Ex Parte Jackson

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 30, 2017

13226299 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/226,299 09/06/2011 Robert Lewis Jackson JR. RJAC 0390 US 3372
15580 7590
Radio IP Law Group
634 North Santa Cruz Avenue
Suite 210
Los Gatos, CA 95030
EXAMINER
KIM, PAUL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2169
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/03/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ed@radloip.com
tom@radloip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROBERT LEWIS JACKSON JR.
Appeal 2016-008697
Application 13/226,299
Technology Center 2100
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and
JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judges.
KRIVAK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1—20, which are all the claims pending in the application. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
Appeal 2016-008697
Application 13/226,299
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention is directed to “[sjystems and methods for use in
representing a path in a graph of nodes” as an “abbreviated path [that]
excludes one or more . . . primary edges,” which “collectively reach all
nodes within the graph” (Spec. 12; Abstract).
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject
matter on appeal.
1. A method for representing all the edges in an original
path in a graph of nodes as an abbreviated path, the method
comprising a computing device:
determining an acyclical collection of edges that
collectively reach all nodes within the graph, wherein the edges
in the acyclical collection are defined as primary edges, and all
edges in the graph other than primary edges are defined as
secondary edges;
identifying an original path between a first node of the
graph and a second node of the graph, wherein the original path
includes one or more primary edges and one or more secondary
edges; and
representing the original path as an abbreviated path, said
abbreviated path including the first node, the second node, and
all the secondary edges from the original path, but excluding one
or more of the primary edges from the original path.
REFERENCES and REJECTIONS
(1) The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 8, 10, and 16 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based upon the teachings of Demers (US 6,105,018;
issued Aug. 15, 2000) and Johnson (US 8,392,467 Bl; issued Mar. 5, 2013).
(2) The Examiner rejected claims 3, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, and 18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based upon the teachings of Demers, Johnson, and Hao
(US 6,377,287 Bl; issued Apr. 23, 2002).
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(3) The Examiner rejected claims 4—6, 12—14, 19, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based upon the teachings of Demers, Johnson, Hao, and
Li (US 6,772,180 Bl; issued Aug. 3, 2004).
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 2, 8, 10, 16, and 18
With respect to claim 1, Appellant contends the Examiner erred in
finding Demers discloses “determining an acyclical collection of edges” as
claimed; rather, “Demers figure 2 . . . shows many cycles (redundant edges
among nodes), making his graph a cyclical graph” in contrast to Appellant’s
“conventional use of ‘acyclical’” (App. Br. 4—5 (citing Demers col. 7,1. 33,
col. 9,1. 26, Eig. 2; Spec. 25, 45)). Appellant also asserts Johnson does
not teach or suggest the claimed “paths” because Johnson “pertains to trees,
not paths” and “[tjhere is a vast difference between a path and a subtree”
(App. Br. 4 (citing Johnson col. 7,11. 34—56, col. 8,11. 4^48; Spec. 12, 29,
43, 51, 73—75); see also Reply Br. 2—3). Appellant additionally contends the
Examiner’s combination of Demers and Johnson does not teach or suggest
the claimed abbreviated path including “all the secondary edges from the
original path, but excluding one or more of the primary edges from the
original path” (Reply Br. 11; see also App. Br. 6—7; Reply Br. 8—9, 12).
Particularly, Appellant argues Johnson does not teach an original path (App.
Br. 4), and Johnson’s subtree and Demers’ augmenting path and spanning
tree do not teach or suggest an abbreviated path (App. Br. 5—6; Reply Br. 5,
11). Lastly, Appellant asserts the Examiner’s rejection lacks articulated
reasoning and does not acknowledge secondary considerations of the
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Appellant’s invention overcoming a long-felt need (App. Br. 7; Reply Br.
11). We do not agree.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings as our own.
Particularly, we agree with the Examiner Demers’ acyclic graph “read[s]
upon the claimed feature of ‘an acyclical collection of edges’” (Ans. 3).
Demers’ “term ‘acyclic’ means that the edges do not form loops in the
graph,” thus, “directed edges would eventually terminate in a node having
no edge emanating therefrom” (see Demers col. 7,11. 35—40), which is
commensurate with the description of “acyclical” in Appellant’s
Specification.1 Appellant’s argument that Demers’ directed graph with
“many cycles” does not teach Appellant’s “undirected acyclical graph” is
not commensurate with the scope of claim 1 (Reply Br. 4; App. Br. 5).
Claim 1 does not recite an undirected acyclical graph, but only recites a
graph including “an acyclical collection of edges that collectively reach all
nodes within the graph.” Additionally, we agree with the Examiner that
(i) Demers’s Figure 2 teaches the claimed graph, and (ii) Demers’ acyclical
spanning tree teaches the claimed “acyclical collection of edges that
collectively reach all nodes within the graph . . . defined as primary edges”
(Ans. 3^4; Final Act. 3 (citing Demers col. 9,11. 12—28)).
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Johnson’s
trees are unrelated to the claimed paths (App. Br. 4; Reply Br. 2—3).
Johnson’s tree includes nodes reached by links, which is commensurate with
1 Appellant’s Specification describes “cycles'’ are formed by “redundant
edges among nodes,” while “an acyclical collection of edges” is “a
collection that includes no redundant edges between any two nodes''’ (Spec.
25, 45 (emphases added)).
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the broad description of “path” in Appellant’s Specification (Ans. 2 (citing
Johnson col. 7,11. 34—56, Figs. 7—8)).2 Appellant’s additional argument that
Johnson does not teach Appellant’s “‘path’ . . . representing traversal from a
first node to a last node, wherein the first and last nodes have exactly one
connecting edge, and all intermediate nodes have exactly two connecting
edges” is not commensurate with the scope of claim 1, which does not
specify a number of connecting edges for nodes (App. Br. 4; Reply Br. 3).
As to Appellant’s arguments that Demers and Johnson do not teach or
suggest representing an original path as an abbreviated path, Appellant
improperly attacks the references individually where the rejection is based
on a combination. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
Particularly, Appellant argues Johnson does not identify an original path
(App. Br. 4, 6). The Examiner, however, also finds Demers’ Figure 2
teaches this feature (Final Act. 3^4 (citing Demers col. 9,11. 12—28, Fig 2)).
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Demers’ Figure 2 includes an
original path between a first node and a second node, the original path
having edges “within a spanning tree” {primary edges) and “edges which are
not to be used within the spanning tree” (secondary edges) (Ans. 4; Final
Act. 3^4 (citing Demers col. 9,11. 12—18, col. 11,11. 54—67)).
Appellant also argues Johnson’s subtree and Demers’ augmenting
path and spanning tree do not teach or suggest an abbreviated path including
all secondary edges from an original path and excluding one or more
primary edges from the original path (Reply Br. 5—6, 9; App. Br. 5—6).
2 Appellant’s Specification explains that a “path” includes a tree’s nodes and
edges/links (see Spec. H 30, 74)), and a tree can be “a simple path or a tree
combining multiple paths” (see Spec. 151).
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Appellant’s arguments again do not address the Examiner’s rejection based
on the combination of references, in which the Examiner relies on
(i) Demers’ augmented path for the claimed abbreviated path “including the
first node, the second node, and all the secondary edges from the original
path,” and (ii) Johnson’s subtree of a binary tree for the claimed abbreviated
path “excluding one or more of the primary edges from the original path”
(Ans. 3).
We agree with the Examiner that Demers’ augmented path including
“the edges represented by dashed arrows [that] are in the graph but not in the
[graph’s] spanning tree” (i.e., secondary edges) teaches an abbreviated path
including secondary edges from an original path, as claimed (Ans. 3^4; Final
Act. 3^4 (citing Demers col. 9,11. 12—18, col. 14,11. 10-25)). Appellant
merely states, “Demers’ augmenting path cannot be analogized to
Applicant’s abbreviated path” without persuasive evidence or reasoning as
to why this would be the case (App. Br. 5).
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner that Johnson’s subtree—
“including] a specific set of nodes [but] not each and every edge” in a
binary tree—teaches and suggests an abbreviated path excluding one or
more primary edges from an original path, as claimed (Ans. 2—3 (citing
Johnson Figs. 7—8)). Appellant argues Johnson’s subtree has child links, not
primary edges that “on their own, by definition, span the entire graph”
(Reply Br. 6; App. Br. 6). Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with
the scope of claim 1, which does not require the primary edges to span the
graph on their own, but only requires the primary edges to “collectively
reach all nodes within the graph.” The Examiner’s findings that Johnson’s
subtree’s links are primary edges as claimed is correct because Johnson’s
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links also form an acyclical collection collectively reaching all nodes within
Johnson’s binary tree (see Johnson Fig. 7).
The Examiner has also articulated sufficient reasoning for
abbreviating Demers’ augmenting path to exclude one or more primary
edges as taught by Johnson, for the predictable result of representing
subtrees in a tree (Ans. 5, 7). We agree with the Examiner that it would
have been known to a skilled artisan at the time of Appellant’s invention to
abbreviate Demers’ augmenting path to exclude one or more primary edges.
Particularly, a skilled artisan would have recognized that abbreviating
Demers’ augmenting path to exclude primary edges would yield the
predictable result of recursively reducing the augmenting path (Ans. 3—4).
Such recursive reduction is useful for “determining a minimum leaf
spanning tree . . . [whose] nodes correspond to anticipated query types”
(Ans. 6; Final Act. 3; see Demers Abstract (describing recursive adjustment
of an augmenting path)).
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument directed to long
felt need as a secondary consideration. Appellant has cited insufficient
evidence of secondary considerations, which our reviewing court guides
“operates as a beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Systems, Inc. v. Tetra
Pak Cheese and Powder Sys., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Nor
has Appellant shown the claimed features are responsible for producing the
specified benefits or provided additional evidence (Wyers v. Master Lock
Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (a nexus must be established
“between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” (citation
and quotations omitted; emphasis omitted)); App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 10).
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In light of the broad terms recited in claim 1 and the arguments
presented, Appellant has failed to clearly distinguish the claimed invention
over the prior art relied on by the Examiner. Thus, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred and sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1,
and independent claims 8 and 16 argued for substantially the same reasons
(App. Br. 8). We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims
2, 10, and 18, argued for their dependency (App. Br. 8, 15).
Claims 3 and 11
Appellant contends Hao’s “user clicks on just a single child node . . .
[t]he user does not select a first node and a second node, as recited in claims
3 and 11” (Reply Br. 12 (citing Hao col. 5,11. 7—27); see also App. Br. 12).
Appellant also argues Hao’s processor merely “performs a mapping and an
unmapping operation, which is not relevant to automatically determing[sic]
an original path, as ‘original path’ is defined in claims 1 and 8” (Reply Br.
12).
As discussed supra with respect to claims 1 and 8, we agree with the
Examiner that the combination of Demers and Johnson teaches and suggests
the original path recited claims 1 and 8. We also agree with the Examiner’s
finding that Hao’s “user may select the child node (i.e. select either a first or
second nodefi when the user “click[s] on a child node that has a secondary
path” to visualize the node’s multi-paths (Ans. 8 (citing Hao col. 5,11. 7—27)
(emphasis added); Final Act. 4—5). Thus, Hao teaches and suggests
receiving a selection of first and second nodes from a user, as claimed (Ans.
8).
Additionally, we agree the Examiner’s combination of Hao’s
automatically mapping a secondary subtree to a selected/clicked node to
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visualize the secondary subtree, with Demers’ computer system determining
a minimum leaf spanning tree for anticipated query types, teaches and
suggests the automatically determining the original path based only on end
nodes’ selection as claimed (see Hao col. 5,11. 7—27; Demers Abstract; Ans.
8). Appellant’s arguments do not address these findings by the Examiner as
they do not argue the combination of Demers and Hao.
Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 11. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 11.
Claims 4 and 12
Appellant contends Hao’s “hyperbolic spaces with multi-paths ... are
not relevant to an abbreviated path as defined in parent claims 1 and 8”
(App. Br. 16). However, as discussed supra with respect to claims 1 and 8,
we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Demers and Johnson
teaches and suggests the abbreviated path of claims 1 and 8.
Appellant also argues Li does not teach the claimed abbreviated path
representation because Li “lists all of the nodes in the path” in contrast to
Appellant’s claims 4 and 12—in which “non-end nodes on primary edge
paths are not included in the textual representation of the path” (App. Br.
16). Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the scope of claims 4
and 12, which do not require “non-end nodes on primary edge paths” to be
excluded from the claimed textual representation. Rather, claims 4 and 12
only require primary edges to be excluded from the abbreviated path
representation, by virtue of base claims 1 and 8.
We also agree the combination of Li’s textual path representation,
with the abbreviated path taught by Demers and Johnson teaches and
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suggests creating and outputting a textual representation of the abbreviated
path, as recited in claims 4 and 12 (Ans. 9; Final Act. 6—7). As Appellant’s
arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 4
and 12, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.
Claims 5, 13, and 19
Dependent claim 5 recites “outputting . . . said textual representation
[of the abbreviated path] excluding at least one node from the path.” Claims
13 and 19 similarly recite a “textual representation excluding at least one
node from the path.” The Examiner finds Demers, Johnson, and Hao’s
teaching of selecting specific nodes and paths with Li’s teaching of a “path
table in the form of a textual representation” suggest “only selected endpoint
nodes may be provided in a textual representation” (Ans. 9—10).
Appellant argues although Hao’s mapping/unmapping moves nodes in
a tree, “Hao displays all nodes in the graph in every state,” thus, the “number
of nodes remains consistently n” (App. Br. 11). Similarly, “Li lists all of the
nodes in the path,” and therefore “Li outputs every node, not ‘only those
nodes that are endpoint nodes of each secondary edge in the abbreviated
path’” as claimed (App. Br. 16—17; see also Reply Br. 15). We agree with
Appellant neither Hao nor Li teaches a textual path representation excluding
at least one path node', rather, Li and Hao display all the path’s nodes (see Li
Fig. 5; Hao Abstract). The Examiner also has not shown that Demers and
Johnson output a path’s representation excluding at least one node from that
path.
As the Examiner has not identified sufficient evidence to support the
rejection of claims 5, 13, and 19, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 5, 13, and 19. Because we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of
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claims 5 and 13, we also reverse the rejection of claims 6 and 14, dependent
therefrom.
Claims 7 and 15
Dependent claim 7 recites “reconstructing the original path from the
abbreviated path based on the derived primary edges.” Claim 15 similarly
recites the “reconstructing” limitation using commensurate language. The
Examiner finds Hao identifies multi-path nodes with hidden secondary
connections that can be mapped or unmapped, suggesting “to one of
ordinary skill in the art that an original path may be derived from the
abbreviated path based on the derived primary edges” (Ans. 9 (citing Hao
col. 5,11. 46—61); see also Final Act. 5—6 (citing Hao col. 3,11. 11—28, col. 6,
11. 30-40; Fig. 10).
Appellant argues Hao’s mapping and unmapping merely “determin[e]
whether a selected [multi-path] node has ‘secondary paths’ (i.e., hidden
outgoing edges) emanating from it” and “show[] [the] ‘secondary paths’
from [the] selected node” (App. Br. 13—14); however, “Hao doesn’t
reconstruct anything in his mapping/unmapping operation^ but] simply
moves a sub-tree” from a root node’s primary path to a different, secondary
path at a multi-path node (Reply Br. 14 (emphasis added)). We agree with
Appellant. The cited portions of Hao do not reconstruct a primary/original
path from an abbreviation of that path, as required by claims 7 and 15 (App.
Br. 14—15 (citing Hao Fig. 10)). As the Examiner has not identified
sufficient evidence to support the rejection of claims 7 and 15, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7 and 15.
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Claims 9 and 17
The Examiner finds Hao’s Figures 6, 10, and 11 teach and suggest
depicting primary edges from an original path as a single primary edge
(Final Act. 5—6 (citing Hao col. 6,11. 30-40; Figs. 6, 10-11)).
Appellant contends Hao does not teach or suggest depicting multiple
edges as a single edge, as required by claims 9 and 17; rather, Hao’s
graphical representation merely distinguishes between multi-path nodes and
other graph nodes, and “hide[s] edges (for example, ‘secondary paths’ in the
‘idle state’)” (App. Br. 14—15). We agree with Appellant. We have
reviewed the cited portions of Hao and do not find support for the
Examiner’s findings. In particular, Hao’s Figures 6, 10, and 11 merely
move subtrees from a root node’s primary path to a multi-path node’s
secondary path, but do not depict multiple edges as a single edge, as
claimed. The Examiner’s Answer does not respond to Appellant’s
arguments.
As the Examiner has not identified sufficient evidence to support the
rejection of claims 9 and 17, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 9 and 17.
Claim 20
The Examiner finds Li’s path table including a path of “q.r.s.v.w” for
a data element suggests “[Hao’s] multi-path nodes may be represented in the
form of a character string separated by the delimiting character” as required
by the claim (Ans. 10; Final Act. 7—8 (citing Li col. 5,11. 32—58; Figs. 5,
12)).
Appellant argues Li’s path table “delimits every node of the path” in
contrast to claim 20 which recites “delimiters between just those nodes that
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are endpoint nodes of each secondary edge in the abbreviated path” (App.
Br. 16—17). We agree with Appellant Li does not teach a textual
representation with delimiters just between endpoint nodes of secondary
edges. Rather, Li’s textual representation displays delimiters between all the
path’s nodes, including endpoint nodes of primary edges (see Li Fig. 5,
primary edge endpoint node “q” is delimited in “q.r.s.v.w”). The cited
portions of Hao, Demers, and Johnson do not disclose delimiters in textual
representations, and therefore do not make up for the above-noted
deficiencies of Li. As the Examiner has not identified sufficient evidence to
support the rejection of claim 20, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claim 20.
OTHER ISSUES
In the event of any further prosecution of this application, the
Examiner may wish to consider rejecting claims 1, 8 and 16 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter, i.e., an abstract
idea in light of the Supreme Court decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Banklnt’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).
In Alice, the Supreme Court sets forth an analytical “framework for
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts.” Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1296—97 (2012)). The first step in the analysis
is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. For example, abstract ideas include, but are
not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing
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human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical formulas or
relationships. Id. at 2355—57.
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second
step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims “individually
and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional
elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1297—98). In other words, the
second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at
1294). The prohibition against patenting an abstract idea “‘cannot be
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular
technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’”
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610—11 (2010). A claim reciting an abstract
idea also does not become eligible “merely by adding the words ‘apply it.’”
Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
In the first step of the framework set out in Alice, the Examiner may
wish to consider whether Appellant’s claims 1, 8, and 16 are directed to a
patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract concept of mathematically
manipulating data to modify characteristics of the data and generate
additional data. All the steps of Appellant’s claim 1, including, for example:
i) determining an acyclical collection of edges that collectively reach all
nodes within a graph; ii) identifying an original path; and iii) representing
the original path as an abbreviated path, are abstract mathematical concepts
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and algorithms that could be performed in the human mind, or by a human
using a pen and paper, without need of any computer or other machine. See
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372—73 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“[A] method that can be performed by human thought alone is
merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.”); see also In
re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[Mjental processes—or
processes of human thinking—standing alone are not patentable even if they
have practical application.”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)
(“Phenomena of nature . . . , mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work” (emphasis added)). Additionally, mental processes
remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user
of what once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.").
Furthermore, data analysis and algorithms are abstract ideas. See,
e.g., Alice 134 S.Ct. at 2355; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 594—95
(1978) (“Reasoning that an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law
of nature, Benson applied the established rule that a law of nature cannot be
the subject of a patent.”); Benson, 409 U.S. at 71—72. That is, “[wjithout
additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to
manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not
patent eligible.” Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758
F.3d 1344, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Data in its ethereal, non-physical
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form is simply information that does not fall under any of the categories of
eligible subject matter under section 101.”).
In the second step of the framework set out in Alice, the Examiner
may wish to consider whether Appellant’s claims 1,8, and 16 recite any
“inventive concept” or “an element or combination of elements” that
amounts to significantly more than the recited abstract concept. See Alice,
134 S.Ct. at 2357 (“[W]e must examine the elements of the claim to
determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea]”’ (citations omitted)).
We leave it to the Examiner to determine if Appellant’s independent
claims 1, 8, and 16 are directed to no more than a patent-ineligible abstract
idea under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and claims 2—7, 9-15, and 17—20, dependent
therefrom.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—4, 8, 10-12, 16, and 18 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 5—7, 9, 13—15, 17, 19, and
20 is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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