Ex Parte Jayadevan et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 28, 2014

11831529 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte GANESH JAYADEVAN, CARLETON MOON LUCK, JR.,
PANDIT PANBURANA, and VIKAS VASHISHT
____________________

Appeal 2011-010980
Application 11/831,529
Technology Center 2400
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Before JOHN C. KERINS, STEFAN STAICOVICI, and
EDWARD A. BROWN, Administrative Patent Judges.

BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1-17. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 7, 13, and 15 are independent. Claim 1 is representative of
the claimed subject matter and reads:
1. A method, comprising:
receiving a session initiation protocol request to
deregister addresses of record, the session initiation protocol
request comprising a plurality of addresses of record to be
deregistered and a contact address for a session initiation
protocol endpoint; and
disassociating the contact address for the session
initiation protocol endpoint from each of the plurality of
addresses of record.

REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, and 16 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Ginde (US 2008/0062863 A1; pub.
Mar. 13, 2008) and Coulas (US 2008/0089290 A1; pub. Apr. 17, 2008).
II. Claims 3 and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ginde, Coulas, and Kumar (US 2006/0245403 A1; pub.
Nov. 2, 2006).
III. Claims 5 and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ginde, Coulas, and Matamoros (US 6,161,109; iss. Dec.
12, 2000).
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IV. Claims 6, 12, 14, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Ginde, Coulas, and Gundu (US 2006/0183491 A1; pub.
Aug. 17, 2006).

ANALYSIS
Rejection I - Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, and 16
Appellants argue claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, and 16 as a group,
and present specific argument for patentability only for claim 1. App. Br.
10-12. Accordingly, we select claim 1 as representative of the grouping,
with claims 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, and 16 standing or falling with claim 1.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Claim 1 recites the limitations “the session initiation protocol request
compris[es] a plurality of addresses of record to be deregistered and a
contact address for a session initiation protocol endpoint,” and
“disassociating the contact address for the session initiation protocol
endpoint from each of the plurality of addresses of record.” Emphases
added.
The Examiner found that Ginde discloses a session initiation protocol
(SIP) request that comprises an address of record and a contact address, and
a deregistration message that “removes a binding between the contact
address and the address of record” (Ans. 4 (citing Ginde, para. [0029])), but
does not teach a “plurality of addresses of record and deregister[ing]
addresses of record” (id.).
The Examiner found that Coulas teaches a “plurality of addresses of
record and deregister[ing] addresses of record.” Id. (citing Coulas, paras.
[0051], [0062]). The Examiner concluded that it would have been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine this teaching with Ginde to
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“allow a device to establish new connections to the network and to move
existing registration bindings and sessions to those new connections with
minimal disruption to the user such that service continuity may be
achieved.” Id. at 4-5 (citing Coulas para. [0010]).
Ginde discloses:
In the SIP protocol, register messages may include
initial REGISTER messages . . . [and] de-
REGISTER messages. More specifically, initial
registration messages are used by a SIP
communication device to bind the contact address
of the device to its registered address of record,
when no such binding existed previously. . . . A de-
registration messages [sic] removes a binding.
Ginde, para. [0029] (emphasis added).
Appellants contend that Ginde discloses “binding a single contact
address to a single address of record,” and deregistering an address of record
by sending “a deregistration message to remove the binding between the
single contact address and the single address of record.” App. Br. 11
(referencing Ginde, para. [0029]). Appellants contend that Ginde teaches
away from the claim limitation of “the session initiation protocol request
comprising a plurality of addresses of record to be deregistered and a
contact address for a session initiation protocol endpoint.” Id. at 11-12.
Appellants also contend that the Examiner’s combination teaches
away from the method of claim 1 (App. Br. 12) and also would not include
all of the claim limitations (Reply Br. 3).
We agree with the Examiner that Appellants’ teaching away argument
with respect to Ginde is not persuasive. Ans. 16. While the Examiner did
not find that Ginde discloses a session initiation protocol request comprising
a plurality of addresses to be deregistered, as claimed, Appellants do not
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identify any disclosure in Ginde that indicates that its deregistration message
should only be used to remove a binding comprising a contact address and a
single address of record, and not a binding comprising more than one
address of record. In our view, Ginde’s lack of explicit disclosure regarding
such a binding and its removal by a deregistration message does not
“criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the claimed “session initiation
protocol request comprising a plurality of addresses of record to be
deregistered and a contact address for a session initiation protocol endpoint.”
In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The Examiner also explained that the combination of Ginde and
Coulas teaches this claim limitation. Ans. 17. The Examiner found that
Coulas discloses deregistering a plurality of addresses of record. Id. at 17-
18 (citing Coulas, para. [0062]).
In response, Appellants contend that paragraph [0062] of Coulas
actually teaches away from what the Examiner found it teaches. Reply Br.
3. In particular, Appellants contend that the Examiner ignored the portion of
paragraph [0062] that states “[i]t is to be noted that the registration
procedures of the embodiments are unlike existing unprotected initial IMS
registration procedures, which would first deregister . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added). Appellants contend that this portion shows that Coulas “is ‘unlike,’
and therefore teaching away from, what the Examiner alleges it teaches.” Id.
We understand Appellants’ contention is that Coulas teaches away
from the “existing unprotected initial IMS registration procedures” described
following the word “first” in paragraph [0062] of Coulas. We disagree.
While Coulas uses the term “unlike” in reference to “the registration
procedures of the embodiments,” this paragraph does not describe that these
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existing procedures might be deficient for any reason, or that they should not
be used for any reason. In our view, this paragraph does not “criticize,
discredit, or otherwise discourage” the claimed “session initiation protocol
request comprising a plurality of addresses of record to be deregistered and a
contact address for a session initiation protocol endpoint.” In re Fulton, 391
F.3d at 1201. Rather, this paragraph merely indicates that the “existing
unprotected initial IMS registration procedures” are different from “the
registration procedures of the embodiments” in some unspecified way.
Appellants do not apprise us of any error in the Examiner’s findings
pertaining to the description in paragraph [0051] of Coulas, or the
description in paragraph [0062] of the “existing unprotected initial IMS
registration procedures.” In addition, Appellants do not identify any claim
limitation that is not included in the Examiner’s combination of reference
teachings, or apprise us of any error in the Examiner’s stated rationale for
combining the teachings of Ginde and Coulas to result in the claimed
method, as noted supra.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and claims 2, 4, 7, 8,
10, 13, 15, and 16 fall with claim 1.
Rejections II-IV
Appellants rely on the arguments presented in regard to rejection I, as
discussed supra, for the patentability of claims 3 and 9 (rejection II), claims
5 and 11 (rejection III), and claims 6, 12, 14, and 17 (rejection IV). App. Br.
13-14; Reply Br. 5-6. However, because we find no deficiency in rejection
I, we also sustain the rejections of claims 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 17 for the
same reasons.

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DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-17 is AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED
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