. The tags in Gehman are used for tracking the transactions; and thus, they are associated with the transactions. Merely combining the agents of Weber into the interconnect of Gehman, although may supply configurable agents in the interconnect, will not provide the transaction tags that Gehman discloses for tracking multiple transactions because the combination will not assign the required tracking tags. Id. Appellants conclude, from this, that there is improper motivation to combine Gehman and Weber in the manner suggested under § 103, allegedly "because the agents of the combination cannot provide different tag IDs on the OCP bus to track the multiple transactions and the combination does not 11 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 disclose assigning different interconnect tag identification numbers to two or more transactions from a same thread." Id. Appellants additionally contend the Examiner’s rejection relies on an improper motivation to combine the references in the manner suggested because the proposed modification allegedly would change the principle of operation of the prior art invention being modified. Id. According to Appellants, this is because "Weber does not disclose any tagging logic and what Weber discloses is configuration parameters of the agents in the interconnect. . . [and] the principle of operation of Gehman [is changed] by combining the master with [a] slave." App. Br. 13. In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue, inter alia, against various rationales which support a conclusion of obviousness, including rationales not proffered by the Examiner. See Reply Br. 6—7.6 We disagree with Appellants' arguments. 6 These various rationales include: (A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results . . . (B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable results .. . (C) Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or products) in the same way . . . (D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results . . . (E) "Obvious to try" - choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success . . . (F) Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it for use in either the same field or a different one based on design incentives or other market forces if the variations are predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art . . . (G) Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference 12 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 Further, we note when there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,421 (2007). Moreover, we are of the view that using Weber's agent to implement tagging logic would have been obvious to try in the interconnect of Gehman since there are only two possible options: (1) the tagging logic is located in the interconnect, or (2) the tagging logic is located outside the interconnect. We find the use of agents for various reasons, including implementation of logic functions, are well-known in the art, as evidenced by Weber, and is in agreement with the Examiner's findings. In addition, the skilled artisan would "be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle" since the skilled artisan is "a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." KSR, 550 U.S. at 420- 21. Appellants have presented no evidence that combining Weber's agent with Gehman's tagging logic was "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art" or "represented an unobvious step over the prior art." Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. or to combine prior art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention. Reply Br. 6—7. The only such rationale in support of a conclusion of obviousness set forth by the Examiner was "[ojbvious to try" (Ans. 3), which we address infra. 13 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418—19). Nor have Appellants provided objective evidence of secondary considerations which our reviewing court guides "operates as a beneficial check on hindsight." Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese and Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). (See also App. Br. 32, "X. Evidence Appendix") (emphasis omitted). Contrary to Appellants' argument that the combination would have changed the references' principle of operation, it is well settled that "a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements." In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Nor is the test for obviousness whether a secondary reference's features can be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated: [It is error to] assum[e] that a person of ordinary skill [in the art] attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem. . . . Common sense teaches . . . that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (citation omitted). An obviousness analysis is not confined to the explicit disclosure of the references and can consider the inferences a skilled person would make (see KSR, 550 U.S. 418—19); the test is what the combined teaching of the references would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art (see Keller, 642 F.2d at 425). 14 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the combined teachings and suggestions of the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner's resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 2, 7—9, 15, 16, and 20 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. 2. $103 Rejection R2 of Claims 17 and 21 Issue 2 Appellants argue (App. Br. 16—18; Reply Br. 18) the Examiner's rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Gehman, Weber, and Wiseman is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 21 under § 103 because, purportedly, the Examiner failed to provide proper motivation to combine Gehman, Weber, and Wiseman in the manner suggested? Analysis Appellants contend: claim 21 has literally different claim limitations than claim 1 but is patentable over the cited art at least for reasons similar to those discussed above with respect to independent claim 1, e.g., Gehman or Weber does not teach . . . [all the limitations and] Applicants incorporate herein the arguments with respect to the patentability of independent claim 1 laid out above. 15 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 App. Br. 17. For the same reasons as discussed, supra, with respect to claim 1, we do not find Appellants' arguments to be persuasive. Appellants additionally contend claim 21 is patentable because: [A] person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would not have properly combined Gehman, Weber, and Wiseman under 35 USC § 103 to make the claims obvious. Wiseman discloses, "If any previous write requests have the same address, that read request is prevented from being passed to the arbiter 28 . . . Although access to the memory 32 is shown as being through a single channel, one, two or multiple channels may be utilized based on the system requirements." (Wiseman, col. 2, lines 44-51 and Figure 2). Thus, the checking and preventing (locking) in Wiseman happens before the arbiter which is located before the channels and does not occur in the channels. In contrast, claim 21 recites a "method of routing transactions over an interconnect", indicating that all the recited limitations, including applying the interlocks, that are related to routing the transactions are performed in the interconnect (channels). App. Br. 17—18. We disagree with Appellants' contentions. We disagree because, with respect to the combination of Wiseman with Gehman and Weber to render claim 21 unpatentable under § 103, not only are Appellants arguing the references separately, the Examiner finds: At the time of the invention it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Gehman, Weber and Wiseman to comprise a first target IP core that is a multiple channel aggregate target IP core with defined memory interleave segments, and the tag logic is further configured to permit multiple outstanding transactions to the same multi channel aggregate target IP core by implementing interlock logic that eliminates an introduction of an out-of-order return of tagged responses within a given thread from the multiple channel aggregate target IP core. This would have helped to 16 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 eliminate erroneous data transfers such as discussed by Wiseman (see e.g. col. 1 lines 40-52). Non-Final Act. 8. See In re Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097. We find the Examiner has met the requirements of KSR. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418) (the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth "some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness"). Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the combined teachings and suggestions of the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 21, nor do we find error in the Examiner's resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claim 21, and grouped claim 17 which falls therewith.7 See Claim Grouping, supra. 3. $ 103 Rejection R3 of Claims 3—6, 10-14, 19, and 22 Issue 3 Appellants argue (App. Br. 19—21; Reply Br. 19) the Examiner's rejection of claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Gehman, Weber, and Hamilton is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 22 under § 103 because, purportedly, the Examiner failed to provide proper motivation to combine Gehman, Weber, and Wiseman in the manner suggested? 7 "Claim 17 depends from independent claim 1 and is patentable for at least the reasons discussed above with respect to independent claim 1." App. Br. 17. 17 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 Analysis Appellants contend "[independent claim 22 has literally different claim limitations than claim 1 but is patentable over the cited art at least for reasons similar to those discussed above with respect to independent claim 1." App. Br. 19. Appellants further contend, Gehman, Weber, and Hamilton do not suggest dynamic mapping of an initiator IP to the interconnect or dynamic mapping of the interconnect to a target IP as a transaction moves through the interconnect. In contrast, Hamilton specifically teaches processing requests and instructions of a single thread from an IP core in order, i.e., in a first in first out (FIFO) or "first come, first served" order. (Hamilton, | [0027].) Putting the transactions of Hamilton one by one in a FIFO is not "mapping one tag id space to another" which does not require keeping the order .... The first in, first out (FIFO) order of Hamilton is a set fixed order and not the same as allowing transactions to be processed out of order. App. Br. 20. We disagree with Appellants' contentions. We disagree because, with respect to the combination of Wiseman with Gehman and Hamilton to render claim 22 unpatentable under § 103, not only are Appellants arguing the references separately, the Examiner finds: Hamilton teaches allocation and de-allocation of internal interconnect tag numbering during the operation of the integrated circuit (see e.g. para. [0023]-[0027], [0047]-[0050], [0075]-[0076]), and a CAM structure (see e.g. para. [0029]). At the time of the invention it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Gehman, Weber and Hamilton to allow allocation and de allocation of internal interconnect tag numbering during the operation of the integrated circuit and use a CAM structure. This would have provided an advantage of allowing access to data without an address to simplify memory access. 18 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 Non-Final Act. 13. See In re Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097. We find this rationale meets the requirements of KSR. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the combined teachings and suggestions of the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 22, nor do we find error in the Examiner's resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claim 22, and grouped claims 3—6, 10-14, and 19 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. REPLY BRIEF To the extent Appellants may advance new arguments in the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 4—19) not in response to a shift in the Examiner's position in the Answer, we note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellants have not shown. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejections R1 through R3 of claims 1—17 and 19—22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior art combinations of record, and we sustain the rejections. 19 Appeal 2015-007206 Application 12/714,810 DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1—17 and 19—22. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 20 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation