Ex Parte Jacobs et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 27, 201911563620 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 27, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 11/563,620 11/27/2006 Paul E. Jacobs 112246 7590 07/01/2019 Loza & Loza, LLP/Qualcomm 305 N. Second Ave., #127 Upland, CA 91786 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 060285 1259 EXAMINER DEGA, MURALI K ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3696 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/01/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com qualcomm-pto@lozaip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PAULE. JACOBS and NIKHIL JAIN Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 Technology Center 3600 Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ALLEN R. MacDONALD, and JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges. SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1, 3, 6, 16, 23, 26-29, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 38-42. Claims 2, 4, 5, 7-15, 17-22, 24, 25, 30, 32, 35, and 37 were cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Qualcomm Incorporated. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants' invention relates to "systems and techniques to authenticate e-commerce transactions using a wireless telecommunications device." Spec. ,-J 1. Exemplary claim 1 under appeal reads as follows: 1. A merchant system, comprising: a network interface; and a processor of the merchant system coupled to the network interface, the processor configured to: receive an e-commerce transaction initiated by a computer via the network interface, where the e-commerce transaction is billed to a consumer's account; obtain an IP address for the computer and a mobile telephone number of a mobile telephone associated with the consumer; send a query to a registry server including the IP address and the mobile telephone number to determine whether the computer has been pre- registered for authentication by a consumer using a mobile telephone of the consumer to authorize the computer as an approved device to conduct the e- commerce transaction usmg the consumer's account; receive a confirmation from the registry server that the computer has been preregistered by the consumer as an approved device for the e- commerce transactions using the consumer's account; send an authorization request to the mobile telephone via a wireless network, after receiving the confirmation from the registry server; and receive an authorization of the e-commerce transaction from the mobile telephone, wherein the e-commerce transaction with the computer is 2 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 authenticated and completed by the merchant system after the authorization of the e-commerce transaction is received from the mobile telephone. REFERENCES and REJECTIONS Claims 1, 3, 6, 16, 23, 26-29, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 38-42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 2. Claims 1, 3, 6, 16, 23, 26-29, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 39-42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim (US 2006/0131390 Al; pub. June 22, 2006), Sulmar (US 2006/0149644 Al; pub. July 6, 2006), Ng (US 2003/0120592 Al; pub. June 26, 2003), Suzuki (US 2005/0033994 Al; pub. Feb. 10, 2005), and Stancil (US 2004/0001088 Al; pub. Jan. 1, 2004). See Final Act. 6. Claim 38 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Sulmar, Ng, Suzuki, Stancil, and Ballou (US 2007/0174467 Al; pub. July 26, 2007). See Final Act. 22. PRINCIPLES OF LAW Patent-Eligible Subject Matter The Supreme Court has set forth "a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 573 U.S. 208,217 (2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). According to this framework, a determination is made to consider whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those concepts (i.e., laws of 3 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas). See id. If so, a further determination must be made to consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as an ordered combination" to determine whether the additional elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-eligible application. Id. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO's January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, Federal Register Vol. 84, No. 4, 50-57 ("Revised Guidance"). Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as fundamental economic practices, or mental processes); and additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55. Only if a claim recites a judicial exception and does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. "The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is well- understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact." Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Obviousness The mere existence of differences between the prior art and the claim does not establish non-obviousness. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 4 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 230 (1976). Instead, the relevant question is "whether the difference between the prior art and the subject matter in question is a [difference] sufficient to render the claimed subject matter unobvious to one skilled in the applicable art." Dann, 425 U.S. at 228 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court made clear that when considering obviousness, "the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007). "The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted). Further, one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually when the rejection is based on a combination of references. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Additionally, a prior art reference is analogous to an application if: (1) it is from the same field of endeavor as the application, regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, it is nonetheless reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As indicated, these tests are in the alternative, i.e., a 5 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 finding of either is sufficient. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992). ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 1 OJ REJECTION Independent claims 1 and 29 recite a system, independent claims 16 and 31 recite a mobile telephone, independent claims 23 and 39 recite a method, independent claim 36 recites a processor, and independent claims 40 and 41 recite a process-readable medium. Thus, under step 1 of the Revised Guidance, independent claims, 1, 16, 23, 29, 31, 36, and 39-41 are directed to one of the four statutory categories of patentability enumerated by 35 U.S.C. § 101 (process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Applying the first part of the Alice analysis, the Examiner finds the claims are directed towards facilitating an e-commerce transaction using registered telecommunications devices between a consumer and a merchant system, after authentication of the consumer. See Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 4-5. The Examiner further finds the concept of facilitating e- commerce is similar to concepts previously determined to be abstract ideas by the federal courts, such as performance of financial transactions, mitigating risk, and collecting and comparing known information. See Final Act. 4 (citing Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); see also Ans. 5. Applying the second part of the Alice analysis, the Examiner finds the claims do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not: effect an improvement to another technology or technical field; 6 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 amount to an improvement to the functioning of a computer itself; or move beyond a general link of the use of an abstract idea to a particular technology environment. See Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 8. More specifically, the Examiner finds the claims amount to nothing more than an instruction to implement the abstract idea (i.e., facilitating e-commerce) in a well- understood, routine and conventional technological environment involving generic computer systems performing generic computer functions. See Final Act. 4-5; see also Ans. 8. Appellants argue the Final Office Action fails to establish a prima facie case of patent-ineligibility because the Final Office Action states that: (a) the claims are directed to an abstract idea (i.e., facilitating e-commerce) without identifying the relevant factors considered or providing factual evidence to support this conclusion; and (b) there are no meaning limitations in the claim that transform the abstract idea into something more without identifying the specific limitations considered or any support or rationale as to why the limitations are not enough to qualify as something more. See App. Br. 12-13. Appellants assert the Examiner impermissibly engages in piecemeal analysis and over-generalizations in evaluating the claims, and fails to consider each of the claims as a whole. See App. Br. 13. Appellants further argue the claims are not directed to the abstract idea of conducting e-commerce, but instead, are directed to a computer network-based authenticated merchant system. See App. Br. 14. More specifically, Appellants argue the claims are directed to the technical aspects of conducting e-commerce (i.e., authentication, security), rather than thee- commerce process itself (e.g., establishing purchase prices, discounts, etc.). See id; see also Reply Br. 2. According to Appellants, the claims are 7 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 directed to an improvement to the functioning of an overall computer system, rather than a fundamental economic or longstanding commercial practice, because the claims address the challenge for authenticating and securing transactions utilizing a two-level procedure, resulting in the merchant system operating more securely and efficiently. See App. Br. 15; see also Reply Br. 2-3. Appellants additionally argue the claims are directed to something more than an abstract idea because the claims include: (1) improvements to another technology or technical field; (2) meaning limitations beyond generally linking the user of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment; and (3) a "new and useful application" in the physical realm. See App. Br. 16; see also Reply Br. 3. Appellants assert the claims are directed to authenticating and securing transactions utilizing a two-level procedure utilizing a computing device and mobile device over two different networks, and, thus, are directed to something more than facilitating e- commerce. See App. Br. 16-17. Under step 2A, prong 1, of the Revised Guidance ( consistent with the Alice analysis), we must determine "whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts," including the abstract ideas enumerated in the Revised Guidance. Claim 1 recites, in part, "receive an e- commerce transaction initiated by a computer," and "receive an authorization of the e-commerce transaction from the mobile telephone." Claims 23, 29, 3 6, and 41 recite similar elements. Further, claim 16 recites, in part, "receive ... an authorization request from a merchant system to authorize an e-commerce transaction initiated by the computer," and "send 8 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 .. an authorization or a denial of the e-commerce transaction." Claims 31, 39, and 40 recite similar elements. Consistent with the Examiner's finding, the aforementioned elements recite a concept of facilitating an e-commerce transaction between a consumer and a merchant system. Commerce transactions between merchants and consumers are examples of fundamental or long-standing economic practices. The Revised Guidance identifies "fundamental economic principles or practices" as an example of certain methods of organizing human activity, which is an enumerated category of abstract ideas. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Further, the fact that the commerce transaction is an e-commerce transaction does not impart patent- eligibility on the claims, as the recitation of "e-commerce" merely amounts to a statement to use a computing system to process the transaction. "[I]f a patent's recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to 'implemen[t]' an abstract idea 'on ... a computer,' that addition cannot impart patent eligibility." Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84). Thus, claims 1, 16, 23, 29, 31, 36, 39, 40, and 41, as well as the corresponding dependent claims, recite an abstract idea. Notwithstanding Appellants' argument that the claims are directed to technical aspects of conducting e-commerce, rather than the e-commerce process itself, Appellants' argument does not change the fact that the claims recite a concept of facilitating an e-commerce transaction, and thus, recite an abstract idea. Because we conclude that the claims recite an abstract idea, we tum to step 2A, prong 2, of the Revised Guidance. As described in the Revised Guidance, we must evaluate "whether the claim as a whole integrates the 9 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 recited [ abstract idea] into a practical application of the [ abstract idea]." 2 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. A claim that integrates an abstract idea into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea. See id. If the exception is so integrated, the claims is not directed to an abstract idea. See id. We agree with the Examiner's findings that the claims do not recite elements ( or a combination of elements) that are either an improvement to the functioning of an underlying computer or an improvement to another technology or technical field. See Final Act. 4-5; see also Ans. 6-8. We conclude Appellants' argued improvement (i.e., causing the merchant system to operate more securely and efficiently via authorizing an e-commerce transaction using a received IP address of a computer associated with a mobile telephone number of a mobile telephone) is not a technological improvement, but, instead, is an improvement to the underlying fundamental economic practice of facilitating an e-commerce transaction, where the improvement is effectuated by using the underlying computer system as a tool to carry out the underlying fundamental economic practice. We further agree with the Examiner's findings that the claims merely recite elements that generally link the use of the fundamental economic practice to a computing system (i.e., merchant system) that includes a 2 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of Revised Guidance). Solely for purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate it under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of Revised Guidance). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55. 10 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 network interface and a processor, where Appellants' Specification discloses that the processor can be any type of a processor, including a general purpose processor. See e.g., Spec. ,i 46. Further, in view of Appellants' Specification, and consistent with the Examiner's findings, the claims do not recite an additional element ( or combination of elements) that: applies or uses an abstract idea to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis; implements an abstract idea with, or uses the abstract idea in conjunction with a particular machine; effects a transformation of a particular article; uses the abstract idea in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment; or otherwise integrates the abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the claims are directed to the technical aspects of conducting e-commerce, rather than the e-commerce process itself, and thus, the claims amount to an improvement to the functioning of the underlying computing system itself. See App. Br. 14-1 7. As previously described, the argued improvement is not an improvement to the underlying computer system, but, instead, is an improvement to the underlying fundamental economic practice effectuated by the use of the computer system to implement the fundamental economic practice. As also previously described, the claim elements, which are allegedly directed to the technical aspects of conducting e-commerce, merely link the use of the e-commerce process to a computing system. Because we conclude that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we tum to step 2B of the Revised Guidance. As described in the Revised Guidance, we must evaluate "the additional elements individually and in 11 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 combination ... to determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself)." Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. We agree with the Examiner's findings that the recited elements of the claims perform activities which are well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Final Act. 4. Consistent with the Examiner's findings, evidence that the recited components, and the recited functionality performed by the recited components, are well-understood, routine, and conventional, is found in Appellants' Specification. More specifically, Appellants' Specification describes that the functionality performed by a merchant system, registry server, authentication device, and telecommunications device can be performed with any type of a processor, including a general purpose processor. See e.g., Spec. ,-J,-J 42-47. Thus, we conclude the claims do not amount to significantly more than an abstract idea. Regarding Appellants' argument that the Final Office Action fails to establish a prima facie case of patent-ineligibility, this argument is not persuasive either. Contrary to Appellants' argument, the Examiner is merely required to provide Appellants reasonable notice as to the basis of the § 101 rejection, as set forth by 35 U.S.C. § 132: [T]he PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in "notify[ ing] the applicant . . . [by] stating the reasons for [its] rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application." 3 5 U.S.C. § 132. That section "is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and 12 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 seeking to counter the grounds for rejection." Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Examiner's findings met this requirement, as the Examiner provided an analysis of the patent- eligibility of the claims and an articulated rationale for the rejection that clearly put Appellants on notice regarding the basis of the rejection and provided sufficient information for Appellants to judge the propriety of continuing the prosecution of the application. See Final Act. 2-5; see also Ans. 4-8. Appellants' argument that the Examiner failed to consider elements of each claim, both individually and as an ordered combination, is also not persuasive. Appellants fail to specifically identify the specific element(s) contained in the claims that the Examiner failed to consider, and that are "significantly more" than the abstract idea. Therefore, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding claims 1, 3, 6, 16, 23, 26-29, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 38-42 recite patent-ineligible subject matter. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3, 6, 16, 23, 26-29, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 38-42 under 35 U.S.C. 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTION We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in light of Appellants' arguments in Appellants' Appeal Brief and Reply Brief that the Examiner has erred. We are unpersuaded by Appellants' contentions and concur with the findings and conclusions reached by the Examiner as explained below. 13 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 Independent Claims 1, 23, 29, 36, and 41 The Examiner finds Kim teaches credit card users connecting with an online merchant system via a network using user computing devices. See Final Act. 6 ( citing Kim ,i 18; Fig. 1 ). The Examiner further finds Kim additionally teaches the merchant server: receives transaction information required for conducting a transaction (e.g., account number and credit card expiration date); sends a notification of the transaction to, and requests authorization from, a mobile device of a credit card user; receives a reply message generated by the mobile device of the credit card user, and analyzes the reply message to determine whether the transaction is approved or denied. See Final Act. 6-9 (citing Kim ,i,i 7, 18, 19, 25, 36, 39; Fig. 1). The Examiner additionally finds the following: • Sulmar teaches a vendor system contacting a user for verification or authorization purposes and using the user's account as a billing account for the user's mobile device (see Final Act. 9-10 ( citing Sulmar ,i,i 8, 1 O)); • Suzuki teaches a device registration system verifying a user is a registered user based on received user identification information (see Final Act. 11-13 ( citing Suzuki ,i,i 15, 173)); • Ng teaches a central registry storing identification information of registered users including a registered user's phone number and credit card information (see FinalAct. 14 (citingNgiJiJ 12, 53; Fig. l)); and • Stancil teaches an Internet Protocol ("IP") address (see Final Act. 15-16 (citing Stancil ,i 41)). 14 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 The Examiner further finds it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the claimed invention, to modify the system of Kim to include the aforementioned features of Sulmar, Suzuki, Ng, and Stancil. See Final Act. 10, 13-16; see also Ans. 21-24. Appellants argue Sulmar is non-analogous to Kim and the claims because Sulmar' s system is directed to billing exclusively in a mobile telephone environment for mobile telephone service and requires a user to make a voice call to a telephone number from a mobile telephone before any billing functionality is executed. See App. Br. 19-21. Appellants also argue Sulmar is based on an entirely different system with materially different functions and/or operations, and thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would not combine Sulmar with Kim, in the manner suggested by the Examiner. See id. This argument is not persuasive. Contrary to Appellants' argument, we conclude that Sulmar is analogous art because Sulmar' s disclosure of a vendor system contacting a user for verification or authorization purposes and using the user's account as a billing account for the user's mobile device is reasonably pertinent to the objective of both the claimed invention (i.e., authenticating e-commerce transactions in order to prevent unauthorized e- commerce transactions) and Kim (i.e., detecting and preventing fraudulent use of credit and debit cards). See e.g., Spec. ,i,i 1-4; see also Kim ,i 2. Further, as previously discussed above, in the context of the obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is not a requirement that references be physically combinable. Instead, the test of obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would suggest to a person of ordinary skill in the art. As previously discussed above, Kim teaches a merchant 15 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 server sending a notification of a transaction to, and requesting authorization from, a mobile device of a credit card user, and Sulmar teaches a vendor system contacting a consumer for authorization purposes and using the consumer's account as a billing account for a telecommunication device. Thus, we agree with the Examiner's finding that it would have been obvious to modify the merchant system disclosed in Kim to include the authorization and billing features of the vendor system disclosed in Sulmar because the combination merely involves the substitution of known elements yielding predictable results. See Final Act. 1 O; see also Ans. 21-24. Appellants also argue Suzuki is non-analogous to Sulmar, Kim, and the claims because the authentication of Suzuki is based on an IC card that contains unique identification. See App. Br. 21-22. This argument is not persuasive either. Similar to Sulmar, we conclude that Suzuki is also analogous art because Suzuki's disclosure of a vendor system that authorizes a registered user for a credit card transaction is also reasonably pertinent to the objective of both the claimed invention (i.e., authenticating e-commerce transactions in order to prevent unauthorized e-commerce transactions) and Kim (i.e., detecting and preventing fraudulent use of credit and debit cards). See e.g., Spec.,i,i 1-4; see also Kim ,i 2. Further, as previously discussed, Kim teaches a merchant server sending a notification of a transaction to, and requesting authorization from, a mobile device of a credit card user, and Suzuki teaches verifying a user is a registered user based on received user identification information. Thus, we agree with the Examiner's finding that it would have been obvious to modify the merchant system disclosed in Kim to include the verifying feature of the vendor system disclosed in Suzuki because the proposed combination merely involves the substitution of 16 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 known elements yielding predictable results. See Final Act. 13; see also Ans. 21-24. Appellants further argue Stancil is wholly irrelevant to the claims because Stancil has nothing to do with authentication and instead discloses a USB stick that is pre-programmed with executable code to automatically generate an IP address of a website containing computing environment data. See App. Br. 22-23. Appellants' argument is not persuasive. The Examiner did not rely on Stancil for teaching authentication. Instead, the Examiner relied on Stancil for teaching the transmission of an IP address. See Final Act. 15-16. We agree with the Examiner that the combination of Kim and Stancil is no more than the modification of the merchant server to utilize an IP address in addition to a mobile telephone number in storing account records in a database for the purpose of sending and receiving authorization requests messages for a specific account. See Final Act. 16. We further agree with the Examiner that such a combination merely involves the substitution of known elements yielding predictable results. See id.; see also Ans. 21-24. Appellants also argue Ng fails to teach or suggest a central registry maintaining a database containing identification of devices that are authorized to conduct Internet transactions, or that the central registry confirms that a user's device is authorized to conduct the Internet transactions because Ng's central registry merely confirms payment. See App. Br. 23-24. This argument is not persuasive either because it attacks the Ng reference individually rather than the Examiner's combination of references. More specifically, the Examiner relied on Kim (in combination with the other cited references) for teaching a server that maintains a 17 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 database containing identification of devices that are authorized to conduct transactions and confirming that a user's device is authorized to conduct a transaction, and further relied upon Ng for teaching a central registry. See Final Act. 13-15. Appellants' argument does not address the Examiner's combination of cited references, and, thus, is not persuasive. Dependent Claim 6 The Examiner further finds Kim teaches a server that locates relevant phone number information stored in a database and designated to handle authorization request messages for an account, and transmits an authorization request message to a mobile device assigned to an account requesting a transaction. See Final Act. 21 ( citing Kim ,i 7); see also Kim ,i 8. Appellants argue there are no teachings or suggestions in any of the references about a merchant server sending an authorization request directly to a mobile telephone to authorize an e-commerce transaction. See App. Br. 25. We are not persuaded by this argument either. Paragraph 8 of Kim discloses that the server "generates an authorization request message ... and transmits the authorization request message to the mobile device assigned to the account requesting the transaction." Kim ,i 8. Thus, we agree with the Examiner's finding that, Kim, in combination with the other cited references, teaches or suggests the elements recited in claim 6. See Final Act. 6, 21. Dependent Claim 26 As previously described above, the Examiner finds Ng teaches a central registry, and further finds Kim teaches a cardholder information database that stores mobile phone number information associated with a corresponding account number. See Final Act. 14, 24 (citing Ng ,i,i 12, 53; 18 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 Fig. 1; Kim ,i 7). Appellants argue, apart from failing to teach or suggest the claimed registry server, the cited references further do not teach or suggest either: (a) a database of identifications of one or more computers approved to conduct e-commerce with a consumer's account; or (b) mapping mobile telephone numbers to each computer identification in the aforementioned database. See App. Br. 25. This argument is not persuasive. Paragraph 6 of Kim discloses that "the phone number information is associated with a corresponding account number and stored in a cardholder information database." Kim ,i 7. Paragraph 39 ofNg discloses a "[c]entral registry" that is "[a] clearing and statement facility that provides basis for identification." Ng ,i 39. Thus, we agree with the Examiner's findings that Kim and Ng, in combination with the other cited references, teaches or suggests the elements of claim 26. See Final Act. 6, 14, 24 Dependent Claim 38 As previously described above, the Examiner finds Ng teaches a central registry, and further finds Kim teaches a cardholder information database that stores mobile phone number information associated with a corresponding account number. See Final Act. 14, 22, and 24 (citing Ng ,i,i 12, 53; Fig. l; Kim ,i 7). The Examiner further finds Ballou teaches a verification server maintaining a registry of subscribing users and list of codes associated with the subscribing users' devices, and further teaches the verification server receives a transmitted code and verifies a particular device using the received code associated with the device. See Final Act. 23 ( citing Ballou ,i 175). Appellants argue Ballou fails to disclose either: (a) a user registering ( or pre-registering) a user device; or (b) a user device is pre- registered using an authentication device such as a mobile telephone to 19 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 authorize the pre-registration. See App. Br. 26-27. We are not persuaded by this argument either because it attacks the Ballou reference individually rather than the Examiner's combination of references. More specifically, the Examiner relied on Kim for teaching a server that retrieves from a database a pending transaction record by matching unique identifying information specified in a received message with corresponding information stored in the database, and verifies that the message is sent from a proper mobile device by matching the phone number transmitting the message with the phone number include in the retrieved record. See Final Act. 22; see also Kim ,-J 9. The Examiner further relied on Ng for teaching a central registry (see Final Act. 22; see also Ng ,-J 39), and relied upon Ballou for teaching a verification server that receives a transmitted code and verifies a particular device using the received code associated with the device (see Final Act. 23 ( citing Ballou ,-J 175)). Appellants' argument does not address the Examiner's specific findings regarding the combination of cited references, and, thus, is not persuasive. Independent Claims 16, 31, 39, and 40 The Examiner finds Ng teaches a pre-registration phrase where a user registers with a central registry by providing credit card information and a telephone number with which the central registry can contact the user to confirm a transaction. See Final Act. 16-18; see also Ng ,-J,-J 39, 41, and 47. The Examiner further finds Kim teaches a system that enables authorized cardholders to designate a phone number of a mobile device for receiving authorization request messages and for transmitting mobile reply authorization messages. See Final Act. 19-21; see also Kim ,-J 7. As 20 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 described above, the Examiner also finds Stancil teaches an IP address. See Final Act. 15-16 ( citing Stancil ,i 41 ). Appellants argue the merchant server disclosed in Kim never receives a phone number of a mobile communication device, which is assigned to receive an authorization request. See App. Br. 28-29. Appellants further argue Kim fails to teach or suggest registering an IP address of a computer and a mobile telephone number of a mobile telephone of a consumer in a database to indicate that the computer is authorized to conduct e-commerce transactions with the merchant system using an account of the consumer, as recited in claim 16, and similarly recited in claims 31, 39, and 40. See App. Br. 29. Instead, according to Appellants, Kim discloses that authorized cardholders designate a mobile device for receiving authorization request messages and transmitting mobile reply messages, and that the phone number is associated with a corresponding account number and stored in a cardholder information database. See id. Appellants additionally argue Ng's disclosure of utilizing a mobile telephone to enter a secret PIN to authenticate an identity of a cardholder during a credit card transaction is not equivalent to the claimed registering an IP address of a computer and a mobile telephone number of a mobile telephone of a consumer in a database to indicate that the computer is authorized to conduct e-commerce transactions with the merchant system using an account of the consumer. See App. Br. 29-30. We are not persuaded by these arguments. Ng discloses a pre- transaction registration phase where a user provides a central registry credit card information and a telephone number of mobile device with which the central registry can contact the user to confirm a transaction. See Ng ,i,i 41, 21 Appeal 2018-003115 Application 11/563,620 4 7. Further, as previously described above, Kim discloses a server that enables authorized cardholders to designate a phone number of a mobile device for receiving authorization request messages and for transmitting reply authorization messages. See Kim ,i 7. As also previously described above, Stancil discloses an IP address. See Stancil ,i 41. Thus, we agree with the Examiner's findings that Kim, Ng, and Stancil, in combination with the other cited references, teach or suggest the elements of claim 16, and similarly recited elements of claims 31, 39, and 40. See Final Act. 16-21. Remaining Claims No separate arguments are presented for the remaining dependent claims. See App. Br. 24, 30. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding claims 1, 3, 6, 16, 23, 26-29, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 38-42 unpatentable over the cited prior art references. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3, 6, 16, 23, 26-29, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 38- 42 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 3, 6, 16, 23, 26-29, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 38-42 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 3, 6, 16, 23, 26-29, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 38-42 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § l .136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 22 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation