Ex Parte James

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 20, 2017

13630205 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 20, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/630,205 09/28/2012 Denman H. James PA20710U; 67097-2031 8402
PUS1
54549 7590 07/24/2017
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS/PRATT & WHITNEY
400 West Maple Road
Suite 350
Birmingham, MI 48009
EXAMINER
TRUONG, MINH D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3654
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/24/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptodocket @ cgolaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DENMAN H. JAMES
(Applicant: UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP.)
Appeal 2016-001311
Application 13/630,205
Technology Center 3600
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 4, 7—10, 12, 14, 16—18, 20, and 21, which are all pending claims.1
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Claims 5 and 15 are cancelled, and claims 2, 3, 6, 11, 13, and 19
withdrawn. See Amendment after Final Action filed May 4, 2015 and
Advisory Action mailed May 18, 2015. We find indications in the record
that claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 15, and/or 19 are subject to appeal to be
harmless, ministerial errors.
Appeal 2016-001311
Application 13/630,205
Introduction
Appellant’s Specification, titled “Multiple Reservoir Lubrication
System,” gives examples of gas turbine engine components that require
uninterrupted lubrication, such as bearings or gears (Spec. 11), and
describes that “[a] sudden change in attitude of the engine could move the
lubricant in the reservoir, moving the lubricant away from a discharge
passage. If this occurs, there could be an interruption in the supply of
lubricant to the lubricated components.” Spec. 12.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the pending claims:
1. A lubrication system for use with a gas turbine
engine comprising:
a first reservoir for containing a lubricant, wherein the
first reservoir includes a first discharge passage through which
the lubricant is flowable in a first direction;
a second reservoir for containing the lubricant, wherein
the second reservoir includes a second discharge passage
through which the lubricant is flowable in a second direction,
wherein the first direction is generally opposite to the second
direction;
a first pump that pumps the lubricant from the first
reservoir;
a second pump that pumps the lubricant from the second
reservoir; and
a manifold to distribute the lubricant to a component,
wherein the lubricant from the first pump and the second pump
flows into the manifold to combine into a common flow, and
the common flow exits the manifold through a common
manifold discharge.
App. Br. 6 (Claim App’x).
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Application 13/630,205
Rejections
Claims 1, 4, 7—9, 12, 14, 16, 17, 20, and 21 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Doell (US 4,511,016; Apr. 16, 1985).
Final Act. 2—5.
Claims 10 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
in view of Doell and Pamin (US 2010/0294597 Al; Nov. 25, 2010). Final
Act. 5—6.
ISSUES
The issues presented by Appellant are whether the Examiner errs in
the rejection of claims 1, 4, 20, and 21 under § 102 as anticipated by Doell
and of claim 10 under § 103 as obvious in view of the teachings of Doell and
Pamin. App. Br. 3—5; Reply Br. 1—2.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
contentions of reversible error. We disagree with Appellant’s conclusions.
Instead, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and reasons as set forth in the
Final Rejection from which this appeal is taken and as set forth in the
Answer. We highlight the following for emphasis.
Appellant argues claims 4 and 14 as a group, from which we select
claim 4 as representative, and claims 10 and 18 as a group, from which we
select claim 10 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Appellant argues the patentability of claims 7—9, 12, 16, and 17 based solely
on the arguments presented for claim 1. Of these, claim 12 is an
independent claim that includes limitations corresponding to the argued
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Application 13/630,205
limitations of claim 1, and claims 7—9, 16, and 17 depend, directly or
indirectly, from claim 1 or 12. Accordingly, claims 7—9, 12, 16, and 17
stand or fall with claim 1. Id
Claims 1 and 4
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding Doell “disclose[s] a
lubrication system including a first discharge passage through which
lubricant is flowable in a first direction and a second discharge passage
through which lubricant is flowable in a second direction that is opposite to
the first direction,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 3. Appellant contends
that Doell does not anticipate claim 1 because it discloses a “hydraulic
circuit arrangement,” which “is schematic and does not show the directions
of actual flow,” and further that “[t]he text of Doell also does not disclose
the claimed directions.” Id.
The Examiner answers by finding
Doell’s drawing clearly shows the relative location of the
structures of the lubricating system and the arrows for
indicating the fluid flow path. For instance, the vertical portion
of passage 2' would clearly direct fluid in a downward direction
since it is removing fluid from an oil sump, which is known in
the art to be gravity fed at a bottom location of the gear box at
element 2. The end portion of passage 12 within reservoir 8
comprises a pick-up funnel, which is indicative of the fluid
being sucked up by pump 9 near the bottom of the reservoir 8
and directed in an upward direction.
Ans. 3.
Appellant replies that the symbols in Doell for the pumps, bearing,
cooler, accumulator and valves are all “known schematic symbols,” and that
“Doell does not state that the diagram shows the actual directions of flow.”
Reply Br. 1.
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Application 13/630,205
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive, because it does not address the
Examiner’s specific findings for Doell’s disclosure of downward flow from
the gearbox sump and upward flow from the reservoir pick-up funnel.
Regarding Doell’s purported silence as to “actual” flow directions, the
question is not what Doell discloses in haec verba. See, e.g., In re Bond,
910 F.2d 831, 832-33 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Akzo N. V. v. U.S. Inti Trade
Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 &n.ll (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (interpretationof
references “is not an ‘ipsissimis verbis’ test”). Rather, the question is what
Doell discloses to an ordinarily skilled artisan. See, e.g., In re Graves, 69
F.3d 1147, 1152 (1995) (system not specifically disclosing simultaneous
monitoring still anticipated claimed invention that required simultaneous
monitoring (citing and quoting In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 936 (CCPA
1962) for the proposition that “[a] reference anticipates a claim if it discloses
the claimed invention ‘such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in
combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in
possession of the invention'1'’'’))', see also In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533
(Fed. Cir. 1985). Despite Doell not positively stating the flow directions
identified by the Examiner must be in opposite directions, Doell depicts
them in opposite directions in the Diagram.
In view of the foregoing, Appellant does not persuade us the
Examiner errs in finding an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood
the arrows in the Diagram represent flow direction and more specifically,
Doell’s lubricant flow directions (i.e., the flow identified with an arrow
going up from a pick-up funnel at the bottom of oil tank 8 and the flow
identified with an arrow going down from a sump at the bottom of
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Application 13/630,205
lubricating chamber 2) to disclose lubricant flow in opposite directions, as
claimed.
Appellant separately argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 4,
which recites “the first direction is substantially upwardly and the second
direction is substantially downwardly,” because “Doell does not disclose
that the lubricant flows upwardly or downwardly and does not disclose any
directions of flow.” App. Br. 3^4. For the same reasons just discussed for
claim 1, Appellant does not persuade us the Examiner errs in finding Doell
discloses the requirements of claim 4.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of claims 1 and 4.
ft follows, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7—9, 12, 14, 16, and
17.
Claim 20
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 20, which
recites “at least one of the first reservoir and the second reservoir
continuously supplies the lubricant to the component,” because Doell’s
“figure shows check valves 13 and 17 on the lines through which the
lubricant flows. The presence of the check valves 13 and 17 indicate that the
flow can be interrupted and is therefore not continuous. The disclosure also
does not disclose any continuous supply of lubricant.” App. Br. 4.
The Examiner answers by finding “the check valves 13 and 17 ensure
a one-way fluid flow in a direction towards the machine components,
thereby preventing back flow. Therefore, the check valves actually ensure a
continuous flow.” Ans. 4. In interpreting the scope of “continuous,” the
Examiner takes the position that the “continuous supply of lubricant can be
construed as a minute timeframe during normal operation of Doell’s
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Application 13/630,205
lubricating system.” Id. Appellant replies that “flow in a single direction is
not equivalent to a continuous flow” and that Doell neither discloses nor
suggests the “minute timeframe” of the Examiner’s interpretation of the
claim term “continuous.” Reply Br. 2.
We agree with Appellant that unidirectional flow, as ensured by the
check valves in Doell, is not equivalent to continuous flow. But we disagree
with Appellant that the presence of check valves in Doell is any indication
that flow is not continuous. Even in light of Appellants’ statement that “the
flow can be interrupted” (App. Br. 4), the flow will otherwise not be
interrupted. As with the disputed limitation of claim 1, the essential
question here is whether the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood
Doell to disclose continuous flow in its described system. We agree with the
Examiner that it does.
Under a broad but reasonable interpretation of claim 20’s requirement
for “continuously supplying] the lubricant to the component,” in view of
Appellant’s Specification, the supply need only be continuous for some
period (such as a minute amount) of time. The system of Doell is “for
assuring a sufficient lubricant supply to the lubricating chamber or chambers
under all operating conditions.” Doell Abstract. We agree with the
Examiner that the ordinarily skilled artisan would understand this to include
continuously supplying the lubricant for some amount of time, as claimed.
In re Graves, 69 F.3d at 1152; In re Donohue, 766 F.2d at 533.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of claim 20.
Claim 21
Claim 21 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein, if the lubricant
moves upwardly because of a change in altitude, the lubricant flows through
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Application 13/630,205
the first discharge passage to the manifold, and if the lubricant moves
downwardly because of the change in altitude, the lubricant flows through
the second discharge passage to the manifold.” The Examiner finds the
structure of Doell mapped to the discharge passages of claim 1 discloses
these limitations. Final Act. 5 (concluding “Doell discloses the claimed
structure [and] thus is capable of performing the function”).
Appellant argues “Doell does not disclose the claimed directions, nor
does it disclose that the refrigerant [sic (recte, lubricant)] is capable of
moving in the claimed directions. Additionally, as stated above, the
directions of Doell are shown schematically, and the figure does not
represent the actual direction of lubricant flow.” App. Br. 4. This is
unpersuasive. As discussed supra for claims 1 and 4, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Doell discloses the claimed directions. The
ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood that the lubricant disclosed
in Doell would move in the recited directions under the conditions recited in
claim 21.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of claim 21.
Claim 10
Claim 10, rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103, depends indirectly from
claim 1 and requires a valve to close “if one of the first reservoir or the
second reservoir is empty.” The Examiner finds Pamin, which discloses
closing a valve when a sensor detects pressure in a lubrication supply
passage connected to a reservoir falls below a threshold, teaches or suggests
this requirement. Final Act. 5 (“The low pressure in the line, as known in
the art, is indicative of having little to no lubricant in the reservoir. As such,
when a reservoir that is fluidly connected to the valve is empty, the pressure
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Application 13/630,205
in the line would be low, therefore causing the valve to close . . . .”) (citing
Pamin 129).
Appellant argues the Examiner errs because “paragraph 29 discloses
using a sensor 108 to sense that pressure in a passage 78 is below a
threshold. Pamin does not disclose sensing that a reservoir is empty as
claimed. Neither reference discloses the claimed features, and the claims are
not obvious.” App. Br. 5.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive. The question is not what
Pamin discloses. The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter
would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the
combined teachings of the cited references. See, e.g., In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Appellant’s conclusory argument fails to identify
how or why there is any error in the Examiner’s findings as to what the
ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood from Pamin’s disclosure.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of claims 10 and
18.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the rejection of claims 1, 4, 7—9, 12,
14, 16, 17, 20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and of claims 10 and 18
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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