Ex Parte Ivanov et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 23, 201813955186 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/955, 186 07 /31/2013 Plamen A. Ivanov 26227 7590 03/27/2018 FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. P.O. BOX 1022 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16113-6317001 1063 EXAMINER NGUYEN, TIMOTHY ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2657 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/27/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): P ATDOCTC@fr.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PLAMEN A. IVANOV, KEVIN J. BASTYR, JOEL A. CLARK, MARK A. JASIUK, TENKASI V. RAMABADRAN, and JINCHENG WU Appeal2017-004165 Application 13/955,186 1 Technology Center 2600 Before JOHN A. EV ANS, HUNG H. BUI, and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. BUI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's Final Office Action rejecting claims 1-10 and 23-34. Claims 11-22 have been cancelled. App. Br. 13. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 2 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Google Inc. App. Br. 1. 2 Our Decision refers to Appellants' Appeal Brief filed April 26, 2016 ("App. Br."); Reply Brief filed January 17, 2017 ("Reply Br."); Examiner's Answer mailed November 23, 2016 ("Ans."); Final Office Action mailed October 7, 2015 ("Final Act."); and original Specification filed July 31, 2013 ("Spec."). Appeal2017-004165 Application 13/955186 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants' invention relates to "voice signal processing for voice recognition systems." Spec. i-f 2. Claims 1, 23, and 33 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter, as reproduced below with disputed limitations in italics: 1. A method comprising: monitoring an audio signal energy level of an audio signal while a voice activity detector and one or more signal processing components are deactivated; determining that the audio signal energy level has changed; and based on determining that the audio signal energy level has changed, activating the voice activity detector and at least one of the one or more signal processing components. App. Br. 12 (Claims App'x.). Evidence Considered Lu US 9,094,744 Bl July 28, 2015 Hennecke US 2008/0249779 Al Oct. 9, 2008 Visser II US 2008/0201138 Al Aug. 21, 2008 Song US 2008/0159560 Al July 3, 2008 Viser US 2007 /0021958 Al Jan.25,2007 Borth us 4,630,304 Dec. 16, 1986 Examiner's Rejections (1) Claims 1-3, 23-25, 33, and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Visser and Lu. Final Act. 2-5. 2 Appeal2017-004165 Application 13/955186 (2) Claims 4 and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Visser, Lu, and Borth. Final Act. 5---6. (3) Claims 5 and 27 stand rejected under35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Visser, Lu, and Song. Final Act. 6-8. (4) Claims 6 and 28 stand rejected under35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Visser, Lu, and Hennecke. Final Act. 8-9. (5) Claims 7-10 and 29-32 stand rejected under35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Visser and Visser II. Final Act. 9-11. Issue on Appeal Based on Appellants' arguments, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the combination of Visser and Lu teaches or suggests two disputed limitations, including: ( 1) "monitoring an audio signal energy level of an audio signal while a voice activity detector and one or more signal processing components are deactivated"; and (2) "based on determining that the audio signal energy level has changed, activating the voice activity detector and at least one of the one or more signal processing components" as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 23 and 33. See App. Br. 4---6; Reply Br. 1. ANALYSIS Claims 1, 23, and 33 Independent claim 1 (and similarly, claims 23 and 33) recites a method comprising two broad steps: (1) "monitoring an audio signal energy level of an audio signal while a voice activity detector and one or more 3 Appeal2017-004165 Application 13/955186 signal processing components are deactivated" and (2) "based on determining that the audio signal energy level has changed, activating the voice activity detector and at least one of the one or more signal processing components." In support of the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 23, and 33, the Examiner finds the combination of Visser and Lu teaches all the limitations. In particular, the Examiner finds Visser teaches (1) "monitoring an audio signal energy level of signal processing components deactivated" (Final Act. 3(citing Visser i-fi-140, 55-57, 60 and Fig. 2)), (2) "determining that the audio signal energy level has changed" and even suggests (3) "activating control signal." Id. (citing Visser i-fi-122, 43, 45, 51, Figs. 1-3). Visser's Figure 1 is reproduced below: I 1cm .~----.· me SH~NAl SE'.PA:RATION PROCESS 123 TRANSM~SStON 1 Visser's Figure 1 shows speech processing system 100 including microphones 102-104 to monitor speech (i.e., audio signal), and voice activity detector 106 to activate signal separation process when speech is occurrmg. 4 Appeal2017-004165 Application 13/955186 To the extent necessary, the Examiner relies on Lu for expressly teaching "activating the voice activity detector and at least one of the one or more signal processing components [when the audio signal energy level has changed]" to support the conclusion of obviousness. Ans. 3--4 (citing Lu 2:63-3:12, 4:23-36, 6:45-7:3, Figs. 2-3). Appellants acknowledge "Visser describes, in part, that 'process 100 uses a voice activity detector 106 [shown in Fig. 1] to activate, adjust, or control selected signal separation, post processing, or transmission functions,' and ' [ u ]pon detecting speech, the [voice activity detector] 106 generates a control signal 107 [that] ... may be used, for example, to activate the signal separation process only when speech is occurring."' App. Br. 4 (citing Visser i-f 40). However, Appellants argue Visser does not "monitor[] an audio signal energy level ... while a voice activity detector [is] deactivated." Id. According to Appellants, "Visser's 'voice activity detector' cannot be deactivated if the 'voice activity detector' is 'generat[ing] a control signal" and"[ e ]ven assuming, arguendo, that the 'voice activity detector' is deactivated while 'generat[ing] a control signal,' 'generat[ing] a control signal' is not the same as 'monitoring an audio signal energy level' as recited by claim 1. "' App. Br. 4--5. Appellants also argue Lu fails to remedy the deficiency of Visser because: (1) "'suppressing the action of the noise cancellation circuit' is not the same as 'voice activity detector ... [being] deactivated"' and (2) Lu's "making a 'V AD decision' suggests that the voice activity detector is already active, not activated 'based on determining that the audio signal energy level has changed"' as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 5---6. 5 Appeal2017-004165 Application 13/955186 We do not find Appellants' arguments persuasive and commensurate with the scope of claims 1, 23, and 33. Instead, we find the Examiner has provided a complete response to Appellant's arguments supported by evidence. Ans. 12. As such, we adopt the Examiner's findings and explanations provided therein. Id. Separately, we note Appellants' claims 1, 23, and 33 are very broad and simply require activation of a voice activity detector and at least one of the one or more signal processing components, when a monitored audio signal energy level has changed. As such, Appellants' claims 1, 23, and 33 do not distinguish over Visser or Lu alone. For example, as acknowledged by Appellants, claim 1 recites, inter alia: "monitoring an audio signal energy level ... while a voice activity detector ... [is] deactivated." As recognized by the Examiner, "when a device/phone is turned on at a very first time, a V AD [voice activity detector] was not activated." Ans. 12. However, microphones 102-104, shown in Visser's Figure 1, are still responsive to monitor speech (i.e., audio signal), while voice activity detector (VAD) 106 is not activated. According to Visser, voice activity detector (VAD) 106 is not activated until two input signals 105 indicate speech (i.e., audio signal of a sufficient threshold). Upon detecting speech, V AD 106 then generates a control signal to activate one or more signal processing components, i.e., signal separation process 180, learning process 188, volume adjustment 189, noise estimation 190, noise reduction 192, AGC 194, and post processing 195, shown in Figure 2, in order to save power. Visser i-fi-140, 51-52, 55-57. A disclosure such as Visser that anticipates under 35 U.S.C. § 102 also renders the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in all but rare cases. See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402 (CCPA 1974); cf Cohesive 6 Appeal2017-004165 Application 13/955186 Tech v. Water Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are separate conditions of patentability"). Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner's obviousness rejection and sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claims 1, 23, and 3 3 and its dependent claims 3-5, 7-22, 25, 27, and 29-32, which Appellants do not argue separately. App. Br. 10. Claims 2 and 24 Claim 2 depends from claim 1, and further recites, "wherein activating the voice activity detector and the at least one of the one or more signal processing components comprises: based on determining that the audio signal energy level has changed running the voice activity detector on the audio signal." Claim 24 depends from claim 23, and recites similar limitations. Appellants argue the Examiner's combination of Visser and Lu does not teach or suggest "based on determining that the audio signal energy level has changed running the voice activity detector on the audio signal." App. Br. 6-7 (citing Visser i-fi-141, 43, Fig. 2; Lu's Fig. 2). We disagree. The phrase "running the voice activity detector" is nothing more than a subset of "activating the voice activity detector." As recognized by the Examiner, Lu's voice activity detector (VAD) runs when user's voice (speech) is picked up via microphones 102a-102b, shown in Figure 2. Ans. 13 (citing Lu 3:48-56). Like Lu, Visser also teaches "running the voice activity detector on the audio signal [when the audio 7 Appeal2017-004165 Application 13/955186 signal energy level has changed]" as recited in claims 2 and 24. See Visser iii! 22, 40. For these reasons, we also sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claims 2 and 24. Claims 6 and 2 8 Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and intervening claim 3, and further recites: "determining, by the noise estimator, that noise suppression is not required for the audio signal; and performing voice recognition on the audio signal without activating a noise suppressor." Claim 28 recites similar limitations. Appellants argue the Examiner's combination of Visser, Lu, and Hennecke does not teach or suggest: (1) "determining, by the noise estimator, that noise suppression is not required for the audio signal;" and (2) "performing voice recognition on the audio signal without activating a noise suppressor." App. Br. 7-9 (citing Visserifif 41, 43, Fig. 2; Lu's Fig. 2). Again, we disagree and adopt the Examiner's findings and explanations provided on page 13 of the Examiner's Answer. Accordingly, we also sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claims 6 and 28. CONCLUSION On the record before us, we conclude Appellants have not demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-10 and 23-34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 8 Appeal2017-004165 Application 13/955186 DECISION As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-10 and 23-34. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv) (2011 ). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation