Ex Parte JacobsDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 17, 201511852956 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 17, 2015) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/852,956 09/10/2007 Mitch C. Jacobs PD-207093 2203 20991 7590 08/17/2015 THE DIRECTV GROUP, INC. PATENT DOCKET ADMINISTRATION CA / LA1 / A109 2230 E. IMPERIAL HIGHWAY EL SEGUNDO, CA 90245 EXAMINER SMITH, CHENEA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2421 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/17/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte MITCH C. JACOBS ____________________ Appeal 2013-006612 Application 11/852,956 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and KAMRAN JIVANI, Administrative Patent Judges. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1–25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Appeal 2013-006612 Application 11/852,956 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention “relates generally to television broadcasting, and more particularly to a method and apparatus for tracking content played including inserted material in a broadcast television signal.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claims 1 and 13 illustrate the claimed subject matter: 1. A method comprising: generating a first run log at a first automation system prior to broadcasting; generating a second run log at a second automation system prior to broadcasting; and generating a consolidated run log corresponding to an on- air status from the first run log and the second run log. 13. A method comprising: generating a content signal; monitoring a switch having a primary position and a back-up position and generating a switch position signal; inserting insert material into the content signal at an automation system of a broadcasting system prior to broadcasting; and generating a consolidated run log corresponding to the insert material, the content signal and the switch position signal prior to broadcasting at the broadcasting system. REJECTIONS Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Whymark (US 2006/0195863 A1; Aug. 31, 2006). Claims 2–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over combinations of Whymark, Feuer, (US 2003/0004793 A1; Jan. 2, 2003), Griffiths (US 6,286,045 B1; Sept. 4, 2001), Holtz (US 2003/0070167 Appeal 2013-006612 Application 11/852,956 3 A1; Apr. 10, 2003), Atarashi (US 6,173,312 B1; Jan. 9, 2001), and Echeita (US 5,826,165; Oct. 20, 1998). ANALYSIS Claim 1 Appellant contends Whymark does not disclose “generating a first run log at a first automation system prior to broadcasting” or “generating a second run log at a second automation system prior to broadcasting” as recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 5–8. In particular, Appellant argues Whymark’s schedules are not “run logs” within the meaning of the claim 1, as one of skill in the art would understand that “a run log is generated in response to events happening, [whereas] Whymark’s ‘schedules’ are generated to define when events should happen . . . .” App. Br. 6–7 (emphases added). Appellant contends the Examiner’s rejection of the original claims and the Examiner’s current construction of “log” support Appellant’s argument that Whymark’s schedules are not “run logs.” See App. Br. 7–8; Reply Br. 2–3. We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive. First, Appellant has not pointed to anything in the claims or Appellant’s specification that supports Appellant’s assertion that one of skill in the art would understand that a “run log” must be “generated in response to events happening.” See App. Br. 6. In fact, Appellant does not provide any persuasive evidence in support of this assertion. See id. Simply asserting a term has a particular meaning to one of skill in the art does not establish that is the case. Second, with respect to the Examiner’s rejection of the original claims, the Examiner did not conclude the original claims are limited to Appeal 2013-006612 Application 11/852,956 4 devices that “receive, analyze, and report on broadcasted content” and exclude schedules as suggested by Appellant. See id. at 7–8. Rather, the Examiner simply determined that the original claims encompass Whymark’s detection devices. See Non-Final Act. 3. The fact that the Examiner determined Appellant’s original claims are broad enough to include Whymark’s detection devices does not, without more, mean that Appellant’s amended claims do not encompass Whymark’s schedules. Third, the Examiner’s construction of “log” does not explicitly limit the term to past events. The Examiner noted the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a “log” as “a record of performance, events, or day-to- day activities. See Ans. 6. Although Appellant asserts the definition means “a log is a record of something that has already occurred,” Appellant has provided no support for this assertion, and the definition does not explicitly limit a “log” to events that have already occurred. In light of Appellant’s failure to provide support for Appellant’s interpretation of “log” and the absence of an explicit temporal limit in the Examiner’s definition of the term, we will not limit “log” to past events. At bottom, Appellant has failed to provide any persuasive evidence or reasoning to support Appellant’s construction of “run logs.” Appellant has therefore failed to persuade us the Examiner’s erroneously found Whymark’s schedules are “run logs” within the meaning of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Claims 13–16 Appellant argues neither Griffiths nor Atarashi teach or suggest “monitoring a switch having a primary position and a back-up position and generating a switch position signal” or “generating a consolidated run log Appeal 2013-006612 Application 11/852,956 5 corresponding to the insert material, the content signal and the switch position signal prior to broadcasting at the broadcasting system.” See App. Br. 10–14. Specifically, Appellant contends the Examiner “does not allege that Griffiths teaches ‘monitoring a switch’” and, in any event, Griffiths does not use the term “switch” to describe a component “but rather [to describe] an event, i.e., the switch from A to B.” Id. at 13; Reply Br. 3. Moreover, according to Appellant, Griffiths’s use of “the terms backup information server and primary information server. . . describ[e] servers and not physical positions of a switch.” App. Br. 13. Appellant contends that Atarashi does not remedy these alleged deficiencies. Id. In Appellant’s view, because neither Griffiths nor Atarashi teach or suggest “monitoring a switch,” the combination of Griffiths and Atarashi cannot teach or suggest “generating a consolidated log corresponding to the switch position signal.” Id. at 13–14. We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive. First, the Examiner found a combination of Feuer, Griffiths, and Atarashi suggests the “monitoring” and “generating” limitations at issue. See Final Act. 13–15. “[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Second, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner explicitly concluded Griffiths suggests the “monitoring a switch” portion of the “monitoring” limitation. See Final Act. 14, Ans. 10–11. Regarding the claimed “switch,” the Examiner explained that Griffiths’s process of switching from a primary server to a backup server “must be carried out by a computer/processor” and therefore Griffiths suggests a “switch.” See Ans. 11–12. Appellant has not persuasively challenged this finding. Appeal 2013-006612 Application 11/852,956 6 Third, as noted by the Examiner, claim 13 does not recite “physical positions of a switch.” Id. at 11. Thus, Appellant’s arguments about the “physical positions of a switch” are not commensurate with the scope of the claim and are therefore unpersuasive. In any event, Appellant’s unsupported argument has not persuaded us Griffiths’s backup information server and primary information server fail to satisfy the limitations recited in claim 13. Fourth, Appellant’s contention that Griffiths and Atarashi fail to teach or suggest generating the recited “consolidated run log” rests on Appellant’s arguments regarding “monitoring a switch” and “physical positions of a switch.” See App. Br. 13–14. Because we find these arguments unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above, we also find Appellant’s contention regarding the “consolidated run log” unpersuasive. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 13–16 Claim 8 Finally, Appellant argues in the Reply Brief that Griffiths fails to teach or suggest the subject matter recited in claim 8. See Reply Br. 3. However, in the Appeal Brief Appellant simply argued claim 8 recites patentable subject matter because it depends from claim 1 and because as “discussed with respect to claim 13, Griffiths and Atarashi do not disclose monitoring a switch position.” App. Br. 15. To the extent the arguments in the Reply Brief for claim 8 differ from those in the Appel Brief, Appellant has waived those arguments. See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (informative) (“[T]he reply brief [is not] an opportunity to make arguments that could have been made in the principal brief on appeal to rebut the Examiner’s rejections . . . .”). As explained above, we find Appellant’s Appeal 2013-006612 Application 11/852,956 7 arguments concerning claims 1 and 13 unpersuasive; therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8. Remaining Claims Appellant relies on arguments similar to those discussed above for claims 2–7, 9–12, and 17–25. See App. Br. 9–10, 14–17. We find these arguments unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above; therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–7, 9–12, and 17–25. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–25. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED kis Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation